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Paley

PALEY'S
NATURAL THEOLOGY;

WITH

ILLUSTRATIVE NOTES,

BY

ENRY, LORD BROUGHAM, F.R.S., AND SIR C. BELL, K.G.H., &c.

AND AN INTRODUCTORY

DISCOURSE OF NATURAL THEOLOGY,

BY LORD BROUGHAM:

TO WHICH ARE ADDED,

SUPPLEMENTARY DISSERTATIONS,
AND A TREATISE ON ANIMAL MECHANICS,
BY SIR CHARLES BELL.

WITH NUMEROUS WOODCUTS.

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CONTENTS

OF

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PAGE

Dedication 7

Introduction—Arrangement of Subjects and Explanation of Terms 11

Analysis of the Work 15

PART I.

NATURE OF THE SCIENCE AND OF ITS EVIDENCES.

Section I.—Introductory View of the Method of Investigation pursued in the Physical and Psychological Sciences 19

Section II.—Comparison of the Physical Branch of Natural Theology with Physics 28

Section III.—Comparison of the Psychological Branch of Natural Theology with Psychology . 45

Section IV.—Of the Argument *à priori* . . . 66

Section V.—Moral or Ethical Branch of Natural Theology 78

Section VI.—Lord Bacon's Doctrine of Final Causes 106

Section VII.—Of Scientific Arrangement, and the *Methods of Analysis* and Synthesis . . 116

PART II.

OF THE ADVANTAGES OF THE STUDY OF NATURAL THEOL

SECTION I.—Of the Pleasures of Science . .
SECTION II.—Of the Pleasure and Improvement peculiar to Natural Theology . . .
SECTION III.—Of the Connexion between Natural and Revealed Religion . . . . .

NOTES.

NOTE I.—Of the Classification of the Sciences . .
II.—Of the Psychological Argument from Final Causes . . . . . .
III.—Of the Doctrine of Cause and Effect .
IV.—Of the 'Système de la Nature,' and the Hypothesis of Materialism . . .
V.—Of Mr. Hume's Sceptical Writings, and the Argument respecting Providence . .
VI.—Of the Ancient Doctrines respecting Mind
VII.—Of the Ancient Doctrines respecting the Deity and Matter . . . .
VIII.—Of the Ancient Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul . . . . .
IX.—Of Bishop Warburton's Theory concerning the Ancient Doctrine of a Future State
X.—Of Lord Bacon's Character . . .

Translation of Passages in the Text . . .
Translation of Passages in the Notes . . .

A

DISCOURSE

OF

NATURAL THEOLOGY,

SHOWING

THE NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE AND THE
ADVANTAGES OF THE STUDY.

BY

HENRY, LORD BROUGHAM, F.R.S.,

AND MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FRANCE

A DISCOURSE

OF

NATURAL THEOLOGY.

TO

JOHN CHARLES VISCOUNT ALTHORPE.*

THE composition of this discourse was undertaken in consequence of an observation which I had often made, that scientific men are apt to regard the study of Natural Religion as little connected with philosophical pursuits. Many of the persons to whom I allude were men of religious habits of thinking; others were free from any disposition towards scepticism, rather because they had not much discussed the subject, than because they had formed fixed opinions upon it after inquiry: but the bulk of them relied little upon Natural Theology, which they seemed to regard as a speculation built rather on fancy than on argument; or, at any rate, as a kind of knowledge quite different from either physical or moral science. It therefore appeared to me desirable to define, more precisely *than had yet been* done, the place and the claims of

---

* Now Earl Spencer.

Natural Theology among the various branches of human knowledge.

About the same time our Society,* as you may recollect, was strongly urged to publish an edition of Dr. Paley's popular work, with copious and scientific illustrations. We both favoured this plan; but some of our colleagues justly apprehended that the adoption of it might open the door to the introduction of religious controversy among us, against our fundamental principles; and the scheme was abandoned. I regarded it, however, as expedient to carry this plan into execution by individual exertion; and our worthy and accomplished colleague, Sir C. Bell—whose admirable treatise on Animal Mechanics pointed him out as the fellow-labourer I should most desire—fortunately agreed to share the work of the illustrations. In these we have made a very considerable progress; and I now inscribe this publication, but particularly the Preliminary Discourse, to you. It was, with the exception of the Third Section of Part I., and the greater portion of the Notes, written at the end of 1830, in 1831, and the latter part of 1833, and a portion was added in the autumn of 1834. In those days I held the Great Seal of this kingdom; and it was impossible to finish the work while many cares of another kind pressed upon me. But the first leisure that could be obtained was devoted to this object, and to a careful revision of what had een written in a season less auspicious for such culations.

inscribe the fruits of those studies to you, not y as a token of ancient friendship—for that you do not require; nor because I always have found you, whether in possession or in resistance of power, a fellow-labourer to maintain our common principles, alike firm, faithful, disinterested—for your known public character wants no testimony from me; nor yet because a work on such a subject needs the patronage of a great name—for it would be affectation in me to pretend any such motive; but because you have devoted much of your time to such inquiries—are beyond most men sensible of their importance—concur generally in the opinions which I profess to maintain—and had even formed the design of giving to the world your thoughts upon the subject, as I hope and trust you now will be moved to do all the more for the present address. In this view, your authority will prove of great value to the cause of truth, however superfluous the patronage of even your name might be to recommend the most important of all studies.

---

* For the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge.

Had our lamented friend Romilly lived, you are aware that not even these considerations would have made me address any one but him, with whom I had oftentimes speculated upon this ground. Both of us have been visited with the most severe afflictions, of a far nearer and more lasting kind than even his removal, and we are now left with few things to care for; yet, ever since the time I followed him to the grave, I question if either of us has read, without meditating upon the irreparable loss we and all men then sustained, the words of the ancient philosopher best imbued with religious opinions—"Proficiscar enim non ad eos solum viros de quibus ante dixi, sed etiam ad Catonem meum, quo nemo vir melior natus est, nemo pietate præstantior; cujus a me corpus crematum est,

animus vero non me deserens sed respectans, in ea profecto loca discessit quo mihi ipsi cernebat esse veniendum; quem ego meum casum fortiter ferre visus sum, non quod æquo animo ferrem; sed me ipse consolabar, existimans, non longinquum inter nos digressum et discessum fore."*

* De Senect.

INTRODUCTION.

ARRANGEMENT OF SUBJECTS AND EXPLANATION OF TERMS.

The words *Theology* and *Religion* are often used as synonymous. Thus *Natural Theology* and *Natural Religion* are by many confounded together. But the more accurate use of the words is that which makes *Theology* the science, and *Religion* its subject; and in this manner are they distinguished when we speak of a "professor of theology," and a "sense of religion."

There is, however, as regards *Natural Theology*, a more limited use of the word, which confines it to the knowledge and attributes of the Deity, and regards the speculation concerning his will, and our hopes from and duties towards him, as another branch of the science, termed *Natural Religion*, in contradistinction to the former. Dr. Paley hardly touches on this latter branch in his book, there being only about one-sixtieth part devoted to it, and that incidentally in treating of the attributes. Indeed, though in the dedication he uses the word *Religion* as synonymous with *Theology*, the title and the arrangement of his discourse show that he *generally employed* the term Natural Theology in *its restricted* sense. Bishop Butler, on the other *hand, seems to* have used *Natural* Religion in sense equally restricted, but certainly little warranted by custom; for that portion of his work which treats of Natural Religion is confined to a future state and the moral government of God, as if he either held Natural Religion and Natural Theology to be two branches of one subject, or Natural Religion to be a branch of Natural Theology. The older writers, Clarke, Bentley, Derham, seem to have sometimes used the words indifferently, but never to have regarded Natural Religion in the restricted acceptation. The ancients generally used *Religion* in a qualified sense, either as connected with an obligation, or as synonymous with superstition.

This Discourse is not a treatise of Natural Theology: it has not for its design an exposition of the doctrines whereof Natural Theology consists. But its object is, first, to explain the nature of the evidence upon which it rests—to show that it is a science, the truths of which are discovered by induction, like the truths of Natural and Moral Philosophy—that it is a branch of science partaking of the nature of each of those great divisions of human knowledge, and not merely closely allied to them both. Secondly, the object of the Discourse is to explain the advantages attending this study. The work, therefore, is a *logical* one.

We have commented upon the use of the terms *Theology* and *Religion*. As it is highly desirable to keep scientific language precise, and always to use the same terms in the same sense, we shall now further observe upon the word "*moral*" in relation to science or faculties. It is sometimes used to denote the whole of our mental faculties, and in opposition to natural and physical, as when w speak of "*moral science*," "*moral truths*," "*moral philosophy*." But it is also used in contradistinction to "*intellectual*" or "*mental*," and in connexion with or in reference to obligation; and then it relates to rights and duties, and is synonymous with *ethical*. It seems advisable to use it always in this sense, and to employ the words *spiritual* and *mental* in opposition to *natural* and *material;* and *psychological*, as applied to the science of mind, in opposition to *physical*. Again, a distinction is sometimes made between the *intellectual* and *moral* powers or faculties—the former being those of the understanding, the latter those of the will, or, as they are often called, the "*active powers*,"—that is, the passions and feelings. It seems better to use the word *active* for this purpose as opposed to *intellectual*. Thus we shall first have these general terms, *spiritual* or *mental*, as applied to the immaterial part of the creation, and *psychological*, as applied to the science which treats of it. We shall next have a subdivision of the mental faculties into *intellectual* and *active;* both form the subjects of *psychological* science. *Moral* science, in its restricted sense, and properly so called, will then denote that branch which treats of duties, and of what is implied in those duties, their correlative rights: it will, in short, be *ethical* science.

Thus the science of mind—say *Metaphysical* science—may be said to consist of two great branches, the one of which treats of existences, the other of duties. The one accordingly has been termed with *great accuracy*, *Ontology*, speaking of *hat which is;* the other, *Deontology*, speaking *that which ought to be*. The former, however, comprehends properly all physical as wel tal science. The division which appears whole most convenient is this: That *met* science, as contradistinguished from *pl* either *psychological*, which treats of th both intellectual and active, but treats ences only; or *moral*, which treats of duties, and is distinguishable from psyc though plainly connected with it nearly laries are with the propositions from wh flow. Then physical truths, in one resp under the same head with the first brancl physical truths. Physical as well as psy science treats of existences, while mor alone treats of duties.

According to a like arrangement, Nat ology consists of two great branches, o bling *Ontology*, the other analogous to *D* The former comprehends the discovery istence and attributes of a Creator, b gating the evidences of design in the wo creation, material as well as spiritual. relates to the discovery of his will and intentions with regard to his creatures, duct and their duty. The former rese physical and psychological sciences, an the evidences of design, wisdom, and go hibited both in the natural and spiritual

The latter resembles rather the depa moral science, as distinguished from botl and psychological. We may thus co science of Natural Theology as consisti inductive science, of three compartments Mental, and Moral; or, taking the Gr Physical, Psychological, and Ethical.

This classification is convenient, and its grounds are very fit to be premised—at the same time that we must admit the question to be one only of classification and technology. Having so stated the divisions of the subject, and the meaning of the terms used in relation to those divisions, I shall assume this arrangement and adhere to this phraseology, as convenient, though far from representing it to be the best. In such discussions it is far more important to employ one uniform and previously explained language or arrangement, than to be very curious in adopting the best. No classification indeed can, from the nature of things, be rigorously exact. All the branches of science, even of natural philosophy, much more of metaphysical, run into each other, and are separated by gradations rather than by lines of demarcation. Nor could any scientific language we possess help breaking down under us in an attempt to maintain a perfectly logical arrangement.*

ANALYSIS OF THE WORK.

THE order of this Discourse is thus set out:

The FIRST PART treats of the nature of the subject, and the kind of evidence upon which Natural Theology rests.

The SECOND PART treats of the advantages derived from the study of the science.

The former Part is divided into seven sections. The *first is introductory*, and treats of the *kind of evidence by which* the truths of Physical and

---

* Note I.

Psychological science are investigated, and shows there is as great an appearance of diversity between the manner in which we arrive at the knowledge of different truths in those inductive sciences, as there is between the nature of any such inductive investigation and the proofs of the ontological branches of Natural Theology. But that diversity is proved to be only apparent; and hence it is inferred, that the supposed difference in the proofs of Natural Theology may also be only apparent.

The *second* section continues the application of this argument to the Physical branch of Natural Theology, and shows further proofs that the first branch of Natural Theology is as much an inductive science as Physics or Natural Philosophy. The first section compared the ontological branches of Natural Theology with all inductive science, physical as well as psychological. The second compares the physical branch of Natural Theology with physical science only.

The *third* section compares the psychological branch of Natural Theology with psychological science, and shows that both rest alike upon induction.

The *fourth* section shows that the *argumentum à priori* is unsound to a great degree—that it is insufficient for the purpose to which it is applied—that it serves only to a limited extent—and that to this extent it is in reality not distinguishable from induction, or the *argumentum à posteriori*.

The fifth section treats of the second or M
he deontological branch of Natural Theology,

shows that it rests upon the same kind of evidence with moral science, and is, strictly speaking, as much a branch of inductive knowledge.

The *sixth* section examines the doctrines of Lord Bacon respecting Final Causes, and shows that he was not adverse to the speculation when kept within due bounds.

The *seventh* section examines the true nature of inductive analysis and synthesis, and points out some important errors prevailing on this subject.

In treating of the proofs of design displayed by the mental constitution of living creatures, and in treating of the Soul's immortality, it becomes necessary to enter more at large into the subject, and therefore the *third* and the *fifth* sections are not, like the others, mere logical discourses in which the doctrines of Natural Theology are assumed rather than explained. The subjects of those two sections have not been sufficiently handled in professed treatises upon Natural Theology, which have been almost wholly confined to the first branch of the science—the proofs of the Deity's existence and attributes—and to the physical portion of that branch. This defect I have endeavoured to supply.

The Second Part, which treats of the advantages of the study, consists of three sections.

The *first* shows that the precise kind of pleasure *derived from the* investigation of scientific *truths is derived from* this study.

The *second* treats of the pleasures which are peculiar to this study.

The *third* treats of the connexion of Natural with Revealed Religion.*

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* I have heard it said that some ideas in one part of this Discourse had been anticipated by a work of Dr. Crombie. That such coincidence is purely accidental must appear from this, that having mislaid his book when it reached me, I have never read one line of it to this hour.—*Sept.* 1845.

PART THE FIRST.

NATURE OF THE SCIENCE, AND OF ITS EVIDENCES.

SECTION I.

INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION PURSUED IN THE PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCES.

THE faculties as well as the feelings of the human mind, its intellectual as well as its active powers, are employed without any intermission, although with varying degrees of exertion, in one of two ways—either in regard to some object immediately connected with the supply of our wants, or in regard to subjects of mere contemplation. The first class of exertions relates to all the objects of necessity, of comfort, or of physical enjoyment: in the pursuit of these, the powers of the understanding, or the passions, or both together, are, with nearly the whole of mankind, employed during the greater portion of their existence, and, with the bulk of mankind, during almost the whole of their existence. The other class of mental exertions, which engrosses but a very few men for the greater part of their lives, and occupies the majority *only* occasionally and at considerable intervals, comprehends within its scope all the subjects of meditation and reflection—of merely speculative reasoning and discussion: it is composed of all the efforts which our understanding can make, and all the desires which we can feel, upon subjects of mere science or taste, matters which begin and end in intellectual or moral gratification.

It is unquestionably true that these two grand branches of exertion have an intimate connexion with each other. The pursuits of science lend constant assistance to those of active life; and the practical exercise of the mental powers constantly furthers the progress of science merely speculative. But the two provinces are nevertheless perfectly distinguishable, and ought not to be confounded. The corollary from a scientific discovery may be the improvement of a very ordinary machine or a common working tool; yet the establishment of the speculative truth may have been the primary object of the philosopher who discovered it; and to learn that truth is the immediate purpose of him who studies the philosopher's system. So the better regulation of the affections or the more entire control of the passions may be the result of an acquaintance with our mental constitution; but the object of him who studies the laws of mind is merely to become acquainted with the spiritual part of our nature. In like manner, it is very possible that the knowledge of a scientific truth may force itself upon one whose faculties or feelings are primarily engaged in some active exertion. Some physical law, or some psychological truth, may be discovered by one only intent upon supplying a physical want, or obtaining a mental enjoyment. But here, as in the former case, the scientific or speculative object is only incidental or collateral to the main pursuit: the matter of contemplation is the corollary, the matter of action the proposition.

The merely contemplative pursuits which thus form one of the great branches of mental exertion seem again to be divisible into two classes, by a line that, to a careless observer, appears sufficiently defined. The objects of our inquiry and meditation appear to be either those things in the physical and spiritual worlds with which we are conversant through our senses or by means of our internal consciousness, or those things with which we are made acquainted only by reasoning—by the evidence of things unseen and unfelt. We either discuss the properties and relations of actually perceived and conceived beings, physical and mental—that is, the objects of sense and of consciousness—or we carry our inquiries beyond those things which we see and feel; we investigate the origin of them and of ourselves; we rise from the contemplation of nature and of the spirit within us, to the first cause of all, both of body and of mind. To the one class of speculation belong the inquiries how matter and mind are framed, and how they act; to the other class belong the inquiries whence they proceed, and whither they tend. In a word, the structure and relations of the universe form the subject of the one branch of philosophy, and may be termed *Human Science;* the origin and destiny of the universe forms the subject of its other branch, and is termed *Divine Science*, or *Theology*.

It is not to be denied that this classifi be convenient; indeed, it rests upon

lation; for the speculations which comp
two branches have certain common diff
s and common resemblances. Yet it is equa
ain, that nothing but an imperfect knowled
he subject, or a superficial attention to it,
mit us to think that there is any well-defin
undary which separates the two kinds of phi
phy; that the methods of investigation are
rent in each; and that the kind of evidence var
y which the truths of the one and of the ot
lass are demonstrated. The error is far m
extensive in its consequences than a mere in
curacy of classification; for it materially imp
the force of the proofs upon which Natu
Theology rests. The proposition which I wo
place in its stead is, That this science is strictl
branch of inductive philosophy, formed and s
ported by the same kind of reasoning upon wh
the Physical and Psychological sciences are foun
This important point will be established by a f
explanation; and we shall best set about this
by showing, in the first place, that the sam
parent diversity of evidence exists in the dif
subjects or departments of the branch whi
have termed Human science. It seems tc
there on a superficial examination: if a
scrutiny puts that appearance to flight,
ference is legitimate, that there may be n
ground for admitting an essential differe
tween the foundations of Human Scie
Divine.

The careless inquirer into physical tru
certainly think he had seized on a so
ciple of classification, if he should divi
jects with which philosophy, Natural

s conversant, into two classes—those objects of which we know the existence by our senses or our consciousness; that is, external objects which we see, touch, taste, and smell, internal ideas which we conceive or remember, or emotions which we feel—and those objects of which we only know the existence by a process of reasoning, founded upon something originally presented by the senses or by consciousness. This superficial reasoner would range under the first of these heads the members of the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms; the heavenly bodies; the mind—for we are supposing him to be so far capable of reflection as to know that the proof of the mind's separate existence is, at the least, as short, plain, and direct, as that of the body, or of external objects. Under the second head he would range generally whatever objects of examination are not directly perceived by the senses, or felt by consciousness.

But a moment's reflection will show both how very short a way this classification would carry our inaccurate logician, and how entirely his principle fails to support him even during that little part of the journey. Thus the examination of certain visible objects and appearances enables us to ascertain the laws of light and of vision. Our senses teach us that colours differ, and that their mixture forms other hues; that their absence is black, their combination in certain proportions white. We are in the same way enabled to understand that the organ of vision performs its functions by a natural apparatus resembling, though far *surpassing, certain* instruments of our own *constructing, and that* therefore it works on the *ame principles.* But that light, which can be perceived directly by none of our senses, exists as a separate body, we only infer by a process of reasoning from things which our senses do perceive. So we are acquainted with the effects of heat; we know that it extends the dimensions of whatever matter it penetrates; we feel its effects upon our own nerves when subjected to its operation; and we see its effects in augmenting, liquefying, and decomposing other bodies; but its existence as a separate substance we do not know, except by reasoning and by analogy. Again, to which of the two classes must we refer the air? Its existence is not made known by the sight, the smell, the taste; but is it by the touch? Assuredly a stream of it blown upon the nerves of touch produces a certain effect; but to infer from thence the existence of a rare, light, invisible, and impalpable fluid, is clearly an operation of reasoning, as much as that which enables us to infer the existence of light or heat from their perceptible effects. But furthermore, we are accustomed to speak of seeing motion; and the reasoner whom we are supposing would certainly class the phenomena of mechanics, and possibly of dynamics generally, including astronomy, under his first head, of things known immediately by the senses. Yet assuredly nothing can be more certain than that the knowledge of motion is a deduction of reasoning, not a perception of sense; it is derived from the comparison of two positions: the idea of a change of place is the result of that comparison attained by a short process of reasoning; and the estimate of velocity is the result of another process of reasoning and of recollection. Thus, then, there is at once excluded from the first class almost the whole range of natural philosophy. But are we quite sure that anything remains which when severely examined will stand the test? Let us attend a little more closely to the things which we have passed over hastily, as if admitting that they belonged to the first class.

It is said that we do not see light, and we certainly can know its existence directly by no other sense but that of sight, but that we see objects variously illuminated, and therefore that the existence of light is an inference of reason, and the diversity of colour an object of sense. But the very idea of diversity implies reasoning, for it is the result of a comparison; and when we affirm that white light is composed of the seven primary colours in certain proportions, we state a proposition which is the result of much reasoning—reasoning, it is true, founded upon sensations or impressions upon the senses; but not less founded upon such sensations is the reasoning which makes us believe in the existence of a body called light. The same may be said of heat and the phenomena of heated bodies. The existence of heat is an inference from certain phenomena, that is, certain effects produced on our external senses by certain bodies, or certain changes which those senses undergo in the neighbourhood of those bodies; but it is not more an inference of reason than the proposition that heat extends or liquefies bodies, for that is merely a conclusion drawn from comparing our sensations occasioned by the external objects placed in varying circumstances.

But can we say that there is no process of reasoning even in the simplest case which we have supposed our reasoner to put—the existence of the

three kingdoms, of nature, of the heavenly bo
of the mind? It is certain that there is in e
one of these cases a process of reasoning. A
tain sensation is excited in the mind through
sense of vision; it is an inference of reason
this must have been excited by something, or r
have had a cause. That the cause must have l
external may possibly be allowed to be ano
inference which reason could make unaided by
evidence of any other sense. But to discover
the cause was at any the least distance from
organ of vision clearly required a new proces
reasoning, considerable experience, and the ind
tions of other senses; for the young man wl
Mr. Cheselden couched for a cataract at first
lieved that everything he saw touched his
Experience and reasoning, therefore, are requ
to teach us the existence of external objects;
all that relates to their relations of size, col
motion, habits, in a word, the whole philosoph
them, must of course be the result of still lo
and more complicated processes of reasoning.
of the existence of the mind: although undoubt
the process of reasoning is here the shortest o
and the least liable to deception, yet so conne
are all its phenomena with those of the body,
it requires a process of abstraction alien from
ordinary habits of most men, to be persuaded
we have a more undeniable evidence of its sepa
existence than we even have of the separate e
ence of the body.

It thus clearly appears that we have been j
fied in calling the classifier whose case we l
been supposing, a careless inquirer, a super
reasoner, an imperfect logician; that there

ıdation for the distinction which we have him to take between the different objects .fic investigation; that the evidence upon ır assent to both classes of truths reposes same kind, namely, the inferences drawn ning from sensations or ideas originally l by the external senses, or by our inward sness.

n, the distinction which at first appeared found to be without any warrant in the kinds of human science, has it any better when we apply it to draw the line between nch of philosophy itself, and the other ıs been termed Divine, or theology? In rds, is there any real, any specific differ- ween the method of investigation, the the evidence, in the two departments of on? Although this preliminary discourse, əd the work itself which it introduces, and lustrations of it, are calculated throughout h the answer to the question, we shall yet particulars in this place, in order to show isely the same fallacy which we have been , in regard to the classification of objects ary scientific research, gives rise to the neral classification or separation of all into two distinct branches, human and nd how erroneous it is to suppose that these ches rest upon different foundations.

SECTION II.

COMPARISON OF THE PHYSICAL BRANCH OF NATURAL THEOLOGY WITH PHYSICS.

THE two inquiries—that into the nature and constitution of the universe, and that into the evidence of design which it displays—in a word, physics and psychology, philosophy whether natural and mental, and the fundamental branch of Natural Theology,—are not only closely allied one to the other, but are to a very considerable extent identical. The two paths of investigation for a great part of the way completely coincide. The same induction of facts which leads us to a knowledge of the structure of the eye, and its functions in the animal economy, leads us to the knowledge of its adaptation to the properties of light. It is a truth of physics, in the strictest sense of the word, that vision is performed by the eye refracting light, and making it converge to a focus upon the retina; and that the peculiar combination of its lenses, and the different materials they are composed of, correct the indistinctness which would otherwise arise from the different refrangibility of light; in other words, make the eye an achromatic instrument. But if this is not also a truth in Natural Theology, it is a position from which, by the shortest possible process of reasoning, we arrive at a theological truth—namely, that the instrument so successfully performing a given service by means of this curious structure, must have been formed with a knowledge of the properties of light. The position from which so easy a step brings us to this doctrine of Natural Theology was gained by strict induction. Upon the same evidence which all natural science rests on, reposes the knowledge that the eye is an optical instrument: this is a truth common to both Physics and Theology. Before the days of Sir Isaac Newton men knew that they saw by means of the eye, and that the eye was constructed upon optical principles; but the reason of its peculiar conformation they knew not, because they were ignorant of the different refrangibility of light. When his discoveries taught this truth, it was found to have been acted upon, and consequently known, by the Being who created the eye. Still our knowledge was imperfect; and it was reserved for Mr. Dollond to discover another law of nature—the different dispersive powers of different substances—which enabled him to compound an object-glass that more effectually corrected the various refrangibility of the rays. It was now observed that this truth also must have been known to the maker of the eye; for upon its basis is that instrument, far more perfect than the achromatic glass of Dollond, framed. These things are truths in both physics and theology; they are truths taught us by the self-same process of investigation, and resting upon the self-same kind of evidence.

When we extend our inquiries, and observe the varieties of this perfect instrument, we mark the adaptation of changes to the diversity of circumstances, as in different animals; and the truths thus learnt are in like manner common to Physical and Theological science; that is, to Natural History, or Comparative Anatomy, and Natural Theology.

That beautiful instrument, so artistly contrived that the most ingenious workman could not imagine an improvement of it, becomes still more interesting and more wonderful, when we find that its conformation is varied with the different necessities of each animal. If the animal prowls by night, we see the opening of the pupil, and the power of concentration in the eye increased. If an amphibious animal has occasionally to dive into the water, with the change of the medium through which the rays pass there is an accommodation in the condition of the humours, and the eye partakes of the eye both of the quadruped and of the fish.

So, having contemplated the apparatus for protection in the human eye, we find that in the lower animals, who want both the accessory means of cleaning the eye and the ingenuity to accomplish it by other modes than the eyelids, an additional eyelid, a new apparatus, is provided for this purpose.

Again, in fishes, whose eye is washed by the element in which they move, all the exterior apparatus is unnecessary, and is dismissed; but in the crab, and especially in that species which lies in mud, the very peculiar and horny prominent eye, which every body must have observed, would be quite obscured were it not for a particular provision. There is a little brush of hair above the eye, against which the eye is occasionally raised to wipe off what may adhere to it. The form of the eye, the particular mode in which it is moved, and, we may say, the coarseness of the instrument compared with the parts of the same organ in the higher class of animals, make the mechanism of eyelids and of lachrymal glands unsuitable. The mechanism used *for this purpose* is discovered by observation and reasoning: that it is contrived for this purpose is equally a discovery of observation and reasoning. Both propositions are strictly propositions of physical science.

The same remarks apply to every part of the animal body. The use to which each member is subservient, and the manner in which it is enabled so to perform its functions as to serve that appointed use, is learnt by an induction of the strictest kind. But it is impossible to deny, that what induction thus teaches forms the great bulk of all Natural Theology. The question which the theologian always puts upon each discovery of a purpose manifestly accomplished is this: "Suppose I had this operation to perform by mechanical means, and were acquainted with the laws regulating the action of matter, should I attempt it in any other way than I here see practised?" If the answer is in the negative, the consequence is irresistible, that some power, capable of acting with design, and possessing the supposed knowledge, employed the means which we see used. But this negative answer is the result of reasoning founded upon induction, and rests upon the same evidence whereon the doctrines of all physical science are discovered and believed. And the inference to which that negative answer so inevitably leads is a truth in Natural Theology; for it is only another way of asserting that design and knowledge are evinced in the works and functions of nature.

It may further illustrate the argument to take one or two other examples. When a bird's egg is examined, *it is found to consist* of three parts; the *chick, the yolk in which* the chick is placed, and *he white in which* the yolk swims. The yolk is lighter than the white; and is attached to it at two points by the treadles. If a line were drawn through these two points it would pass below the centre of gravity of the yolk. From this arrangement it must follow that the chick is always uppermost, roll the egg how you will; consequently, the chick is always kept nearest to the breast or belly of the mother while she is sitting. Suppose, then, that any one acquainted with the laws of motion had to contrive things so as to secure this position for the little speck or sac in question, in order to its receiving the necessary heat from the hen—could he proceed otherwise than by placing it in the lighter liquid, and suspending that liquid in the heavier, so that its centre of gravity should be above the line or plane of suspension? Assuredly not; for in no other way could his purpose be accomplished. This position is attained by a strict induction; it is supported by the same kind of evidence on which all physical truths rest. But it leads by a single step to another truth in Natural Theology; that the egg must have been formed by some hand skilful in mechanism, and acting with the knowledge of dynamics.

The forms of the bones and joints, and the tendons or cords which play over them, afford a variety of instances of the most perfect mechanical adjustment. Sometimes the power is sacrificed for rapidity of motion, and sometimes rapidity is sacrificed for power. Our knee-pan, or patella, throws off the tendon which is attached to it from the centre of motion, and therefore adds to the power of the muscles of the thigh, which enable us to rise or to leap. We have a mechanism of precisely the same kind in the lesser joints, where the bones, answer-ng the purposes of the patella, are formed iminutive size.* In the toes of the ostrich naterial is different, but the mechanism is the sa An elastic cushion is placed between the tenc and the joint, which, whilst it throws off the tend from the centre of motion, and therefore adds the power of the flexor muscle, gives elasticity the bottom of the foot. And we recognise tl intention of this when we remember that this bir does not fly, but runs with great swiftness, and tha the whole weight rests upon the foot, which ha but little relative breadth; these elastic cushions serving in some degree the same office as the elastic frog of the horse's hoof, or the cushion in the bottom of the camel's foot.

The web-foot of a water-fowl is an inimitable paddle; and all the ingenuity of the present day exerted to improve our steam-boats makes nothing o approach it. The flexor tendon of the toes of ie duck is so directed over the heads of the bones 'the thigh and leg, that it is made tight when e creature bends its leg, and is relaxed when the is stretched out. When the bird draws its foot the toes are drawn together, in consequence of bent position of the bones of the leg pressing he tendon. When, on the contrary, it pushes leg out straight, in making the stroke, the ons are relieved from the pressure of the heel- , and the toes are permitted to be fully ex- d and at the same time expanded, so that the etween them meets the resistance of a large e of water.

nother class of birds, those which roost upon *ıch of a tree*, the same mechanism answers *ourpose.* The great length of the toes o

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'alled *Sesamoid*, from *Sesamum*, a kind of grai these birds enables them to grasp the branch; yet were they supported by voluntary effort alone, and were there no other provision made, their grasp would relax in sleep, and they must fall. But, on the contrary, we know that they roost on one foot, and maintain a firm attitude. Borelli has taken pains to explain how this is. The muscle which bends the toes lies on the fore part of the thigh, and runs over the joint which corresponds with our knee-joint; from the fore part its tendon passes to the back part of the leg, and over the joint equivalent to our heel-bone; it then splits, and extends in the bottom of the foot to the toes. The consequence of this singular course of the tendon is, that when the mere weight of the bird causes these two joints to bend under it, the tendon is stretched, or would be stretched, were it not that its divided extremities, inserted into the last bones of the toes, draw those toes, so that they contract, and grasp the branch on which the bird roosts, without any effort whatever on its part.

These are facts learnt by induction; the inductive science of dynamics shows us that such mechanism is calculated to answer the end which, in point of fact, is attained. To conclude from thence that the mechanist contrived the means with the intention of producing this end, and with the knowledge of the science, is also strictly an inference of induction.

Consider now, in land animals, the structure of the larynx, the upper part of which is so contrived as to keep the windpipe closely shut by the valve thrown over its orifice, while the food is passing into the stomach, as it were, over a drawbridge, and, but for that valve, would fall into the lungs. No one can hesitate in ascribing this curious mechanism to the intention that the same opening of the throat and mouth should serve for conveyin food to the stomach and air to the lungs, without any interference of the two operations. But that structure would not be sufficient for animals which live in the water, and must, therefore, while they breathe at the surface, carry down their food to devour it below. In them, accordingly, as in the whale and the porpoise, we find the valve is not flat, but prominent and somewhat conical, rising towards the back of the nose, and the continuation of the nostril by means of a ring (or *sphyncter*) muscle embraces the top of the windpipe so as to complete the communication beween the lungs and the blow-hole, while it cuts off all communication between those lungs and the mouth.

Again, if we examine the structure of a porpoise's head, we find its cavities capable of great distention, and such that he can fill them at pleasure with air or with water, according as he would mount, float, or sink. By closing the blow-hole, he shuts out the water; by letting in the water he can sink; by blowing from the lungs against the cavities he can force out the water and fill the hollows with air, in order to rise. No one can doubt that such facts afford direct evidence of an apt contrivance directed towards a specific object, and adopted by some power thoroughly acquainted with the laws of hydrostatics, as well as perfectly skilful in workmanship.

To draw an example from a very different source, let us observe the structure of the planetary system. There is one particular arrangement which produces a certain effect—namely, the stability of the system,—*produces it in a* manner peculiarly adapted *for perpetual duration,* and produces it through *the agency of an influence* quite universal, *pervading all space,* and equally regulating the m tions of the smallest particles of matter and o most prodigious masses. This arrangement sists in making the planets move in orbits mor less elliptical, but none differing materially f circles, with the sun near the centre, revol almost in one plane of motion, and moving in same direction — those whose eccentricity is most considerable having the smallest masses, the larger ones deviating hardly at all from circular path. The influence of gravitation, wl is inseparably connected with all matter as fa we know, extends over the whole of this syst so that all those bodies which move round the —twenty-three planets including their satell and six or seven comets—are continually a upon each by two kinds of force,—the orig projection which sends them forward, and is acc panied with a similar and probably a coeval r tory motion in some of them round their axis, the attraction of each towards every other b which attraction produces three several effects— solidating the mass of each, and, in conjunction the rotatory motion, moulding their forms—ret ing each planet in its orbit round the sun, and satellite in its orbit round the planet—altering or turbing what would be the motion of each round sun if there were no other bodies in the syste attract and disturb. Now it is demonstrated by strictest process of mathematical reasoning, the result of the whole of these mutual acti proceeding from the universal influence of gra tion, must necessarily, in consequence of the culiar arrangement which has been describe the orbits and masses, and in consequence of law by which gravitation acts, produce a co alteration in the orbit of each body, which tion goes on for thousands of years, very slowly making that orbit bulge, as it were, until it reaches a certain shape, when the alteration begins to take the opposite direction, and for an equal number of years goes on constantly, as it were, flattening the orbit, till it reaches a certain shape, when it stops, and then the bulging again begins; and that this alternate change of bulging and flattening must go on for ever by the same law, without ever exceeding on either side a certain point. All changes in the system are thus periodical, and its perpetual stability is completely secured. It is manifest that such an arrangement, so conducive to such a purpose, and so certainly accomplishing that purpose, could only have been made with the express design of attaining such an end—that some power exists capable of thus producing such wonderful order, so marvellous and wholly admirable a harmony, out of such numberless disturbances—and that this power was actuated by the intention of producing this effect.* The reasoning upon this subject, I have observed, is purely mathematical; but the facts respecting the system on which all that reasoning rests are known to us by induction alone: consequently the grand truth respecting the secular disturbance, or the periodicity of the changes in the system—that discovery which makes the glory of Lagrange and Laplace, and constitutes the triumph of the Integral Calculus, whereof it is the fruit, and of the most patient course of astronomical observation whereon the analysis is grounded

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* Earum autem perennes cursus atque perpetui cum admirabili incredibili*que constantiâ*, declarant in his vim et *mentem esse divinam, ut hæc* ipsa qui non sentiat deorum *vim habere, is nihil omnino* sensurus esse videatur.—Cicero *De Nat. Deo. II. 21.*

—may most justly be classed as a truth both of Mixed Mathematics and of Natural Theology—the theologian only adds a single short link to chain of the physical astronomer's demonstrati in order to reach the great Artificer from the p nomena of his system.

But let us examine further this matter.] position which we reach by a strict process of duction, is common to Natural Philosophy ι Natural Theology—namely, that a given or performs a given function, or a given arrangem possesses a certain stability, by its adaptation mechanical laws. I have said that the process reasoning is short and easy, by which we arr at the doctrine more peculiar to Natural Theol —namely, that some power acquainted with ι acting upon the knowledge of those laws, fashio the organ with the intention of having the funct of vision performed, or constructed the system so t it might endure. Is not this last process as m one of strict induction as the other? It is plai only a generalization of many particular facts reasoning from things known to things unknow an inference of a new or unknown relation fr other relations formerly observed and known. to take Dr. Paley's example, we pass over a cc mon and strike the foot against a stone, we do stop to ask who placed it there; but if we f that our foot has struck on a watch, we at o conclude that some mechanic made it, and t some one dropt it on the ground. Why do draw this inference? Because all our former *perience had* told us that such machinery is *result of human skill* and labour, and that it *where grows wild* about, or is found in the e

When we see that a certain effect, namely, distinct vision, is performed by an achromatic instrument, the eye, why do we infer that some one must have made it? Because we nowhere and at no time have had any experience of any one thing fashioning itself, and indeed cannot form to ourselves any distinct idea of what such a process as self-creation means; and further, because when we ourselves would produce a similar result, we have recourse to like means. Again, when we perceive the adaptation of natural objects and operations to a perceived end, and from thence infer design in the maker of these objects and superintender of these operations, why do we draw this conclusion? Because we know by experience that if we ourselves desired to accomplish a similar purpose, we should do so by the like adaptation; we know by experience that this is design in us, and that our proceedings are the result of such design; we know that if some of our works were seen by others, who neither were aware of our having made them, nor of the intention with which we made them, they would be right should they, from seeing and examining them, both infer that we had made them, and conjecture why we had made them The same reasoning, by the help of experience, from what we know to what we cannot know, is manifestly the foundation of the inference, that the members of the body were fashioned for certain uses by a maker acquainted with their operations, and willing that those uses should be served.

Let us consider a branch of science which, if not wholly of modern introduction, has received of late years such vast additions that it may really be said to have its rise in our own times—I allude t the sublime speculations in Osteology prosecut by Cuvier, Buckland, and others, in its connexion with Zoological and Geological researches.

A comparative anatomist, of profound learning and marvellous sagacity, has presented to him what to common eyes would seem a piece of half-decayed bone, found in a wild, in a forest, or in a cave. By accurately examining its shape, particularly the form of its extremity or extremities (if both ends happen to be entire), by close inspection of the texture of its surface, and by admeasurement of its proportions, he can with certainty discover the general form of the animal to which it belonged, its size as well as its shape, the economy of its viscera, and its general habits. Sometimes the investigation in such cases proceeds upon chains of reasoning where all the links are seen and understood; where the connexion of the parts found with other parts and with habitudes is perceived, and the reason understood,—as that the animal had a trunk because the neck was short compared with its height; or that it ruminated because its teeth were imperfect for complete mastication. But, frequently, the inquiry is as certain in its results, although some links of the chain are concealed from our view, and the conclusion wears a more empirical aspect—as gathering that the animal ruminated from observing the print of a cloven foot, or that he had horns from his wanting certain teeth, or that he wanted the collar-bone from his having cloven hoofs. Limited experience having already shown such connexions as facts, more
ded experience will assuredly one day enable
omprehend the reason of the connexion.
overies already made in this branch
wonderful, and they proceed
of induction. It is shown

animals formerly existed on the globe, being unknown varieties of *species* still known; but it also appears that *species* existed, and even *genera*, wholly unknown for the last five thousand years. These peopled the earth, as it was, not before the general deluge, but before some convulsion long prior to that event had overwhelmed the countries then dry, and raised others from the bottom of the sea. In these curious inquiries, we are conversant not merely with the world before the flood, but with a world which, before the flood, was covered with water, and which, in far earlier ages, had been the habitation of birds, and beasts, and reptiles. We are carried, as it were, several worlds back, and we reach a period when all was water, and slime, and mud; and the waste, without either man or plants, gave resting place to enormous beasts like elephants and river-horses, while the water was tenanted by lizards, sixty or seventy feet long, and by others with eyes having shields of solid bone to protect them, and glaring from a neck ten feet in length, and the air was darkened by flying reptiles covered with scales, opening long jaws and expanding wings, armed at the tips with claws.

No less strange, and yet no less proceeding from induction, are the discoveries made respecting the former state of the earth; the manner in which those animals, whether of known or unknown tribes, occupied it; and the period when, or, at least, the way in which, they ceased to exist. Professor Buckland has demonstrated the identity with the hyæna's of the animal's habits that cracked the bones *which fill some* of the caves, in order to *come at the marrow;* but he has also satisfactorily *shown that it inhabited* the neighbourhood, an *must have been suddenly* exterminated by drow ing. His researches have been conducted by e periments with living animals, as well as by obs vation upon the fossil remains.*

That this branch of scientific inquiry is sing larly attractive all will allow. Nor will any o dispute that its cultivation demands great kno ledge and skill. But this is not our chief purp in referring to it. We learn from it that as a wo existed without human beings, for no human bo are found in the earlier strata, it must be true th a superior power, a divine and creative power, terfered with the established order of things, a made man. But for another reason I have int duced these details. There can be as little dou that the investigation of the former world from scanty remains, forms, in the strictest sense the term, a branch of physical science, and th this branch sprang legitimately from the gra root of the whole,—induction ; in a word, that t process of reasoning employed to investigate—t kind of evidence used to demonstrate—its trut is the modern analysis or induction taught by Bacon and practised by Newton. Now wherein, with reference to its nature and foundations, does it vary from the inquiries and illustrations of Natural Theology, one of whose propositions I have given as a corollary from this science? When from examining a few bones, or it may be a single fragment of a bone, we infer that, in the wilds where we found it, there lived and ranged, some thousands of years ago, an animal wholly different from any we ever saw, and from any of which any account, any tradition, written or oral, has reached us, nay, from any that ever was seen by any person of whose existence we ever heard, we assuredly are led to this remote conclusion, by a strict and rigorous process of reasoning; but, as certainly, we come through that same process to the knowledge and belief of things unseen, both of us and of all men—things respecting which we have not, and cannot have, a single particle of evidence, either by sense or by testimony. Yet we harbour no doubt of the fact in fossil osteology; we go farther, and not only implicitly believe the existence of this creature, for which we are forced to invent a name, but we clothe it with attributes, till, reasoning step by step, we come at so accurate a notion of its form and habits, that we can represent the one, and describe the other, with unerring accuracy; picturing to ourselves how it looked, what it fed on, and how it continued its kind.

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* The researches both of Cuvier and Buckland, far fr impugning the testimony to the great fact of a deluge bo by the Mosaic writings, rather fortify it; and bring ad tional proofs of the fallacy which, for some time, had philosophers to ascribe a very high antiquity to the wo we now live in.

The extraordinary sagacity of Cuvier is, perhaps, in instance more shown, nor the singular nature of the scie better illustrated, than in the correction which it enab him to give the speculation of President Jefferson upon *Megalonyx*—an animal which the President, from the s of a bone discovered, supposed to have existed, four ti the size of an ox, and with the form and habits of the li Cuvier has irrefragably shown, by an acute and learned duction, that the animal was a sloth, living entirely u vegetable food, but of enormous size like a rhinoceros, whose paws could tear up huge trees.

Now, the question is this: What perceivable difference is there between the kind of investigations we have just been considering, and those of Natural Theology—except, indeed, that the latter are far more sublime in themselves, and inc parably more interesting to us? Where *logical precision* of the arrangement which draw a broad line of demarcation between the two speculations, giving to the one the name and the rank of a science, but refusing it to the other, and affirming that the one rested upon induction, but not the other? We have, it is true, no experience directly of that Great Being's existence in whom we believe as our Creator; nor have we the testimony of any man relating such experience of his own. But so, neither we, nor any witnesses in any age, have ever seen those works of that Being, the lost animals that once peopled the earth; and yet the lights of inductive science have conducted us to a full knowledge of their nature, as well as a perfect belief in their existence. Without any evidence from our senses, or from the testimony of eye-witnesses, we believe in the existence and qualities of those animals, because we infer by the induction of facts that they once lived, and were endowed with a certain nature. This is called a doctrine of inductive philosophy. Is it less a doctrine of the same philosophy, that the eye could not have been made without a knowledge of optics, and as it could not make itself, and as no human artist, though possessed of the knowledge, has the skill and power to fashion it by his handy-work, that there must exist some being of knowledge, skill, and power, superior to our own, and sufficient to create it? Is the corollary which I have given from the proposition that these lost animals once existed before man was created, a corollary of Natural Theology, less the result of induction than that proposition itself a proposition of physical science? *Has the Natural* Theology any other foundation *than the Natural* Philosophy?*

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* *See the treatise of* Fossil Osteology, published with the *Dialogues on Instinct* in this work.

SECTION III.

MPARISON OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH OF NATURAL THEOLOGY WITH PSYCHOLOGY.

ITHERTO, our argument has rested upon a com-
rison of the truths of Natural Theology with
ose of Physical Science. But the evidences of
sign presented by the universe are not merely
ose which the material world affords; the intel-
ctual system is equally fruitful in proofs of an in-
lligent cause, although these have occupied little
the philosopher's attention, and may, indeed, be
id never to have found a place among the specu-
tions of the Natural Theologian. Nothing is
ore remarkable than the care with which all the
riters upon this subject, at least among the
oderns, have confined themselves to the proofs
forded by the visible and sensible works of nature,
hile the evidence furnished by the mind and its
erations has been wholly neglected.* The cele-
ated book of Ray on the Wonders of the Creation
ems to assume that the human soul has no se-
rate existence—that it forms no part of the
eated system. Derham has written upon Astro-
eology and Physico-theology as if the heavens
one proclaimed the glory of God, and the earth
ly showed forth his handy-work; for his only
ention of intellectual nature is in the single

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* Note II.

chapter of the Physico-theology on the soul, in which he is content with two observations: one, on the variety of man's inclinations, and another, on his inventive powers—giving nothing which precisely proves design. Dr. Paley, whose work is chiefly taken from the writings of Derham, deriving from them its whole plan and much of its substance, but clothing the harsher statements of his original in an attractive and popular style,* had so little of scientific habits, so moderate a power of generalising, that he never once mentions the mind, or any of the intellectual phenomena, nor ever appears to consider them as forming a portion of the works or operations of nature. Thus, all these authors view the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, the structure of animals, the organization of plants, and the various operations of the material world which we see carried on around us, as indicating the existence of design, and leading to a knowledge of the Creator. But they pass over in silence, unaccountably enough, by far the most singular work of divine wisdom and power—the mind itself. Is there any reason whatever to draw this line; to narrow within these circles the field of Natural Theology; to draw from the constitution and habits of matter alone the proof that one Intelligent Cause formed and supports the universe? Ought we not rather to consider the phenomena of the mind as more peculiarly adapted to help this inquiry, and as bearing a nearer relation to the Great Intelligence which created and which maintains the system?

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* This observation in nowise diminishes the peculiar merit of the style, and also of the homely, but close and logical, manner in which the argument is put; nor does it deny the praise of bringing down the facts of former writers, and adapting them to the improved state of physical science—a merit the more remarkable, that Paley wrote his *Natural Theology* at the close of his life.

There cannot be a doubt that this extraordinary omission had its origin in the doubts which men are prone to entertain of the mind's existence independent of matter. The eminent persons above named* were not materialists, that is to say, if you had asked them the question, they would have answered in the negative; they would have gone farther, and asserted their belief in the separate existence of the soul independent of the body. But they never felt this as strongly as they were persuaded of the natural world's existence. Their habits of thinking led them to consider matter as the only certain existence—as that which composed the universe—as alone forming the subject of our contemplations—as furnishing the only materials for our inquiries, whether respecting structure or habits and operations. They had no firm, definite, abiding, precise idea of any other existence respecting which they could reason and speculate. They saw and they felt external objects; they could examine the lenses of the eye, the valves of the veins and arteries, the ligaments and the sockets of the joints, the bones and the drum of the ear; but though they now and then made mention of

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[*] Some have thought, unjustly, that the language of Paley rather savours of materialism; but it may at least be doubted whether he was fully impressed with the evidence of mental existence. His unexercised powers of abstract discussion, and the natural predilection for what he handled so well—a practical argument level to all comprehensions—appear not to *have given him any taste* for metaphysical speculations.

the mind, and, if forced to the point, would have acknowledged a belief in it, they never were fully and intimately persuaded of its separate existence. They thought of it and of matter very differently; they gave *its* structure, and *its* habits, and *its* operations, no place in their inquiries; their contemplations never rested upon it with any steadiness, and indeed scarcely ever even glanced upon it at all. That this is a very great omission, proceeding, if not upon mere carelessness, upon a grievous fallacy, there can be no doubt whatever.

The evidence for the existence of mind is to the full as complete as that upon which we believe in the existence of matter. Indeed it is more certain and more irrefragable. The consciousness of existence, the perpetual sense that we are thinking, and that we are performing the operation quite independently of all material objects, proves to us the existence of a being different from our bodies, with a degree of evidence higher than any we can have for the existence of those bodies themselves, or of any other part of the material world. It is certain—proved, indeed, to demonstration—that many of the perceptions of matter which we derive through the senses are deceitful, and seem to indicate that which has no reality at all. Some inferences which we draw respecting it are confounded with direct sensation or perception, for example, the idea of motion; other ideas, as those of hardness and solidity, are equally the result of reasoning, and often mislead. Thus we never doubt, on the testimony of our senses, that the parts of matter touch—that different bodies come in contact with one another, and with our organs *of sense;* and yet nothing is more certain than that ıme small distance between the bodies k we perceive to touch. Indeed it is that all the sensations and percep- have of the material world may be our own minds: it is barely possible, t matter should have no existence. l—that the sentient principle—that the being which we call "*I*" and hich thinks, feels, reasons—should nce, is a contradiction in terms. Of nces, then, that of mind as inde- atter is more certain than that of om mind. In a subsequent branch se* we shall have occasion to treat uestion, when the constitution of the ence to its future existence becomes discussion. At present we have teadily in view the undoubted fact, uite as much an integral part of the atter.

at the constitution and functions of as much the subjects of inductive investigation as the structure and er. The mind, equally with matter, subject of observation by means of which enables us to arrest and exa- thoughts: it is even the subject of the power which we have, through bstraction and attention, of turning into courses not natural to them, s, and watching the results.† Now

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Note IV.

will occur in the *Fifth* Section of this Part, ients upon the course of our thoughts in d.

the phenomena of mind, at the knowledge of which we arrive by this inductive process, the only legitimate intellectual philosophy, afford as decisive proofs of design as do the phenomena of matter, and they furnish those proofs by the strict method of induction. In other words, we study the nature and operations of the mind, and gather from them evidences of design, by one and the same species of reasoning, the induction of facts. A few illustrations of these positions may be useful, because this branch of the science has, as we have seen, been unaccountably neglected by philosophers and theologians.

First. The structure of the mind, in every way in which we can regard it, affords evidences of the most skilful contrivance. All that adapts it so admirably to the operations which it performs, all its faculties, are plainly means working to an end. Among the most remarkable of these is the power of *reasoning*, or first comparing ideas and drawing conclusions from the comparison, and then comparing together those conclusions or judgments. In this process the great instrument is *attention*, as indeed it is the most important of all the mental faculties. It is the power by which the mind fixes itself upon a subject, and its operations are facilitated by many contrivances of nature, without which the effort would be painful, if not impossible—voluntary attention being the most difficult of all acts of the understanding.

Observe, then, in the *second* place, the helps which are provided for the exertion of this faculty. *Curiosity*, or the thirst of knowledge, is one of the chief of these. This desire renders any new idea *the source of* attraction, and makes the mind almost

ntarily, and with gratification rather than
bend and apply itself to whatever has the
y of novelty to rouse it. But *association*
additional facilities of the same kind, and
s us attend with satisfaction to ideas which
rly were present and familiar, and the revival
ich gives pleasure oftentimes as sensible as
f novelty, though of an opposite kind. Then,
, *habit*, in this, as in all other operations of
culties, has the most powerful influence, and
es us to undergo intellectual labour with ease
omfort.

irdly. Consider the phenomena of *memory.*
important faculty, without which no intel-
al progress whatever could be made, is sin-
ly adapted to its uses. The tenacity of our
lection is in proportion to the attention which
een exercised upon the several objects of con-
lation at the time they were submitted to the
. Hence it follows, that by exerting a more
ous attention, by detaining ideas for some
under our view, as it were, while they pass
gh the mind or before it, we cause them to
a deeper impression upon the memory, and
thus enabled to recollect those things the
st which we most desire to keep in mind.
e, too, whatever facilitates attention, what-
excites it, helps the memory, as we some-
say; so that we recollect those things the
st which were most striking at the time. But
things are, generally speaking, most striking,
most excite the attention, which are in them-
s most *important.* In proportion, therefore,
thing is most useful or for any reason most

desirable to be remembered, it is most easily stored up in our memory.

We may observe, however, in the *fourth* place, that readiness of memory is almost as useful as tenacity—quickness of bringing out as power of retention. *Habit* enables us to tax our recollection with surprising facility and certainty; as any one must be aware who has remarked the extraordinary feats performed by boys trained to learn things by heart, and especially to recollect numbers in calculating. From the same force of habit we derive the important power of forming artificial or conventional associations between ideas—of tacking, as it were, one to the other, in order to have them more under our control; and hence the relation between arbitrary signs and the things signified, and the whole use of language, whether ordinary or algebraical: hence, too, the formation of what is called artificial memory, and of all the other helps to recollection. But a help is provided for quickness of memory, independent of any habit or training, in what may be termed the natural association of ideas, whereby one thing suggests another from various relations of likeness, contrast, contiguity, and so forth. The same association of ideas is of constant use in the exercise of the inventive faculty, which mainly depends upon it, and which is the great instrument not only in works of imagination, but in conducting all processes of original investigation by pure reasoning.

Fifthly. The effect of *habit* upon our whole intellectual system deserves to be further considered, though we have already adverted to it. It is a law of our nature that any exertion becomes more easy the more frequently it is repeated. This might have been otherwise: it might have been just the contrary, so that each successive operation should have been more difficult; and it is needless to dwell upon the slowness of our progress, as well as the painfulness of all our exertions, say, rather, the impossibility of our making any advances in learning, which must have been the result of such an intellectual conformation. But the influence of habit upon the exercise of all our faculties is valuable beyond expression. It is indeed the great means of our improvement, both intellectual and moral, and it furnishes us with the chief, almost the only power we possess of making the different faculties of the mind obedient to the will. Whoever has observed the extraordinary feats performed by calculators, orators, rhymers, musicians, nay, by artists of all descriptions, can want no further proof of the power that man derives from the contrivances by which habits are formed in all mental exertions. The performances of the Italian *Improvvisatori*, or makers of poetry off-hand upon any presented subject and in almost any kind of stanza, are generally cited as the most surprising efforts in this kind. But the power of *extempore speaking* is not less singular, though more frequently displayed, at least in this country. A practised orator will declaim in measured and in various periods—will weave his discourse into one texture—form parenthesis within parenthesis—excite the passions, or move to laughter—take a turn in his discourse from an accidental interruption, making it the topic of his rhetoric for *five minutes* to come, and pursuing in *like manner the new illustrations* to which it gives *rise—mould his diction* with a view to attain or to shun an epigrammatic point, or an alliteration, c discord; and all this with so much assured r ance on his own powers, and with such perfect e to himself, that he shall even plan the next sente while he is pronouncing off-hand the one he engaged with, adapting each to the other, and sh look forward to the topic which is to follow, a fit in the close of the one he is handling to be introducer; nor shall any auditor be able to disco the least difference between all this and the porti of his speech which he has got by heart, or m the transition from the one to the other.*

Sixth. The feelings and the passions w which we are moved or agitated are devised purposes apparent enough, and to effect which th adaptation is undeniable. That of *love* tends to continuance of the species—the *affections*, to t rearing of the young; and the former is fitted the difference of sex, as the latter are to that of a Generally, there are feelings of *sympathy* excit by distress and by weakness, and these beget attac ment towards their objects, and a disposition relieve them or to support. Both individuals a societies at large gain by the effects thence arisi of union and connexion, and mutual help. *hope*, of which the seeds are indigenous in bosoms, and which springs up like certain pla in the soil as often as it is allowed to repose, enco rages all our labours, and sustains us in every vic situde of fortune, as well as under all the toils our being. *Fear*, again, is the teacher of cautio prudence, circumspection, and preserves us fr danger. Even *anger*, generally so painful, is not without its use: for it stimulates to defence, and it oftentimes assuages the pain given to our more tender feelings by the harshness, or ingratitude, or injustice, or treachery of those upon whom our claims were the strongest, and whose cruelty or whose baseness would enter like steel into the soul, were no re-action excited to deaden and to protect it. *Contempt*, or even *pity*, is calculated to exercise the same healing influence.* The operation of these reagents, so to speak, resembles the *vis medicatrix* in our bodily system, the form it has of throwing off foreign matter, or of healing injuries sustained. Then, to go no farther, *curiosity* is implanted in all minds to a greater or a less degree; it is proportioned to the novelty of objects, and consequently to our ignorance, and its immediate effects are to fix our attention—to stimulate our apprehensive powers—by deepening the impressions of all ideas on our minds, to give the memory a hold over them—to make all intellectual exertion easy, and convert into a pleasure the toil that would otherwise be a pain. Can anything be more perfectly contrived as an instrument of instruction, and an instrument precisely adapted to the want of knowledge, by being more powerful in proportion to the ignorance in which we are? Hence it is the great means by which, above all in early infancy, we are taught every thing most necessary for our physical as well as moral existence. In riper years it smooths way for further acquirements to most men; to s in whom it is strongest, it opens the path science; but in all, without any exception, it vails at the beginning of life so powerfully a make them learn the faculties of their own bo and the general properties of those around the an amount of knowledge which, for its extent its practical usefulness, very far exceeds, tho the most ignorant possess it, whatever additions greatest philosophers are enabled to build upo in the longest course of the most successful inv gations.

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* This experiment has been tried with perfect succes *my knowledge.*

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* "Atque illi (Crantor et Panætius) quidem etiam utiliter naturâ dicebant permotiones istas animis nostris datas, metum cavendi causâ; misericordiam ægritudinemque clementiæ; ipsam iracundiam fortitudinis quasi cotem esse dicebant."—*Acad. Quæst.* iv. 44.

Nor is it the curiosity natural to us all alone tends to the acquirement of knowledge; *desire of communicating* it is a strong proper of our nature, and conduces to the same impor end. There is a positive pleasure as well in te ing others what they knew not before, as in le ing what we did not know ourselves; and undeniable that all this might have been differe arranged without a material alteration of ou tellectual and moral constitution in other resp The propensity might have been, like the perve desires of the miser, to retain what we know w out communication, as it might have been n painful instead of pleasurable to acquire new i by novelty being rendered repulsive and not ag able. The stagnation of our faculties, the pension of mental exertion, the obscuration of intellectual world, would have then followed as tainly as universal darkness would veil the univ on the extinction of the sun.

Thus far we have been considering the use *which the mental* faculties and feelings are su

their admirable adaptation to these ends.
the intellectual world as a whole, and
is impossible to contemplate without
the extraordinary spectacle which the
an displays, and the immense progress
as been able to make in consequence of
e, its capacity and its propensities, such
e just been describing them. If the
of the heavenly bodies, the prodigious
their motions, their vast distances and
k, fill the imagination with awe, there
wonder excited by the brilliancy of the
powers—the inconceivable swiftness of
he boundless range which our fancy can
vast objects which our reason can em-
at we should have been able to resolve
ts into their more simple constituents—
the subtle light which fills all space—to
rom that remote particle in the universe,
e occupy a speck, into regions infinitely
certain the weight of bodies at the sur-
most distant worlds—investigate the
govern their motions, or mould their
calculate to a second of time the periods
e-appearance during the revolution of
-all this is in the last degree amazing,
much more food for admiration than
phenomena of the material creation.
shall we say of that incredible power of
ion which has enabled some even to an-
ages the discovery of truths the farthest
bove ordinary apprehension, and the
ring of improbability and fiction—not
a Clairaut conjecturing the existence of
lanet, and the position of its orbit, but

of a Newton learnedly and sagaciously infe from the refraction of light, the inflammable q of the diamond, the composition of apparentl simplest of the elements, and the opposite n of the two ingredients, unknown for a ce after, of which it is composed?* Yet the something more marvellous still in the proces thought, by which such prodigies have been formed, and in the force of the mind itself, it acts wholly without external aid, borrowin thing whatever from matter, and relying on it powers alone. The most abstruse investigati the mathematician are conducted without an gard to sensible objects; and the helps he d in his reasonings from material things at all absolutely insignificant, compared with the p of his work which is altogether of an abstract —the aid of figures and letters being only to tate and abridge his labour, and not at all ess to his progress. Nay, strictly speaking, the no truths in the whole range of the pure m matics which might not, by possibility, have discovered and systematized by one depriv sight and touch, or immured in a dark cha without the use of a single material object. instrument of Newton's most sublime specula the *calculus* which he invented, and the astoni systems reared by its means, which have give mortality to the names of Euler, Lagrange place, all are the creatures of pure abstract th and all might, by possibility, have existed in their present magnificence and splendour, without owing to material agency any help whatever, except such as might be necessary for their recording and communication. These are, surely, the greatest of all the wonders of nature, when justly considered, although they speak to the understanding and not to the sense. Shall we, then, deny that the eye could be made without skill in optics, and yet admit that the mind could be fashioned and endowed without the most exquisite of all skill, or could proceed from any but an intellect of infinite power?

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* Further induction may add, to the list of these ful conjectures, the thin ether, of which he even cal the density and the effects upon planetary motion. tainly the acceleration of Encke's comet does seem to *the existence of some* such medium by no means imp

At first sight, it may be deemed that there is an essential difference between the evidence from mental and from physical phenomena. It may be thought that mind is of a nature more removed beyond our power than matter—that over the masses of matter man can himself exercise some control—that, to a certain degree, he has a plastic power—that into some forms he can mould them, and can combine into a certain machinery—that he can begin and can continue motion, and can produce a mechanism by which it may be begun, and maintained, and regulated—while mind, it may be supposed, is wholly beyond his reach; over it he has no grasp; its existence alone is known to him, and the laws by which it is regulated;—and thus, it may be said, the great First Cause, which alone can call both matter and mind into existence, has alone the power of modulating intellectual nature. But, when the subject is well considered, this difference between the two branches of science disappears with all the rest. It is admitted, of course, that we can no more create matter than we can mind; and we can influence mind in a [illegible] -*gether analogous* to our power of [illegible] matter. By means of the properties of matter we can form instruments, machines, and figures. So by availing ourselves of the properties of mind, we can affect the intellectual faculties—exercising them, training them, improving them, producing, as it were, new forms of the understanding. Nor is there a greater difference between the mass of rude iron from which we make steel, and the thousands of watch-springs into which that steel is cut, or the chronometer which we form of this and other masses equally inert—than there is between the untutored indocile faculties of a rustic who has grown up to manhood without education, and the skill of the artist who invented that chronometer, and of the mathematician who uses it to trace the motions of the heavenly bodies.

Although writers on Natural Theology have altogether neglected, at least in modern times, that branch of the subject at large with which we have now been occupied, there is one portion of it which has always attracted their attention—the *Instincts* of animals. These are unquestionably mental faculties, which we discover by observation and consciousness, but which are themselves wholly unconnected with any exercise of reason. They exhibit, however, the most striking proofs of design, for they all tend immediately to the preservation or to the comfort of the animals endowed with them. The lower animals are provided with a far greater variety of instincts, and of a more singular kind than man, because they have only the most circumscribed range and feeblest powers of reason, while to reason man is in almost every thing indebted. Yet it would be *as erroneous* to deny that we are endowed with *any instincts,* because so much is accomplished by reason, as it would be rash to conclude that other animals are wholly destitute of reasoning, because they owe so much to instinct. Granting that infants learn almost all those animal functions which are of a voluntary nature, by an early exercise of reason, it is plain that instinct alone guides them in others which are necessary to continue their life, as well as to begin their instruction: for example, they suck, and even swallow by instinct, and by instinct they grasp what is presented to their hands. So, allowing that the brutes exercise but very rarely, and in a limited extent, the reasoning powers, it seems impossible to distinguish from the operations of reason those instances of sagacity which some dogs exhibit in obeying the directions of their master, and indeed generally the docility shown by them and other animals; not to mention the ingenuity of birds in breaking hard substances by letting them drop from a height, and in bringing the water of a deep pitcher nearer their beaks by throwing in pebbles. These are different from the operations of instinct, because they are acts which vary with circumstances novel and unexpectedly varying; they imply therefore the adaptation of means to an end, and the power of varying those means when obstacles arise: we can have no evidence of design, that is, of reason, in other men, which is not similar to the proof of reason in animals afforded by such facts as these.

But the operations of pure instinct, by far the greater portion of the exertions of brutes, have never been supposed by any one to result from reasoning, and certainly they do afford the most striking proofs of an intelligent cause, as well as of a unity *of design in the* world. The work of bees is among the most remarkable of all facts in both these respects. The form is in every country the same—the proportions accurately alike—the size the very same to the fraction of a line, go where you will; and the form is proved to be that which the most refined analysis has enabled mathematicians to discover as of all others the best adapted for the purposes of saving room, and work, and materials. This discovery was only made about a century ago; nay, the instrument that enabled us to find it out—the *fluxional* or *differential calculus*—was unknown half a century before that application of its powers. And yet the bee had been for thousands of years, in all countries, unerringly working according to this fixed rule, choosing the same exact angle of 120 degrees for the inclination of the sides of its little room, which every one had for ages known to be the best possible angle, but also choosing the same exact angles of 110 and 70 degrees for the parallelograms of the roof, which no one had ever discovered till the 18th century, when Kœnig solved that most curious problem of *maxima* and *minima*, the means of investigating which had not existed till the century before, when Newton and Leibnitz invented the *calculus*, whereby such problems can now be easily worked. It is impossible to conceive any thing more striking as a proof of refined skill than the creation of such instincts, and it is a skill altogether applied to the formation of intellectual existence.[*]

Now, all the inferences drawn from the exami-

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[*] See Dialogues on Instinct, where the subject of the Bee architecture is more fully treated.

ɔn which we have just gone through of psy-
ogical phenomena are drawn according to the
t rules of inductive science. The facts re-
ıg to the velocity of mental operations—to
exercise of attention—to its connexion with
ıory—to the helps derived from curiosity and
ı habit—to the association of ideas—to the
:es, feelings, and passions—and to the adjoin-
provinces of reason and instinct—are all dis-
ːred by consciousness or by observation; and
even can make experiments upon the subject
arying the circumstances in which the mental
ers are exercised by ourselves and others, and
king the results. The facts thus collected and
pared together we are enabled to generalize,
thus to show that certain effects are produced
n agency calculated to produce them. Aware
if we desired to produce them, and had the
er to employ this agency, we should resort to
ɔr accomplishing our purpose, we infer both
some being exists capable of creating this
ıcy, and that he employs it for this end. The
ess of reasoning is not like, but identical with,
by which we infer the existence of design in
rs (than ourselves) with whom we have daily
·course. The kind of evidence is not like, but
tical with, that by which we conduct all the
stigations of intellectual and of natural science.
ıch is the process of reasoning by which we
: the existence of design in the natural and
al world. To this abstract argument an ad-
ın of great importance remains to be made.
whole reasoning proceeds necessarily upon
assumption that there exists a being or thing
rate *from, and independent* of, matter, and

conscious of its own existence, which we call *m*
For the argument is—"Had I to accomplish
purpose, I should have used some such mear
or, "Had I used these means, I should h
thought I was accomplishing some such purpo
Perceiving the adaptation of the means to the
the inference is, that some being has acted as
should ourselves act, and with the same vie
But when we so speak, and so reason, we are
the while referring to an intelligent principl
existence: we are referring to our mind, and
to our bodily frame. The agency which we i
from this reasoning is, therefore, a spiritual
immaterial agency — the working of someth
like our own mind—and intelligence like our o
though incomparably more powerful and m
skilful. The Being of whom we thus acquir
knowledge, and whose operations as well as ex
ence we thus deduce from a process of induc
reasoning, must be a spirit, and wholly immate
But His being such is only inferred, because
set out with assuming the separate existence of
own mind, independently of matter. Without t
we never could conclude that superior *intellig*
existed or acted. The belief that mind exist
essential to the whole argument by which we i
that the Deity exists. This belief we have sh
to be perfectly well grounded, and further o
sions of confirming the truth of it will occur u
another head of discourse.* But at any rat
is the foundation of Natural Theology in all
branches: and upon the scheme of material
no rational, indeed no intelligible, account ca

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* Sect. V. and Note IV.

given of a First Cause, or of the creation or government of the universe.*

The preceding observations have been directed to the inquiries respecting the design exhibited in the universe. But the other parts of the first great branch of Natural Theology come strictly within the scope of the same reasoning. Thus, all the proofs of the Deity's *personality*, that is, His individuality, His unity; all the evidence which we have of His works, showing throughout not only that they proceeded from design, but that the design is of one distinctive kind—that they come from the hand not only of an intelligent being, but of a being whose intellect is specifically peculiar, and always of the same character; all these proofs are in the most rigorous sense inductive.

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* It is worthy of observation, that not the least allusion is made in Dr. Paley's work to the argument here stated, although it is the foundation of the whole of Natural Theology. Not only does this author leave entirely untouched the argument *à priori* (as it is called), and also all the inductive arguments derived from the phenomena of mind, but he does not even advert to the argument upon which the inference of design must of necessity rest—that design which is the whole subject of his book. Nothing can more evince his distaste or his inferior capacity for metaphysical researches. He assumes the very position which alone sceptics dispute. In combating him they would assert that he begged the whole question; for certainly they do not deny, at least in modern times, the *fact* of adaptation. As to the fundamental doctrine of causation, not the least allusion is ever made to it in any of his writings, even in his Moral Philosophy. This doctrine is discussed in Note III.

SECTION IV.

OF THE ARGUMENT À PRIORI.

HITHERTO we have confined our attention to the evidences of Natural Religion afforded by the phenomena of the universe—what is commonly termed the argument *à posteriori*. But some ingenious men, conceiving that the existence and attributes of a Deity are discoverable by reasoning merely, and without reference to facts, have devised what they term the argument *à priori*, of which it is necessary now to speak.

The *first* thing that strikes us on this subject is the consequence which must inevitably follow from admitting the possibility of discerning the existence of the Deity and his attributes *à priori*, or wholly independent of facts. It would follow that this is a necessary, not a contingent truth, and that it is not only as impossible for the Deity not to exist, as for the whole to be greater than the sum of its parts, but that it is equally impossible for his attributes to be other than the argument is supposed to prove they are. Thus the reasoners in question show, by the argument *à priori*, that he is a being of perfect wisdom and perfect benevolence. Dr. Clarke is as clear of this as he is clear that his existence is proved by the same argument. Now, impossible that any such truths can be *for* their contraries are not things wholly inconceivable, inasmuch as there is nothing at all inconceivable in the Maker of the universe existing as a being of limited power and of mixed goodness, nay of malevolence. We never, before all experience, could pronounce it mathematically impossible that such a being should exist, and should have created the universe. But next, the facts, when we came to examine them, *might* disprove the conclusions drawn *à priori*. The universe *might* by possibility be so constructed that every contrivance might fail to produce the desired effect —the eye might be chromatic and give indistinct images—the joints might be so unhinged as to impede motion—every smell, as Paley has it, might be a taint, and every touch a sting. Indeed, we know that, perfect as the frame of things actually is, a few apparent exceptions to the general beauty of the system have made many disbelieve the perfect power and perfect goodness of the Deity, and invent Manichean theories to account for the existence of evil. Nothing can more clearly show the absurdity of those arguments by which it is attempted to demonstrate the truths of this science as mathematical or necessary, and cognizable *à priori*.

But, *secondly*, let us see whether the argument in question be really one *à priori*, or only a very imperfect process of induction—an induction from a limited number of facts.

Dr. Clarke is the chief patron of this kind of demonstration, as he terms it; and though his book contains it more at large, the statement of his *fundamental* argument is, perhaps, to be found *most distinctly* given in the letters subjoined to th *celebrated work*. The fundamental propositi in the discourse itself are, That something must have existed from all eternity, and that this something must have been a being independent and self-existent. In the letters he condenses, perhaps explains, certainly illustrates, these positions (see Answers to letters 3, 4, and 5) by arguing that the existence of space and time (or, as he terms it, duration) proves the existence of something whereof these are qualities, for they are not themselves substances; he cites the celebrated *Scholium Generale* of the *Principia;* and he concludes that the Deity must be the infinite being of whom they are qualities.

But to argue from the existence of space and time to the existence of anything else, is assuming that those two things have a real being independent of our conceptions of them; for the existence of certain ideas in our minds cannot be the foundation on which to build a conclusion that anything external to our minds exists. To infer that space and time are qualities of an infinite and eternal being is surely assuming the very thing to be proved, if a proposition can be said to have a distinct meaning at all which predicates space and time as qualities of anything. What, for example, is time but the succession of ideas, and the consciousness and the recollection which we have of that succession? To call it a quality is absurd; as well might we call motion a quality, or our ideas of absent things and persons a quality.

Again, if space is to be deemed a quality, and if infinite space be the quality of an infinite being, finite space must also be a quality, and must, by parity of reason, be the quality of a finite being. *Of what being?* Here is a cube of one foot within an exhausted receiver, or a cylinder of half an inch diameter and three inches high in the Torricellian vacuum. What is the being of whom that square and that round space are to be deemed as qualities? Is distance, that is, the supposed movement of a point in a straight line, *ad infinitum*, a quality? It must be so if infinite space is. Then of what is it a quality? If infinite space is the quality of an infinite being, infinite distance must be the quality of an infinite being also. But can it be said to be the quality of the same infinite being? Observe that the mind can form just as correct an idea of infinite distance as of infinite space, or, rather, it can form a somewhat more distinct idea. But the being to be inferred from this infinite distance cannot be exactly the same in kind with that to be inferred from space infinite in all directions. Again, if infinite distance shows an infinite being of whom it is the quality, finite distance must be the quality of a finite being. What being? Of what kind of being is the distance between two trees or two points a quality? There can be no doubt that this argument rests either upon the use of words without meaning, or it is a disguised form of the old doctrine of the *anima mundi*, or of the hypothesis that the whole universe is a mere emanation of the Deity.

But it deserves to be remarked that this argument, which professes to be *à priori*, and wholly independent of all experience, is, strictly speaking, inductive, and nothing more. We can have no idea whatever of space apart from experience. The experience of space filled with matter enables us, by means of abstraction, to conceive space *without the matter;* and a further abstracti

and generalization enable us to conceiv
space by imagining the limits indefinitely
of a particular portion of space. But th
tion of the whole reasoning is the expe
certain finite portions of space first observe
nection with matter. Therefore our idea
are the result of our experience as to ext
jects. Even if we would fancy figure (
possible) without having seen or touched
jects external to ourselves, still it woul
experience of our own ideas that had give
idea. So of time; it is the succession of
and we have the notion of it from cons
and memory. From hence we form an id
definite time or eternal duration. But th
the whole is the observation which we h
upon the actual succession of our ideas;
is inductive, though the process of reas
very short. It is as much a process of i
reasoning as that by which we arrive at t
ledge of the mind's existence. There is, t
great inaccuracy in denominating the arg
question, were it ever so sound, an arg
priori, for it is a reasoning founded on ex
and it is to be classed with the arguments
from the observation of external objects, th
of our reasoning *à posteriori* as to matt
the utmost, with the information given
sciousness, the whole ground of our rea
posteriori as to mind.

When, however, Dr. Clarke has once
propositions to which we have been adve
deduces from them the whole qualities of t
—those which we learn from experie
thinks he can derive them all from the sin

positions that lie at the foundation of his argument. It is truly astonishing to find so profound a thinker, and, generally speaking, so accurate a reasoner, actually supposing that he can deduce from the proposition, that a self-existent being must have existed from all time, this other proposition, that therefore this being must be infinitely wise (Prop. XI.), and that he "must of necessity be a being of infinite goodness, justice, and truth, and all other moral perfections, such as become the supreme *governor* and *judge* of the world." (Prop. XII.) With the general texture of this argument we have at present nothing to do, further than to show how little it can by possibility either deserve the name of an argument *à priori*, or be regarded as the demonstration of a necessary truth. For surely, prior to all experience, no one could ever know that there were such things as either judges or governors; and without the previous idea of a finite or worldly ruler and judge, we could never gain any idea of an eternal and infinitely just ruler or judge; and equally certain it is that this demonstration, if it proves the existence of an infinite and eternal ruler or judge to be a necessary and not a contingent truth (which is Dr. Clarke's whole argument), would just as strictly prove the existence of finite rulers and judges to be a necessary and not a contingent truth; or, in other words, it would follow, that the existence of governors and judges in the world is a necessary truth, like the equality of the three angles in a triangle to two right angles, and that it would be a contradiction in terms, and so an impossibility, to conceive the world existing without *governors and judges.*

I believe it may safely be said, that very fe men have ever formed a distinct apprehension the nature of Dr. Clarke's celebrated argumen and that hardly any person has ever been at a satisfied with it. The opinion of Dr. Reid is we known upon this subject, and it has received th full acquiescence of no less an authority than th of Mr. Stewart.

"These," says Dr. Reid, "are the speculatio of men of superior genius; but whether they b as solid as they are sublime, or whether they b the wanderings of imagination in a region beyon the limits of human understanding, I am unabl to determine."

To this Mr. Stewart adds—"After this candi acknowledgment from Dr. Reid, I need not b ashamed to confess my own doubts and difficulti on the same subject."*

That the argument *à priori* has been most e plicitly handled by Dr. Clarke, and that its acce tation rests principally upon his high authorit cannot be denied. Nevertheless, other great me preceded him in this field; and beside Sir Isaa Newton's *Scholium Generale*, which is thought have suggested it, the same reasoning is to found in the writings of others of Dr. Clarke predecessors.

The tenth chapter of Mr. Locke's fourth boo does not materially differ, in its fundamental p sition, from the "Demonstration of the Being a Attributes." The argument is all drawn from t truth, assumed as self-evident. "Nothing can more produce any real being than it can be equ

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* *Philosophy* of the Active Powers, i. 334.

ıt angles." From this, and the know-
ıve of our own existence, it is shown to
t, " from eternity there has been some-
l again, " that this eternal being must
nost powerful and most knowing," and
God." The only difference between
ent and Dr. Clarke's is, that Mr. Locke
me of his propositions, our knowledge
existence. But this difference is only
ıce ; for Dr. Clarke really has assumed
ocke has more logically made a distinct
. Dr. Clarke's first proposition, that
must have existed from all eternity, is
ed by showing the absurdity of the sup-
ıt " the things which now are were pro-
f nothing." He therefore assumes the
f those things, while Mr. Locke more
umes the existence of ourselves only,
states it as a proposition. The other
of Mr. Locke are more ingenious than
's, and the whole reasoning is more
though he does not give it the name of
ation, and scarcely can be said to treat
that the Deity's existence is a necessary
re it to be so considered, the objections
ıted would apply to it. Indeed, if Dr.
stated the different steps of his reason-
nctly as Mr. Locke has done, he would
ved it to be inconclusive beyond a very
nt, and to that extent inductive.*
vorth, in the fifth chapter of his great
, in answering the Democritick argu-

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ularly Mr. Locke's proofs of his first position.
standing, IV. x. sec. 2.)
al System, Book I. c. v. s. 3, par. 4. The

ments, so plainly anticipated Dr. Clarke, that hardly possible to conceive how the latter sh have avoided referring to the passage.* "If s be indeed a nature distinct from body, and a t really incorporeal, then will it undeniably fol from this very principle of theirs (the Dem tists), that there must be incorporeal space; (this space being supposed by them also to be nite) an infinite incorporeal Deity. Becaus space be not the extension of body, nor an affec thereof, then must it of necessity be, eithe accident existing alone by itself, without a stance, which is impossible; or else the exten or affection of some other incorporeal subst that is infinite." He then supposes a reply (fou on the doctrines of Gassendi), that space is middle nature and essence, and proceeds to obs upon it:—"Whatsoever is, or hath any kin entity, doth either subsist by itself, or else i attribute, affection, or mode of something doth subsist by itself. For it is certain that t can be no mode, accident, or affection of nothi and, consequently, that nothing cannot be exte nor mensurable. But if space be neither the tension of body, nor yet of substance incorpo then must it of necessity be the extension of thing, and the affection of nothing, and not must be measurable by yards and poles. We clude, therefore, that from this very hypothesi

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profound learning of this unfinished work, and its sati tory exposition of the ancient philosophers, are abov praise. Why are the manuscripts of the author still b in the British Museum?

* Cudworth's book was published in 1678. The *monstration"* was delivered in 1704-5 at the Boyle Lect

the Democritick and Epicurean atheists, that space is a nature distinct from body, and positively infinite, it follows undeniably that there must be some incorporeal substance whose affection its extension is; and because there can be nothing infinite but only the Deity, that it is the infinite extension of our incorporeal Deity." The statement of Dr. Clarke's argument, given in his correspondence, is manifestly, if not taken from this, at least coincident with it in every important respect. Dr. Cudworth, indeed, confines his reasoning to the consideration of space and immensity, and Dr. Clarke extends his to time and eternity also. But of the two portions of the argument this has been shown to be the most fallacious.

The arguments of the ancient theists were in great part drawn from metaphysical speculations, some of which resembled the argument *à priori*.* But they were pressed by the difficulty of conceiving the possibility of creation, whether of matter or spirit; and their inaccurate views of physical science made them consider this difficulty as peculiar to the creative act. They were thus driven to the hypothesis that matter and mind are eternal, and that the creative power of the Deity is only plastic. They supposed it easy to comprehend how the divine mind should be eternal and self-existing, and matter also eternal and self-existing. They found no difficulty in comprehending how that mind could, by a wish or a word, reduce chaos to order, and mould all the elements of things into their present form; but how everything could be made out of nothing they could not understand.

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* Notes VI. and VII.

When rightly considered, however, there is no more difficulty in comprehending the one than the other operation—the existence of the plastic, than of the creative power; or rather, the one is as incomprehensible as the other. How the Supreme Being made matter out of the void is not easily comprehended. This must be admitted; but is it more easy to conceive how the same Being, by his mere will, moved and fashioned the primordial atoms of an eternally existing chaos into the beauty of the natural world, or the regularity of the solar system? In truth, these difficulties meet us at every step of the argument in Natural Theology, when we would penetrate beyond those things, those facts which our faculties can easily comprehend; but they meet us just as frequently, and are just as hard to surmount, in our steps over the field of Natural Philosophy. How matter acts on matter—how motion is begun, or, when begun, ceases—how impact takes place—what are the conditions and limitations of contact—whether or not matter consists of ultimate particles, endowed with opposite powers of attraction and repulsion, and how these act—how one planet acts upon another at the distance of a hundred million of miles—or how one piece of iron attracts and repels another at a distance less than any visible space—all these, and a thousand others of the like sort, are questions just as easily put, and as hard to answer, as how the universe could be made out of nothing, or how, out of chaos, order could be made to spring.

In concluding these observations upon the argument *à priori*, I may remark, that although it carries us but a very little way, and would be unsafe *to build upon* alone, it is yet of eminent use in two articulars. First, it illustrates, if it does not ndeed prove, the possibility of an Infinite Being xisting beyond and independent of us and of all isible things; and, secondly, the fact of those deas of immensity and eternity, forcing themselves, s Mr. Stewart expresses it, upon our belief, seems o furnish an additional argument for the existence of an Immense and Eternal Being. At least we must admit that excellent person's remark to be well-founded, that after we have, by the argument *à posteriori* (I should rather say the *other parts* of the argument *à posteriori*), satisfied ourselves of the existence of an intelligent cause, we naturally connect with this cause those impressions which we have derived from the contemplation of infinite space and endless duration, and hence we clothe with the attributes of immensity and eternity the awful Being whose existence has been proved by a more rigorous process of investigation.*

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* Lord Spencer, who has deeply studied these abstruse subjects, communicated to me, before he was aware of my opinion, that he had arrived at nearly the same conclusion upon the merits of the argument *à priori*.

SECTION V.

MORAL OR ETHICAL BRANCH OF NATURAL THEOLOGY.

If we now direct our attention to the other grea branch of Natural Theology, that which we hav termed the moral or ethical portion, which treat of the probable designs of the Deity with respec to the future destiny of his creatures, we shall fin that the same argument applies to the nature of it truths which we have been illustrating in its application to the first or ontological branch of th science, or that relating to the existence and attributes of the Creator, whether proved by physica or by psychological reasoning. The second branch like the first, rests upon the same foundation wit all the other inductive sciences, the only differenc being that the one belongs to the inductive scienc of Natural and Mental, and the other to th inductive science of Moral Philosophy.

The means which we have of investigating th probable designs of the Deity are derived from tw sources—the nature of the human mind, and th attributes of the Creator.

To the consideration of these we now proceed but in discussing them, and especially the first, ther is this difference to be marked as distinguishin them from the former branch of Natural Theolog They are far less abundant in doctrine; they hav *been much* less cultivated by scientific inquirers *and the truths* ascertained in relation to them a

number: in a word, our knowledge of the
designs in the order of nature is much
ited than our acquaintance with his exist-
attributes. But, on the other hand, the
of the evidence with that on which the
luctive sciences rest is far more conspicuous
may be termed the psychological part of
d branch of Natural Theology than in any
f the first branch, it being much less appa-
the inferences drawn from facts in favour
eity's existence and attributes are of the
ure with the ordinary deductions of phy-
ence—in other words, that this part of
Theology is a branch of Natural Philoso-
an it is that the deductions from the nature
ind in favour of its separate and future
are a branch of Metaphysical science.
this diversity it follows, that, in treating
nd branch of the subject, there will be
essity for entering at large into the subject
eity's probable designs in regard to the
ecially those to be inferred from its consti-
han we found there was for entering into the
s of his existence and attributes, although
l not be so much labour required for prov-
this is a branch of inductive science.

IOLOGICAL ARGUMENT, OR EVIDENCE OF EITY'S DESIGNS DRAWN FROM THE NA- OF THE MIND.

materiality of the Soul is the foundation of
octrines relating to its future State. If it
of material parts, or if it consists of any
tion of matter, or if it is inseparably con-
ith any combination of material elements,

we have no reason whatever for believing that can survive the existence of the physical part of o frame; on the contrary, its destruction seems follow as a necessary consequence from the dissolı tion of the body. It is true that the body is n destroyed in the sense of being annihilated; but is equally true that the particular conformatio the particular arrangement of material partick with which the soul is supposed to have been ins parably connected, or in which it is supposed t consist, is gone and destroyed even in the sens of annihilation; for that arrangement or conforma tion has no longer an existence, any more than marble statue can be said to have an existence whe it is burned into a mass of pounded quick-lime. No it is to the particular conformation and arrangemen and not to the matter itself, that the soul is consi dered as belonging by any theory of materialism there being none of the theories of materialists s absurd as to make the total mass of the partick themselves, independent of their arrangement, th seat of the soul. Therefore, the destruction of th form and organization as effectually destroys th soul which consists in it, as the beauty or the inte lectual expression of the statue is gone when th marble is reduced to lime-dust.

Happily, however, the doctrines of materialisı rest upon no solid foundation, either of reason experience. The vague and indistinct form of tl propositions in which they are conveyed affor one strong argument against their truth. It not easy to annex a definite meaning to the prop sition that mind is inseparably connected with particular arrangement of the particles of matter; *is more difficult* to say what they mean who vague call it a modification of matter; but to consider it as consisting in a combination of matter, as coming into existence the instant that the particles of matter assume a given arrangement, appears to be a wholly unintelligible collocation of words.

Let us, however, resort to experience, and inquire what results may be derived from that safe guide whom modern philosophers most willingly trust, though despised as too humble a helpmate by most of the ancient sages.

We may *first* of all observe that if a particular combination of matter gives birth to what we call mind, this is an operation altogether peculiar and unexampled. We have no other instance of it; we know of no case in which the combination of certain elements produces something quite different, not only from each of the simple ingredients, but also different from the whole compound. We can, by mixing an acid and an alkali, form a third body, having the qualities of neither, and possessing qualities of its own different from the properties of each; but here the third body consists of the other two in combination. There are not two things—two different existences—the neutral salt composed of the acid and the alkali, and another thing different from that neutral salt, and engendered for the first time by that salt coming into existence. So when, by chiselling, "the marble softened into life grows warm," we have the marble new moulded, and endowed with the power of agreeably affecting our senses, our memory, and our fancy; but it is all the while the marble: there is the beautiful and expressive marble i
of the amorphous mass, and we have not
the marble, a new existence created by i

which has been given to that stone. But materialists have to maintain that, by matter b arranged in a particular way, there is prod both the organized body and something diff from it, and having not one of its properti neither dimensions, nor weight, nor colour, form. They have to maintain that the che who mixed the aqua fortis and potash produced nitre and something quite different from all three, and which began to exist the instant the nitre crystallized; and that the sculptor fashioned the Apollo, not only made the ma into a human figure, but called into being s thing different from the marble and the statue, which exists at the same time with both and w out one property of either. If, therefore, t theory is true, it must be admitted to rest u nothing which experience has ever taught us supposes operations to be performed and rela to exist of which we see nothing that bears least resemblance in anything we know.

But *secondly*, the doctrine of the materialis every form which it assumes is contradicted by most plain and certain deductions of experie The evidence which we have of the existen the mind is complete in itself, and wholly i pendent of the qualities or the existence of ma It is not only as strong and conclusive as the dence which makes us believe in the existen matter, but more strong and more conclusive; steps of the demonstration are fewer; the tru which they conduct the reason is less remote the axiom—the intuitive or self-evident pos whence the demonstration springs. We be *that matter* exists because it makes a certain ression upon our senses, that is, because it prouces a certain change or a certain effect; and we rgue, and argue justly, that this effect must have cause, though the proof is by no means so clear hat this cause is something external to ourselves. But we know the existence of mind by our consciousness of or reflection on what passes within us, and our own existence as sentient and thinking beings implies the existence of the mind which has sense and thought. To know, therefore, that we are, and that we think, implies a knowledge of the soul's existence. But this knowledge is altogether independent of matter, and the subject of it bears no resemblance whatever to matter in any one of its qualities, or habits, or modes of action. Nay, we only know the existence of matter through the operations of the mind; and were we to doubt of the existence of either, it would be far more reasonable to doubt that matter exists than that mind exists. The existence and the operations of mind, supposing it to exist, will account for all the phenomena which matter is supposed to exhibit. But the existence and action of matter, vary it how we may, will never account for one of the phenomena of mind. We do not believe more firmly in the existence of the sensible objects around us when we are well and awake, than we do in the reality of those phantoms which the imagination conjures up in the hours of sleep, or the season of derangement. But no effect produced by material agency ever produced a spiritual existence, or engendered the belief of such an existence; indeed, the thing is almost a contradiction in terms. That all around us should only be the creatures of our fancy, no one can affirm to be impossible. But that our mind—that which remembers—coı imagines—in a word, that which thinks- the existence of which we are perpetuɛ scious—that which cannot but exist if w that which can make its own operations th of its own thoughts—that this should existence is both impossible and indeed ɪ diction in terms. We have, therefore, ev the strictest kind—induction of facts the ɪ cise and unerring—to justify the conclus the mind exists, and is different from ɛ pendent of matter altogether.*

Now this proposition not only destroys trine of the materialists, but leads to the inferences in favour of the mind surviving with which it is connected through life. experience shows no one instance of ann Matter is perpetually changing—never dı the form and manner of its existence are and ceaselessly varying—its existence nı minates. The body decays, and is said tı that is, it is resolved into its elements, and the material of new combinations, animatı animate, but not a single particle of it i lated; nothing of us or around us ever ceaseı If the mind perishes, or ceases to exist at is the only example of annihilation which ı

But, it may be said, why should it not, body, be changed, or dissipated, or resol its elements? The answer is plain: it dif the body in this, that it has no parts; it *lutely one* and simple; therefore it is incɑ *resolution or* dissolution. These words,

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* *See, on the* Hypothesis of Materialism, ˈ

erations or events they refer to, have no appli-
tion to a simple and immaterial existence.

Indeed, our idea of annihilation is wholly derived
om matter, and what we are wont to call de-
ruction means only change of form and resolution
to parts, or combination into new forms. But
r the example of the changes undergone by mat-
r, we should not even have any notion of destruc-
on or annihilation. When we come to consider
e thing itself, we cannot conceive it to be pos-
ible; we can well imagine a parcel of gunpowder
r any other combustible substance ceasing to exist
s such by burning or exploding; but that its
hole elements should not continue to exist in a
ifferent state, and in new combinations, appears
nconceivable. We cannot follow the process so
ar; we can form no conception of any one particle
hat once is, ceasing wholly to be. How then can
e form any conception of the mind which we
ow know to exist ceasing to be? It is an idea
ltogether above our comprehension. True, we
o longer, after the body is dissolved, perceive the
ind, because we never knew it by the senses; we
ly were aware of its existence in others by its
fects upon matter, and had no experience of it
nconnected with the body. But it by no means
llows that it should not exist, merely because we
ve ceased to perceive its effects upon any portion
matter. It had connexion with the matter which
used to act upon, and by which it used to be
ted on; when its entire severance took place
at matter underwent a great change, but a change
ising from its being of a composite nature. The
e separation cannot have affected the mind i
like manner, because its nature is simple a

not composite. Our ceasing to perceive any effect produced by it on any portion of matter, the onl means we can have of ascertaining its existence, i therefore no proof that it does not still exist; an even if we admit that it no longer does produc any effect upon any portion of matter, still this wil offer no proof that it has ceased to exist. Indeed when we speak of its being annihilated, we may b said to use a word to which no precise meanin can be attached by our imaginations. At any rat it is much more difficult to suppose that this annihilation has taken place, and to conceive in wha way it is effected, than to suppose that the min continues in some state of separate existence, disencumbered of the body, and to conceive in wha manner this separate existence is maintained.

It may be further observed that the materia world affords no example of creation, any mor than of annihilation. Such as it was in point o quantity since its existence began, such it still is not a single particle of matter having been eithe added to it or taken from it. Change—unceasin change—in all its parts, at every instant of time it is for ever undergoing; but though the combinations or relations of these parts are unremittingly varying, there has not been a single one o them created, or a single one destroyed. Of min this cannot be said; it is called into existence perpetually before our eyes. In one respect this ma weaken the argument for the continued existenc of the soul, because it may lead to the conclusion that as we see mind created, so may it be destroyed while matter, which suffers no addition, is liable t no loss. Yet the argument seems to gain in anoth direction more force than it loses in this; for thing can more strongly illustrate the diversity between mind and matter, or more strikingly show that the one is independent of the other.

Again, the mind's independence of matter and capacity of existence without it, appears to be strongly illustrated by whatever shows the entire dissimilarity of its constitution. The inconceivable rapidity of its operations is, perhaps, the most striking feature of the diversity; and there is no doubt that this rapidity increases in proportion as the interference of the senses—that is, the influence of the body—is withdrawn. A multitude of facts, chiefly drawn from and connected with the Phenomena of Dreams, throw a strong light upon this subject, and seem to demonstrate the possible disconnexion of mind and matter.

The bodily functions are in part suspended during sleep, that is, all those which depend upon volition. The senses, however, retain a portion of their acuteness; and those of touch* and hearing, especially, may be affected without awakening the sleeper. The consequence of the cessation which takes place of all communication of ideas through the senses is that the action of the mind, and, above all, of those powers connected with the imagination, becomes much more vigorous and uninterrupted. This is shown in two ways—first, by the celerity with which any impression upon the senses, strong enough to be felt without awaking, is caught up and made the groundwork of a new train of ideas, the mind instantly accommodating itself to the suggestions of the impression, and making all its thoughts chime in with that; and, secondly, by the prodigiously long succession of images that pass through the mind, with perfect distinctness and the greatest liveliness, in an instant of time.

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* The common classification of the senses which makes the touch comprehend the sense of heat and cold, is here adopted; though, certainly, there seems almost as little reason for ranging this under touch, as for ranging sight, smell, hearing, and taste under the same head.

The facts upon this subject are numerous, and of undeniable certainty, because of daily occurrence. Every one knows the effect of a bottle of hot water applied during sleep to the soles of the feet: you instantly dream of walking over hot mould, or ashes, or a stream of lava, or having your feet burnt by coming too near the fire. But the effect of falling asleep in a stream of cold air, as in an open carriage, varies this experiment in a very interesting, and, indeed, instructive manner. You will, instantly that the wind begins to blow, dream of being upon some exposed point, and anxious for shelter, but unable to reach it; then you are on the deck of a ship, suffering from the gale—you run behind a sail for shelter, and the wind changes, so that it still blows upon you—you are driven to the cabin, but the ladder is removed, or the door locked. Presently you are on shore, in a house with all the windows open, and endeavour to shut them in vain; or, seeing a smith's forge, you are attracted by the fire, and suddenly a hundred bellows play upon it, and extinguish it in an instant, but fill the whole smithy with their blast, till you are as cold as on the road. If you from time to time awake, the moment you fall asleep again, the same course of dreaming succeeds in the greatest variety of changes that can be rung on our thoughts.*

But the rapidity of these changes, and of the succession of ideas, cannot be ascertained by this experiment: it is most satisfactorily proved by another. Let any one who is extremely overpowered with drowsiness—as after sitting up all night, and sleeping none the next day—lie down, and begin to dictate: he will find himself falling asleep after uttering a few words, and he will be awakened by the person who writes repeating the last word, to show he has written the whole; not above five or six seconds may elapse, and the sleeper will find it at first quite impossible to believe that he has not been asleep for hours, and will chide the amanuensis for having fallen asleep over his work, so great apparently will be the length of the dream which he has dreamt, extending through half a lifetime. This experiment is easily tried: again and again the sleeper will find his endless dream renewed; and he will always be able to tell in how short a time he must have performed it. For suppose eight or ten seconds required to write the four or five words dictated, sleep could hardly begin in less than four or five seconds after the effort of pronouncing the sentence; so that, at the utmost, not more than four or five seconds can have been spent in sleep. But, indeed, the greater probability is, that not above a single second can have been so passed: for a writer will easily finish two words in a second; and suppose he has to write four, and half the time is consumed in falling asleep, one second only is the duration of the dream, which yet seems to last for years, so numerous are the images that compose it.*

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* *This* happened to me many years ago when travelling in Sweden by night. Lord Stuart, who was with me, slept sounder, and did not feel it.

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* *The experiment related* in the text was made by myself *fter I had been in court all* night on a trial, and had no *ept next day.*

Another experiment is still more striking, and affords a more remarkable proof both of the velocity of thought, and of the quickness with which its course is moulded to suit any external impression made on the senses. But this experiment is not so easily tried. A puncture made will immediately produce a long dream, which seems to terminate in some such accident as that the sleeper has been wandering through a wood, and received a severe wound from a spear, or the tooth of a wild animal, which at the same instant awakens him. A gun fired in one instance, during the alarm of invasion, made a military man at once dream the enemy had landed, so that he ran to his post, and repairing to the scene of action, was present when the first discharge took place, which also the same moment awakened him.*

Now these facts show the infinite rapidity of thought; for the puncture and discharge of the gun took place in an instant, and their impression on the senses was as instantaneous; and yet, during that instant, the mind went through a long operation of fancy, suggested by the first part of the impression, and terminated, as the sleep itself was, by the continuation—the last portion of the same impression. Mark what was done in an instant—in a mere point of time. The sensation of the pain or noise beginning is conveyed to the mind, and sets it a thinking of many things connected with such sensations. But that sensation is lost or forgotten for a portion of the short instant during ich the impression lasts; for the conclusion of e same impression gives rise to a new set of eas. The walk in the wood, and the hurrying the post, are suggested by the sensation begin-ng. Then follow many things unconnected with at sensation, except that they grew out of it; d, lastly, comes the wound, and the broadside, ggested by the continuance of the sensation, ile, all the time, this continuance has been pro-cing an effect on the mind wholly different from e train of ideas the dream consists of, nay, de-ructive of that train—namely, the effect of rous-g it from the state of sleep, and restoring its minion over the body. Nay, there may be said be a third operation of the mind going on at e same time with these two—a looking forward the *dénouement* of the plot,—for the fancy is all ong so contriving as to fit that, by terminating some event, some result consistent with the im-ression made on the senses, and which has given se to the whole train of ideas.

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* *The ingenious* Eastern tale, in the Spectator, of the *magician who made* the prince plunge his head into a pail *of water, is founded* on facts like those to which I have *been referring.*

There seems every reason to conclude, from these cts, that we only dream during the instant of trans-ion into and out of sleep, and when our sleep is not mplete. That instant is quite enough to account r the whole of what appears a night's dream. It quite certain we remember no more than ought, cording to these experiments, to fill an instant of me; and there can be no reason why we should nly recollect this one portion if we had dreamt uch more. The fact that we never dream so much when our rest is frequently broken, proves the me proposition almost to demonstration. An un-sy and restless night passed in bed is always a night dded full with dreams. So, too, a night passed on the road in travelling, by such as sleep well in a carriage, is a night of constant dreaming. Every jolt that awakens or half-awakens us seems to be the cause of a dream. If it be said that we always or generally dream when asleep, but only recollect a portion of our dream, then the question arises, why we recollect a dream each time we fall asleep, or are awakened, and no more? If we can recall twenty dreams in a night of interrupted sleep, how is it that we can only recall one or two when our sleep is continued? The length of time occupied by the dream we recollect is the only reason that can be given for our forgetting the rest; but this reason fails if, each time we are roused, we remember separate dreams.

Nothing can be conceived better calculated than these facts to demonstrate the extreme agility of the mental powers, their total diversity from any material substances or actions; nothing better adapted to satisfy us that the nature of the mind is consistent with its existence apart from the body.

The changes which the mind undergoes in its activity, its capacity, its mode of operation, are matter of constant observation, indeed of every man's experience. Its essence is the same; its fundamental nature is unalterable; it never loses the distinguishing peculiarities which separate it from matter; never acquires any of the properties of the latter; but it undergoes important changes, both in the progress of time, and by means of exercise and culture. The development of the bodily powers appears to affect it, and so does their decay; but we rather ought to say, that, in ordinary cases, its improvement is contemporaneous with the growth of the body, and its decline

illy is contemporaneous with that of the
after an advanced period of life. For it is
doubted fact, and almost universally true,
he mind before extreme old age becomes
sound, and is capable of greater things
; nearly thirty years of diminished bodily
s; that, in most cases, it suffers no abate-
of strength during ten years more of bodily
e; that, in many cases, a few years more
ily decrepitude produce no effect upon the
and that, in some instances, its faculties
bright to the last, surviving the almost
xtinction of the corporeal endowments. It
ain that the strength of the body, its agility,
ience of fatigue, indeed all its qualities, de-
from thirty at the latest; and yet the mind
roving rapidly from thirty to fifty; suffers
or no decline before sixty: and therefore is
when the body is enfeebled, at the age of
ight or fifty-nine, than it was in the acme
corporeal faculties thirty years before. It
ally certain, that while the body is sensibly
ng, between sixty or sixty-three and seventy,
nd suffers hardly any loss of strength in the
lity of men; that men continue to seventy-
r seventy-six in the possession of all their
l powers, while few can then boast of more
the remains of physical strength; and in-
s are not wanting of persons who, between
and ninety, or even older, when the body
rdly be said to live, possess every faculty of
ind unimpaired. We are authorised to con-
from these facts, that unless some unusual
lent accident interferes, such as a serious
r a grave contusion, the ordinary course o
nts the mind and the body running cours

widely different, and in great part of the time in opposite directions; and this affords strong proof, both that the mind is independent of the body, and that its destruction in the period of its entire vigour is contrary to the analogy of nature.

The strongest of all the arguments both for the separate existence of mind, and for its surviving the body, remains, and it is drawn from the strictest induction of facts. The body is constantly undergoing change in all its parts. Probably no person at the age of twenty has one single particle in any part of his body which he had at ten; and still less does any portion of the body he was born with continue to exist in or with him. All that he before had has now entered into new combinations, forming parts of other men, or of animals, or of vegetable or mineral substances, exactly as the body he now has will afterwards be resolved into new combinations after his death. Yet the mind continues one and the same, "without change or shadow of turning." None of its parts can be resolved or dispersed; for it is one and single, and it remains unchanged by the changes of the body. The argument would be quite as strong though the change undergone by the body were admitted not to be so complete, and though some small portion of its harder parts* were supposed to continue with us through life.

But observe how strong the inferences arising from these facts are, both to prove that the existence of the mind is entirely independent of the existence of the body, and to show the probability of its surviving! If the mind continues the same *while all or nearly* all the body is changed, it ows that the existence of the mind depends not in the least degree upon the existence of the body; for it has already survived a total change of, or, in the common use of the words, an entire destruction of that body. But again, if the strongest argument to show that the mind perishes with the body, nay, the only argument be, as it indubitably is, derived from the phenomena of death, the fact to which we have been referring affords an answer to this. For the argument is, that we know of no instance in which the mind has ever been known to exist after the death of the body. Now here is exactly the instance desiderated, it being manifest that the same process which takes place on the body more suddenly at death is taking place more gradually, but as effectually in the result, during the whole of life, and that death itself does not more completely resolve the body into its elements and form it into new combinations than living fifteen or twenty years does destroy, by like resolution and combination, the self-same body. And yet after those years have elapsed and the former body has been dissipated and formed into new combinations, the mind remains the same as before, exercising the same memory and consciousness, and so preserving the same personal identity as if the body had suffered no change at all. In short, it is not more correct to say that all of us who are now living have bodies formed of what were once the bodies of those who went before us, than it is to say that some of us who are now living at the age of fifty have bodies which in part belonged to others now living at that and other ages. The *phenomena are* precisely the same, and *he operations are performed* in like manner, though *ith different degrees* of expedition. Now all *uld believe in the* separate existence of the soul if they had experience of its existing apart from the body. But the facts referred to prove that it does exist apart from one body with which it once was united, and though it is in union with another, yet as it is not adherent to the same, it is shown to have an existence separate from, and independent of, that body. So all would believe in the soul surviving the body, if after the body's death its existence were made manifest. But the facts referred to prove that after the body's death, that is, after the chronic dissolution which the body undergoes during life, the mind continues to exist as before. Here, then, we have that proof so much desiderated—the existence of the soul after the dissolution of the bodily frame with which it was connected. The two cases cannot, in any soundness of reasoning, be distinguished; and this argument, therefore, one of pure induction, derived partly from physical science, through the evidence of our senses, partly from psychological science by the testimony of our consciousness, appears to prove the possible Immortality of the Soul almost as rigorously as "if one were to rise from the dead."

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* *Except the* enamel of the teeth none such appea
exist; and the teeth of course grow long after the
xists.

Now we have gone through the first division of this second branch of the subject, and have considered the proofs of the separate and future existence of the soul afforded by the nature of mind. It is quite clear that all of them are derived from a strict induction of facts, and that the doctrines rest upon precisely the same kind of evidence with that upon which the doctrines respecting the constitution and habits of the mind are founded. In truth, the subjects are not to be distinguished as regards the *species of* demonstration applicable to them—th *process by* which the investigation of them is to *conducted*. That mind has an existence perceiv l demonstrable as well as matter, and that it is olly different from matter in its qualities, is a th proved by induction of facts. That mind can ist independent of matter and survive the dissoion of the body, is a truth proved exactly in the ne manner, by induction of facts. The phenona of dreams which lead to important conclusions ching the nature of the mind, lead, and by the f-same kind of reasoning, to important conclusions a similar description, touching the mind's existce independent of the body. The facts, partly ysical, partly psychological, which show the nd to be unaffected by the decay and by even e total though gradual change of the body during e, likewise show that it can exist after the more dden change of a similar kind, which we term e dissolution of the body by death. There is no ans of separating the two classes of truths, those Psychology and those of Natural Theology; ey are parts of one and the same science; they e ascertained by one and the same process of instigation; they repose upon one and the same d of evidence; nor can any person, without ing way to a most groundless and unphilosoical prejudice, profess his belief in the former ctrines, and reject the latter. The only difference tween the two is that the Theological propoions are of much greater importance to human ppiness than the Metaphysical.

MORAL ARGUMENT, OR EVIDENCE OF THE DEITY'S DESIGNS DRAWN FROM HIS ATTRIBUTES *IN CONNECTION* WITH THE CONDITION F *THE SPECIES.*

probable designs of Divine Providence wit respect to the future lot of man are to be gathered in part from the nature of the mind itself, the work of the Deity, and in part from the attributes of the Deity, ascertained by an examination of his whole works. It thus happens that a portion of this head of the argument has been anticipated in treating the other head, the nature of the mind. Whatever qualities of the soul show it to differ from matter, both make it improbable that it should perish with the body, and make it improbable that the Deity should destine it to such a catastrophe; and whatever facts show that it can survive a total change of the body during life, show likewise the probability that the same being who endowed it with that capacity will suffer it, in like manner, to continue in being after the more sudden change which the body undergoes at death.

The argument built upon the supposed designs of the Creator requires to be handled in a humble and submissive spirit; but, if so undertaken, there is nothing in it which can be charged with presumption, or deemed inconsistent with perfect though rational devotion. In truth, all the investigations of Natural Theology are equally liable to such a charge; for to trace the evidences of design in the works of nature, and inquire how far benevolence presides over their formation and maintenance—in other words, to deduce from what we see, the existence of the Deity, and speculate upon His wisdom and goodness in the creation and government of the universe—is just as daring a thing, and exactly of the same kind of audacity, as to speculate upon His *probable intentions* with respect to the future *tiny of man.*

The contemplation of the Deity's goodne *deducible from* the great preponderance of ins

ch benevolent design is exhibited,* when ac-
nied with a consideration of the feelings and
of the human mind, gives rise to the first
ent which is usually adduced in favour of the
rtality of the Soul. There is nothing more
sal or more constant than the strong desire of
tality which possesses the mind, and com-
with which its other wishes and solicitudes
it faint and occasional. That a benevolent
should have implanted this propensity with-
e intention of gratifying it, and to serve no
pparent purpose unless it be the proving that
ithout an object, appears difficult to believe:
rtainly the instinctive fear of death would
erved all the purposes of self-preservation
t any desire of immortality being connected
, although there can be no doubt that this
or at least the anxiety about our future des-
intimately related to our dread of dissolu-
But the inference acquires additional strength
he consideration that the faculties of the mind
nd improve almost to the time of the body's
ion, and that the destruction of the soul a
ment of its being fitter than ever for worthy
seems quite inconceivable.

tender affections so strongly and so univer-
perating in our nature afford another argu-
f a like kind. No doubt the purpose to
they are subservient in this life is much more
tly perceivable; yet still it is inconsistent
e provisions of a benevolent Power to sup-
at we should be made susceptible of such
nt feelings, and be suffered to indulge in.

Dissertation on Evil, in which it is shown that our
and partial views are probably the cause of ou
vil to exist.

them, so as to make our happiness chiefly consist in their gratification, and that then we should suddenly be made to undergo the bitter pangs of separation, while, by our surviving, those pangs are lengthened out without any useful effect resulting from our sufferings. That such separations should be eternal appears irreconcilable with the strength of the affections wounded, and with the goodness so generally perceived in the order of the universe. The supposition of a re-union hereafter overcomes the difficulty, and reconciles the apparent inconsistency.

The unequal distribution of rewards and punishments in this world, that is, the misery in which virtue often exists, and the prosperity not seldom attendant upon vice, can in no way be so well accounted for, consistently with the scheme of a benevolent Providence, as by the supposition of a Future State.

But perhaps there is nothing more strongly indicative of such a design in the Creator than the universal prevalence of religion amongst men. There can hardly be found a tribe so dark and barbarous as to be without some kind of worship, and some belief in a future state of existence. Now all religions are so far of God that he permits them; he made and preserves the faculties which have invented the false ones, as well as those which comprehend and treasure up the true faith. Religious belief, religious observance, the looking forward to a future existence, and pointing to a condition in which the deeds done on earth shall be visited with just recompense, are all facts of *universal* occurrence in the history and intellectual habits of the species. Are they all a mere fiction? Do they indeed signify nothing? Is that a me groundless fancy, which in all places, in all a

upies and has occupied the thoughts and mingled
lf with the actions of all mankind, whether
barous or refined?*

3ut if it be said that the belief of such a state
ubservient to an important use, the restraining
passions and elevating the feelings, it is ob-
us to reply, that so great a mechanism to pro-
e this effect very imperfectly and precariously,
ears little consistent with the ordinary efficacy
l simplicity of the works of Providence, and that
disposition to shun vice and debasement could
e been more easily and more certainly implanted
making them disgusting. True, there would
n have been little merit in the restraint; but of
at value is the production of such merit, if the
nd which attains it and becomes adorned by it
no sooner approached perfection than it ceases
exist at all? The supposition of a Future State
once reconciles all inconsistencies here as before,
l enables us to comprehend why virtue is taught
the hopes of another life, as well as why those
pes, and the grounds they rest on, form so large
ortion of human contemplation.

That the existence of the soul in a new state
er the entire dissolution of the body—nay, that
existence of the body itself in a new state,
er passing through death, is nothing contrary
the analogies which nature presents, has been
entimes observed, and is a topic much dwelt
on, especially by the ancient philosophers. The
traordinary transformations which insects un-
rgo have struck men's imaginations so power-
ly in *contemplating this* subject, that the soul

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* *Notes VIII.* and IX.

itself was deemed of old to be aptly de
under the emblematical form of a butterfl
having emerged from the chrysalis state, fl
the air, instead of continuing to crawl on tl
as it did before the worm it once was c
exist. The instance of the fœtus of anim
especially of the human embryo, has occu
attention of modern inquirers into this int
subject. Marking the entire difference in c
of existence before and after birth, and
versity of every one animal function at tl
periods, philosophers have inferred, that as
ing from the one to the other state of exist
mighty a change is wrought, without any
tion either of soul or body, a like transit
take place at death, and the event which
to close our being may only open the port
new, and higher, and more lasting conditi
far as such considerations suggest analogi
furnish matter of pleasing contemplation,
lend even some illustration to the ar
Nevertheless they must be regarded as exc
feeble helps in this latter respect, if inde
aid be not of a doubtful, and even dangero
They are all drawn from material objects,—
upon the properties and the fortunes of c
existences. Now the stronghold of the
maintain the Immortality of the Soul, and,
all the doctrines of Natural Theology, is tl
difference between mind and matter, and th
we have constantly around us, and withi
existences as real as the bodies which af
outward senses, but resembling those pe
things in no one quality, no one habit c
no one mode of being.

Upon the particulars of a future state—the kind of existence reserved for the soul—the species of its occupations and enjoyments—Natural Theology is, of course, profoundly silent; but not more silent than Revelation. We are left wholly to conjecture, and in a field on which our hopelessness of attaining any certain result is quite equal to our interest in the success of the search. Indeed, all our ideas of happiness in this world are such as rather to disqualify us for the investigation, or what may more fitly be termed the imagination. Those ideas are, for the most part, either directly connected with the senses, or derived from our condition of weakness here, which occasions the formation of connexions for mutual comfort and support, and gives to the feebler party the feeling of allegiance, to the stronger the pleasure of protection. Yet may we conceive that, hereafter, such of our affections as have been the most cherished in life shall survive and form again the delight of meeting those from whom death has severed us—that the soul may enjoy the purest delights in the exercise of its powers, above all, for the investigation of truth—that it may expatiate in the full discovery of whatever has hitherto been most sparingly revealed, or most carefully hidden from its view—that it may be gratified with the sight of the useful harvest reaped by the world from the good seed which it helped to sow. We can only conjecture or fancy. But these, and such as these, are pleasures in which the gross indulgences of sense have no part, and which are even removed above the less refined of our moral gratifications: they may, therefore, be supposed consistent with a pure and faultless state of spiritual being.

Perhaps the greatest of all the difficulties which we feel in forming such conjectures, regards the endless duration of an immortal existence. All our ideas in this world are so adapted to a limited continuance of life—not only so moulded upon the scheme of a being incapable of lasting beyond a few years, but so inseparably connected with a constant change even here—a perpetual termination of one stage of existence and beginning of another—that we cannot easily, if at all, fancy an eternal, or even a long-continued, endurance of the same faculties, the same pursuits, and the same enjoyments. All here is in perpetual movement—ceaseless change. There is nothing in us or about us that abides an hour—nay, an instant. Resting-place there is none for the foot—no haven is provided where the mind may be still. How then shall a creature, thus wholly ignorant of repose—unacquainted with any continuation at all in any portion of his existence—so far abstract his thoughts from his whole experience as to conceive a long, much more a perpetual, duration of the same powers, pursuits, feelings, pleasures? Here it is that we are the most lost in our endeavours to reach the seats of the blessed with our imperfect organs of perception, and our inveterate and only habits of thinking.*

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* The part of Dean Swift's satire which relates to the *Stulbrugs* may possibly occur to some readers as bearing upon this topic. That the staunch admirers of that singularly-gifted person should have been flung into ecstacies on the perusal of this extraordinary part of his writings, needs not surprise us. Their raptures were full easily ex
but I am quite clear they have given a wrong gloss t
heaped upon its merits a very undeserved prais
think that the picture of the Stulbrugs was intend to

emains to observe, that all the speculations which we have touched under this second ision of the subject, the moral argument, nilar to the doctrines of inductive science— t to such of those doctrines as are less per- ascertained; but the investigation is con- l upon the same principles. The most satis- y proofs of the soul's immortality are those first, or psychological class, derived from ng the nature of mind; those of the second which we have last been surveying, derived he condition of man in connexion with the ites of the Deity, are less distinct and cogent; ould they be sufficient of themselves; but add important confirmation to the others; th are as truly parts of legitimate inductive e as any branch—we may rather say, any branch—of moral philosophy.

a love of life, and that it has well accomplished its e. I am very certain that the Dean never had any ing in view, because his sagacity was far too great perceive that he only could make out this position by undisguised begging of the question. How could any the most ordinary reflection expect to wean his fel- atures from love of life by describing a sort of persons a given age lost their faculties, and became doting ing idiots? Did any man breathing ever pretend wished to live, not only for centuries but even for ore years and ten, bereaved of his understanding, and by the law and by his fellow men as in hopeless in- dotage? The passage in question is much more to have proceeded from Swift's exaggerated misan- , and to have been designed as an antidote to human by showing that our duration is necessarily limited— *ed, it is not rather to be* regarded as the work of mere *nd caprice.*

SECTION VI.

LORD BACON'S DOCTRINE OF FINAL CAUSES.*

It now appears, that when we said that Natural Theology can no more be distinguished from the physical, psychological, and ethical sciences, in respect of the evidence it rests upon and the manner in which its investigations are to be conducted, than the different departments of those sciences can be distinguished from each other in the like respect, we were only making an assertion borne out by a close and rigorous examination of the subject. How, then, comes it to pass, it may be asked, tha the father of Inductive Philosophy has banished the speculation of Final Causes from his system, as if it were no branch of inductive science? A more attentive consideration of the question will show, *first,* that the sentence which he pronounce has been not a little misunderstood by persons wh looked only at particular aphorisms, without dul regarding the context and the occasion; and, *secondly,* that Lord Bacon may very probably hav conceived a prejudice against the subject altogether from the abuses, or indeed perversions, to whic a misplaced affection for it had given rise in som of the ancient schools of philosophy.

That Lord Bacon speaks disparagingly of th *inquiry concerning* Final Causes, both when ıdles it didactically, and when he mentions it :identally, is admitted. He enumerates it among ; errors that spring from the restlessness of nd (*impotentia mentis*), which forms the fourth ıss of the idols of the species (*idola tribus*) or uses of false philosophy, connected with the culiarities of the human constitution.* In other rts of the same work he descants upon the misiefs which have arisen in the schools from mixing e doctrines of natural religion with those of .tural philosophy ;† and he more than once treats the inquiry concerning Final Causes as a barren eculation, comparing it to a nun or a vestal con:rated to heaven.‡ But a nearer examination this great authority will show that it is not verse to our doctrine.

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* Note X.

1. First of all it is to be remarked, that Lord ıcon does not disapprove of the speculation conrning Final Causes absolutely, and does not unrvalue the doctrines of Natural Religion, so long that speculation and those doctrines are kept in eir proper place. His whole writings bear testiɔny to the truth of this proposition. In the *arasceve* to natural and experimental history, ıich closes the *Novum Organum*, he calls the ıtory of the phenomena of nature a volume of ; work of God, and as it were another Bible— rolumen operum Dei, et tanquam altera scrip:a."§ In the first book of the *De Dignitate*, he ;s there are two books of religion to be consulted

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Nov. Org. lib. i. Aph. 48.

Ib. Aph. 96; and De Dig. et Aug. lib. i.

"Sterilis et tanquam virgo Deo sacra non parit." c. 5 *Dig. lib. iii.*

arasceve, c. 9.

—the Scriptures, to tell the will of God, an book of creation, to show his power.* Ac ingly he maintains elsewhere† that a *miracl* never yet performed to convert atheists, bec these might always arrive at the knowledge o Deity by the light of nature. Nor ought we pass over the remarkable passage of the *Cogitat* *Visa*, in which he propounds the use of Natu Philosophy as the cure for superstition and support of true religion. "Naturalem Philo phiam, post verbum Dei, certissimam superstitio medicinam, eandem probatissimum fidei aliment esse. Itaque merito religioni tanquam fidati mam et acceptissimam ancillam attribui, c altera voluntatem Dei, altera potestatem ma festet."‡ If the earlier part of the passage any doubt of the kind of service which relig was to derive from inductive science, the last wo clearly show that it could only be by the doctr of final causes.

2. But further, he distinctly classes natural ligion among the branches of legitimate scien and it is of great and decisive importance to present inquiry that we should mark the parti lar place which he assigns to it. He first divi science into two great branches, Theology Philosophy—comprehending under the former scription only the doctrines of revelation, under the latter all human science. Now, a expressly excluding Natural Religion§ from first class, he treats it as a part of the seco The second, or philosophy, is divided into th

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* Lib † Ib. lib. iii. c. 13.

oni, Cogitata et Visa.

ig. lib. iii. c. 1.

parts, according as its object is the Deity, Nature, or Man. The first of these subdivisions constitutes Natural Religion, which he says may be termed Divine knowledge, if you regard its object, but Natural knowledge, if you consider its nature and evidence ("ratione informationis scientia naturalis censeri potest."*) That he places it in a different subdivision from Natural Philosophy proves nothing; for he classes anatomy, medicine, and intellectual philosophy also in a different subdivision: they come under the head of Human Philosophy, or the science of man, as contradistinguished from Natural Theology and Natural Philosophy, or the science of God and of external objects. Many objections may undoubtedly be made to this classification, of which it is perhaps enough to say, that it leads to separating optics as well as anatomy and medicine† from natural philosophy. But, at all events, it shows both that Lord Bacon deemed Natural Theology a fit object of philosophical inquiry, and that he regarded the inductive method as furnishing the means by which the inquiry was to be conducted.

3. The general censure upon the doctrine of Final Causes to which we have in the outset adverted, as conveyed by certain incidental remarks, is manifestly directed against the abuse of such speculations, and more especially in the ancient schools of antiquity. Lord Bacon justly objects to the confounding of final with efficient or physical causes; he marks the loose and figurative language to which this confusion has given rise; he

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* De Dig. lib. iii. c. 2.

† Ib. lib. iv. c. 3. He treats of the desiderata *under the head* of the human mind—the senses.

asks if it is philosophical to describe the eye as Aristotle, Galen, and others do, with the eyelids and eyelashes as a wall and a hedge to protect it; or the bones as so many beams and pillars to support the body;* and he is naturally apprehensive of the danger which may result from men introducing fancies of their own into science, and, above all, from their setting out with such fancies, and then making the facts bend to humour them. This is indeed the great abuse of the doctrine of final causes; and the more to be dreaded in its consequences, because of the religious feelings which are apt to mix themselves with such speculations, and to consecrate error.†

4. The objections of Lord Bacon are the more clearly shown to be levelled against the abuse only, that we find him speaking in nearly similar terms of logic and the mathematics as having impeded the progress of natural science. In the passage already referred to, and which occurs twice in his books, where the Platonists are accused of mixing Natural Religion with philosophy, the latter Platonists (or Eclectics) are in the same words charged with corrupting it by the mathematics, and the Peripatetics by logic.‡ Not cer-

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* De Dig. lib. iii. c. 4.

† This idea is expressed by Bacon, with his wonted felicity, in the 75th Aphorism. "Pessima enim res est errorum apotheosis; et pro peste intellectûs habenda est, si vanis accedat veneratio." (Nov. Org. lib. i.) He gives an instance of this folly in the perverted use made of some portions of the Bible history—"Huic vanitati nonnulli ex modernis *summâ levitate* ita indulserunt, ut in primo capitul
seôs et in libro Job et aliis scripturis sacris, Philos
Naturalem fundare conati sint; *inter viva quærentes* mor

‡ *Nov. Org.* lib. i. Aph. 96; De Dig. lib. i.

tainly that the greatest logician of modern times could undervalue either his own art or the skill of the analyst, but because Aristotle through dialectic, and Proclus through geometrical pedantry, neglected that humbler but more useful province of watching and interpreting nature, and used the instruments furnished by logic and the mathematics, not to assist them in classifying facts or in reasoning from them, but to construct phantastic theories, to which they made the facts bend.

When rightly examined, then, the authority of Lord Bacon appears not to oppose the doctrine which we are seeking to illustrate. Yet it is possible that a strong impression of the evils occasioned by the abuse of these speculations may have given him a less favourable opinion of them than they deserved. It appears that he had even conceived some prejudice against logic and the mathematics from a similar cause; and he manifests it, not only in the passages already referred to, but in that portion of his treatise *De Dig. et Aug.* in which he treats of mathematical as an appendix to physical science, expressing much hesitation whether to rank it as a science, and delivering himself with some asperity against both logicians and mathematicians.* High as is the authority of this great man—and upon the subject of the present inquiry the highest of all—yet, if it clearly appears that the argument from Final Causes comes within the scope of inductive science, we are bound to admit it within the circle of legitimate human knowledge, even if we found the father of that science had otherwise judged. It is clear that, had he now lived, he would himself have rejected some speculations as wholly beyond the reach of the human faculties, which he unhesitatingly ranges among the objects of sound philosophy.* It is equally undeniable that he would have treated others with greater respect than he has shown them.† Above all, it is certain that he would never have suffered that the veneration due to his own name should enshrine an idol ‡ to obstruct the progress of truth, and alienate her votaries from the true worship which he himself had founded.

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* De Dig. lib. iii. c. 6.—" Delicias et festum mathematicorum, qui hanc scientiam physicæ fieri imper
Nescio enim quo fato fiat ut mathematica et
cillarum loca erga physicam se gerere debeb
certitudinem *præ se* jactantes, dominatio
tunt;"

That Lord Bacon has not himself indulged in any speculations akin to those of Natural Theology is, beyond all dispute, true. There is hardly any writer upon moral or natural science, in whose works fewer references can be found to the power or wisdom of a superintending Providence. It

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* He distinctly considers the "doctrine of angels and spirits" as an "appendix to Natural Theology," and holds that their nature may be investigated by science, including that of unclean spirits or dæmons, which he says hold in this inquiry the same place as poisons do in physics, or vices in ethics.—(De Dig. lib. iii. c. 2.) Natural magic, the doctrine of fascination, the discovery of futurity from dreams and ecstacies, especially in bad health from death-bed glimpses—in a word, divination—he holds to be branches of science deserving of cultivation; though he warns against sorcery, or the practice of witchcraft.—(Ib. lib. iv. c. 3, and lib. ii. c. 2.)

† He complains of treatises of Natural History being *"swelled with figures of animals and plants, and other superfluous matter, instead of being enriched with solid observations."*—(*De Dig.* lib. ii. c. 3.)

‡ *Idolum theatri.*

ould be difficult to find in any other author, an-
ent or modern, as much of very miscellaneous
atter upon almost all physical subjects as he has
rought together in the *Sylva Sylvarum*, without
ne allusion to Final Causes. But it must also be
dmitted, that it would not be easy to find in any
ther writer of the least name upon physical sub-
ects so little of value, and so much that is wholly
nworthy of respect. That work is, indeed, a
triking instance of the inequalities of the human
aculties. Among the one thousand observations
f which it consists, hardly one—of the two hun-
red and eighteen pages certainly not one—can be
ound in which there is not some instance of cre-
ulity, superstition, groundless hypothesis, mani-
est error of some kind or other; and nothing at
ny time given to the world ever exhibited a more
ntire disregard of all his own rules of philoso-
hizing: for a superficial examination of facts, a
asty induction, and a proneness to fanciful theory,
orm the distinguishing characters of the whole
ook. Assuredly it is a proof that the doctrine
f Final Causes is not the only parent of a "phan-
astic philosophy," though the other base under-
rowth of "heretical religion"* may not be found
n the recesses of the Sylva.

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* This striking and epigrammatic antithesis occurs more
an once in his writings. Thus, in the Nov. Org. lib. i.
ph. 65—"Ex divinorum et humanorum malesana admix-
one, non solum educitur philosophia phantastica, sed etiam
eligio hæretica;" and again, in De Dig. et Aug. lib. iii. c.
, speaking of the abuse of speculations touching natural
eligion, he *remarks on the* "incommoda et pericula quæ
eo (abusû) tum religioni, tum philosophiæ impendent,
ote qui religionem hæreticam procudit et philosophiam
ntasticam et superstitiosam."

Descartes, whose original genius for the abstract sciences fixed an æra in the history of pure mathematics, as remarkable as Bacon's genius did in that of logic, like him failed egregiously as a cultivator of natural philosophy; and he excluded Final Causes altogether from his system as a preposterous speculation—an irreverent attempt to penetrate mysteries hidden from human eyes by the imperfection of our nature. But it is to be observed, that all the successful cultivators of physical science have, as if under the influence of an irresistible impulsion, indulged in the sublime contemplations of Natural Religion. Nor have they fallen into this track from feeling and sentiment; they have pursued it as one of the paths which inductive philosophy opens to the student of nature. To say nothing of Mr. Boyle, one of the earliest cultivators of experimental philosophy, whose works are throughout embued with this spirit, and who has left a treatise expressly on the subject of Final Causes, let us listen to the words of Sir Isaac Newton himself. The greatest work of man, the Principia, closes with a swift transition from its most difficult investigation, the determination and correction of a comet's trajectory upon the parabolic hypothesis,* to that celebrated scholium, upon which Dr. Clarke's argument *à priori* for the existence of a Deity is built. But whatever may be deemed the soundness of that argument, or the intrinsic value of the eloquent and sublime passages which lay its foundation, its illustrious author at the same time points our attention to the demonstration from induction, and i the most distinct and positive terms sanctions e doctrine, that this is a legitimate branch of atural knowledge. "Hunc (Deum) cognoscimus er proprietates ejus et attributa et per sapientissimas et optimas rerum structuras et causas finales, t admiramur ob prospectiones." — "Deus sine ominio, providentiâ, et causis finalibus, nihil aliud st quam fatum et natura."—"Et hæc de Deo— e quo utique ex phænomenis disserere ad philosohiam naturalem pertinet." — (*Scholium Geneale.*)

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* Principia, lib. iii. Prop. xli. and xlii.

And if he could not rest from his immortal bours in setting forth the system of the Universe, ithout raising his mind to the contemplation of Iim who "weighed the mountains in scales and the ills in a balance," so neither could he pursue the ore minute operations of the most subtile materialgent, without again rising towards Him who said 'Let there be light." The most exquisite invesigation ever conducted by man of the laws of ature by the means of experiment, abounds in its atter portion with explicit references to the doctrines f Natural Theology, and with admissions that the usiness of physical science is "to deduce causes rom effects till we come to the very First Cause," nd that "every true step made in inductive phiosophy is to be highly valued, because it brings us earer to the First Cause." *

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* Optics, Book iii. Query 28.—"How came the bodies of imals to be contrived with so much art, and for what ends ere the several parts? Was the eye contrived without ill in optics, and the ear without knowledge of sound?" ee, too, *Query 31.)*

SECTION VII.

OF SCIENTIFIC ARRANGEMENT, AND THE METHODS OF ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS.

Having shown that Natural Theology is a branch of inductive science—partly physical, partly intellectual and moral—it is of comparatively little importance to inquire whether or not it can be kept apart from the other branches of those sciences. In one view of this question we may say, that there is no more ground for the separation than there would be for making a distinct science of all the propositions in Natural Philosophy which immediately relate to the human body—whereby we should have portions of dynamics, pneumatics, optics, chemistry, electricity, and all human anatomy and pathology as contradistinguished from comparative, reduced under one and the same head—a classification, indeed, resembling Lord Bacon's. But in another, and, as it seems, the more just view, there is a sufficient number of resemblances and differences, and the importance of the subject is sufficient, to justify the making a separate head of Natural Theology. The question is entirely one of convenience; nothing of essential moment turns upon the classification; and there is obviously an advantage in having the truths collected in one body, though they are culled from the various parts of Physical and Metaphysical science to which they naturally belong. All tha s needful is, constantly to keep in mind the identity of the evidence on which these truths rest with that which is the groundwork of those other parts of philosophy.

Although, however, convenience and the paramount importance of the subject seem to require such a separation, it is manifest that much of theology must still be found intermingled with physics and psychology, and there only; for the truths of Natural Theology being sufficiently demonstrated by a certain induction of facts—a certain number of experiments and observations—no further proof is required; and to assemble all the evidence, if it were possible, would be only encumbering the subject with superfluous proofs, while the collection would still remain incomplete, as every day is adding to the instances discovered of design appearing in the phenomena of the natural and moral world. It has been said, indeed, that a single well-established proof of design is enough, and that no additional strength is gained to the argument by multiplying the instances. We shall afterwards show with what limitations this proposition is to be received; but for our present purpose it is sufficient, that, at all events, a certain definite number of instances are of force enough to work out the demonstration; and yet in every branch of physics and psychology new instances are presented at each tep we make. These instances are of great importance; they are to be carefully noted and reasured up; they form most valuable parts of hose scientific inquiries, conveying, in its purest form and *in its highest* degree, the gratification of *ontemplating abstract* truths, in which consists the whole of the pleasure derived from science, p so called—that is, from science as such, independent of its application to uses or enjo of a corporeal kind.

An apprehension has frequently been ente by learned and pious men—men of a truly sophical spirit—lest the natural desire of design in the works of nature should carry in too far, and lead them to give scope t imagination rather than contain their specu within the bounds of strict reasoning. The dreaded the introduction of what Lord Baco a "phantastic philosophy," and have also felt at the injuries which religion may receiv being exposed to ridicule, in the event of t culations proving groundless upon a closer e ation. But it does not appear reasonabl philosophers should be deterred by such co ations from anxiously investigating the su Final Causes, and giving it the place which to it in all their inquiries; provided that t not suffer fancy to intermix with and distur speculations. If they do, they commit the g error of which reasoners can be guilty—a against which it is the very object of inducti losophy to guard; but it is no more an e this, than in the other investigations of s He who imagines design where there is no who either assumes facts in order to buil them an inference favourable to Natural Relig from admitted facts draws such an inference fully, and not logically, comes within the d *tion of a false* philosopher: he prefers the *thetical to the* inductive method; he can with his master, "*hypotheses non fingo;*"* he renounces the modern, and recurs to the exploded modes of philosophising. But he is not the more a false philosopher, and does not the more sin against the light of improved science, for committing the offence in the pursuit of theological truth. He would have been liable to the same charge if he had resorted to his fancy instead of observation and experiment while in search of any other scientific truth, or had hypothetically assumed a principle of classifying admitted phenomena, instead of rigorously deducing it from examining their circumstances of resemblance and of diversity.

That any serious discredit can be brought upon the science of Natural Theology itself, from the failures to which such hypothetical reasonings may lead, seems not very easy to conceive. Vain and superficial minds may take any subject for their ridicule, and may laugh, as they heretofore have laughed, at the mechanician and the chemist as well as the theologian, when they chance to go astray in their searches after truth. Yet no one ever thought of being discouraged from experimental inquiries, because even the strictest prosecution of the inductive method cannot always guard against error; nor did the Scriblerus of the combined wits ever deter one student of Nature. It is of the essence of all investigations of merely contingent truth, that they are exposed to casualties which do not beset the paths of the geometrician and the analyst. A conclusion from one induction of facts may be well warranted until a larger induction obliges us to abandon it, and *adopt another.* Yet no one deems chemistry *discredited because* a body considered in one state of our knowledge to be a compound acid has since appeared rather to be a simple substance, bearing to the acids no resemblance in its composition; nor would the optical discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton be discredited, much less the science he cultivated be degraded, if the undulatory hypothesis should, as appears likely enough on a fuller inquiry, become established by strict proof. Yet such errors, or rather such imperfect and partial views, were the result of a strict obedience to the inductive rules of philosophising. How much less ground for cavil against either those rules, or the sciences to which they are applicable, would be afforded by the observations of those who had mistaken their way through a neglect of inductive principle, and by following blindly false guides!

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* *Principia*, lib. iii. Sch. Gen.

While then, on the one hand, we allow Natural Theology to form a distinct head or branch, the other sciences must of necessity continue to class its truths among their own; and thus every science may be stated to consist of *three* divisions:—1. The truths which it teaches relative to the constitution and action of matter or of mind;—2. The truths which it teaches relative to theology; and 3. The application of both classes of truths to practical uses, physical or moral. Thus, the science of pneumatics teaches, under the *first* head, the doctrine of the pressure of the atmosphere, and its connexion with respiration, and with the suspension of weights by the formation of a vacuum. Under the *second* head, it shows the adaptation of the lungs of certain animals to breathe the air, and the feet of others to support their bodies, in consequence of both being framed in accordance with the forme doctrine—that is, with the law of pressure—a

Under the *third* head, it teaches the construction of barometers, steam-engines, &c., while the contemplation of the Divine wisdom and goodness inculcates piety, patience, and hope.

But it may be said, that in this classification of the objects of science, we omit one ordinarily reckoned essential—the explanation of phenomena. The answer is, that such a classification is not strictly accurate, as no definite line can be drawn between the explanation of phenomena and the analytical process by which the truths themselves are established; in a word, between analysis and synthesis in the sciences of contingent truth. For the same phenomena which form the materials of the analytical investigation—the steps that lead us to the proposition or discovery—would, in a reversed order, become the subjects of the synthetical operation: that is, the things to be explained by means of the proposition or discovery, if we had been led to it by another route, in other words, if we had reached it by means of other phenomena of the like kind, referrible to the same class, and falling within the same principle or rule. Thus the experiments upon the prismatic spectrum prove the sun's light to be composed of rays of different refrangibility. This being demonstrated, we may explain by means of it the phenomena which form the proofs of the first proposition of the "*Optics*," that lights which differ in colour differ in refrangibility—as that a parallelogram of two colours refracted through a prism has its sides no longer parallel; or, having shown the different refrangibility by *the prismatic* phenomena, we may explain why *a lens has the focus* of violet rays nearer than *e focus of red,* while this experiment is of itse one of the most cogent proofs of the different refrangibility. It is plain that, in these cases, the same phenomenon may be made indiscriminately the subject matter either of analysis or synthesis. So, one of the proofs given of latent heat is, that after you heat a bar of iron once or twice by hammering it, the power of being thus heated is exhausted, until by exposing it to the fire that power is restored. Yet, suppose we had proved the doctrine of the absorption of heat by other experiments —as by the effects on the thermometer of liquids of different temperatures mixed together—the phenomenon of the iron bar would be explicable by that doctrine thus learnt. Again, another proof of the same truth is the production of heat by the sudden condensation of gaseous fluids, and of cold by evaporation, the evolution of heat being inferred from the former, and its absorption from the latter operation. But if the experiments upon the mixture of fluids of different temperatures, and other facts, had sufficiently proved the disappearance of heat in its sensible form, and its being held in a state in which it did not affect the thermometer, we should by means of that doctrine have been able to account for the refrigerating effect of evaporation, and the heating power of condensation.

It cannot, then, be a real and an accurate distinction, or one founded on the nature of the thing, which depends on the accident of the one set of facts having been chosen for the instruments of the analytical, and the other set for the subjects of the synthetical operation, each set being alike applicable to either use. For, in order that the synt
may be correct, nay, in order that it may be
and not hypothetical, it is obviously necessary

the phenomena should be of such a description as might have made them subservient to the analysis. In truth, both the operations are essentially the same—the generalization of particulars—the arranging or classifying facts so as to obtain a more general or comprehensive fact; and the explanation of phenomena is just as much a process of generalization or classification as the investigation of the proposition itself, by means of which you are to give the explanation. We do not perform two operations, but one, in these investigations. We do not in reality first find by the prism that light is differently refrangible, and then explain the rainbow—or show by the air-pump that the atmosphere presses with the weight of so many pounds upon a square foot, and then explain the steam-engine and the fly's foot—or prove, by burning the two weighed gases together and burning iron in one of them, that water is composed of them both, and that rust is the metal combined with one, and then explain why iron rusts in water. But we observe all these several facts, and find that they are related to each other, and resolvable into three classes—that the phenomena of the prism and of the shower are the same, the spectrum and the rainbow being varieties of the same fact, more general than either, and comprehending many others, all reducible within its compass—that the air-pump, the steam-engine, the fly's foot, are all he same fact, and come within a description still more general and compendious—that the rusting of iron, the burning of inflammable air, and the partial consumption of the blood in the lungs, are *kewise the same fact in* different shapes, and re-*vable into a fact* much more comprehensive.

If, then, the distinction of investigation and explanation, or the analytical and synthetical process, is to be retained, it can only be nominal; and it is productive of but little if any convenience. On the contrary, it is calculated to introduce inaccurate habits of philosophising, and holds out a temptation to hypothetical reasoning. Having obtained a general law, or theory, we are prone to apply it where no induction shows that it is applicable; and perceiving that it would account for the observed phenomena, if certain things existed, we are apt to assume their existence, that we may apply our explanation. Thus we know, that if the walrus's foot, or the fly's, make a vacuum, the pressure of the air will support the animal's weight, and hence we assume that the vacuum is made. Yet it is clear that we have no right whatever to do so; and that the strict rules of induction require us to prove the vacuum before we can arrange this fact in the same class with the other instances of atmospheric pressure. But when we have proved it by observation, it will be said we have gained nothing by our general doctrine. True; but all that the science entitles us to do is, not to draw facts we are half acquainted with under the arbitrary sway of our rule, but to examine each fact in all its parts, and bring it legitimately within the rule by means of its ascertained resemblances—that is, classify it with those others to which we actually find that it bears the common relation. Induction gives us the right to expect that the same result will always happen from *the same action* operating in like circumstances; *but it is of the essence of this inference that the similarity be first shown.*

It may be worth while to illustrate this further, as it is an error very generally prevailing, and leads to an exceedingly careless kind of inquiry. The fundamental rule of inductive science is, that no hypothesis shall be admitted—that nothing shall be assumed merely because, if true, it would explain the facts. Thus the magnetic theory of Æpinus is admitted by all to be admirably consistent with itself, and to explain all the phenomena—that is, to tally exactly with the facts observed. But there is no proof at all of the accumulation of electrical or magnetic fluid at the one pole, and other fundamental positions; on the contrary, the facts are rather against them: therefore, the theory is purely gratuitous; and although it would be difficult to find any other, on any subject, more beautiful in itself, or more consistent with all the phenomena, it is universally rejected as a mere hypothesis, of no use or value in scientific research. The inductive method consists in only admitting those things which the facts prove to be true, and excludes the supposing things merely because they square with the facts. Whoever makes such suppositions upon observing a certain number of facts, and then varies those suppositions when new facts come to his knowledge, so as to make the theory tally with the observation—whoever thus goes on touching and retouching his theory each time a new fact is observed which does not fall within the original proposition, is a mere framer of hypotheses, not an inductive inquirer—a fancier, and not a philosopher.

Now, *this being the* undoubted rule, does not *he course of those fall* exactly within it, who, *ving upon a certain* class of phenomena, built a nclusion legitimately and by strict induction, nploy that conclusion to explain other phenomena, hich they have not previously shown to fall within he same description? Take the example of the Torricellian vacuum. Having by that experiment proved the weight of the atmosphere, we have a right to conclude that a tube filled with water forty feet high would have a vacuum in the uppermost seven feet—because we know the relative specific gravities of water and mercury, and might predict from thence that the lighter fluid would stand at the height of thirty-three feet; and this conclusion we have a right to draw, without any experiments to ascertain the existence of a vacuum in the upper part of the tube. But we should have no right whatever to draw this conclusion, without ascertaining the specific gravities of the two fluids; for if we did, it would be assuming that the two facts belonged to the same class. S respecting the power of the walrus or the fly t walk up a vertical plane. We know the effects exhausting the air between any two bodies, a leaving the external atmosphere to press agai them: they will cohere. But if from thence explain the support given to the walrus or the without examining their feet, and ascertaining they do exhaust or press out the air—if, in sh we assume the existence of a vacuum under feet, merely because were there a vacuum pressure of the air would produce the coh and thus account for the phenomena—we *only propound* a hypothesis. We suppose c *circumstances to* exist, in order to classify th *with other facts* actually observed, and th *ence of which* circumstances is necessary.

that the phenomena may be reducible under the same head.

There is no reason whatever for asserting that this view of the subject restricts the use of induction by requiring too close and constant a reference to actual observation. The inductive principle is this—that from observing a number of particular facts, we reason to others of the same kind—that from observing a certain thing to happen in certain circumstances, we expect the same thing to happen in the like circumstances. This is to generalize; but then this assumes that we first show the identity of the facts, by proving the similarity of the circumstances. If not, we suppose or fancy, and do not reason or generalize. The tendency of the doctrine that a proposition being demonstrated by one set of facts, may be used to explain another set, has the effect of making us suppose or assume the identity or resemblance which ought to be proved. The true principle is, that induction is the generalizing or classifying of facts by observed resemblances and diversities.

Nothing here stated has any tendency to shackle our experimental inquiries by too rigidly narrowing the proof. Thus, although we are not allowed to suppose any thing merely because, if it existed, other things would be explained; yet, when no other supposition will account for the appearances, the hypothesis is no longer gratuitous; and it constantly happens, that an inference drawn from an imperfect induction, and which would be, on that state of the facts, unauthorized because equivocal and *not the only* supposition on which the facts *could be explained,* becomes legitimate on a *further induction,* whereby we show that, though th

facts first observed might be explained by sı
other supposition, yet those facts newly obser
could to no other supposition be reconciled. Tl
the analytical experiment on the constitution
water, by passing steam over red hot iron, is
conclusive, because, although it tallies well v
the position that water consists of oxygen and
drogen, yet it would also tally with another s
position, that those gases were produced in
process, and not merely separated from each otl
so that neither oxygen nor hydrogen existed in
water any more than acid and water exist in
and wood; but only their elements, and that,
the acid and water, the products of the destruc
distillation of those vegetable substances, the c
gen and hydrogen were compounded and in
produced by the process. But when, beside
analytical, we have the synthetical experiment
Mr. Cavendish and Dr. Priestley*—when we
that by burning the two gases in a close ve
they disappear, and leave a weight of water e
to their united weights—we have a fact not re
cilable to any other supposition, except that of
composition of this fluid. It is as when, in sol
a problem, we fix upon a point in one line, cu

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* Dr. Priestley drew no conclusion of the least v
from his experiments. But Mr. Watt, after thorou
weighing them, by careful comparison with other f
arrived at the opinion that they proved the compositi
water. This may justly be said to have been the disco
of that great truth in chemical science. I have exam
the evidence, and am convinced that he was the first d
verer, in point of time, although it is very possible that
Cavendish may have arrived at the same truth from his
experiments, without any knowledge of Mr. Watt's e
process of reasoning.—See Life of Watt, and Paper a
to M. Arago's Eloge.

or straight, because it answers one of the conditions—it may be the right point, or it may not, for all the other points of the line equally answer that condition; but when we also show that the remaining conditions require the point to be in another line, and that this other intersects the former in the very point we had assumed, then no doubt can exist, and the point is evidently the one required, none other fulfilling all the conditions.

We have used the words *analytical* and *synthetical* as applicable to the experiments of resolution and composition; and in this sense these terms are strictly correct in reference to inductive operations. But the use of the terms *analysis* and *synthesis* as applicable to the processes of induction—the former being the investigation of truths by experiment or observation, and the latter the explaining other facts by means of the truths so ascertained—is by no means so correct, and rests upon an extremely fallacious analogy, if there be indeed any analogy, for identity, or even resemblance, there is none. The terms are borrowed from mathematical science, where they denote the two kinds of investigation employed in solving problems and investigating theorems. When, in order to solve a problem, we suppose a thing done which we know not how to do, we reason upon the assumption that the prescribed conditions have been complied with, and proceed till we find something which we already possess the means of doing. This gives us the construction; and the synthetical demonstration consists in merely retracing the steps of the analysis. *And so of a theorem*: we assume it to be true, and *reasoning on that* assumption, we are led to some*thing which* we know from other sources to true, the synthesis being the same opera versed. The two operations consist here, fest necessity, of the very same steps— being the steps of the other taken in the order. In physics, to make the operations to these, the same facts should be the g component parts of both. In analysis, w ascend not only from particulars to gene from the same particulars, and then the would be a descent through the same step particular phenomena from the general fa it is a spurious synthesis, unlike the math and not warranted by induction, to prove position by one set of facts, and by that pr to explain—that is, classify—another set, examining it by itself. If we do exami itself, and find that it is such as the pr applies to, then also is it such as might p proposition; and the synthesis is here, a case of the mathematical investigation, the reversed. As far as any resemblance or goes, there is even a greater affinity bet inductive analysis and the geometrical s than between those operations which g same name; and I hardly know anythin perimental investigation resembling the n tical analysis, unless it be when, from o certain facts, we assume a position, and th that if this be true, some other facts must a which we find (from other proofs) really This bears a resemblance rather to the a investigation than to the composition or sy demonstration of theorems in the ancient g It is not the course of reasoning frequently *in experimental* sciences; but a most

le of it occurs in the second part of Dr.
s experiments on Magnesia Alba and Quick
the foundation of the modern gaseous che-
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n the whole, the use of these terms is apt to
l; and, for the reasons which have been
d, there seems no solidity in the division of
ive inquiry into the two classes.*

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ien this section was written, I had not seen Mr.
's learned remarks upon analysis and synthesis in the
volume of his Elements, nor was aware of the ob-
ns of Dr. Hook, quoted by him, and which show a
ble coincidence with one of the observations in the
Mr. Stewart's speculations do not come upon the same
with mine; but Dr. Hook having reversed the use
rms analysis and synthesis in experimental science,
a strong confirmation of the remark which I have
d to make upon the inaccuracy of this application of
atical language.—(See Elem. of Phil. of Human
ol. ii. p. 354, 4to.)

PART THE SECOND.

OF THE ADVANTAGES OF THE STUDY OF NATURAL THEOLOGY.

The uses of studying the science to which our i quiries have been directed now demand some co sideration. These consist of the pleasures whi attend all scientific pursuits, the pleasures and t improvement peculiar to the study of Natural Th ology, and the service rendered by this study to t doctrines of Revelation.

SECTION I.

OF THE PLEASURES OF SCIENCE.

As we have established the position that Natu Theology is a branch of Inductive Science, it f lows that its truths are calculated to bestow same kind of gratification which the investigati and the contemplation of scientific truth genera is fitted to give.

That there is a positive pleasure in such searches and such views, wholly independent any regard to the advantages derived from th application to the aid of man in his physical nec sities, is quite undeniable. The ascertaining by demonstration any of the great truths in the mathematics, or proving by experiment any of the important properties of matter, would give a real and solid pleasure, even were it certain that no practical use could be made of either the one or the other. To know that the square of the hypothenuse is always exactly equal to the sum of the squares of the sides of a right-angled triangle, whatever be its size, and whatever the magnitude of the acute angles, is pleasing; and to be able to trace the steps by which the absolute certainty of this proposition is established is gratifying, even if we were wholly ignorant that the art of guiding a ship through the pathless ocean mainly depends upon it. Accordingly we derive pleasure from rising to the contemplation of the much more general truth, of which the discovery of Pythagoras (the 47th proposition of the First Book of Euclid) is but a particular case, and which is also applicable to all similar triangles, and indeed to circles and ellipses also, described on the right-angled triangle's sides; and yet that general proposition is of no use in navigation, nor indeed in any other practical art. In like manner, the pleasure derived from ascertaining that the pressure of the air and the creation of a vacuum alike cause the rise of the mercury in the barometer, and give the power to flies of walking on the ceiling of a room, is wholly independent of any practical use obtained from the discovery, inasmuch as it is a pleasure superadded to that of contemplating the doctrine proved by the Torricellian experiment, which had conferred all its practical benefits long before the cause of the fly's power was found out.

Thus again it is one of the most sublime truths in science, and the contemplation of which, as mere contemplation, affords the greatest pleasure, that the same power which makes a stone fall to the ground keeps the planets in their course, moulds the huge masses of those heavenly bodies into their appointed forms, and reduces to perfect order all the apparent irregularities of the system: so that the handful of sand which for an instant ruffles the surface of the lake, acts by the same law which governs, through myriads of ages, the mighty system composed of myriads of worlds. There is a positive pleasure in generalizing facts and arguments—in perceiving the wonderful production of most unlike results from a few very simple principles—in finding the same powers or agents re-appearing in different situations, and producing the most diverse and unexpected effects—in tracing unexpected resemblances and differences—in ascertaining that truths or facts apparently unlike are of the same nature, and observing wherein those apparently similar are various: and this pleasure is quite independent of all considerations relating to practical application; nay, the additional knowledge that those truths are susceptible of a beneficial application gives a further gratification of the like kind to those who are certain never to have the opportunity of sharing the benefits obtained, and who indeed may earnestly desire never to be in the condition of being able to share them.

in addition to the pleasure received from
plating a truth in animal physiology, we
other gratification from finding that one of
llaries is the construction of an instrument
n urgical operation. Yet,

assuredly, we have no desire ever to receive advantage from this corollary; and our scientific gratification was wholly without regard to any such view. In truth, generalizing—the discovery of remote analogies—of resemblances among unlike objects—forms one of the most pleasing employments of our faculties in every department of mental exertion, from the most severe investigations of the mathematician to the lightest efforts of the wit. To trace the same equality, or other relation, between figures apparently unlike, is the chief glory of the geometrician; to bring together ideas of the most opposite description, and show them in unexpected, yet when suddenly pointed out, undeniable connexion, is the very definition of wit. Nay, the proposition which we have just enunciated is a striking instance of the same general truth; for we have been surveying the resemblance, or rather the identity, in one important particular of two pursuits, in all other respects the most widely remote from each other—mathematics and wit.

If the mere contemplation of scientific truth is the source of real gratification, there is another pleasure, alike remote from all reference to practical use or benefit, and which is obtained by tracing the investigations and demonstration—the steps that lead analytically to the discovery, and synthetically to the proof of those truths. This is a source of pleasure, both by giving us the assurance that the propositions of generalization—the statements of resemblance and diversity—are true in themselves, and also by the conscio
power which it imparts, and the feelin
culty *overcome which it* involves. We

fied when we have closely followed the brilliant induction which led Newton to the discovery that white is the union of all colours, and when we have accompanied him in the series of profound researches, from the invention of a new calculus or instrument of investigation, through innumerable original geometrical lemmas, to the final demonstration that the force of gravitation deflects the comet from the tangent of its elliptical orbit; and we feel the gratification, because the pursuit of these investigations assures us that the marvellous propositions are indeed true—because there is a consciousness of man's power in being able to penetrate so far into the secrets of nature, and search so far into the structure of the universe—and because there is a pleasure, which we enjoy individually, in having accomplished a task of considerable difficulty. In these gratifications, derived from the contemplation and the investigation of general laws, consists the Pleasure of Science properly so called, and apart from all views of deriving particular advantages from its application to man's use.

This pleasure is increased as often as we find that any scientific discovery is susceptible of practical applications. The contemplation of this adaptation is pleasing, independent of any regard to our own individual advantage, and even though we may desire never to be in a condition to reap benefit from it. We sympathize, perhaps, with those who may be so unfortunate as to require the aid afforded by such applications to relieve and assuage pain; but the mere knowledge that such a corollary follows from the discovery of the scientific truth is pleasing. Of course the gratification is increased, if we know that individually we shall profit by it, and we may perhaps always more or less contemplate this possibility; but this is a pleasure, properly speaking, of a different kind from that which science, as such, bestows.

The branch of science which we are here particularly considering differs in no respect from the other departments of philosophy in the kind of gratification which it affords to those who cultivate it. Natural Theology, like the other sciences, whether physical or mental, bestows upon the student the pleasures of contemplation--of generalization; and it bestows this pleasure in an eminent degree. To trace design in the productions and in the operations of nature, or in those of the human understanding, is, in the strictest sense of the word, generalization, and consequently produces the same pleasure with the generalizations of physical and of psychological science. Every part of the foregoing reasoning, therefore, applies closely and rigorously to the study of Natural Theology. Thus, if it is pleasing to find that the properties of two curves so exceedingly unlike as the ellipse and the hyperbola closely resemble each other, or that appearances so dissimilar as the motion of the moon and the fall of an apple from the tree are different forms of the same fact, it affords a pleasure of the same kind to discover that the light of the glow-worm and the song of the nightingale are both provisions of nature for the same end of attracting the animal's mate, and continuing its kind—that the peculiar law o
tion pervading all matter, the magnit
heavenly bodies, the inclination of the
move *in, and the* directions of their cou

so contrived as to make their mutual actions, and the countless disturbances thence arising, all secure a perpetual stability to the system which no other arrangement could attain. It is a highly pleasing contemplation of the self-same kind with those of the other sciences to perceive every where design and adaptation—to discover uses even in things apparently the most accidental—to trace this so constantly, that where peradventure we cannot find the purpose of nature, we never for a moment suppose there was none, but only that we have hitherto failed in finding it out—and to arrive at the intimate persuasion that all seeming disorder is harmony—all chance, design—and that nothing is made in vain. Nay, things which in our ignorance we had overlooked as unimportant, or even complained of as evils, fill us afterwards with contentment and delight, when we find that they are subservient to the most important and beneficial uses. Thus inflammation and the generation of matter in a wound we find to be the effort which Nature makes to produce new flesh, and effect the cure; the opposite hinges of the valves in the veins and arteries are the means of enabling the blood to circulate; and so of innumerable other arrangements of the animal economy. So, too, there is the highest gratification derived from observing that there is a perfect unity, or, as it has been called, a *personality*, in the kind of the contrivances in which the universe abounds; and truly this peculiarity of character or of manner, as other writers have termed it, affords the same species of pleasure which we derive from contemplating general resemblances in the other sciences.

We may close this branch of the subject with he observation that those other sciences have often n their turn derived aid from Natural Theology, at east from the speculation of Final Causes, for which hey; generally speaking, lay the foundation. Many iscoveries in the physiology both of animals and lants owe their origin to some arrangement or tructure being remarked, the peculiar object of hich was not known, and the ascertaining of hich led to the knowledge of an important truth. he well-known anecdote of Harvey related by Ir. Boyle is the best example of this which can be iven. In his tract on Final Causes he thus writes: 'I remember that when I asked our famous Har-ey, in the only discourse I had with him (which as but a while before he died), what were the hings that induced him to think of a circulation f the blood, he answered me, that when he took otice that the valves in the veins of so many parts f the body were so placed that they gave free assage to the blood towards the heart, but opposed he passage of the venal blood the contrary way, e was incited to imagine that so provident a cause s Nature had not so placed so many valves without esign, and no design seemed more probable than hat since the blood could not well, because of the nterposing valves, be sent by the veins to the limbs, it should be sent through the arteries, and return through the veins whose valves did not oppose its course that way."* Even the arts have borrowed from the observation of the animal economy. Those valves — the hollow bones of birds—the sockets of the joints—have all furnished suggestions upon which some of our most useful machinery is constructed. Nor can any abuse arise from this employment of the argument, so long as we take care only to let it occupy the subordinate place of a suggestor—an originator of inquiry—and never suffer it to usurp the station of a sole guide, or a substitute for that induction which alone can be relied on in forming our conclusions. The ancients were ignorant of this caution, and would probably have rested satisfied with the consideration which only set Harvey upon making experiments, instead of proving in this way what the argument from Final Causes only rendered probable. Hence much of what, as we have already explained, Lord Bacon has said upon the subject of this speculation, abused as it certainly has been in all ages, but especially in ancient times.

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* Disquisition about the Final Causes of Natural Things. —Works, vol. v. p. 427. *4to.*

SECTION II.

OF THE PLEASURE AND IMPROVEMENT PECULIAR TO NATURAL THEOLOGY.

HITHERTO we have only shown that the gratification which the contemplation of scientific truth is calculated to bestow belongs to Natural Theology in common with the other branches of philosophy. But there are several considerations which make it plain that the pleasure must be greater which flows from the speculations of this than any which the other sciences confer.

In the *first* place, the nature of the truths with which Natural Theology is conversant is to be considered. They relate to the evidences of design, of contrivance, of power, of wisdom, of goodness, but let us only say of design or contrivance. Nothing can be more gratifying to the mind than such contemplations: they afford great scope to the reasoning powers; they exercise the resources of our ingenuity; they give a new aspect to the most ordinary appearances; they impart life, as it were, to dead matter; they are continually surprising us with novel and unexpected proofs of intentions plainly directed to a manifest object. If some scoffers and superficial persons despise the enthusiasm with which these investigations have at times been pursued, and hold the exercise given by them to the ingenuity of inquirers to be rather a play of imagination than of reasoning, it is equally undeniable that in some of the most important and most practically useful of the sciences, design, so far from being a matter of fanciful conjecture, is always assumed as incontestable, and the inquiry, often with a merely practical view, is confined to discovering what the object of the design is. Thus, when the physiologist has discovered some part of the animal body before unknown, or observed some new operation of the known organs, he never doubts that design exists, and that some end is to be answered. This he takes for granted without any reasoning; and he only endeavours to find out what the purpose is—what use the part can have—what end the operation is intended to accomplish; never supposing it possible that either the part could be created, or the function appointed, without an object. The investigation conducted upon the assumption of this postulate has frequently led to the most brilliant discoveries—among others, as we have just seen, to by far the most important ever made in physiological science. For the mere exercise of the intellectual faculties, or gratification of scientific curiosity, we may refer to almost all the singular phenomena which form the bases of the reasonings as to design—the structure of the ear, and still more of the eye—the circulation of the blood—the physiology of the fœtus in the womb, as contrasted with the economy of the born animal, and the prospective contrivances of a system which, until the birth, is to be wholly useless—the structure of the eye and the nictitating membrane in different birds, and the haw in certain quadrupeds—the powers of the eye in birds of prey—perhaps more than anything else, the construction of their *cells by bees,* according to the most certain principles discovered by men only with the help of the most refined analytical calculus. The atheist can only deny the wonderful nature of such operations of instinct by the violent assumption that the bee works as the heavenly bodies roll, and that its mathematically correct operations are no more to be wondered at than the equally mathematically adjusted movements of the planets—a truly violent assumption, and especially of those who angrily deny that men have a soul differing in kind from the sentient principle in the lower animals.

Secondly. The universal recurrence of the facts on which Natural Theology rests deserves to be regarded as increasing the interest of this science. The other sciences, those of Physics at least, are studied only when we withdraw from all ordinary pursuits, and give up our meditations to them. Those which can only be prosecuted by means of experiment can never be studied at all without some act of our own to alter the existing state of things, and place nature in circumstances which force her by a kind of question, as Lord Bacon phrases it, to reveal her secrets. Even the sciences which depend on observation have their fields spread only here and there, hardly ever lying in our way, and not always accessible when we would go out of our way to walk in them. But there is no place where the evidences of Natural Religion are not distributed in ample measure. It is equally true that those evidences continually meet us in all the other branches of science. A discovery made in these almost certainly involves some new proofs of design in the formation and government of the universe.

Thirdly and chiefly. Natural Theology stands far above all other sciences from the sublime and elevating nature of its objects. It tells of the creation of all things—of the mighty power that fashioned and that sustains the universe—of the exquisite skill that contrived the wings, and beak, and feet of insects invisible to the naked eye—and that lighted the lamp of day, and launched into space comets a thousand times larger than the earth, whirling a million of times swifter than a cannon ball, and burning with a heat which a thousand centuries could not quench. It exceeds the bounds of material existence, and raises us from the creation to the Author of Nature. Its office is, not only to mark what things are, but for what purpose they were made by the infinite wisdom of an all-powerful Being, with whose existence and attributes its high prerogative is to bring us acquainted. If we prize, and justly, the delightful contemplations of the other sciences; if we hold it a marvellous gratification to have ascertained exactly the swiftness of the remotest planets—the number of grains that a piece of lead would weigh at their surfaces—and the degree in which each has become flattened in shape by revolving on its axis; it is surely a yet more noble employment of our faculties, and a still higher privilege of our nature, humbly, but confidently, to ascend from the universe to its Great First Cause, and investigate the unity, the personality, the intentions, as well
he matchless skill and mighty power of Him
made and sustains and moves those prodigious
, and all that inhabit them.

atification of which we have been
cientific, and wholly independent

of any views of practical benefit resulting from th science of Natural Theology. The pleasure i question is merely that double gratification whic every science bestows—namely, the contemplatio of truth, in tracing resemblances and difference and the perception of the evidence by which tha truth is established. Natural Theology gives thi double pleasure, like all other branches of scienc —like the mathematics—like physics—and woul give it if we were beings of an order different fro man, and whose destinies never could be affecte by the truth or the falsehood of the doctrines i question. Nay, we may put a still stronger cas one analogous to the instance given above of th pleasure derived from contemplating some fin invention of a surgical instrument. Persons c such lives as should make it extremely desirable t them that there was no God, and no Future Stat might very well, as philosophers, derive gratification from contemplating the truths of Natura Theology, and from following the chain of evidence by which these are established, and migh in such sublime meditation, find some solace to th pain which reflection upon the past and fears of th future are calculated to inflict upon them.

But it is equally certain that the science derive an interest incomparably greater from the consideration that we ourselves, who cultivate it, ar most of all concerned in its truth—that our ow highest destinies are involved in the results of th investigation. This, indeed, makes it, beyond al doubt, the most interesting of the sciences, an sheds on the other branches of philosophy an interest beyond that which otherwise belongs t them, rendering *them* more attractive in propo tion as they connect themselves with this grand branch of human knowledge, and are capable of being made subservient to its uses. See only in what contemplations the wisest of men end their most sublime inquiries! Mark where it is that a Newton finally reposes after piercing the thickest veil that envelopes nature—grasping and arresting in their course the most subtle of her elements and the swiftest—traversing the regions of boundless space—exploring worlds beyond the solar way—giving out the law which binds the universe in eternal order! He rests, as by an inevitable necessity, upon the contemplation of the Great First Cause, and holds it his highest glory to have made the evidence of his existence, and the dispensations of his power and of his wisdom, better understood by men.

If such are the peculiar pleasures which appertain to this science, it seems to follow that those philosophers are mistaken who would restrict us to a very few demonstrations, to one or two instances of design, as sufficient proofs of the Deity's power and skill in the creation of the world. That one sufficient proof of this kind is in a certain sense enough cannot be denied: a single such proof overthrows the dogmas of the atheist, and dispels the doubts of the sceptic; but is it enough to the gratification of the contemplative mind? The great multiplication of proofs undeniably strengthens our positions; nor can we ever affirm respecting the
ems in a science not of necessary b
truth, that the evidence is sufficie
variety and repetition. But, ind
tion, the gra
design wh

led to contemplate. Each is different from the other. Each step renews our delight. The finding that at every step we make in one science, and with one object in view, a new proof is added to those before possessed by another science, affords a perpetual source of new interest and fresh enjoyment. This would be true if the science in question were one of an ordinary description. But when we consider what its nature is—how intimately connected with our highest concerns—how immediately and necessarily leading to the religious adoration of the Supreme Being—can we doubt that the perpetually renewed proofs of his power, wisdom, and goodness tend to fix and to transport the mind, by the constant nourishment thus afforded to feelings of pure and rational devotion? It is, in truth, an exercise at once intellectual and moral, in which the highest faculties of the understanding and the warmest feelings of the heart alike partake, and in which not only without ceasing to be a philosopher the student feels as a man, but in which the more warmly his human feelings are excited, the more philosophically he handles the subject. What delight can be more elevating, more truly worthy of a rational creature's enjoyment, than to feel, wherever we tread the paths of scientific inquiry, new evidence springing up around our footsteps—new traces of divine intelligence and power meeting our eye! We are never alone; at least, like the old Roman, we are never less alone than in our solitude. We walk with the Deity; we commune with the great First Cause, who sustains at every instant what the word of his power made. The delight is renewed at each step of progress, though as far as evidence is concer have long ago had proof enough. But that is no more a reason for ceasing to contemplate the subject in its perpetually renovated and varied forms, than it would be a reason for resting satisfied with once seeing a long-lost friend, that his existence had been sufficiently proved by one interview. Thus, instead of restricting ourselves to the proofs alone required to refute atheism or remove scepticism, we should covet the indefinite multiplication of evidences of design and skill in the universe, as subservient in a threefold way to purposes of use and of gratification: *first*, as strengthening the foundation whereupon the system reposes; *secondly*, as conducive to the ordinary purposes of scientific gratification: each instance being a fresh renewal of that kind of enjoyment; and *thirdly*, as giving additional ground for devout, pleasing, and wholesome adoration of the Great First Cause who made and who sustains all nature.

It is, therefore, manifest that, instead of resting satisfied with details and reasons barely sufficient to prove the existence of design in the universe, the gratification of a laudable scientific curiosity, and the proper indulgence of rational devotion, require that every occasion should be taken of exhibiting those evidences upon which the system of Natural Theology rests. The professed treatises upon that science do not suffice for this purpose, although they ought unquestionably to enter largely, and with very great variety of illustration, into the proofs; but each several branch of science, natural and moral, should have a constant reference to this, and should never fail to apply its peculiar doctrines towards the proof and the illustration of the *doctrines of* Natural Theology.

SECTION III.

ON THE CONNEXION BETWEEN NATURAL AND REVEALED RELIGION.

The ordinary arguments against Natural Theology with which we have to contend are those of atheists and sceptics; of persons who deny the existence of a First Cause, or who involve the whole question in doubt; of persons who think they see a balance of reason for denying the existence of a Deity, or who consider the reasons on both sides as so equally poised that it is impossible to decide either way. An objection of a very different nature has sometimes proceeded, unexpectedly, from a very different quarter—the friends of Revelation—who have been known, without due reflection, to contend that by the light of unassisted reason we can know absolutely nothing of God and a Future State. They appear to be alarmed lest the progress of Natural Religion should prove dangerous to the acceptance of Revealed; lest the former should, as it were, be taken as a substitute for the latter. They argue as if the two systems were rivals, and whatever credit the one gained, were so much lost to the other. They seem to think that if any discovery of a First Cause and another world were made by natural reason, it would no longer be true that "life and immortality were brought to light by the gospel." Although these reasoners are neither the most famous advocates of revelation, nor most enlightened, we yet may do well to show the groundlessness of the alarms which they would excite.

1. In the *first* place, it is worthy of our consideration that the greatest advocates of Natural Theology have always been sincere and even zealous Christians. The names of Ray, Clarke, Derham, Keill, Paley, attest the truth of this assertion. None of these was likely to lend his support to any system, the evidence of which put the outworks of Christianity in jeopardy. Some of them, as Clarke and Paley, have signalized themselves as strenuous and able defenders of the truth of Revelation. Derham actually delivered his celebrated work on the great truths of Natural Theology as a series of sermons preached in Bow Church, at a Lecture for the promotion of the Christian religion, founded by Mr. Boyle. At the same Lecture, in St. Paul's, was delivered Dr. Clarke's argument *à priori*, and indeed his whole "Evidence of Natural and Revealed Religion," as well as his "Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God;" and Dr. Bentley, the first preacher upon that foundation, delivered in like manner as sermons his argument in favour of Natural Religion from the structure of the human mind, the animal body, and the universe at large.

This Lecture was expressly founded by Mr. Boyle in support of the Christian religion; and no reference to Natural Theology, apart from its uses in supporting Revelation, is to be found in the terms of the gift. The subject of the eight sermons is to be, in the words of the will, "The proof of the Christian religion against notorious infidels, *viz. atheists*, theists, Pagans, Jews, and Mahometans, not descending lower to any controversies that are among Christians themselves." Yet the great Christian divines whom we have named so construed these words as to include a proof of Natural Religion among the most essential arguments for Christianity; and almost as many of the sermons preached at the Boyle Lecture, during the first forty years after its foundation, relate to the doctrines of Natural Theology as to those of Revelation. So far were the divines of that day from holding the two subjects as hostile to each other.*

2. But, *secondly*, Natural Theology is most serviceable to the support of Revelation. All the soundest arguments in behalf of the latter presuppose the former to be admitted. Witness the profound work of Butler, his "Analogy of Natural and Revealed Religion to the Order of Nature," the most argumentative and philosophical defence of Christianity ever submitted to the world. But Lardner and Paley, and all other writers on the same side, abound in references to Natural Theology, and in the course of their reasonings assume its truth as postulates.

We may suppose that those practised controversialists and zealous Christians did not make such assumptions gratuitously. We may safely give them credit for not resting their case upon more postulates than the exigency of the argument required. Such a course, if unnecessary, would have been most unskilful, and might have proved dangerous by opening the door to new attacks. But they are not peculiar in their view of the subje Boyle and Newton were as sincerely attached Christianity as any men in any age, and they likewise the most zealous advocates of Natu Religion. Lord Bacon, though imbued perh with a certain degree of prejudice on this subje but of a philosophical and not a polemical orig distinctly places the truth of Natural Religion the entrance of theological study, and regards t evidences of Revelation as founded upon the p vious demonstration of Natural Theology. "T latter," he says, "is the key of the former, a opens our understanding to the genuine spirit the scriptures, but also unlocks our belief, so t we may enter upon the serious contemplation the divine Power, the characters of which are deeply graven in the works of the creation."* elsewhere also lays it down as clear that atheism to be refuted not by miracles but by the conte plation of nature, and accurately takes the disti tion between Revelation and Natural Religio that the former declares the will of God as to t worship most acceptable, while the latter teac his existence and powers, but is silent as to ritual.†

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* If any one will read the vituperation rather than sermon against infidels with which Dr. Bentley commences his discourses upon Natural Religion, he will see no reason to doubt *the zeal for Christianity* of that most learned preacher.

3. Accordingly we proceed a step farther, a assert, *thirdly*, that it is a vain and ignorant thi to suppose that Natural Theology is not necess to the support of Revelation. The latter may untrue, though the former be admitted. It m be proved, or allowed, that there is a God, thou it be denied that he ever sent any message to m through men or other intermediate agents; as

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* *De Dig.* et Aug. lib. i.

† De Dig. lib. iii. c. 2.

deed the Epicureans believed in the existence of the gods, but held them to keep wholly aloof from human affairs, leaving the world, physical as well as moral, to itself, without the least interference in its concerns.* But Revelation cannot be true if Natural Religion is false, and cannot be demonstrated strictly by any argument, or established by any evidence, without proving or assuming the latter. A little attention to the subject will clearly prove this proposition.

Suppose it were shown by incontestable proofs that a messenger sent immediately from heaven had appeared on the earth; suppose, to make the case more strong against our argument, that this messenger arrived in our own days, nay appeared before our eyes, and showed his divine title to have his message believed by performing miracles in our presence. No one can by possibility imagine a stronger case; for it excludes all arguments upon the weight or the fallibility of testimony; it assumes all the ordinary difficulties in the way of Revelation to be got over. Now, even this strong evidence would not at all establish the truth of the doctrine promulgated by the messenger; for it would not show that the story he brought was worthy of belief in any one particular except his supernatural powers. These would be demonstrated by his working miracles. All the rest of his statement would rest on his assertion. E being capable of working miracles might very be capable of deceiving us. The possessio power does not of necessity exclude either frau malice. This messenger might come from an as well as from a good being; he might come more beings than one; or he might come from being of many existing in the universe. W Christianity was first promulgated, the miracl Jesus were not denied by the ancients; but it asserted that they came from evil beings, and he was a magician. Such an explanation was sistent with the kind of belief to which the vot of polytheism were accustomed. They were h tually credulous of miracles and of divine i positions. But their argument was not at unphilosophical. There is nothing whatever consistent in the power to work miracles b conferred upon a man or a minister by a su natural being, who is either of limited power l self, or of great malignity, or who is one of m such beings. Yet it is certain that no means be devised for attesting the supernatural agenc any one, except such a power of working mirac therefore, it is plain that no sufficient evidence ever be given by direct Revelation alone in fa of the great truths of religion. The messenge question might have power to work miracles w out end, and yet it would remain unproved, ei that God was omnipotent, and one, and benevol or that he destined his creatures to a future s or that he had made them such as they are in t present state. All this might be true, indeed; its truth would rest only on the messenger's as *tion, and upon* whatever internal evidence nature of his communication afforded; and it might be false, without the least derogation to the truth of the fact that he came from a superior being, and possessed the power of suspending the laws of nature.

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* It is singular, too, that this sect inculcated religious duties towards the gods, whom nevertheless they neither believed to be the creators nor governors of the universe. Cicero says of its founder, "De sanctitate, de pietate adversus deos libros scripsit Epicurus. At quomodo in his loquitur? ut Coruncanum, ut Scævolam, pontifices maximos, te audire dicas." "You would think," says he, "to hear him it was our high-priests descanting upon holiness and

But the doctrines of the existence of a Deity and of his attributes, which Natural Religion teaches, preclude the possibility of such ambiguities and remove all those difficulties. We thus learn that the Creator of the world is one and the same; and we come to know his attributes, not merely of power, which alone the direct communication by miracles could convey, but of wisdom and goodness. Built upon this foundation, the message of Revelation becomes at once unimpeachable, and invaluable. It converts every inference of reason into certainty, and, above all, it communicates the Divine Being's intentions respecting our own lot with a degree of precision which the inferences of Natural Theology very imperfectly possess. This, in truth, is the chief superiority of Revelation, and this is the praise justly given to the Gospel in sacred writ—not that it teaches the being and attributes of God, but that it brings life and immortality to light.

It deserves, however, to be remarked, in perfect consistency with the argument which has here been maintained, that no mere Revelation, no direct message, however avouched by miraculous gifts, could prove the faithfulness of the promises held out by the messenger, excepting by the slight inference which the nature of the message might afford. The portion of his credentials which consisted of his miraculous powers could not prove it. For unless we had first ascertained the unity

and the benevolence of the being that sent him,
those miracles only prove power, he might be se
to deceive us ; and thus the hopes held out by hi
might be delusions. The doctrines of Natur
Religion here come to our aid, and secure o
belief to the messenger of one Being, whose goo
ness they have taught us to trust.

4. In other respects, the services of Natur
Religion are far from inconsiderable, as subsidiar
to, and co-operative with, the great help of Rev
lation. Thus, were our whole knowledge of th
Deity drawn from Revelation, its foundation mu
become weaker and weaker as the distance in poi
of time increases from the actual interpositio
Tradition, or the evidence of testimony, must
necessity be its only proof: for perpetual miracl
must be wrought to give us evidence by our ow
senses. Now, a perpetual miracle is a contradic
tion in terms; for the exception to, or suspensio
of, the laws of nature so often repeated woul
destroy the laws themselves, and with the law
the force of the exception or suspension. Upo
testimony, then, all Revelation must rest. Ever
age but the one in which the miracles wer
wrought, and every country but the one that wit
nessed them—indeed, all the people of that countr
itself save those actually present—must receiv
the proofs which they afford of Divine interposi
tion upon the testimony of eye-witnesses, and o
those to whom eye-witnesses told it. Even if th
miracles were exhibited before all the nations o
one age, the next must believe upon the authorit
of tradition, and if we suppose the interpositio
to be repeated from time to time, each repetitio
would incalculably weaken its force, because th

laws of nature, though not wholly destroyed, as they must be by a constant violation, would yet lose their prevailing force, and each exception would become a slighter proof of supernatural agency. It is far otherwise with the proofs of Natural Religion: repetition only strengthens and extends them. We are by no means affirming that Revelation would lose its sanction by lapse of time, as long as it had the perpetually new and living evidence of Natural Religion to support it. We are only showing the use of that evidence to Revelation, by examining the inevitable consequences of its entire removal, and seeing how ill supported the truths of Revelation would be, if the prop were withdrawn which they borrow from Natural Theology; for then they would rest upon tradition alone.*

In truth, it is with Natural Religion as with many of the greatest blessings of our sublunary lot: they are so common, so habitually present to and enjoyed by us, that we become insensible of their value, and only estimate them aright when we lose them, or fancy them lost. Accustomed to handle the truths of Revelation in connexion with, and in addition to, those of Natural Theology, and never having experienced any state of mind in which we were without the latter, we forget how essential they are to the former. As we are wont to forget the existence of the air we constantly breathe until put in mind of it by some violent change threatening suffocation, so it requires a violent fit of abstraction to figure to ourselves the state of our belief in Revelation were the lights of natural religion withdrawn. The existence and attributes of a God are so familiarly proved by every thing around us, that we can hardly picture to ourselves the state of our belief in this great truth, if we only knew it by the testimony borne to miracles, which, however authentic, were yet wrought in a remote age and distant region.*

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* Note V.

5. The use of Natural Theology to the believer in Revelation is equally remarkable in keeping alive the feelings of piety and devotion. As this topic has occurred under a former head, it is only to be presented here in close connexion with Revealed Religion. It may be observed, then, that even the inspired penmen have constant recourse to the views which are derived from the contemplation of nature when they would exalt the Deity by a description of his attributes, or inculcate sentiments of devotion towards him. "How excellent," says the Psalmist, "is thy name in all the earth; thou hast set thy glory above the heavens. I will consider the heavens, even the work of thy fingers; the moon and the stars which thou hast ordained." See also that singularly beautiful poem the 139th Psalm; and the Book of Job, from the 38th to the 41st chapter.

It is remarkable how little is to be found of particularity and precision in any thing that has been revealed to us respecting the nature of the Godhead. For the wisest purposes it has pleased

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* Mr. Locke has said, upon a similar question, "He that es away Reason to make way for Revelation puts out the t of both: and does much about the same as if he would us put out his eyes, the better to receive the invisible star by a telescope."—(Human 19, 4.)

Providence to veil in awful mystery almost all the attributes of the Ancient of Days beyond what natural reason teaches. By direct interposition, through miraculous agency, we become acquainted with his will, and are made more certain of his existence; but his peculiar attributes are nearly the same in the volume of Nature and in that of his Revealed word.*

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* Archbishop Tillotson has pronounced an authoritative opinion in favour of Natural Religion, as essential to the proof of Revealed. His admirable Sermons abound in such statements—thus, in the 41st, "Unless we be first firmly persuaded of the providence of God, and of his particular care of mankind, why should we suppose that he makes any revelation of his will to us? Unless it be first naturally proved that God is a God of truth, what ground is there for believing his word? So that all religion is founded upon right notions of God and his perfections, insomuch that Divine Revelation itself does suppose these for its foundation, and can signify (*i. e.* disclose or reveal) nothing to us unless they be first known and believed." "So that the principles of Natural Religion are the foundations of that which is revealed." This sermon was preached before the King and Queen (William and Mary) on the Thanksgiving for the naval victory in 1692. The sermon on Steadfastness in Religion, one of the archbishop's great masterpieces, and in which he demonstrates against Rome the right of private judgment, tallies with the 41st in the doctrine on Natural Religion.

NOTES.

Note I.—Page 15.

Of the Classification of the Sciences.

ıundantly sensible, not only, as is stated in the text,
perfect all such classifications must be, but that grave
ns may be urged against the one I have adopted, and
arly against the threefold division of *physical*, *psycho-*
and *ethical* or *moral*. It may be said that one part
ıoral branch of Natural Theology belongs to psycho-
ıamely, the arguments drawn from the nature of the
ı favour of a future state; and that this part ought
·e to have been classed with the second division of
ılogical branch—namely, the psychological. But it
borne in mind that the two first divisions, comprising
ological branch, are confined to the doctrine of ex-
—the investigation of the Deity's existence and attri-
while the whole of the third division, or second
relates to the prospects of man with respect to his
nd consequently, although the arguments respecting
ospects are partly of a psychological nature, yet they
ı the future, and not at all to the past or present—not
o the doctrine of existence or attributes. This is
e a sufficiently distinct ground for the separation. In
classifications we should be guided by views of con-
, rather than by any desire to attain perfect sym-
and that arrangement may be best suited to a par-
ıurpose which plants the same things in one order,
arates them and unites them in one way, when an
ment which should dispose those things differently
ıe preferable, if we had another purpose to serve.
ıe three divisions of physics, psychology, and morals

may be convenient for the purposes of Natural T
and yet it may not so well suit the purposes of
science; although I own my opinion to be in favou
classification for such general purposes also, keepin
in mind that whatever portion of moral science (
term in its more ordinary sense) belongs to ontolo
within the second, and not the third, subdivision,
the third deals with deontology alone.

The various classifications which, in ancient as
modern times, have been made of the sciences, are
culated to illustrate the difficulty of a perfect arra
The Greek philosophers distinguished them into
ethics, and logic. Under the first head was compr
both the nature of mind and of the Deity; conse
under physics were classed what we now term ps
and theology, as well as natural philosophy. M
mainly adopted the same order when he ranged th
of science into *physical*, *practical*, and *logical* (φυσι
τικη, σημειωτικη, or λογικη); or, 1. Things in th
knowable, whether God himself, angels, spirits, bo
their affections as number, figure, &c. 2. Actions,
depend upon us in order to happiness; and 3. Th
signs, in order to knowledge. Thus, like the Gree
sophers, he classed natural philosophy, psycholo
theology under one head; but as he only stated eth
"the most considerable of the second head," it
doubtful whether or not he included under it any
application of the natural branches of the first hea
thing, too, is quite clear in this arrangement,—t
mathematics becomes part of the science of ontology
of existences, natural and mental; and yet it bear
close relation to the third, or logical division. It
appears somewhat violent to class fluxions with a
metallurgy with psychology, and entomology with t
while we make separate heads of ethics and logic.
more violent is M. Turgot's classification, by w
ranges, under the head of physical sciences, not only
philosophy and metaphysics by name, but also lo
history. To thus classing history there is, indeed,
objection. Not only is it doing unnecessary vio
common language, to make that which bears no e
relation to natural objects a part of physics, but
history a science at all is perhaps yet more object

the sense in which inductive science is deemed by Lord Bacon—being considered by him as the facts. But this, too, is incorrect; for the history of facts is only the foundation of inductive science, nsists in the comparison, or reasoning from the n, of these facts, and marking their differences and ces; whereas history is applicable to all events ences, being merely the record of things that have of whatever kind, and implies no reasoning or ; at all. Why is poetry, music, painting, omitted n arrangement as that of Turgot? They are as nces as history.

acon's own scientific classification is certainly not ied by peculiar felicity. He divides science into ts, according as its object is the Deity, Man, or Nature, naming these branches—Natural Theology, hilosophy, and Natural Philosophy. Hence, while l and moral philosophy are separated from theo- are both classed with anatomy and medicine; ics and acoustics, merely from their relation to the e and the human ear, are ranged under the same ethics, and separated from natural philosophy.), the chemical nature of the blood and bones of de one part of one division—Human Philosophy: chemical nature of the blood and bones of all nals is ranged under another head—Natural Phi- As for logic and the mathematics, they are treated of appendix to physics, rather than as deserving of sciences.

NOTE II.—PAGE 45.

Psychological Argument from Final Causes.

RKE maintains that the evidences of design are e to be traced in the natural than in the moral ut he plainly means by this proposition, not so ompare the proofs of Divine wisdom exhibited in mena of the material with those exhibited in the a of the intellectual world, as to show that the intentions of the Deity are more easily perceived rangements of the world with which we are most conversant, than his plans for our happiness, and intentions respecting our fate, are to be inferred considerations. It is, however, to be remarked tl other reasoners upon Natural Theology, Dr. Clai his attention entirely to physical, and never psychological, proofs.

Mr. Smith, in his *Theory of Moral Sentiments* spersed with his reasonings upon the constitu affections and feelings, reflections upon the p which they are subservient; and Mr. Stewart afford frequent instances of his attention having to the soundness of the same speculation. Ind who had the accurate and just views of the na sentient principle, and the steady conviction of i and immaterial nature, which prevail through a ings, could fail to perceive the application of th *à posteriori* to our mental constitution. But th tions of this admirable writer's attention to the accidental, and scattered through his works; ai ceedingly to be regretted, nor, indeed, very ea explained, that he should have entirely omitted al to the constitution of our mental faculties in the full and able treatise upon Natural Religion w so large a part — above one-third—of his 'Ph the Active Powers.' With the exception of a sin (vol. ii., p. 48), and that only upon the adaptat faculties to our external circumstances, and a from Locke, which relates more to the bodily t mental powers, there occurs nothing whatever up portant part of the subject in that excellent wor would have been so peculiarly appropriate.

This silence of modern writers upon Natural T easily accounted for by the same consideration to Reid has referred in explaining how the mode have admitted the existence of appearances of de universe, and denied what he terms the major pro that design may be traced by its effects; while t sceptics, admitting the latter proposition denied t He considers this as owing to the great discoveries made in modern times; and to the same caus ascribed the disposition of Natural Theologians their attention to the evidences afforded by th world. The ancients, on the other hand, whos

Natural Philosophy was extremely limited, bestow more tention, and with considerably greater success, upon Intel-tual Philosophy; and accordingly we find that they drew eir arguments *à posteriori* for the existence of design in e universe as much from moral as from physical consi-rations.

The discussion held by Socrates with Aristodemus, as corded by Xenophon, is well known. After enumerating e various convenient arrangements of the bodily organs, adds—Ου τοινυν μονον ηρκεσε τῷ θεῷ του σωματος επιμε-θηναι· αλλ' (ὁπερ μεγιστον εστι) και την ψυχην κρατιστην ανθρωπῷ ενεφυσε· τινος γαρ αλλου ζωου ψυχη πρωτα μεν ων, των τα μεγιστα και καλλιστα συνταξαντων, ησθηται ὁτι σι; τι δε φυλον αλλο η ανθρωποι, θεους θεραπευουσι; ποια δε χη της ανθρωπινης ἱκανωτερα προφυλλαττεσθαι, η λιμον, η ψος, η ψυχη, η θαλπη, η νοσοις επικουρησαι, η ρωμην ασ-σαι, η προς μαθησιν εκπονησαι, η ὁσα αν ακουσῃ. η ιδῃ, η θῃ, ἱκανωτερα εστι διαμεμνησθαι;—"*Nor has the Deity en satisfied with taking care of the body alone; he has im-lanted in man what is a far greater work to have made—a ost excellent soul; for what other animal possesses a mind at can perceive the existence of the Gods by whom all these st and fair works have been formed? What other creature an man worships those Gods? What other intelligence is perior to man's in providing against hunger, and thirst, and ld, and heat? or in curing diseases, or in exercising strength, in cultivating learning, or in storing up the recollection of ings heard, and seen, and learnt?*"*—It may be observed re, in passing, that Mr. Stewart, who refers to this passage, s adopted the paraphrastic translation by Mrs. Fielding, d it is extremely unlike the original. Mr. Stewart justly aises the "almost divine simplicity" of the whole conver-tion, which is a just eulogy; but the translation, although ell written, little resembles the Greek in that particular. he one I have here given is at least faithful.

In like manner, the discussion with Euthydemus, after owing the goodness of the Gods in adapting all things to an's use, closes with mentioning the senses given us to joy those gifts of external nature, and, lastly, the use of ason. Το δε και λογισμον ἡμιν εμφυσαι, &c. &c.—"*They ve implanted reason in our nature, whereby we inquire uching external things; and, arguing and remembering, we*

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* Xen. Memor. I. iv. 13.

learn the use of each, and hit upon many contrivances for attaining good and avoiding evil. Have they not also given us the gift of speech, by which we can communicate mutually all we have learnt, and thus instruct each other, and make laws, and regulate civil polity?"[*]

Plato pursues the same course of reasoning. We may refer particularly to the tenth and twelfth books of the treatise *De Legg.* Thus, towards the end of the latter book, he states the argument for the Deity's existence as twofold—the nature of the mind, and the order of the worldly system. The first of his reasons is drawn from considering the qualities of the mind; its greater antiquity than that of the body, and its immortality; for the Platonists certainly considered immortality to be so much of the essence of mind as to deduce from thence, as the less clear proposition, the existence of a Deity.

The Stoics reasoned in like manner, with an equal regard to mental and to natural phenomena. Epictetus, after deducing the inference of design from the adaptations of sensible objects, as of the eye to light, adds, correctly and philosophically, that "the constitution of the understanding, whereby it not only receives impressions through the senses, but also deals with the ideas thus received, and combines or composes something out of them, proceeding from things that are near to things quite remote, proves the existence of an Artificer; since things carrying such marks of contrivance could not," he contends, "exist spontaneously, and without design."[†]

The same train of reasoning is followed by Cicero in all those parts of his writings in which he treats of the existence of a Deity. Thus the famous passage so often quoted from the treatise *De Natura Deorum*, ends with a reference to our mental constitution, although this part of it is not so frequently attended to. "An vero si domum magnam pulchramque videris, non possis adduci ut, etiamsi dominum non videas, muribus illam et mustelis ædificatam putes; tantum vero ornatum mundi, tantam varietatem pulchritudinemque rerum cœlestium, tantam vim et magnitudinem maris atque terrarum, si tuum ac non deorum immortalium domicilium putes, nonne plane desipere videare?" Thus far as to sensible objects. But he proceeds, "Aliud a terrâ sumsimus, aliud ab humore, aliud ab igne, aliud ab aëre, eo m spiritû ducimus: illud autem quod vincit hæc omnia, ionem dico, et si placet, pluribus verbis, mentem, con- um, cogitationem, prudentiam, ubi invenimus? unde tulimus?" *

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[*] Xen. Memor. IV. iii. 11.

[†] Epict. Enchir. i. 6.

nd again, in the same book, after speaking at large on structure of the body, and the uses to which its various ts are adapted, he adds, "Jam vero animum ipsum men- ıque hominis, rationem, consilium, prudentiam, qui non inâ curâ perfecta esse perspicit, is his ipsis rebus mihi etur carere." He proceeds to show how great a gift son is from its productions: "Ex quo scientia intelli- ur quam vim habeat, qualis sit, quâ ne in deo quidem est ulla præstantior;" and he closes with the well-known sage in praise of eloquence.†

n the Tusculan Questions he alludes to mind in a different nner. After going through the various provisions made human enjoyment in the economy of nature, he adds, ic mentem hominis, quamvis eam non videas, ut deum non es; tamen, ut deum agnoscis ex operibus ejus, sic ex moriâ rerum et inventione et celeritate motus omnique chritudine virtutis, vim divinam mentis agnoscito." ‡

The course of the argument in which he is engaged in s first part of his work, the immortality of the soul, leads n to use the phenomena of its faculties for the purpose of strating its separate existence; and, therefore, he only ımerates the arrangements of the natural world as proofs Divine agency, and gives those proofs not as the main ect of the argument, but as introductory to his statement the soul's independent nature.

n these speculations of the ancient philosophers, we can- find any process of strict inductive reasoning; and, ordingly, the facts are not turned to the best account for purposes of the argument. But this defect appears, at least, as much in the physical as in the psychological tion of the reasoning. Indeed, the latter comes more near our own philosophy; and certainly we must admit that se old writers upon Natural Theology, in the place which y assigned to intellectual phenomena, pursued a more nd and consistent method of philosophising, than the derns have done when speculating upon the same subject.

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* De Nat. Deor. ii. 6. † Ibid. ii. 59. ‡ Tusc. Qu. i. 28.

NOTE III.—PAGE 65.

Of the Doctrine of Cause and Effe

E argument deduced by sceptical writer
me's doctrine respecting causation has ten
ne discredit upon the doctrine itself, by raisin
ainst it. The bad use, however, which is mad
inciple is not fairly a matter of charge again
ple. The only question is whether or not the
ist in itself; and it cannot be just if legitima
an deduce from it an absurd consequence.
onsequence, how rigorously soever following fr
of course form no reason against its receptio
might justly be made the ground of examining ve
the foundations upon which the doctrine itself r

Mr. Stewart, in a valuable and learned note t
losophy of the Human Mind' (vol. i., note D,)
together the authorities, which have all more or
countenanced, but even forestalled Mr. Hume in
—that we know nothing of causation except by
constant junction between two events or two f
unquestionably true. We expect that heat
to combustible bodies, they will take fire; and
excluded they will cease to burn. We expec
between the application of heat and the ignitio
body, between the exclusion of air and the ex
fire, we have constantly observed the relatio
the one event being always followed close
The inference which forms the ground of t
forms the ground of our belief that the one
the other—that there is between the two a c
the mere relation of junction and sequen
one, the preceding event, exerts an infl
power, over the other, and produces the ot

This constant conjunction, therefore, i
the ground of our belief, and is the origi
causality or causation. So far we must
in question. That it is the only ground
the only origin of the idea, may admit of
is the point on which turns the conn
science of Natural Theology and the con

referring to; and therefore it deserves some consideration in the present note.

1. The mere constant and unvarying succession of two events would not of itself be sufficient to make us, even in popular language, denominate the one a cause of the other. Light uniformly succeeds dark—one o'clock always follows twelve; but no man ever thought of calling or of deeming night to be the cause of day, or noon of afternoon.* Another and a very important experiment or observation is required before we pronounce the successive or conjoined events to be related one to the other as cause and effect. Not only must the second event always have been found to follow the first, but the second must never have been observed without the first preceding it, or at least without some other event preceding it—in which case the causation is predicated alike of both those preceding events. Thus, the clock pointing to one is not reckoned the effect of its having previously pointed to twelve; but it is reckoned the effect of a certain mechanism, namely, a spring unfolding itself, because if the spring is prevented from relaxing, the hand no longer points; and so it is also reckoned the effect of a weight pulling a cord, because, when that weight is stopped in its descent, the whole machinery stops.

2. But we derive not our notion of causality from even this double proof—the positive and negative combined—the two observations that one event always follows the other, and that it ceases when the other ceases. This of itself would only tell us the fact, that when one event exists the other exists immediately afterwards and not otherwise. Our minds form, whether we will or no, another idea—not merely that of constant connexion or succession, but of the one exerting a power over the other by an inherent force; and this is the idea of causation. Whence do we derive it? I apprehend only from our consciousness. We feel that we have a will and a power—that we can move a limb, and affect by our own powers, excited after our own volition, a change upon external objects. Now from this consciousness we derive the idea of power, and we transfer this idea and the relation on which it is founded between our own will and

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* Mr. Stewart's observation, that day follows night as much as night follows day, makes no difference in this illustration: for we may suppose the case of a person seeing day for the first time, or twelve o'clock for the first time, and the conclusion in the text would still hold good.

the change produced, to the relations between events wholly external to ourselves—assuming them to be connected, as we feel our volition and our movements are mutually connected.

If it be said that this idea by no means involves that of necessary connexion, nothing can be more certain. The whole is a question of fact—of contingent truth. Just as the world might be so constituted that heat applied should not ignite, nor air excluded extinguish—so might our volition cease to make our limbs move, as it does cease in paralysis. As it is, and because our will has hitherto had the power to move our limbs, we have acquired the idea of power and of causation. But if it had always been otherwise, and that no connexion of succession had ever existed between our volition and our movements, I do not see how the idea of power or causality could ever have been obtained by us from any observation of the sequence of events. The idea of design or contrivance, in like manner, must have been wanting to us; and hence, I cannot understand how, but for the consciousness of power, we could ever have been led to the belief in the existence of a First Cause. This is another, and, to my mind, a very strong, additional reason for resting the evidences of Natural Theology upon the argument *à posteriori* alone.

That they are greatly in error who confound, as has been too common, causation with necessary connexion, and who deny the existence of the relation of causality merely because the relation is contingent and not necessary, is sufficiently manifest. Our ideas of power and of causation are solid and well founded, although they only refer to a power or a causation which may or may not exist. That one event causes another may be a proposition quite true, to which we affix a precise and definite meaning, and which we have learnt from observation and from consciousness, although the order of nature might easily have been so constituted as that the two events should never have been found in sequence. At present the order of nature connects them, and we affirm that there exists the relation of cause and effect—a relation contingent, however, and not necessary. Of necessary causation we can by no possibility know anything; but causation may be real enough though contingent.

NOTE IV.—PAGE 49, 64.

Système de la Nature,' and the Hypothesis of Materialism.

ıo book of an atheistical description which has
ı greater impression than the famous *Système de*
It bears the impression of London, 1780, but
stly printed in France; also, it purports to be
Mirabaud, secretary of the Académie Française;
refatory advertisement by the supposed editor,
ınces a great panegyric upon the work, enough
engender doubts of Mirabaud having been its
e died in 1760; and it was twenty years before
ıpeared—found, says the writer, among a collec-
ıuscripts made by a "savant curieux de rassem-
oductions de ce genre." Robinet, the author of
·k of similar tendency, called *De la Nature,* has
ferent times said to be its author, without any
ıdeed probability; but the general opinion now
o the Baron d'Holbach, aided, in all probability,
Helvetius, and other members of the freethink-
who frequented the Baron's house, and who used
. of Voltaire's excess of religious principle, not
y ridiculing him for his fanaticism. Mirabaud,
. this publication most unjustifiably charges the
lacing his name in the title-page without any
essed, and reserving the doubts for the preface,
of unimpeachable integrity and amiable disposi-
ıad been educated in the College of the Jesuits,
ırds was preceptor to some branches of the royal
: died at the age of eighty-five, universally
ır his unblemished character, his strict probity,
tractive manners. The Diderots and Grimms,
perhaps persons of abandoned life, were very far
ing such praise: indeed, the licentious works that
from Diderot's pen attest his deficiency, at least
ch of morals.

possible to deny the merits of the *Système de la*
'he work of a great writer it unquestionably is;
it lies in the extraordinary eloquence of the com-
ıd the skill with which words substituted for

ideas, and assumptions for proofs, are made to pass current not only for arguments against existing beliefs, but for a new system planted in their stead. As a piece of reasoning, it never rises above a set of plausible sophisms—plausible only as long as the ear of the reader being filled with sounds, his attention is directed away from the sense. The chief resource of the writer is to take for granted the thing to be proved, and then to refer back to his assumption as a step in the demonstration, while he builds various conclusions upon it, as if it were complete. Then he declaims against a doctrine seen from one point of view only, and erects another for our assent, which, besides being liable to the very same objections, has also no foundation whatever to rest upon. The grand secret, indeed, of the author goes even further in *petitione principii* than this; for we oftentimes find, that in the very substitute which he has provided for the notions of belief he would destroy, there lurks the very idea which he is combating, and that his idol is our own faith in a new form, but masked under different words and phrases.

The truth of these statements we are now to examine; but first it may be fitting to state why so much attention is bestowed upon this work. The reason is, that its bold character has imposed on multitudes of readers, seducing some by its tone of confidence, but intimidating others by its extreme audacity. It is the only* work of any consideration wherein atheism is openly avowed and preached—avowed, indeed, and preached in terms. (See, particularly, part ii., chap. ii.) This effect of its hardihood was certainly anticipated by its author; for the supposed editor, in his advertisement, describes it somewhat complacently, if not boastingly, as "l'ouvrage le plus hardi et le plus extraordinaire que l'esprit humain ait osé produire jusqu'à présent."

The grand object of the book being to show that there is no God, the author begins by endeavouring to establish the most rigorous materialism, by trying to show that there is no such thing as mind—nothing beyond or different from the material world. His whole fabric is built on this foundation; and it would be difficult to find in the history of metaphysical controversies such inconclusive reasoning, and such undisguised assumptions of the matter in dispute as this fundamental part of his system is composed of. He begins with asserting that man has no means of carrying his mind beyond the visible world; that he is necessarily confined within its limits; and that there exists nothing, and there can exist nothing, beyond the boundary which incloses all beings—that is, the material world. Nature, we are told. acts according to laws, simple, uniform, invariable, which we discover by experience. We are related to Universal Nature by our senses, which alone enable us to discover her secrets; and the instant we abandon the lessons which those senses teach us, we plunge into an abyss where we become the prey of imagination.

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* The treatise of Robinet, *De la Nature*, which, though far less eloquent and dexterous, is superior in real merit, has never attracted *anything* like the same notice.

Thus the very first chapter—the opening of the work—has already made the gratuitous assumption of a being whom the author calls Nature, without either defining what that is, or how we arrive at a knowledge of its existence. He has also assumed another existence, that of matter, or the material world; and then he asserts—what is absolutely contrary to every day's experience, and to the first rudiments of science—that we know, and can know, nothing but what our senses tell us. It is a sufficient answer to ask, how we know anything of mathematical truth? And in case a cavil should arise upon geometrical science (though it would be but a cavil) we shall speak only of analytical; and then it is certain that the whole science of numbers, from the rules of elementary arithmetic up to the highest branches of the modern calculus, could by possibility have been discovered by a person who had never in his life been out of a dark room—who had never touched any body but his own—nay, whose limbs had all his life been so fixed, that he had never exercised even upon his own body the sense of touch: indeed, we might even go so far as to say, who had never heard a sound uttered; for the primitive ideas of number might by possibility have suggested themselves to his mind, and been made the grounds of all further calculations. What becomes now of all our knowledge depending on the senses? But we need not go to so extreme a case as the one just put: there would be an end of the position we are dealing with, if a person so circumstanced could have discovered any one analytical or common arithmetical truth. Enough, indeed, is known to every one, how moderately soever imbued with mathematical learning, to satisfy him how little the intima-

received from the senses have, or can have,
whole science of number and quantity. Th
ations of the senses are themselves not at all o
ure, we shall presently see.

After many discussions and much eloquence, i
which various agents are introduced beside
ecessity, Relation, and so forth, without definit
alities or proof of their existence,—we come
emonstration that no soul, no mind, nothing se
he body and from matter, exists, or indeed ca
his book is not content with scepticism; it res
satisfied with disproof: it affects to show the imp
the doctrines which it combats; and while perpe
plaining of dogmas, it is perhaps the most dogm
that was ever written. The sixth and seventh c
the seventh especially, treat of this fundamenta
the corner-stone of the whole building. The arg
fact, a mere vague and unintelligible combinatio
as when the author concludes by saying, The r
whole is, that "the soul, far from being anyt
guishable from the body, is only the body its
relatively to some of its functions, or to some of
of acting or of being, whereof it is capable
enjoys life"—(n'est que ce corps lui-même envi
ment à quelqu'unes de ses fonctions ou à que
d'être et d'agir dont il est susceptible tant qu'i
vie). Or when he describes those faculties w
garly called intellectual, as modes or manners c
acting, which result from the organization of
facultés que l'on nomme intellectuelles ne son
ou des façons d'être et d'agir résultant de l'
notre corps.)—Part i. chap. viii.

But there is still more to be remarked
Treatise, an inconceivable forgetfulness of
which each party in the controversy most
assumption of the thing in question, and ev
assumption of that very separate and s
which it is the author's object to disprove.

Like all materialists, but far more gro
cally than almost any other, the author b
that Matter exists, that we can have no
this, and that any other existence is a t
Now, what is this matter? Whence

wledge of it? How do we assure ourselves of its e ? What evidence at all have we respecting eithe g or its qualities? We feel, or taste, or smell so g—that is, we have certain sensations which make lude that something exists beyond ourselves. It v do to say beyond our bodies; for our bodies themsel us the same sensations. What we feel is somethi nd, or out of, or external to, or other than and apa , *ourselves*—that is, from our minds. Our sensatio us the intimation of such existences. But what are ou ations? The feelings or thoughts of our minds. The t we do is this: From certain ideas in our minds, pro ed no doubt by, and connected with, our bodily senses, independent of, and separate from them, we draw cer- conclusions by reasoning, and those conclusions are in ur of the existence of something other than our sensa- s and our reasonings, and other than that which ex- ences the sensations and makes the reasonings—passive he one case—active in the other. That something is t we call Mind. But plainly, whatever it is, we owe to e knowledge that Matter exists: for that knowledge is ed by means of a sensation or feeling, followed by a ess of reasoning; it is gained by the mind having first red something, and then done something, and, therefore, there is no such thing as Matter would be a much less l inference than to say there is no such thing as Mind. ery act of inferring, as we do by reasoning, that the which affects our senses exists apart from ourselves, lly incapable of giving us any knowledge of the existence without, at the same time, giving us a lge of our own—that is, of the Mind's existence. An implies necessarily an internal; that there may be beyond or without, there must needs be some other yond or without which it is said to exist; that there a body which we feel abiding separate from us, ur own body, one part of which gives us sensations nother part—there must be a *we*, an *us*—that is, a as the *Système de la Nature* often contends, we ht to call spirit, or soul, or Mind, a mere negation ities of Matter, surely this might just as well be saying, that Matter is only a negation of the quali- l. But, in truth, the materialists cannot stir one the aid of that Mind whose existence they deny.

Then what are those *qualities* of Matter they are always speaking about? What but the effects, or the power of causing those effects produced by Matter upon the Mind through the senses? A remarkable instance, and a very instructive one, of the impossibility of a materialist arguing legitimately, strictly, or consistently, is to be found in the passage of this book, where the argument is as it were summed up against the existence of mind: "La matière seule peut agir sur *nos sens*, sans *lesquels* il *nous* est impossible que rien se fasse *connoître de nous*." Here the author, in order to deny the possibility of Mind, or any thing else than Matter having an existence, uses, in two lines, expressions, six times over, all drawn from the assumption of a something existing separate from and independent of Matter. *Our—senses—which—us—known—by us*—all these are words absolutely without meaning if there is nothing but matter in existence; and these are expressions conveying the ideas of which this fundamental proposition wholly consists. But that the author refers to Bishop Berkeley, as well as Mr. Locke, it might have been supposed that he had never been made aware of the controversy upon the existence of matter. Indeed the manner in which he mentions the speculations of Berkeley is quite sufficient to show his ignorance of the nature of the question, and reminds us forcibly of the remark made by D'Alembert, that whoever had not at times doubted the existence of matter, might be assured he had not any genius for metaphysical inquiries. Would any one believe it possible, that an author who could dogmatically deny the possibility of Mind existing in any form apart from Matter, should be so little competent to discuss questions like this, as to speak in these terms of Berkeley? "Que disons nous d'un Berkeley qui s'efforce de nous prouver que tout dans ce monde n'est qu'une illusion chimérique; que l'univers entier n'existe que dans nous-mêmes, et dans notre imagination," &c. "Pour justifier des opinions si monstrueuses, "&c.

The truth is, that we believe in the existence of Matter, because we cannot help it. The inferences of our reason from our sensations impel us to this conclusion, and the steps are few and short by which we reach it. But the steps are fewer and shorter, and of the self-same nature, which lead us to believe in the existence of Mind; for of that we have the evidence within ourselves, and wholly independent of *our senses*. Nor can we ever draw the inference in any one instance of the existence of matter without at the same time exhibiting a proof of the existence of mind; for we are, by the supposition, reasoning, inferring, drawing a conclusion, forming a belief; therefore there exists somebody, or something, to reason, to infer, to conclude, to believe; that is, *we*—not any fraction of matter, but a reasoning, inferring, believing being—in other words, a Mind. In this sense the celebrated argument of Descartes—*cogito, ergo sum*—had a correct and a profound meaning. If, then, scepticism can have any place in our system, assuredly it relates to the existence of Matter far more than of Mind; yet the *Système de la Nature* is entirely founded upon the existence of Matter being a self-evident truth, admitting of no proof, and standing in need of none.

We have combated the main body of the argument which runs through the whole book, and passed over some of the gross errors, apparently proceeding from ignorance of physical science, in which it abounds. Of these the most notable, no doubt, is that which Voltaire, in his *Essai sur le Système de la Nature*, considers (chap. i.) as the foundation of the whole theory—the absurd passage respecting the formation of eels. Certain it is, that in the Second chapter of Part I., the experiment of moistening flour, and thereby producing live microscopic insects, is referred to as a proof that "inanimate matter can pass into life," "which," adds the book, "is itself but the union of notions." No one indeed can accuse Voltaire of taking an unfair advantage when he relies on this piece of extraordinary ignorance; but it is not altogether just to represent the whole book as resting on this blunder.

As for the kind of comparisons or analogies by which, like all materialists, this writer tries to illustrate his hypothesis, and by which many materialists really are deceived—the mechanism of a watch, for example, consisting of parts each separately incapable of producing any result, but altogether forming a moving instrument that measures the efflux of time—nothing, surely, can be more puerile than the attempt to draw from thence an argument in favour of the confused, and, when examined closely, unintelligible position that Mind is a modification of Matter, or the result of a collocation of material particles. For the watch is material, doubtless, both in its whole and in each part separately; the combination never produces any effect that is not strictly of a material kind; the motions and the registration of time resulting from them are all as purely mechanical as the form of each part, and each part has in it every quality and incident in kind which the whole possesses. The difference in the case of Mind is, that we have something wholly of a new and peculiar kind, and in no respect resembling or belonging to the same class with any of the exertions or operations of the material parts, the combination of which is alleged by the materialist to have given it birth.

The first part having laid the foundation by disproving the existence of Mind, the second part of the "*Système*" proceeds to raise upon it the conclusion that the Deity's existence is impossible. This part is much more declamatory than the former, though often displaying great powers of eloquence, and reminding us of the more striking parts of Rousseau's early writings, especially his paradoxes against knowledge, perhaps in a more choice style, and with colouring more subdued. But reasoning it contains absolutely none, with the exception of the Fourth chapter, where Dr. S. Clarke's argument *à priori* is dissected and refuted—a task, unfortunately, not very difficult to accomplish, though it is here done in an illegitimate manner. We cannot, however, fail observe, that while the author proposes to go through the arguments of the various philosophers who have maintained the existence of a Deity; and while he does remark on Descartes, Malebranche, Newton, and Clarke (in a chapter which forms by far the most argumentative part of his book), he never approaches those who have treated the question by the argument *à posteriori*. In one place (chap. vii.) he refers to Final Causes, but this passage only relates to the subject of man's superiority and the arguments of the optimists, and does not at all touch upon the evidences of design derived from the structure of the universe—the great foundation of Natural Theology. It is impossible to suppose the author ignorant of the argument *à posteriori*, for he in one place refers to Derham by name. The omission of all reference
the most important branch of the subject is one of the
ings that most bring the good faith of this writer into
stion.

he purpose of this note having been to show how the
grounded on materialism fails when ex-
tion with the evidences of the Mind's
e, to pursue further the Second Part of

the work is unnecessary. But a few remarks are added to show how exactly the same assumption of the things to be proved prevails here which we observed in the First Part.

The first proposition, and supported at great length, is that all the ideas which man has formed of a First Cause have resulted from the evils of his lot, and that but for human suffering a Deity would never have been thought of. "Inquiry and speculation," says the author, "is itself an evil; and no creature living easy and happy, without pain and without wants, would ever give himself the trouble and annoyance of arguing on a First Cause. But fear and evil, especially pain and death—the terrors of earthquake, eclipse, tempest—the horrors of death—drove the mind to seek out the source of all these dangers, and to appease or disarm its supposed wrath; and thus the sky was peopled with gods and spirits."

Now, that the fears and the ignorance of men have been the fruitful source of polytheism, no one doubts; but it is wholly false to assert that genuine and philosophical religion could have had no other origin. To affirm that, but for their sufferings and fears, men never would have encountered the pain or the trouble of speculating on a First Cause, is quite contrary to the most obvious facts. Those speculations, far from being painful or troublesome, are gratifying in the highest degree. As well might it be said that all the pleasures of scientific discovery and study would have been foregone by all men, but for some physical inconvenience that drove them into those paths of investigation. Of all writers, the authors of the great improvements in physical science are they who have been the least under the pressure of want. and have gained the least by their labours. But such speculations are productive of the greatest gratification, both to the guide who originally points out the way, and to those who more humbly follow in his footsteps. So the sublime contemplations of Natural Theology have engaged men's attention and exercised their faculties, wholly independent of any sufferings they were exposed to, or any fears they entertained; and far from being a source of pain, this study has ever been found to reward its votaries with the purest enjoyment.

That the study and the knowledge of a Deity would have existed without any relation to evil is therefore clear. Man's curiosity—his natural desire of tracing the origin of what he saw around him—his anxiety to know whence he came, and whither he was going, and how the frame of the universe was contrived and sustained—would have led to the study and knowledge of a Creator without any such motives as this book supposes.

It is remarkable, that in the latter, as in the former portion of the work, blind assumptions are not only always made, but an entire disregard is shown to the evidence which often arises out of those very assumptions, and proves the truths its author is endeavouring to subvert. Thus, in the Second chapter, he says: "Whether the human race has always existed on this earth, or that it is a recent and transitory production of nature......." Now, if it be a recent production of nature, surely this admits the creative power—the very divinity the book is contending against; for what can be the meaning of a state of things, in which, up to a certain time—*i.e.* six or seven thousand years ago—the human species had no existence, and then this species coming into existence, or, as the book says, being produced by nature? What but that a superintending power, which had not before acted in this way, now for the first time began thus to act? To call this Nature is only changing the name—a Deity is the plain and the true meaning, and the only thing which can be meant.

Indeed, nothing can be more absurd and unreflecting than the play made throughout the book with mere words. Thus, in the same chapter, it is asked—whether a Theologian "can really be sincere in believing himself to have made a step by substituting the vague words spirit, incorporeal substances, divinity, &c., for those intelligible words"—what? what words so much less vague and more intelligible* than spirit?—" those intelligible words, matter, nature, mobility, necessity!" Now, we may safely ask, if all language furnishes two words more vague and less intelligible than two out of these four—viz. nature and necessity? But we have, in truth, already shown that Matter, as far as the present controversy is concerned, offers no more precise idea to our contemplation than Mind or spirit, and that its existence and qualities rest on less conclusive evidence than do those of Mind. Possibly the reader of this passage, and especially if he casts his eye back upon the former parts of the argument, may be inclined to adopt the writer's description of Theology, and apply it to the dogmatical Atheism of the *Système de la Nature.*

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* There occurs everywhere in this book a vague and mysterious idea of a force or living power belonging to Matter, and almost a *deification* of this power, utterly unintelligible; but in a hater of Deity—a derider of all gods—quite marvellous. The passage in which this idea is most strikingly announced is the 11th chapter of part ii., where he is answering the position that there is no such a thing as an Atheist in the world—"Si par *Athée* l'on désigne un homme qui nieroit l'existence d'une *force inhérente à la nature* et sans laquelle l'on ne peut concevoir *la Nature*, et si c'est à cette force motive qu'on donne le nom de *Dieu*, il n'existe point d'Athées, et le mot sous lequel on les désigne, n'annonceroit que des fous."—Can any one doubt, that after rejecting all reasonable and consistent notions of a Deity, this writer had really made unto himself other gods, and bowed down before them, and worshipped them?—For what is "the force inherent in matter?" and what is "nature," and the *essence of nature*, or that thing "without which nature cannot be conceived?"

NOTE V.—PAGE 157.

Of Mr. Hume's Sceptical Writings, and the Argument respecting Providence.

THE two most celebrated and most dangerous treatises of this great author, upon religious subjects, are those in which he has attacked the foundations of Natural and of Revealed Religion—the *Essay on Providence and a Future State,* and the *Essay on Miracles.* Others of his writings have a similar tendency, and more covertly though as surely sap the principles of religion. But the two essays to which we have referred are the most important writings of this eminent philosopher, because they bring his sceptical opinions more directly to bear upon the systems of actual belief.

I. The argument of Tillotson against the doctrine of the Real Presence is stated to have suggested that against the truth or rather the possibility of Miracles; but there is this most material difference between the two questions—that they who assert the Real Presence drive us to admit a proposition contrary to the evidence of our senses, upon a subject respecting which the senses alone can decide, and to admit it by the force of reasonings ultimately drawn from the senses—reasonings far more likely to deceive than they, because applicable to matter not so well fitted for argument as for perception, but reasonings at any rate incapable of exceeding the evidence the senses give. Nothing, therefore, can be more conclusive than Tillotson's argum
against the Real Presence we have of necessity

ment, and of the selfsame kind with those which it purports to rest upon, and a good deal more besides; for if we must not believe our senses when they tell us that a piece of bread is merely bread, what right have we to believe those same senses, when they convey to us the words in which the arguments of the Fathers are couched, or the quotations from Scripture itself, to make us suppose the bread is not bread, but flesh? And as ultimately even the testimony of a witness who should tell us that he had heard an apostle or the Deity himself affirm the Real Presence, must resolve itself into the evidence of that witness's senses, what possible ground can we have for believing that he heard the divine affirmation, stronger than the evidence which our own senses plainly give us to the contrary?

This is very far from being the case with the argument on Miracles. There, the evidence for and the evidence against do not coincide in kind, but take opposite directions. There, we have not to disbelieve indications of the same nature with those upon which our belief is challenged. The testimony of witnesses is adduced to prove a Miracle, or deviation from the ordinary laws of nature; but, says Mr. Hume, it is more likely that the witnesses should be deceived or should deceive, than that the laws of nature should be broken; and at all events we believe testimony only because it is a law of nature that men should tell the truth. This may very possibly be true; doubtless it is, generally speaking, so likely to be true, that the belief of a miracle is, and ought to be, most difficult to bring about; but at least, it is not like the belief in the Real Presence: it does not at one and the same time assume the accuracy of the indications given by our senses, and set that accuracy at nought;—it does not at once desire us implicitly to trust and entirely to disregard the evidence of testimony, as the doctrine of Transubstantiation calls upon us at once to trust and disregard the evidence of our senses.

There are two answers, however, to which the doctrine proposed by Mr. Hume is exposed, and either appears sufficient to shake it.

First—Our belief in the uniformity of the laws of nature rests not altogether upon our own experience. We believe no man ever was raised from the dead—not merely because we ourselves never saw it, for indeed that would be a very *limited ground* of deduction; and our belief was fixed on the subject long before we had any considerable experience—fixed chiefly by authority—that is, by deference to other men's experience. We found our confident belief in this negative position partly, perhaps chiefly, upon the testimony of others; and at all events, our belief that in times before our own the same position held good, must of necessity be drawn from our trusting the relations of other men—that is, it depends upon the evidence of testimony. If, then, the existence of the law of nature is proved, in great part at least, by such evidence, can we wholly reject the like evidence when it comes to prove an exception to the rule—a deviation from the law? The more numerous are the cases of the law being kept—the more rare those of its being broken—the more scrupulous certainly ought we to be in admitting the proofs of the breach. But that testimony is capable of making good the proof there seems no doubt. In truth, the degree of excellence and of strength to which testimony may rise seems almost indefinite. There is hardly any cogency which it is not capable by possible supposition of attaining. The endless multiplication of witnesses—the unbounded variety of their habits of thinking, their prejudices, their interests—afford the means of conceiving the force of their testimony augmented *ad infinitum,* because these circumstances afford the means of diminishing indefinitely the chances of their being all mistaken, all misled, or all combining to deceive us. Let any man try to calculate the chances of a thousand persons who come from different quarters, and never saw each other before, and who all vary in their habits, stations, opinions, interests—being mistaken or combining to deceive us, when they give the same account of an event as having happened before their eyes—these chances are many hundreds of thousands to one. And yet we can conceive them multiplied indefinitely; for one hundred thousand such witnesses may all in like manner bear the same testimony; and they may all tell us their story within twenty-four hours after the transaction, and in the next parish. And yet, according to Mr. Hume's argument, we are bound to disbelieve them all, because they speak to a thing contrary to our own experience, and to the accounts which other witnesses had formerly given us of the laws of nature, and which our forefathers had handed down to us as derived from witnesses who lived in the old time before them. It is unnecessary to add that no testimony of the witnesses whom we are supposing to concur in their relation contradicts any testimony of our own senses If it did, the argument would resemble Archbishop Tillotson's upon the real presence, and our disbelief would be at once warranted.*

Secondly.—This leads us to the next objection to which Mr. Hume's argument is liable, and which we have in part anticipated while illustrating the first. He requires us to withhold our belief in circumstances which would force every man of common understanding to lend his assent, and to act upon the supposition of the story told being true. For suppose either such numbers of various witnesses as we have spoken of; or, what is perhaps stronger, suppose a miracle reported to us, first by a number of relators, and then by three or four of the very soundest judges and most incorruptibly honest men we know—men noted for their difficult belief of wonders, and, above all, steady unbelievers in Miracles, without any bias in favour of religion, but rather accustomed to doubt, if not disbelieve—most people would lend an easy belief to any Miracle thus vouched. But let us add this circumstance, that a friend on his death-bed had been attended by us, and that we had told him a fact known only to ourselves—something that we had secretly done the very moment before we told it to the dying man, and which to no other being we had ever revealed—and that the credible witnesses we are supposing inform us that the deceased appeared to them, conversed with them, remained with them a day or two, accompanying them, and to avouch the fact of his reappearance on this earth, communicated to them the secret of which we had made him the sole depositary the moment before his death. According to Mr. Hume, we are bound rather to believe, not only that those credible witnesses deceive us, or that those sound and unprejudiced men were themselves deceived, and fancied things without real existence, but further, that they all hit by chance upon the discovery of a real secret, known only to ourselves and the dead man. Mr. Hume's argument requires us to believe this as the lesser improbability of the two—as less unlikely than the rising of one from the dead; and yet every one must feel convinced, that were he placed in the situation we have been figuring, he would not only lend his belief to the relation, but, if the relators accompanied it with a special warning from the deceased person to avoid a certain contemplated act, he would, acting upon the belief of their story, take the warning, and avoid doing the forbidden deed. Mr. Hume's argument makes no exception. This is its scope; and whether he chooses to push it thus far or no, all Miracles are of necessity denied by it, without the least regard to the kind or the quantity of the proof on which they are rested; and the testimony which we have supposed, accompanied by the test or check we have supposed, would fall within the grasp of the argument just as much and as clearly as any other Miracle avouched by more ordinary combinations of evidence.

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* Prophecy is classed by Mr. Hume under the same head with Miracle—every prophecy being, he says, a miracle. This is not, however, quite correct. A prophecy—that is, the happening of an event which was foretold—may be proved even by the evidence of the senses of the whole world. Suppose it had one thousand years ago been foretold, that, on a certain day this year, one person of every family in the world should be seized with a particular distemper, it is evident that every family would be at once certain that the event had happened, and that it had been foretold. To future generations the fulfilment would no doubt come within the description of a miracle in all respects. The truth is, that the event happening which was foretold may be compared to the miracle; and Mr. Hume's argument will then be, not that there is anything miraculous in the event itself, but only in its happening after it had been foretold. Bishop Sherlock wrote discourses on this subject, which Dr. Middleton answered: the former denying that prophecy was more exempt from the scope of the sceptical argument than miracles. On the whole, however, it does seem more exempt.

The use of Mr. Hume's argument is this, and it is an important and a valuable one. It teaches us to sift closely and rigorously the evidence for miraculous events. It bids us remember that the probabilities are always, and must always be, incomparably greater against than for the truth of these relations, because it is always far more likely that the testimony should be mistaken or false, than that the general laws of nature should be suspended. Further than this the doctrine cannot in soundness of reason be carried. It does not go the length of proving that those general laws cannot, by the force of human testimony, be shown to have been, in a particular instance, and with a particular purpose, suspended.

It is unnecessary to add, that the argument here has only been conducted to one point, and upon one ground, namely, to refute the doctrine that a Miracle cannot be proved by any evidence of testimony. It is for those who maintain the truth of any revelation to show in what manner the evidence suffices to prove the Miracles on which that revelation rests. This treatise is not directed to that object; but in commenting upon Mr. Hume's celebrated argument, we have dealt with a fundamental objection to all Revelation, and one which, until removed, precludes the possibility of any such system being established.

II. The Essay on Miracles being supposed by its author sufficient to dispose of Revelation, the Essay on Providence and a Future State appears to have been aimed as a blow equally fatal to Natural Religion. Its merits are, however, of a very superior order. There is nothing of the sarcasm so unbecoming on subjects of this most serious kind, which disfigures the concluding portion of the former treatise. The tone is more philosophic, and the sceptical character is better sustained. There cannot, indeed, be said to prevail through it anything of a dogmatical spirit, and certainly we here meet with none of that propensity to assume the thing in question, to insist upon propositions as proved which have only been enunciated, to supply by sounds the place of ideas, which we remark in the '*Système de la Nature*.' On the contrary, the argument, whether sound or not, is of a substantial nature; it is rested on very plausible grounds; and we may the rather conclude that it is not very easily answered, because, in fact, it has rarely, if ever, been encountered by writers on theological subjects. Nevertheless, it strikes at the root of all Natural Religion, and requires a careful consideration.

Mr. Hume does not deny that the reasoning from the appearances and operations of nature to the existence of an intelligent cause is logical and sound; at least he admits this for argument's sake. But he takes this nice and subtle distinction. We are here, he observes, dealing with an agent, an intelligence, a being wholly unlike all we elsewhere see or hitherto have known: our inferences, therefore, must be confined strictly tc the facts from whence they are drawn. When we see a foot-mark imprinted on the sand, we conclude that a man has walked there, and that his other foot had likewise left its print, which the waves have effaced. But this inference is not drawn from the inspection of the foot alone; it comes from a previous knowledge of the human body, of which the foot makes a part. Had we never seen that body, or any other that walked on feet, the observation of the mark in the sand could have led to no other conclusion than that some body or thing had been there with a form like the mark. So, when we are to reason from the works of nature to their cause, we are entitled to conclude that a Being exists whose power and skill created them such as we behold them, and consequently that this Being is possessed of skill and power sufficient to contrive and to execute those works—that is, those precise works, and no more. We have no right to infer that this Being has the skill or the power to contrive and create one single blade of grass or grain of sand beyond what we see. It follows, then, that the argument *à posteriori* only leads to the conclusion that a finite and not an infinitely or an indefinitely wise and powerful Being exists: and it further follows that we are left without any evidence of his power (much less of his intention) to perpetuate our existence after death, as well as without any proof of the capacity of the soul to receive such a continuation of being after its separation from the body. This is the sum of the very ingenious, subtle, and original argument of Mr. Hume, affording a mighty contrast to the flimsy sophisms, the declamatory assertions, of the French writers, and giving the Natural Theologian, it must be allowed, a good deal to answer. We have stated it as strongly as we could, in order to meet it fully; and it appears capable of a satisfactory answer.

The whole argument *à posteriori* rests upon the assumption, that if we perceive arrangements made, by means of which certain effects are produced, and if seeing such arrangements among the works of men, we should at once conclude that they were designed to produce those effects, we are entitled to say that the arrangements which we see and which we know not to be the work of man, are the work of an intelligent cause, contriving them for the purpose of producing the effects observed. In truth, such must needs be the assumption on which the argument rests, because we have no other knowledge of what design and contrivance are. They necessarily bear reference to our own nature and the knowledge we have of our own minds, derived from our own consciousness and experience; and of this we have treated in the text, sect. iii. and iv. of Part i.

If we found anywhere a mechanism of any kind, a watch, for instance, as Paley puts the case, we should at once conclude that some skilful and intelligent being had been there, and had left his works on the spot. We should conclude (indeed this is involved in the former inference) that he was capable of doing what we saw he had done, and that he had intended to produce a particular effect by the exercise of his skill; but we should also conclude that he who could do this could repeat the operation if he chose, and the probability would be that his skill had not been confined to the single exertion of it which we had observed. There is nothing peculiar in the nature of human workmanship or of the human character to make us draw this conclusion. We arrive at it just as we arrive at the inference of design and contrivance; we believe in them because we are wholly unable to conceive such an adaptation without such an intention; and we are equally unable to conceive that any being, or any intelligence, or any power, which had sufficed to perform the operation we see, should be confined to that single exertion. We can conceive no reason whatever why the same power should not be capable of repeating the operation. There is nothing peculiar—no limit—no sufficient reason, of an exclusive nature, why the same power should not be again exercised, and with the same result. All induction proceeds upon similar grounds: it is the generalization of particulars; it is the concluding from a certain limited number of instances to an indefinite number—to any number unless circumstances arise to restrict the generality—to any number where nothing arises to vary or limit the conclusion. We mix an acid and alkali, and form a neutral salt having peculiar properties. We pass a sun-beam or the light of a candle through a prism, and observe the rays separated into lights making certain colours. Why do we conclude from hence that all the acid made by burning sulphur, in what way soever the sulphur was produced or the combustion effected, will be neutralized by soda wheresoever produced and howsoever obtained, and that their union will always make Glauber's salts? Or, that all light, of all kinds, even that obtained by burning newly-discovered bodies, as the metal of potassium, unseen, unknown before the year 1807, will be found resolvable into the seven primary colours? According to Mr. Hume's argument, we have no right to infer that any one portion of acid or alkali, save the one we have subjected to our experiments, or any light save that of the formerly-known combustible bodies, or rather of those classes of them on which we had experimented; nay, *of the individuals* of those classes which we have burnt, will produce the effects we have experienced in our laboratory, or in our darkened chamber. In other words, according to this argument, all experimental knowledge must stand still, generalizing be at an end, and philosophers be content never to make a single step, or draw one conclusion beyond the mere facts observed by them: in a word, Inductive Science must be turned from a process of general reasoning upon particular facts, into a bare dry record of those particular facts themselves.

If, indeed, it be said that we never can be so certain of the things we infer as we are of those we have observed, and on which our inference is grounded, we may admit this to be true. But no one therefore denies the value of the science which is composed of the inferences. So we cannot be so well assured of the Deity's power to repeat and to vary and to extend his operations, as we are of his having created what we actually observe; and yet our assurance may be quite sufficient to merit entire confidence. Nor will any student of Natural Theology complain if the only result of the argument we are combating be to place the higher truths of the science but a very little lower in point of proof than the inferences of design in the works actually examined. The selfsame difference is to be found in the inferences composing the other branches of inductive science, and it in no perceptible degree lessens our confidence in the inductive method.

It has oftentimes been asked, why we believe that the same result will happen from the same cause acting in the like circumstances—the foundation of all induction; and no answer has ever been given except that we cannot help so believing—that the condition of our being, the nature of our minds—compels us so to believe; and we take this as an ultimate fact incapable of being resolved into any fact more general. Can we help believing that a Being capable of creating what we see and examine, is also capable of exercising other acts of skill and power? Can we avoid believing that the same power which made all the animals and vegetables on our globe suffices to people and provide other worlds in like manner? Again, can we by any effort bring our minds to suppose that this Being's whole skill and power were exhausted by one effort, and that having sufficed to create the universe, it ceases to be effective for any purpose whatever? The answer is, that we cannot; t can as soon believe in the sun not rising to-morrow, or in his light ceasing to be differently refrangible.

Much is said in the course of arguments like the present of the word "*infinite*." Whether or not we are able to form any precise idea of that which has no bounds in power or in duration may be another question. But when we see such stupendous exertions of power, upon a scale so vast as far to pass all our faculties of comprehension, and with a minuteness at the same time so absolute, that, as we can on the one hand perceive nothing beyond its grasp, so we are on the other hand unable to find anything too minute to escape its notice, we are irresistibly led to conclude that there is nothing above or below such an agent, and that nothing which we can conceive is impossible for such an intelligence. The argument of Mr. Hume supposes or admits that the whole universe is its work, and that animal life is its creation. We can no more avoid believing that the same power which created the universe can sustain it—that the same power which created our souls can prolong their existence after death—than we can avoid believing that the power which sustained the universe up to the instant we are speaking, is able to continue it in being for a thousand years to come. But indeed Mr. Hume's argument would go the length of making us disbelieve that the Deity has the power of continuing the existence of the creation for a day. We are only entitled, according to this argument, to conclude that the Deity had the power of working the works we have seen and no more. Last spring and autumn we observed the powers of nature in vegetation, that is, we noted the operations of the Deity in that portion of his works, and were entitled, Mr. Hume admits, to infer that he had the skill and the power to produce that harvest from that seed time, but no more. We had, says the argument, no right whatever to infer that the Deity's power extended to another revolution of the seasons. The argument is this, or it is nothing. Confining its scope, as Mr. Hume would confine it, to the universe as a whole, and excluding all inferences as to a future state or other worlds, is wholly gratuitous. The argument applies to all that we have seen of the already past and the actually executed in this universe, and excludes all respecting this same universe which is yet to come; consequently, if it be good for anything, it is sufficient to prove that, although *our experience* may authorise us to conclude that the Deity has skill and power sufficient to maintain the world in its present state up to this hour, yet that experience is wholly insufficient to prove that he has either skill or power to continue its existence a moment longer. Every one of the topics applied by him to a Future State applies to this. If we have no right to believe that one exertion of skill proves the author of nature adequate to another exertion of a kind no more difficult and only a little varied, we can have no right to believe that one exertion of skill proves him adequate to a repetition of the same identical operation. Now no man living carries or can carry his disbelief so far as this. Indeed such doubts would not only shake all inductive science to pieces, but would put a stop to the whole business of life. And assuredly we may be well contented to rest the truths of Natural Theology on the same foundation upon which those of all the other sciences, as well as the practical conduct of all human affairs, must for ever repose.

NOTE VI.—PAGE 75.

Of the Ancient doctrines respecting Mind.

THE opinions of the ancient philosophers upon the nature of the Soul were not very consistent with themselves; and in some respects were difficult to reconcile with the doctrine of its immateriality, which most of them maintained. It may suffice to mention a few of those theories.

Plato and his pupil Aristotle may certainly be said to have held the Soul's immateriality; at least, they maintained that it was of a nature wholly different from the body; and they appear often to hold that it was unlike all matter whatever, and a substance or existence of a nature quite peculiar to itself. Their language is nearly the same upon this subject. Plato speaks of the *ουσια ασωματος και νοητη—a bodiless* or *incorporeal and intelligent being;* and of such existence he says, in one place, *τα ασωματα καλλιστα οντα και μεγιστα λογῳ μονον, αλλῳ δε ουδενι σαφως δεικνυται*—"*Things incorporeal being the most excellent and the greatest of all, are made manifest by reason alone, and no otherwise.*"—(*Politicus*. So again in the *Cratylus*, he derives *σωμα* from *σωζεσθ* and represents the body as a prison of the soul, [illegible]

δεσμωτηριον ειναι ουν της ψυχης αυτο εως ην τα οφειλ
σωμα, following herein the doctrine said to have
livered by Orpheus. Aristotle, too, speaks of a bei
rable and separated from things perceivable by the
ουσια χωριστη και κεχωρισμενη των αισθητων. Neve
these philosophers frequently speak of the soul
always, and as it were necessarily, connected with
some kind or other—*αει ψυχη επιτεταγμενη σωματι,*
αλλῳ, τοτε δε αλλῳ. "*The soul is always annexed t*
sometimes to one and sometimes to another."—*De*
Thus Aristotle (*De Gener. Anim.* ii. 4), *ἡ γαρ ψυ*
σωματος τινος εστι—"*the soul is the substance of some*
body." And in the treatise *De Anima*, ii. 2, he says-
τουτο καλως ὑπολαμβανουσιν, οἱς δοκει μητε ανευ σωμα
μητε σωμά τι ψυχη· σωμα μεν γαρ ουκ εστι, σωματος
"*Those therefore rightly hold who think that the sou*
exist without the body, and yet that it is not body;
the body, but somewhat of the body."

This corporeal connexion is stated by Plutarch,
Quæst. Platon., still more plainly to have been the
doctrine—*ψυχην αει πρεσβυτεραν του σωματος, αιτια*
εκεινου γενεσεως και αρχην·—ουκ αν γενεσθαι ψυχ
σωματος, ουδε νουν ανευ ψυχης· αλλα ψυχην μεν εν
νουν δε εν τῃ ψυχῃ. "*The soul is older than the b*
the cause and origin of its existence: not that the so
without the body, or the understanding without the s
that the soul is in the body, and the understandin
soul."

According to these representations and quotatio
together, Plato held the soul to be an immaterial su
separable from any given body, but incapable of
without some body or other, and the mind or unders
to be a part of the soul. The residue of the soul wa
shall afterwards see, its sensitive or mortal portion.

The idea of motion seems to have been intimat
nected in their views with mind or spirit, and in so
doctrines approach those, if we can call them doct
the modern atheists (See Note IV.)—*το ἑαυτο κιν*
Plato), *φῃς λογον εχειν την αυτην ουσιαν ἡνπερ τουνο*
παντες ψυχην προσαγορευομεν; φημι γε—"*You say*
substance (or *being*) *to which we all give the name*
has for its definition 'that which moves itself?' I c
do say so."—*De Legg.* x.

But the same philosophers also held the soul to be an manation from the Deity, and that each individual soul was a portion of the Divine Essence, or Spirit: consequently, they could not mean to assert that the divine essence was nseparable from matter of some kind, but only those portions of that essence which they represented to be severed, and as it were torn off, from the divine mind—*συναφεις τῷ εῷ, ἅτε αυτου μορια ουσια και αποσπασματα.*—(*Epict.*)

Plutarch, in the work already cited, says—*ἡ δε ψυχη ουκ ργον εστι του θεου μονον αλλα και μερος· ουδ᾽ ὑπ᾽ αυτου αλλ᾽ π᾽ αυτου, και εξ αυτου, γεγονεν*—"*The soul is not only his work, but a part of himself; it was not created by him, but from him and out of him.*"

NOTE VII.—PAGE 75.

Of the Ancient Doctrines respecting the Deity and Matter.

The notions of the Supreme Being entertained by the ancient philosophers were more simple and consistent than their theory of the soul; and but for the belief, which they never shook off, in the eternity of matter, would very nearly have coincided with our own. They give him the very same names, and clothe him apparently in the like attributes. He is not only *αθανατος, αφθαρτος, ανωλεθρος*—*immortal, incorruptible, indestructible*—but *αγεννητος, αυτογενης, αυτοφυης, αυθυποστατος*—*uncreated, self-made, self-originating, self-existing.* *Ζωον πασαν εχον μακαριοτητα μετ᾽ αφθαρσιας*, says Epicurus—"*A Being having all happiness, with an incorruptible nature.*" Again, he is *παντοκρατωρ, παγκρατης*—*omnipotent, all-powerful; δυναται γαρ ἅπαντα*, says Homer (*Odyss.* ξ)—"*He has the power over all things.*" The creative power is also, in words at least, ascribed to him—*κοσμοποιητης, δημιουργος*—*the maker of the world, the great artificer.* Aristotle, so, in a very remarkable passage of the Metaphysics, says that God seems to be the cause of all things, and, as it were, beginning, or principle—*Θεος δοκει το αιτιον πασιν ειναι ι αρχη τις*: and, indeed, by implication, this is ascribed in e terms *uncreated, self-created*, and *self-existing*; for in soundness of reason the being who had no creator, and mu more the being who created himself (if we can conceive su an idea), must have created all things else. Neverthele such was certainly not so plain an inference of reasoni with the ancients; for whether it be that by *αυτοφυης* a *αυτογενης*, they only meant to convey the idea of *αγενητος*- of a being uncreated and existing from all eternity—or th they took some nice distinction, to us incomprehensible, b tween self-creation and the creation of other beings or thin —certain it is, that the same philosophers who so described t Deity clung to the notion of matter being also eternal, a co-existent with the supreme power, and that by creator a artificer they rather seem to have meant the arranger atoms—the power giving form to chaotic matter, than t power calling things into existence. They appear to ha been all pressed by the difficulty (and who shall deny it of conceiving the act of creation—the act of calling e istences out of nothing. Accordingly, the maxim whi generally prevailed among most of the Greek sects, a which led to very serious and even practical consequences their systems, was *ουδεν εκ μη οντος* (or *εξ ουδενος*) *γινεσθαι* *that nothing is made of what has no existence, or of nothi* Aristotle represents this as the common opinion of all natu philosophers before him—*κοινην δοξαν των φυσικων.* says, in another passage (*De Cœlo*, iii. 1), *οἱ μεν αυτ* (*προτερον φιλοσοφησαντες*) *ανειλον ὁλως γενεσιν και φθορ* *ουδεν γαρ ουτε γιγνεσθαι φασιν ουτε φθειρεσθαι των οντων* "*Some of those* (*older philosophers*) *took away* (*or abolishe* *all generation and destruction, for they hold that none of* *things which exist are either created or destroyed.*" Nev theless, it cannot be doubted that the Platonic doctrine of the same kind, and that Aristotle, in truth, ascribed o a qualified creative power to the Deity. Plutarch's sta ment of the Platonic doctrine is precise to this point—*βελτ* *ουν Πλατωνι πειθομενους τον μεν κοσμον ὑπο θεου γεγονε* *λεγειν και αδειν· ὁ μεν γαρ καλλιστος των γεγονοτων,* *αριστος των αιτιων· την δε ουσιαν και ὑλην εξ ἧς γεγονεν* *γενομενην, αλλα ὑποκειμενην αει τῷ δημιουργῳ, εις διαθε* *και ταξιν αυτης και προς αυτον εξομοιωσιν, ὡς δυνατον* *παρασχειν· ου γαρ εκ του μη οντος γενεσις, αλλ' εκ του* *καλως, μηδ' ἱκανως εχοντος, ὡς οικιας, και ἱματιου, και αν* *αυτος*--"*Better then be convinced by Plato, and say and* *that the world was made by God; for the world is the* *xcellent of all created things, and he the best of all causes. But the substance or matter* (literally *timber*) *of which he nade it, was not created, but always lay ready for the artificer, to be arranged and ordered by him; for the creation was ot out of nothing, but out of what had been without form and nfit, as a house, or a garment, or a statue are made.*" And hus it seems that when Maker or Creator is used by the cademics, we are rather to regard them as meaning Maker n the sense in which an artificer is said to make or fabriate the object of his art. Εποιησεν ων (says Timæus) *ουδε τον κοσμον εξ ἁπασας τας ὑλας—He made the world of ll kinds of matter.—De An. Mund.* Indeed, I can in no ther way understand that very obscure, and but for some ch gloss, contradictory passage of Aristotle, in the first ook of the *Physics*, where he is giving his own doctrine in pposition to the tenets of the elder philosophers on this oint—'Ημεις *δε και αυτοι φαμεν γιγνεσθαι μεν ουδεν ἁπλως κ μη οντος, ὁμως μεντοι γιγνεσθαι εκ μη οντος, οἱον κατα υμβεβηκος· εκ γαρ της στερησεως ὁ εστι καθ' αὑτο με ον, κ ενυπαρχοντος γιγνεται τι. θαυμαζεται δε τουτο και αδυατον οὑτω δοκει γιγνεσθαι τι εκ μη οντος*—"*We ourlves however say that nothing is absolutely* (or *merely*) *roduced from what has no existence, yet that something is roduced from that which has no existence as far as regards ccidents* (or *accessory qualities*)*; for something is produced om privation, which has no existence in itself, and not from ything inherent. But this is wonderful, and seems imposble, that something should be produced out of that which has existence.*"—(*Phys.* i. 8.) Indeed he had said in the me treatise, just before, that all confessed it impossible and conceivable that *any being could either be created out of thing, or be utterly destroyed—εκ μη οντος γινεσθαι τοτε οι ολλυσθαι ανηνυστον και αῤῥηκτον.* (*Ib.* i. 5.)

Upon the uncreated nature of things—for the doctrine tended to mind as well as to matter—the ancient philophers founded another tenet of great importance. Matter d soul were reckoned not only uncreated, but indeructible; their existence was eternal in every sense of the ord, without end as without beginning: *μηδεν εκ του μη τος γινεσθαι, μηδε εις το μη ον φθειρεσθαι*—"*Nothing can produced out of that which has no existence, nor can anying be reduced to nonentity.*" Such is Diogenes Laertius's count of *Democritus'* doctrine, or the Atomic principle.

"Principium hinc cujus nobis exordia sumet,
Nullam rem e nihilo gigni divinitus unquam."—
"Huc accedit uti quidque in sua corpora rursum
Dissolvat natura, neque ad nihilum intereunt res"—
"Haud igitur redit ad nihilum res ulla, sed omnes
Discidio redeunt in corpora materiai"—

are the expressions of Lucretius, in giving an account of th Epicurean Philosophy (i. 151, 217, 249), or, as Persius mor shortly expresses it,

"De nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti."—*Sat.* iii. 84.

And it must be admitted that they reasoned with great co sistency in this respect; for if the difficulty of comprehen ing the act of creation out of nothing was a sufficient grou for holding all things to be eternal *à parte ante*—the equ difficulty of comprehending the act of annihilation was good a ground for believing in their eternity *à parte post*- there being manifestly just as much difficulty, and of t same kind, in comprehending how a being can cease to exi as how it can come into existence.

From this doctrine mainly it is that the Greek philos phers derive the immortality of the soul, as far as the met physical and more subtle arguments for their belief go; a accordingly its pre-existence is a part of their faith as mu as its future life, the eternity *ab ante* being as much co sidered as the eternity *post*. Thus Plato says that "*our so was somewhere before it existed in the human form, so th also it seems to be immortal afterwards*"—ην που ἡμ ἡ ψυχη πριν εν τῷδε τῷ ανθρωπινῳ ειδει γενεσθαι, ὥσ και ταυτῃ αθανατον τι εοικεν η ψυχη ειναι.—(*Pha* Nevertheless, it must be admitted that their doctrine future existence is most unsatisfactory as far as it is th derived, that is, their psychological argument: and for t reasons—*first*, because it is coupled with the tenet of p existence, and having no kind of evidence of that from r soning, we not only are prone to reject it, but are driven suppose that our future existence will in like manner severed by want of recollection from all consideration personal identity; *secondly*, because, according to the d trine of the soul being an emanation from the Deity, future state implies a return to the divine essence, and confusion with or absorption in that supreme intellige and consequently an extinction of individual existence;

doctrine which was accordingly held by some of the metaphysical philosophers who maintained a Future State.

In one important particular there was an entire difference of opinion among the ancient philosophers; in truth, so important a difference, that those were held not to be theists, but atheists, who maintained one side of the argument—I mean as to Providence. The Atomists and Epicureans held that there were Gods, and upon the subject of creative power they did not materially differ from those generally called theists; but they denied that these Gods ever interfered in the affairs of the universe. The language of Plato and the other theists upon this subject is very strong: they regard such a doctrine as one of the three kinds of blasphemy or sacrilege; and in the Republic of that philosopher, all the three crimes are made equally punishable with death. The first species is denying the existence of a Deity, or of Gods—*το δε δευτερον, οντας (θεους) ου φροντιζειν ανθρωπον.* "*The second, admitting their existence, but denying that they care for man.*" The third kind of blasphemy was that of men attempting to propitiate the Gods towards criminal conduct, as *φθονοι* and *αδικηματα*, *slaughters* and *outrages upon justice*, "*by prayers, thanksgivings, and sacrifices—thus making those pure beings the accomplices of their crimes, by sharing with them a small portion of the spoil, as the wolves do with the dogs.*"—*De Logg.* x.*

Note VIII.—Page 101.

Of the ancient Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul.

That the ancient philosophers for the most part believed in the Future Existence of the Soul after death is undeniable.

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* Who can read these, and such passages as these, without wishing that some who call themselves Christians, some Christian Principalities and Powers, had taken a lesson from the heathen sage, and (if their nature forbade them to abstain from massacres and injustice) at least had not committed the scandalous impiety, as he calls it, of singing in places of Christian worship, and for the accomplishment of their enormous crimes, Te Deums, which in Plato's Republic would have been punished as blasphemy? Who, indeed, can refrain from lamenting another pernicious kind of sacrilege (an anthropomorphism) yet more frequent—that of making Christian temples resound with prayers for victory over our enemies, and thanksgiving for their defeat? Assuredly such a ritual as this is not taken from the New Testament.

It is equally certain that their opinions upon this im
subject varied exceedingly, and that the kind of imm
admitted by one class can hardly be allowed to dese
name. Thus they who considered it as a portion
Divine essence severed for a time, in order to be unite
a perishable body, believed in a future existence v
memory or consciousness of personal identity, and me
a reuniting of it with the Divine mind. Such, howev
not the belief of the more pure and enlightened theis
to their opinion, as approaching nearest our own, it
posed to confine the present notice.

In one respect, even the most philosophical of thos
ries differed widely from the Christian faith, and
departed almost as widely from the intimations of
reason. They all believed in the soul's pre-existence
is expressly given as proved by facts, and as one ar
for immortality or future existence, by Plato in th
elaborate treatise which remains upon the subject, the
He considers that all learning is only recollection,
θησιν αναμνησιν ειναι, and seems to think it inconc
that any idea could ever come into the mind, of wh
rudiments had not formerly been implanted there.
Timæus and other writings the same doctrine is furt
pounded. Ην που ἡμων ἡ ψυχη πριν εν τῷδε τῷ αν
ειδει γενεσθαι, ὥστε και ταυτῃ αθανατον τι εοικεν ἡ ψυχ
"*Our soul existed somewhere before it was produce
human form (or body) so that it seems to be immorta*
The arguments indeed, generally speaking, on whi
Plato and other philosophers ground their positions
their chief interest from the importance of the subj
from the exquisite language in which they are cloth
reasonings they are of little force or value. Thus i
borately shown, or rather asserted in the *Phædo*. t
traries always come from contraries, as life from de
death from life, in the works of Nature. Another ar
is that the nature or essence of the soul is immortal
hence it is easily inferred that it exists after death, a
reasoning hardly deserving the name—'Οποτε δη το α
και αδιαφθορον εστιν, αλλο τὶ ψυχη, η ει αθανατος
ουσα. και ανωλεθρος αν ειη—"*Since that which is imn
also indestructible, what else can we conclude but that
being (or happening to be) immortal, must also be i
able?*" (*Phæd.*) A more cogent topic is that of its sin

from whence the inference is drawn that it must be indestructible, because what we mean by the destruction of matter is its resolution into the elements that compose it. In one passage Plato comes very near the argument relied on in the text respecting the changes which the body undergoes; but it appears from the rest of the passage that he had another topic or illustration in view—*αλλα γαρ αν φαιην ἑκαστην των ψυχων πολλα σωματα κατατριβειν, αλλως τε κἀν πολλα ετη βιῳ. Ει γαρ ρεοι το σωμα και απολλυοιτο, ετι ζωντος του ανθρωπου, αλλ' ἡ ψυχη αει το κατατριβομενον ανυφαινοι, αναγκαιον μεντ' αν ειη, ὁποτε απολλυοιτο ἡ ψυχη, το τελευταιον ὑφασμα τυχειν αυτην εχουσαν. και τουτου μονου προτεραν απολλυσθαι*—"*But I should rather say that each of our souls wears out many bodies, though these should live many years; for if the body runs out and is destroyed, the man still living, but the soul always repairs that which is worn out, it would follow of necessity that the soul when it perished would happen to have its last covering, and to perish only just before that covering.*"—*Phæd.* A singular instance of the incapacity of the ancients to observe facts, or at least the habitual carelessness with which they admitted relations of them, is afforded in another of these arguments. Socrates is made to refer, in the *Phædo*, to the appearance of ghosts near places of burial as a well-known and admitted fact, and as proving that a portion of the soul for a while survived the body, but partook of its nature and likeness, and was not altogether immortal. This distinction between the mortal or sensitive and the immortal or intellectual part of the soul pervades the Platonic theism. We have observed already in the statement of Plutarch, that the Platonists held the *νους* or intellect to be contained in the *ψυχη* or soul, and the same doctrine occurs in other passages. Aristotle regards the soul in like manner as composed of two parts—the active, or *νους*, and the passive: the former he represents as alone immortal and eternal; the latter as destructible, *τουτο μονον αθανατον και αϊδιον, ὁ δε παθητικος φθαρτος*.—*Nic. Eth.*

It must, however, be admitted, that the belief of the ancients was more firm and more sound than their reasonings were cogent. The whole tenor of the doctrine in the *Phædo* refers to a renewal or continuation of the soul as a separate and individual existence, after the dissolution of the body, and with a complete consciousness of personal identity—in short, *to a continuance* of the same rational being's existence after death. The liberation from the body is treated a beginning of a new and more perfect life—*τοτε γαρ καθ᾽ αὑτην ἡ ψυχη εσται χωρις του σωματος· προτερον (τελευτησασι).* Xenophon thus makes Cyrus deliver self to his children on his death-bed—*Ουτοι εγωγε, ω πο ουδε τουτο πωποτε επεισθην ὡς ἡ ψυχη, ἑως μεν αν εν θ σωματι ῃ, ζῃν, ὁταν δε τουτου απαλλαγῃ, τεθνηκεν—ουδ ὁπως αφρων εσται ἡ ψυχη, επειδαν του αφρονος σωματος γενηται, ουδε τουτο πεπεισμαι· αλλ᾽ ὁταν ακρατος και κα ὁ νους εκκριθῃ, τοτε και φρονιμωτατον εικος αυτον ε* Cicero has translated the whole passage upon this su beautifully, though somewhat paraphrastically; but portion he has given more literally—"Mihi quidem quam persuaderi potuit, animos dum in corporibus e mortalibus, vivere; quum exissent ex iis, emori: nec tum animum esse insipientem, quum ex insipienti co evasisset; sed quum omni admixtione corporis libe purus et integer esse cœpisset, eum esse sapientem."†

None of the ancients, indeed, has expressed himself clearly or more beautifully upon the subject than this philosopher and rhetorician. His reasoning, too, respe it, greatly exceeds in soundness and in sagacity that c Grecian sages. Witness the admirable argument i Tusculan Questions. They who deny the doctrine, say can only allege as the ground of their disbelief the diffi of comprehending the state of the soul severed fron body, as if they could comprehend its state in the "Quasi vero intelligant, qualis sit in ipso corpore, conformatio, quæ magnitudo, qui locus."—"Hæc re isti (he adds) qui negant animum sine corpore se intel posse; videbunt quem in ipso corpore intelligant. quidem naturam animi intuenti, multo difficilior oc cogitatio, multoque obscurior, qualis animus in corpo tanquam alienæ domi, quam qualis, cum exierit, et ir rum cœlum quasi domum suam venerit."‡ That he de the most refined gratification from such contempla many passages of his writings attest; none more than towards the close of the Cato Major, which must often cheered the honest labourers for their country and

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[*] Cyrop. ii.

[†] De Senect. 80.—Here the words "omni admixtione," a added.

[‡] *Tusc. Quæst.* i. 22.

l in the midst of an ungrateful and unworthy generation. n censes (ut de me ipso aliquid more senum glorier) me os labores diurnos nocturnosque, domi militiæque susurum fuisse, si iisdem finibus gloriam meam, quibus m essem terminaturus? Nonne melius multo fuisset sam ætatem et quietam sine ullo labore aut contentione ucere?" "Think you—to speak somewhat of myself after manner of old men—think you that I should ever have rgone such toils, by day and by night, at home and abroad, I believed that the term of my life was to be the period y renown? How much better would it have been to away a listless being and a tranquil, void of all strife, free from any labour?"* And again, that famous pas- : "O præclarum diem quum ad illud divinum animo- concilium cœtumque proficiscar; quumque ex hac a et colluvione discedam!" "Delightful hour! when ll journey towards that divine assemblage of spirits, depart from this crowd of polluted things!"†

ıe Platonic ideas of a future state, as well as those ted by the Roman sage, distinctly referred to an act rendered, and rewards or punishments awarded for hings done in the body—χρη παντα ποιειν, says Plato, αρετης και φρονησεως εν τῳ βιῳ μετασχειν· καλον γαρ ον και ἡ ελπις μεγαλη—"*We ought to act in all things* *to pursue virtue and wisdom in this life, for the labour* *cellent and the hope great.*"—(*De Legg.* x.) Τον δε οντα ἑκαστον οντως αθανατον ειναι, ψυχην επονομαζομενον, θεοις αλλοις απιεναι, δωσοντα λογον, καθαπερ ὁ νομος ὁ ρος λεγει, τῷ μεν αγαθῷ θαρῥαλεον, τῷ δε κακῷ μαλα οον—"*In truth each of us—that is to say, each soul—* *mortal, and departs to other Gods* (or *Gods in another* *l*) *to render an account as the laws of the state declare.* *to the good is matter of confidence, but to the wicked of* r."—(*De Legg.* xii.) So in the beginning of the *Epi-*s, he says that a glorious prospect (καλη ελπις) is held o us of attaining, when we die, the happiness not to be ed on earth, and to gain which after death we had ed all our efforts. In the *Phædo*, where he is giving a what fanciful picture of the next world, he tells us that which have committed lesser crimes come εις την ν και εκει οικουσι τε και καθαιρομενοι των δε αδικημα-διδοντες δικας απολυονται ει τις τι ηδικησε—"*they*

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* De Senect. 82. † Ibid. 85.

remain in that space, and being cleansed (or purged) of thei offences, are released;" (from whence the idea and the nam of *purgatory* has been taken). But such as have been incurably wicked, murderers and others, are driven, he says into Tartarus, *δθεν ουποτε εκβαινουσιν*, "*whence they neve more escape.*" * It is remarkable, that in the same work Plato, if some words have not been interpolated in the text looks forward to some direct divine communications of ligh upon this subject; but recommends abiding by the light o reason till that shall be granted. Let us, he says, choose th best human reason, and, sitting on it like a raft, pass throug the dangers of life, unless (or until) *ει μητις δυναιτο ασφαλε στερον και ακινδυνοτερον επι βεβαιοτερου οχηματος η λογ θειου τινος διαπορευθηναι*—"*unless some one can pass us ov more easily and safely upon some stronger vehicle or divi word.*" †

The passage in the *Somnium Scipionis*, where celesti enjoyments are held out as the rewards of public virtue, i well known. The precision indeed of the language touching a future state, which marks this treatise, is singular, approaching to that of the New Testament—"beati ævo sempiterno fruuntur"—"ea vita via est in cœlum et in hunc cœtum eorum qui jam vixerunt et corpore laxati illum incolunt locum"—"immo vero ii vivunt, qui ex corporum vinculis, tanquam e carcere, evolaverunt; vestra vero, quæ dicitur vita, mors est"—"sic habeto, non esse te mortalem, sed corpus hoc; nec enim tu is es, quem forma ista declarat, sed mens cujusque, is est quisque"—"animus in domum suam pervolabit, idque ocius faciet, si jam tum, quum erit inclusus in corpore, eminebit foras, et ea quæ extra erunt contemplans, quam maxime se à corpore abstrahet." These things have given rise to doubts of the authenticity of the treatise—doubts easily removed by looking to the many absurdities respecting the celestial bodies and the other accompaniments of heaven with which the work abounds; to the Platonic doctrine respecting motion as the essence o mind, which it adopts; and also to the doctrine distinctly stated of the pre-existent state.

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* Phæd.

† Ibid.

NOTE IX.—PAGE 101.

Of Bishop Warburton's Theory concerning the ancient Doctrine of a Future State.

To any one who had read the extracts in the last Note, but still more to one who was familiar with the ancient writers from whose works they are taken, it might appear quite impossible that a question should ever be raised upon the general belief of antiquity in a Future State, and the belief of some of the most eminent of the philosophers, at least, in a state of rewards and punishments. Nevertheless as there is nothing so plain to which the influence of a preconceived opinion and the desire of furthering a favourite hypothesis will not blind men, and as their blindness in such cases bears even a proportion to their learning and ingenuity, it has thus fared with the point in question, and Bishop Warburton has denied that any of the ancients except Socrates really believed in a future state of the soul individually, and subject to reward or punishment. He took up this argument because it seemed to strengthen his extraordinary reasoning upon the Legation of Moses. It is therefore necessary first to state how his doctrine bears upon that reasoning.

His reasoning is this. The inculcating of a future state of retribution is necessary to the well being of society. All men, and especially all the wisest nations of antiquity, have agreed in holding such a doctrine necessary to be inculcated. But there is nothing of the kind to be found in the Mosaic dispensation. And here he pauses to observe that these propositions seem too clear to require any proof. Nevertheless his whole work is consumed in proving them; and the conclusion from the whole, that therefore the Mosaic law is of Divine original, is left for a further work, which never appeared; and yet this is the very position which all, or almost all who may read the book, and even yield their assent to it, are the most inclined to reject. Indeed it may well be doubted if this work, learned and acute as it is, and showing the author to be both well read and well fitted for controversy, ever satisfied any one except perhaps Bishop Hurd, or ever can demonstrate any thing so well as it proves the preposterous and perverted ingenuity of an able and industrious man.

That such was very far from being the author's opi we have ample proof. He terms his work ‘ stration.” He describes his reasoning “ as ver of mathematical certainty,” and “ to which n mere physical possibility of the contrary can. l and he declares his only difficulty to be in “ tell the pleasure of the discovery or the wonder that make be the greater.” Accordingly in the co between him and his friend Bishop Hurd, the c cess of the “ Demonstration ” is always assum glory of it is made the topic of endless and even tulation, not without pity and even vituperation can remain dissatisfied, and who are habitual placently classed by name with the subjects of known satire.

The two things which the author always over the possibility of a human lawgiver making a system, and of sceptics holding the want of the question to be no argument for the divine o Mosaic law, but rather a proof of its flowing fro and fallible source. As these “ mere possib wholly independent of the admission that every book is correct, and all the positions are demon as nothing whatever is said to exclude such supp manifest that a more useless and absurd argume maintained upon any grave and important su merit of the book lies in its learning and its c gument; indeed nearly the whole is collateral, nected with the purpose of the reasoning. But of that collateral matter is fanciful and unsound. that the descent of Æneas to hell in the sixth Æneid is a veiled account of the Eleusinian M probably made as few proselytes as the main “ Demonstration;” and if any one has lent his theory that the ancients had no belief in a fut retribution, it can only be from being led away assertion from the examination of the facts.

This position of Bishop Warburton is manif unnecessary to the proof of his general theor thought it would show more strongly the opinion of the uses to be derived from inculcating the d Future State, if he could prove that they who public, and with political views, did not the *lieve it.*

The way in which he tries to prove this is by observing that there prevailed among the old philosophers, as well as lawgivers, a principle of propagating what they knew to be false opinions for the public benefit, and of thus holding one kind of doctrine in secret, the *esoteric*, and another, the *exoteric*, in public. Of this fact there is no doubt, but its origin is hardly to be thus traced to design always prevailing. The most ancient notions of religion were the birth or fear and ignorance in the earliest ages, and the fancy of the poets mingled with these, multiplying and improving and polishing the rude imaginations of popular terror and simplicity. The rulers of the community, aiding themselves by the sanctions which they drew from thence, favoured the continuance and propagation of the delusions: and philosophers who afterwards arose among the people were neither disposed themselves nor permitted by the magistrate openly to expose the errors of the popular faith. Hence they taught one doctrine in private, while in public they conformed to the prevailing creed, and the observances which it enjoined.

But whatever be the origin of the double doctrine, Bishop Warburton cannot expect that its mere existence, and the use made of it by ancient writers and teachers will prove his position, unless he can show that the future state of retribution is only mentioned by them upon occasions of an *exoterical* kind, and never when *esoterically* occupied. Now this he most signally fails to do; indeed he can hardly be said fairly to make the attempt, for his rule is to make the tenor of the doctrine the criterion of *esoteric* or *exoteric*, instead of showing the occasion to be one or the other from extrinsic circumstances, which is manifestly begging the question most unscrupulously. It seems hardly credible that so acute and practised a controversialist should so conduct an argument, but it is quite true. As often as anything occurs in favour of a Future State, he says it was said *exoterically;* and whenever he can find anything on the opposite side, or leaning towards it (which is really hardly at all in the Platonic or Ciceronian writings,) he sets this down for the *esoteric* sentiments of the writer. But surely if there be any meaning at all in the double doctrine, whatever may have been its origin, the occasion is everything, and there can be no difficulty in telling whether any given
maintained *esoterically* or not, by the circu
which, and the purposes for which, it was prop

The argument on which he dwells most is drawn from the allusion made by Cæsar in the discussion upon the punishment of the conspirators as related by Sallust, "Ultra (mortem) neque curæ neque gaudio locum esse;" and from the way in which Cato and Cicero evade, he says, rather than answer him, appealing to the traditions of antiquity and the authority of their ancestors instead of arguing the point. (*Div. Leg. III.* 2. 5.) Can any thing be more inconclusive than this? Granting that Sallust, in making speeches for Cæsar and Cato (whom by the way he makes speak in the self-same style, that is, in his own Sallustian style), adhered to the sentiments each delivered; and further, that Cæsar uses this strange topic not as a mere rhetorical figure, but as a serious reason against capital punishment, and as showing that there is mercy and not severity in such inflictions (a very strong supposition to make respecting so practised and so practical a reasoner as Caius Cæsar); surely so bold a position as practical atheism brought forward in the Roman senate was far more likely to be met, whether by the decorum of Cato or the skill of Cicero, with a general appeal to the prevalence of the contrary belief, and its resting on ancient tradition, than with a metaphysical or theological discourse singularly out of season in such a debate. To make the case our own: let us suppose some member of Parliament, or of the Chamber of Deputies, so ill judged as to denounce in short but plain terms the religion of the country,—would any person advert further to so extravagant a speech than to blame it, and in general expressions signify the indignation it had excited? Would not an answer out of Lardner, or Paley, or Pascal be deemed almost as ill-timed as the attack? To be sure neither Cato nor Cicero are represented as testifying any great disgust at the language of Cæsar, but this, as well indeed as the topic being introduced at all by the latter, only shows that the doctrine of a Future State was not one of the tenets much diffused among the people, or held peculiarly sacred by them. Had the orator vindicated Catiline by showing how much less flagitious his bad life was than that of some of the gods to whom altars were erected and worship rendered, a very different burst of invective would have been called down upon the blasphemous offender.

In truth, the passage thus relied upon only shows, like all *the rest of* the facts, that the doctrine of retribution was rather more *esoteric* than *exoteric* among the ancients. The elaborate dissertation of Bishop Warburton's upon the Mysteries, proves this effectually, and clearly refutes his whole argument. For to prove that the doctrine of future retribution was used at all as an engine of state, he is forced to allege that it was the secret disclosed to the initiated in the Sacred Mysteries; which, according to Cicero, were not to be viewed by the imprudent eye. (Ne imprudentiam quidem oculorum adjici fas est, *De Legg. II.* 14.) Surely this would rather indicate that such doctrines were not inculcated indiscriminately, and that at all events, when a philosopher gives them a place in his works, it cannot be in pursuance of a plan for deceiving the multitude into a belief different from his own. It is indeed plain enough that the bulk of the people were restrained, if by any sanctions higher than those of the penal laws, rather by the belief of constant interposition from the gods. An expectation of help from their favour or of punishment from their anger in this life and without any delay, formed the creed of the Greeks and the Romans; and nothing else is to be found in either the preamble to Zaleucus the Locrian's laws quoted by Bishop Warburton, or in the passages of Cicero's treatise, to which he also refers. (*Div. Leg. II.* 3.)

Among the many notable inadvertencies of his argument, concealed from himself by an exuberant learning and a dogmatism hardly to be paralleled, is the neglecting to observe how difficultly the appearance of the doctrine in the places where we find it is reconciled with his notion of its having formed the subject of the Mysteries. What part in those Mysteries did Cicero's and Plato's and Seneca's and Xenophon's writings bear? There we have the doctrine plainly stated; possibly to the world at large—possibly, far more probably, to the learned reader only—but assuredly not by the Hierophant or the Mystagogue, to the initiated. This is wholly inconsistent with the notion of its being reserved for these alone. It is equally inconsistent with the theory that it was promulgated for the purposes of deception; for such purposes would have been far better served by decidedly making it a part neither of the instruction given to the select and initiated few, nor of the doctrine confined to th students of philosophy, but of the common, vulgar, po belief and ritual which it is admitted not to have been. truth *undeniably is, that* as, on the one hand, it was u *versally preached* and inculcated, so neither was mystery forbidden to be divulged—that it was no part of the vulgar creed, nor yet so repugnant to the religion of the country as to be concealed from prudential considerations, like the unity of the Deity, the fabulousness of the ordinary polytheistic superstitions, as to the gods and goddesses, the demigods, and the Furies. These opinions were indeed *esoteric*, and only promulgated among the learned. A few allusions, and but a few, are found to them in any of the classical authors whose writings were intended for general perusal, and chiefly to the parts which had in process of time become too gross even for the vulgar, such as the Furies, Cerberus, &c., which Cicero describes as unfit for the belief of even an ignorant or doting old woman (Quæ anus tam excors, &c. *De Nat. Deor.*, and *Tusc. Quæst.*), and which are treated as fables both by Demosthenes in that noble passage where he exclaims that the Furies, who are represented in the scene as driving men with burning torches (ελαυνειν δᾳσιν ἡμμεναις), are our bad passions, and by Cicero in words (Hi faces, hæ flammæ, &c.) almost translated from the Greek.

After all, can any thing be more violent than the supposition that those philosophers, for the purpose of deceiving the multitude, delivered opinions not held by themselves, and delivered them in profound philosophical treatises? It is in the Phædo and the Timæus (hardly intelligible to the learned), and the Tusculan Questions, and the Somnium Scipionis, in an age when there were hardly any readers beyond the disciples of the several sects, that those *exoteric* matters are supposed to be conveyed for accomplishing the purposes of popular delusion—not in poems and speeches, read in the Portico or pronounced in the Forum. If then the records of their opinions on the most recondite subjects were chosen for the depositories of *exoteric* faith, where are we to look for their *esoteric* doctrines? Bishop Warburton must needs answer, in the very same records; for to this he is driven, because he has none other; and he cannot choose but admit that the whole argument is utterly defective, if it stops short at only showing those opinions to have been de-
red, even if proved to be *exoterical*, unless he can also
pposite doctrines to have been *esoterically* entertained
might grant the former to have been
(which, however, Bishop Warbur-
yet deny that they were
ption. Accordingly he is

find, if he can, proofs of those opposite doctrines in the self-same writings where he says the exoteric ones are conveyed. However, nothing surely can be more absurd than this; for it is to maintain that Plato and Cicero pretended to believe a future state of retribution in order to deceive the multitude, by stating it in the same writings in which they betrayed their real sentiments to be the very reverse. And this absurdity is the same, and this argument is as cogent, if we take the double doctrine to apply, not—as we are, in favour of the Bishop's argument, generally supposing it to a difference between what was taught in the face of the people and what was reserved for the scholars, but to a division of the scholars into two classes, one only of whom was supposed to see the whole truth—for the same writings on this subject are said to contain both the statements of it. Nevertheless let us shortly see how he finds any such contrary statements, or any means of explaining away the positive and precise dicta, and even reasonings, cited in the former note (Note VIII.).

1. There can be no doubt that both the Greek and Roman philosophers disbelieved part of the popular doctrine as to future retribution, those punishments, to wit, which are of a gross and corporeal nature; and, accordingly, what Timæus the Locrian and others have said of the *τιμωριαι ξεναι* proves nothing, for it applies to those only. Strabo plainly speaks of these only in the passage where he observes that women and the vulgar are not to be kept pious and virtuous by the lessons of philosophy, but by superstition, which cannot be maintained without mythology (fable-making) and prodigies (*δια δεισιδαιμονιας· τουτο δ' ουκ ανευ μυθοποιΐας και τερατειας*), for he gives as examples of these, Jupiter's Thunder, the Snakes of the Furies, &c.

2. Nothing can be more vague than the inference drawn from such passages as those in Cicero and Seneca, where a doubt is expressed on the subject of a Future State, and a wish of more cogent proofs seems betrayed—as where Cicero makes one of his prolocutors, in the Tusculan Questions, say, that when he lays down the Phædo, which had persuaded him, "assensio omnis illa elabitur" (i. 11), and when Seneca speaks of the philosophers as "rem gratissimam promittentes magis quàm probentes," and
"bellum somnium." (*Epist.* 102.) No one pretend
ancients *had a firm* and abiding opinion, founded
cogent reasons, respecting a Future State; and

sounder theologians than they were, the anxiety naturally incident to so momentous an inquiry may well excite occasional doubts, and even apprehensions. Who questions Dr. Johnson's general belief in Revelation, because in moments of depression, when desiderating some stronger evidence, he was kindly told by a religious friend that he surely had enough, and answered, "*Sir, I would have more?*"

3. When Strabo speaks of the Brahmins having invented fables, like Plato, upon future judgment, it is plain that he alludes to those speculations in the Phædo, which are avowedly and purposely given as imaginary respecting the details of another world. To no other part of the Platonic doctrine can the Brahminical mythology be likened: nor would there be any accuracy of speech at all in comparing those fables to the more abstract doctrines of the immortality of the soul, as the words literally do—(*ὥσπερ και Πλατων περι της αφθαρσιας ψυχης*).

4. The quotation from Aristotle may refer to this world merely, but it is certainly made a good deal stronger in Bishop Warburton's translation—*φοβερωτατον δε θανατος· περὰς γαρ, και ουδεν ετι τῷ τεθνεωτι δ' ουκ ει, ουτε αγαθον, ουτε κακον ειναι.* "Death (as our author renders it) is of all things the most terrible; for it is the final period of existence, and beyond that, it appears there is neither good nor evil for the dead man to dread or hope." This is, at the best, a mere paraphrase. Aristotle says—*Death is most terrible, for it is an end (of us), and there appears to be nothing further, good or bad, for the dead.* Even were we to take this as an avowal of the Stagyrite's opinion in the sense given it by Bishop Warburton, it proves nothing as to Plato.

4. Some of the Stoics seem certainly to have held that the dissolution of the body closed the scene, and that the body ceased to exist by the resolving of its mortal frame into the kindred elements. Nevertheless, many of their observations may be conceived to regard the vulgar superstitions, and many of their sayings to flow from the habit of grandiloquent contempt for all bodily suffering. However, no one maintains that all the ancient sects of Theists, and each disciple of every sect, firmly believed in a future state; and it must be remarked that the question raised by Bishop Warburton being as to the belief in a state of retribution, *his citations* from Seneca and Epictetus go to deny the future

continuance of the soul altogether. Now he does not deny that at least some of the ancients did believe in this.

5. But the authority of Cicero presses our author the most closely, and accordingly he makes great efforts to escape from it. After showing some circumstances, rather of expression than anything else, in his philosophical treatises, he cites the oration *Pro Cluentio*, where, speaking of the vulgar superstition, he says it is generally disbelieved; and then asks, "Quid aliud mors eripuit præter sensum doloris?" But this at best is a rhetorical flourish; and being delivered in public (though before the judges), never could be seriously meant as an *esoteric* attack on the doctrine. The doctrines in the *De Officiis* relate only to the Deity's being incapable of anger or malevolence, on which account he praises Regulus the more for keeping his oath when all philosophers knew *nec irasci Deum nec nocere;* which shows, according to our author, that Cicero could not believe in future retribution. But this is said by Cicero only in reference to immediate punishments, or judgments, as the vulgar term them. At any rate, the passage is quite capable of this sense, and every rule of sound construction binds us to prefer it as consistent with the other passages on a future state, while those passages will bear no meaning but one. We may here observe, in passing, the gratuitous manner in which works are held *esoteric* and *exoteric*, just as suits the purposes of the argument. The Offices contain the above passage, and therefore, Bishop Warburton says it is the work which "bids the fairest of any to be spoken from the heart." The passage in the Somnium Scipionis, "Omnibus qui patriam conservarint, adjuverint, auxerint, certum esse in cœlo, ad definitum locum ubi beati ævo sempiterno fruantur," (*Som. Scip.* 37,) is got rid of, by saying that the ancients believed souls to be either human, or heroic and demonic, and that the two last went to heaven to enjoy eternal happiness, but that the former, comprehending the bulk of mankind, did not. This is begging the question to no purpose, for it is also giving up the point, and at the utmost only reduces the author's position to a denial that the ancients believed in the immortality of *all* souls. It must, however, be observed, that unless he is allowed to assume also something like election and predestination, he gains hardly even this in his argument; for if a man by patriotic conduct c
one of the heroic souls, and so gain eternal life,
distinct admission can be desired of a future stat

tion? That the doctrine of immortality was, by many at least, confined in some such way, may be true. That beautiful passage in Tacitus seems to point that way, "Si non cum corpore extinguuntur *magnæ* animæ."—(*Vit. Ag. sub fin.*) The main proof, however, against Cicero's belief is drawn from the Epistles, where alone, says our author, we can be sure of his speaking his real sentiments. Yet never did proof more completely fail. Writing to Torquatus, he says, "Nec enim dum ero, angar ullâ re, cum omni vacem culpâ—et si non ero, sensû omnino carebo," (lib. vi. Ep. 3); and to Toranius, "Ima ratio videtur, ferre moderate, præsertim cum omnium rerum mors sit extremum" (Lib. vi. Ep. 21.) And this, which really means nothing more than a common remark on death ending all our pains and troubles, the learned author calls "professing his disbelief in a future state of retribution in the frankest manner."—*Div. Leg.* iii. 3.

It seems, therefore, not too much to say that the Divine Legation does not more completely fail in proving the grand paradox which forms the main object of the argument, and which has been parodied by Soame Jenyns, in his most injudicious defence of Christianity, than it does in supporting the minor paradox which is taken up incidentally as to the real opinions of the ancients, and which, it must be admitted, is indeed quite unnecessary to the general argument, and as little damages it by its entire failure, as it could help it by the most entire success.

NOTE X.—SECTION VI., p. 106.

A LEARNED and valuable work upon the life of Lord Bacon has been published by Mr. B. Montagu. Some very important facts are proved satisfactorily by the ingenious author, and show how much the criminality of this great man is exaggerated in the common accounts of his fall. But it is clearly shown, that he was prevailed upon by the intrigues of James I. and his profligate minister to abandon his own defence, and sacrifice himself to their base and crooked policy—a statement which disgraces them more than it vindicates him. One thing, however, is undeniable—that they who so loudly blame Bacon overlook the meanness of almost all the great statesmen of those courtly times.

TRANSLATION OF PASSAGES IN THE TEXT.

Pages 9, 10.

For I shall go not only to meet those of whom I have been speaking, but also to my Cato, than whom a better man never was born, nor one of more eminent piety, whose remains I attended to the grave; while his soul, not quitting, but looking down upon me, departed to those regions whither he saw I should follow—a loss which I seemed to bear with fortitude, not because I could sustain it with an equal mind, but because I consoled myself with the reflection that the interval between our separation and our meeting could not be long.

Page 37.

But their course, everlasting and perpetual, performed with admirable and incredible constancy, declares the Divine force and mind, so that whosoever fails to perceive the power of the Deity in them should seem incapable of perceiving anything.

Page 55.

And, indeed, these philosophers (Crantor and Panætius) held that such emotions were usefully implanted in our minds by Nature: fear for giving caution, pity and suffering for giving clemency; anger itself they maintained to be, as it were, the whetstone of fortitude.

Page 107.

The volume of the works of God, and, as it were, another Scripture.

A virgin barren and, as it were, consecrated to God, never brings forth.

Page 109.

In respect of its information or science it may be reckoned natural philosophy.

Page 110.

The worst of all this is the consecration of errors, and it is to be accounted the pest of the understanding if vain things become objects of veneration.

In this vanity some of the moderns have so far indulged with the utmost thoughtlessness, that they have attempted to found natural philosophy on the first chapter of Genesis and the Book of Job and other Scriptures—*seeking the living among the dead.*

Page 111.

The delight and *feast* of the mathematicians, who would *make this science* control natural philosophy; for I know not by what fatality it happens that mathematics and logic, which ought to have behaved as the handmaidens of physics, yet, vaunting their certainty, seek to exercise dominion.

Page 113.

From the unwholesome admixture of divine and human things there comes not only a fantastic philosophy, but an heretical religion.

The inconveniences and dangers which, from that abuse, threaten both religion and philosophy, coining an heretical religion and a fantastical and superstitious philosophy.

Page 115.

"Him (God) we know by his qualities and attributes, and by his most wise and excellent structure, and by final causes; and we admire him on account of our foresight of the future."—"A God without dominion, providence, and final causes is nothing but fate and nature."—"And thus far of God, to inquire concerning whom from the phenomena no doubt it belongs to natural philosophy."

Page 153.

Epicurus wrote two books on holiness and piety towards the Gods: but how does he speak of them? As you might suppose you were listening to Coruncanus, to Scævola, our high-priests.

TRANSLATION OF PASSAGES IN THE NOTES.

Page 166.

If you should see a large and handsome house, you could not be induced, though you saw no master, to suppose that it was built for mice and weasels; but such is the embellishment of the world, such the variety and beauty of the heavens, such the force of the ocean and magnitude of the earth, that if you supposed them formed for the habitation of man rather than the immortal gods, you would obviously seem to be insane.

Whatever we take from earth, from water, from fire, from air, differs from what we obtain from the spirit; but that which surpasses all things, reason I mean, or if you please, in other words, mind, judgment, thought, prudence, where do we find it? whence can we obtain it?

Page 167.

He who does not perceive that the soul and mind of man, *reason*, judgment, prudence, have been made perfect by *divine* care, seems to me to be deficient in these very things.

From which knowledge we may understand its power, which is, indeed, such that there is nothing more excellent even in God himself.

Thus, though you cannot see the mind of man, as you cannot see God, yet as you acknowledge God from his works, so, from memory and invention, from the celerity of its movements and the excellence of its qualities, you acknowledge the divine power of the mind.

Page 172.

The most audacious and extraordinary work which the human mind has hitherto dared to produce.

Page 176.

Matter alone can act upon our senses, without which it is impossible that anything can become known to us.

What shall we say of a Berkeley who endeavours to prove to us that everything in the world is a chimerical illusion; that the whole universe only exists in ourselves and in our imagination? To justify opinions so monstrous, &c.

Page 180, Note.

If by Atheist is meant a man who would deny the existence of a force inherent in Nature, and without which Nature cannot be conceived, and if it is to that moving force that the name God is given, then there are no Atheists, and the word by which they are designated is applicable only to fools.

Page 196.

Hence we assume this principle in the commencement, that there has never been anything divinely formed out of nothing.

We come to this conclusion, that Nature resolves everything again into its parts, nor is anything ever reduced to nothing.

Therefore there is never anything which returns to nothing; but all substances by dissolution return into their parts.

Nothing can come from nothing, nothing return to nothing.

Page 200.

For I, my sons, never could persuade myself that the soul was living while it continued in a mortal body, and died when dismissed from it; nor could I ever persuade myself that it became unintellectual on its separation from an unintellectual body; but that when the mind acted without restraint and was purified (was freed from admixture *with the body), then it* became most intellectual.

As if they could comprehend what it was even when *in the body, its form,* size, and situation.

Such are the opinions of those who say that they cannot comprehend how the mind can exist distinct from the body, who yet comprehended it when it was in the body. To me, when I contemplate the nature of the soul, the subject is more obscure, and it is much more difficult to conceive what the soul is in the body, as in a house not belonging to it, than what it may be when it has left the body, and has come into the open heaven as into its own house.

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The blessed enjoy eternal life.

This life is the road to heaven and to the society of those who, liberated from the body, inhabit that place.

They live indeed who, freed from the chains of the body, have flown away as from a prison; but your life, as it is called, is death.

Consider thus—that thou art not mortal, but thy body only; for thou art not that which thy form exhibits, but the mind of every man is the man.

The soul will fly away to its home, and that the more readily, if, while included in the body, it elevates itself above the body by the contemplation of those things which especially abstract it from the body.

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Promising a pleasing thing rather than proving it.

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If great souls are not annihilated with the body.

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The deepest reason seems to be, to endure patiently, especially as death is the end of all things.

END OF VOLUME I.

London: Printed by W. CLOWES & SONS, Stamford-street.

PALEY'S
NATURAL THEOLOGY;

WITH

ILLUSTRATIVE NOTES,

BY

ENRY, LORD BROUGHAM, F.R.S., AND SIR C. BELL, K.G.H., &c.

AND AN INTRODUCTORY

DISCOURSE OF NATURAL THEOLOGY,

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TO WHICH ARE ADDED,

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WITH NUMEROUS WOODCUTS.

IN FOUR VOLS. VOL. II.

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CONTENTS OF VOL. II.

CHAP. I.—STATE OF THE ARGUMENT.

Watch, page 5; eight cases, 7-10.

Note 1, Referring to the Appendix for a description of the mechanism of the watch, page 5; 2, on "how the stone came to be there," *ib.*; 3, on the turning of oval frames, 7; 4, on "laws" of nature, &c., 10.

CHAP. II.—STATE OF THE ARGUMENT CONTINUED.

Note 5, on the management and tendency of the argument in Chap. II., 16.

CHAP. III.—APPLICATION OF THE ARGUMENT.

Eye and telescope, 17; light—distance, 22; eyes of birds, 27; eyes of fish, *ib.*; minuteness of picture, 30; socket—eye-brow—eye-lid—tears, 30, 31; nictitating membrane—muscle, 32; expedients, 35; why means used, *ib.*; ear, 36.

Note 6, referring to Appendix, 17; 7, referring to Appendix, and on the adaptation of the eyes of fish to the medium in which they live, 18; 8, referring to Appendix, and on refraction, 21; 9, on the adjustment of the eye to different distances, 25; 10, on the pressure of the sea at great depths, and on the structure of the eyes of fishes in order to resist that pressure, 28; 11, referring to the Appendix for observations on the structure of the eyes of fishes, 32; 12, on the *membrana nictitans*, 34; reference to Appendix for observations on the limits which the Deity seems to have prescribed to his own power, 35; 13, referring to the Appendix, and on the structure of the ear, 36; 14, on the chain of bones in the ear, 40.

CHAP. IV.—OF THE SUCCESSION OF PLANTS AND ANIMALS.

No account hereby of contrivance, 44; plants, *ib.*; oviparous animals, 45; viviparous—rational animals, 46; instance from gardener, *ib.*

Note 15, on the limits of the term of existence, and on reproduction, 47.

CHAP. V.—APPLICATION OF THE ARGUMENT CONTINUED.

Repetition from Chapter I., 50; imperfection, 51; superfluous parts, *ib.*; atheistic argument, 53; remains of possible forms, 56; use arising out of the parts, 59; a principle of order, 61; of our ignorance, 62.

Note 16, on the suspension of respiration, 51; 17, on parts of animals said to be superfluous, 53; 18, on results supposed to arise from chance, 55; 19, on the supposition of animals having been produced by chance, 57; 20, on the dexterity which man acquires by practice as distinguishing him from other animals, 60.

CHAP. VI.—THE ARGUMENT CUMULATIVE.

CHAP. VII.—THE MECHANICAL AND IMMECHANICAL PARTS AND FUNCTIONS OF ANIMALS AND VEGETABLES.

Imperfection of knowledge no proof of want of contrivance, 67; on chemistry, 70; secretion, 72.

Note 21, on the perfection of the immechanical parts of animals, 67; 22, on the gastric juice as not acting upon the stomach of the living animal, 72.

CHAP. VIII.—MECHANICAL ARRANGEMENT IN THE HUMAN FRAME.

Of bones, 78; neck, *ib.*; fore-arm, 80; spine, 82; chest, 89; knee-pan, 90; shoulder-blade, 91; joints, 92; ball and socket, 93; ginglymus, 94; knee, 95; ankle, *ib.*; shoulder, 96; passage of blood-vessels, 97; gristle, *ib.*; moveable cartilages, 98; synovia, 100; how well the joints wear, *ib.*; immoveable joints, 101.

Note 23, on the meaning of the terms tenon and mortise, 79; 24, on variations of structure to suit the peculiar condition or necessities of different animals, 87; 25, referring to Appendix for further proofs of adaptation of structure to habits and condition of animals, 90; 26, on the shoulder-blade and collar-bone, 91; 27, on the absence, in the orang-outang, of the ligament in the head of the thigh-bone, 94; 28, on the ankle-joint, 95; 29, on the cartilage which covers the ends of the bones, 98; 30, on the manner in which the thigh-bone rests upon the shin-bone, and the use of the cartilage between them, 99; 31, on absorption, in a case of inflammation of a joint, 100.

CHAP. IX.—OF THE MUSCLES.

Suitableness to the joints, 102; antagonist muscles, 105; not obstructing one another, *ib.*: action wanted where their situation would be inconvenient, 106; variety of figure, *ib.*; how many things must be right for health, 108; variety, quickness, and precision of muscular motion, 109 tongue, *ib.*; mouth, 110; nose, 111; music—writing, 112; sphincters, 113; combination of muscles, 114; delicacy of small muscles, *ib.*; mechanical disadvantages, 115: single muscles, 116; lower jaw, *ib.*; slit tendons, 117; bandage at the ankles, *ib.*; hypothesis from appetency repelled, 118; Keill's enumeration of muscles, *ib.*; why mechanism is not more striking, *ib.*; description inferior to inspection, 119; quotation from Steno, *ib.*

Note 32, on the balance of action between the antagonist muscles, 106; 33, on the sacrifice of power in certain muscles, in order to acquire velocity, 107; 34, on the complexity of structure in the tongue, 112.

CHAP. X.—OF THE VESSELS OF ANIMAL BODIES.

i. The circulation of the blood, 121; disposition of the blood-vessels, 122; arteries and veins, *ib.*; ii. heart, as receiving and returning the blood, 124; heart, as referable to the lungs, 126; valves of the heart, 130; vital motions involuntary, 134; pericardium, *ib.*; iii. alimentary system, 135; passage of the food through the stomach to the intestines, *ib.*; passage of the chyle through the lacteals and thoracic duct to the blood, 136; length of intestines, 137; peristaltic motion, *ib.*; tenuity of the lacteals, *ib.*; valves of the thoracic duct, 138; entrance at the neck, *ib.*; digestion, *ib.*; iv. gall bladder, 141; oblique insertion of the biliary duct into the intestines, 142; v. parotid gland, *ib.*; vi. larynx, 143; trachea—gullet—epiglottis, *ib.*: rings of the trachea, 144; sensibility, 145; musical instrument, 146; lifting the hand to the head, 147.

Note 35, referring to the Appendix for a dissertation on the circulation of the blood and its uses, 121; 36, on the composition of the atmosphere, 125; 37, on the necessity of exposing the venous blood to the air, 126; 38, on the valves of the veins and arteries, 132; 39, on the germination of seeds which have passed unbroken through the stomachs of animals, 140; 40, referring to Appendix on the stomach of the horse, 141; 41, on the necessity of certain sensibilities in the body, 145: 42, referring to Appendix for observations on the lungs, 146.

CHAP. XI.—OF THE ANIMAL STRUCTURE REGARDED AS A MASS.

i. Correspondence of sides, 149; not belonging to the separate limbs, 150; nor to the internal contents, 151; nor to the feeding vessels, *ib.*; ii. package, 152; heart, 153; lungs, *ib.*; liver, *ib.*; bladder, 154; kidneys, *ib.*; pancreas, *ib.*; spleen, *ib.*; omentum, 155; septa of the brain, *ib.*; guts, *ib.*; iii. beauty, 156; in animals, 157; in flowers, *ib.*; whether any natural sense of beauty, 158; iv. concealment, 159; v. standing, 160; vi. interrupted analogies, 163; periosteum at the teeth, *ib.*; early skin at the nails, 164; soft integuments at the skull, *ib.*

Note 43, on the spleen, 154 ; 44, on the sensibility by which we are enabled to balance the body, 162 ; 45, referring to the Appendix for a dissertation on the teeth, 163 ; 46, on the use of the nails of the fingers, 164 ; 47, referring to the Appendix for a note on the form of the skull, 165.

CHAP. XII.—COMPARATIVE ANATOMY.

i. Covering of animals, 167 ; of man, *ib.* ; of birds, 168 ; structure of feathers, 169 ; black down, 171 ; ii. mouths of animals, 172 ; bills of birds, 173 ; serrated bills, 175 ; affinity of mouths, 177 ; iii. gullets of animals, 178 ; iv. intestines of animals, *ib.* ; valves or plates, *ib.* ; length, 179 ; v. bones of animals, 180 ; bones of birds, *ib.* ; vi. lungs of animals, *ib.* ; lungs of birds, *ib.* ; vii. birds oviparous, 181 ; viii. instruments of motion, *ib.* ; wings of birds, *ib.* ; fins of fish, 183 ; web-feet of water-fowl, 186 ; ix. senses of animals, 187.

Note 48, on the coverings of birds and other animals with reference to warmth, 171 ; 49, on the adaptation of the bills of birds to the habits of each kind, 174 ; 50, on the connexion of the fifth nerve of the brain with the organ of touch, 177 ; 51, referring to the Appendix for observations on the relation of the bodies of birds to the atmosphere, 180 ; 52, on the necessity of birds being oviparous in order to retain the power of flying, 181 ; 53, on the similarity of the system of bones in all vertebrated animals, 183 ; 54, on the uses and muscular power of the fins of fishes, 185.

CHAP. XIII.—PECULIAR ORGANIZATIONS.

Pax-wax of quadrupeds, 190 ; oil of birds, 191 ; air-bladder of fish, 192 ; fang of viper, 194 ; bag of opossum, *ib.* ; claw of heron, 195 ; stomach of camel, *ib.* ; tongue of woodpecker, 196 ; babyroussa, 200.

Note 55, on the ligaments of the neck, 191 ; 56, on the air-bladder of fishes, 193 ; 57, on the habits and tongue of the woodpecker, 197 ; 58, on the erroneous notion of the babyroussa sleeping standing, 200.

CHAP. XIV.—PROSPECTIVE CONTRIVANCES.

Teeth, 201 ; milk, 203 ; eye of the fœtus, 204 ; lungs of the fœtus—foramen ovale, &c. &c., 205.

Note 59, referring to Appendix for note upon the teeth, 202 ; 60, on the means by which the second set of teeth are made to succeed the first, 203 ; 61, on the provision for the first nourishment of plants and animals, 204 ; 62, on the gradual development of animal bodies, 207.

CHAP. XV.—RELATIONS.

Alimentary system, 209 ; kidneys, ureters, and bladder, 211 ; eyes, hands, feet, 212 ; sexes, *ib.* ; teats and mouths, 213 ; particular relations, *ib.* ; swan, *ib.* ; mole, 214.

CHAP. XVI.—COMPENSATION.

Elephant's proboscis, 216 ; hook in the bat's wing, 218 ; crane's neck, *ib.* ; parrot's bill, *ib.* ; spider's web, 220 ; multiplying eyes of insects, 221 ; eyelid of the cameleon, 222 ; intestines of the alopecias, 223 ; snail—mussel—cockle—lobster, *ib.* ; sloth—sheep, 224 ; more general compensations, 225 ; want of fore-teeth—rumination, *ib.* ; in birds, want of teeth and gizzard, 227 ; reptiles, 228.

Note 63, on the unreasonableness of the notion of a change in the original structure of animal organs, 216 ; 64, interesting particulars concerning the powers and habits of spiders, 220 ; 65, 66, referring to Appendix, 224, 225 ; 67, on the digestive organs, with reference to the different kinds of food, 226 ; 68, on the relation between the mouths and stomachs of animals, 227 ; 69, on the variety of the instruments of motion of different animals, 229.

ILLUSTRATIVE WOODCUTS.—VOL. II.

1. THE form of the eye, 17.
2. Section of the anterior part of the human eye, to show the manner in which the images of objects are impressed upon the retina, 22.
3. The iris separated from the eye, and laid out flat, 23.
4. Head of the eel, showing the form of the eye, 28.
5. Plan of the human ear, 37.
6. Bones of the ear, 39.
7. Bones of the ear separated, 39.
8. Drum of the ear, 41.
9. The eye, showing the transmission of the images of objects, 64.
10. A muscle, 68.
11. The lower surface, or base, of the skull, 77.
12. Uppermost vertebra, or atlas, 78.
13. Articulation of the first and second vertebræ of the neck, 79.
14. Bones of the fore-arm, 81.
15. Section of the three lower vertebræ, 83.
16. Three views of the knee-joints, 90.
17. Muscle with tendons on different sides, 107.
18. Figure showing how velocity is acquired by pulling obliquely, 107.
19. Figure of the arm, showing the action of the biceps muscle, 114.
20. The heart and great blood-vessels, 120.
21. The two sides of the heart separated, 127.
22. Section of the ventricle and the artery, 129.
23. Valve of the great artery, 133.
24. Bones of the human foot, 161.
25. Heads of birds, showing the form of the bills, 173.
26. Head and neck of the heron, 174.
27. Head of the spoon-bill, 176.
28. Feet of birds, with and without web, 186.
29. Heads of the wolf and hare, showing the different manner in which the ears are turned, 188.
30. Iris of the lion's eye, 189.
31. Dissected head of the woodpecker, 198.
32. Skull of the babyroussa, 200.
33. Spider suspended from a twig, 219.

NATURAL THEOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

STATE OF THE ARGUMENT.[1]

In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a *stone*, and were asked how the stone came to be there, I might possibly answer, that, for anything I knew to the contrary, it had lain there for ever; nor would it, perhaps, be very easy to show the absurdity of this answer.[2] But suppose I had found a *watch* upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place, I should hardly think of the answer which I had before given—that, for anything I knew, the watch might have always been there. Yet why should not this answer serve for the watch as well as for the stone? why is it not as admissible in the second case as in the first? For this reason, and for no other, viz., that, when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive (what we could not discover in the stone) that its several parts are framed and put together for a purpose, *e. g.* that they are so formed and adjusted as to produce motion, and that motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day; that, if the different parts had been differently shaped from what they are, of a different size from what they are, or placed after any other manner, or in any other order than that in which they are placed, either no motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or none which would have answered the use that is now served by it. To reckon up a few of the plainest of these parts, and of their offices, all tending to one result. We see a cylindrical box containing a coiled elastic spring, which, by its endeavour to relax itself, turns round the box. We

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[1] The last note of the Appendix describes the mechanism of a watch, and illustrates the elementary principles of mechanics. Contrasted with the mere mechanism, there is another essay on the mechanism of the animal body. These may be perused either before or after reading the present chapter.

[2] The argument is here put very naturally. But a considerable change has taken place of late years in the knowledge attained even by common readers, and there are few who would be without reflection "how the stone came to be there." The changes which the earth's surface has undergone, and the preparation for its present condition, have become a subject of high interest; and there is hardly any one who now would, for an instant, believe that the stone was formed where it lay. On lifting it, he would find it rounded like gravel in a river: he would see that its asperities had been worn off, by being rolled from a distance in water: he would perhaps break it, look to its fr survey the surrounding heights, to discover w been broken off, or from what remote regi swept hither: he would consider the place w

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in reference to the level of the sea or the waters; and, revolving all these things in his mind, he would be impressed with the conviction that the surface of the earth had undergone some vast revolution.

Such natural reflections lead an intelligent person to seek for information in the many beautiful and interesting works on geology that have been published in our country of late years. And by these he will be led to infer that the fair scene before him, so happily adapted for the abode of man, was a condition of the earth resulting from many successive revolutions taking place at periods incalculably remote; and that the variety of mountain and valley, forest and fertile plain, promontory and shallow estuary, formed a world suited to his capacities and enterprise.

So true is the observation of Sir J. Herschel, "that the situation of a pebble may afford him evidence of the state of the globe he inhabits myriads of ages ago, before his species *became* its denizens."

next observe a flexible chain (artificially wrought for the sake of flexure) communicating the action of the spring from the box to the fusee. We then find a series of wheels, the teeth of which catch in, and apply to, each other, conducting the motion from the fusee to the balance, and from the balance to the pointer, and, at the same time, by the size and shape of those wheels, so regulating that motion as to terminate in causing an index, by an equable and measured progression, to pass over a given space in a given time. We take notice that the wheels are made of brass, in order to keep them from rust; the springs of steel, no other metal being so elastic; that over the face of the watch there is placed a glass, a material employed in no other part of the work, but in the room of which, if there had been any other than a transparent substance, the hour could not be seen without opening the case. This mechanism being observed (it requires indeed an examination of the instrument, and perhaps some previous knowledge of the subject, to perceive and understand it; but being once, as we have said, observed and understood), the inference, we think, is inevitable, that the watch must have had a maker: that there must have existed, at some time, and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer; who comprehended its construction, and designed its use.

I. Nor would it, I apprehend, weaken the conclusion, that we had never seen a watch made; that we had never known an artist capable of making one; that we were altogether incapable of executing such a piece of workmanship ourselves, or of understanding in what manner it was performed; all this being no more than what is true of some exquisite remains of ancient art, of some lost arts, and, to the generality of mankind, of the more curious productions of modern manufacture. Does one man in a million know how oval frames are turned?[3] Ignorance of this kind exalts our opinion of the unseen and unl artist's skill, if he be unseen and unknown, but rai doubt in our minds of the existence and agency of an artist, at some former time, and in some place or Nor can I perceive that it varies at all the infe whether the question arise concerning a human or concerning an agent of a different species, or an possessing, in some respects, a different nature.

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[3] It is certainly a thing not easily expressed in words. The nave of a circular wheel moves on a single pivot; but there are here two pivots, and grooves in the wheel to corre-

II. Neither, secondly, would it invalidate our c sion, that the watch sometimes went wrong, or t seldom went exactly right. The purpose of th chinery, the design, and the designer, might be ev and, in the case supposed, would be evident, in wh way we accounted for the irregularity of the move or whether we could account for it or not. It i necessary that a machine be perfect, in order to with what design it was made: still less necessary, the only question is, whether it were made with any d at all.

III. Nor, thirdly, would it bring any uncertaint the argument, if there were a few parts of the w concerning which we could not discover, or had n discovered, in what manner they conduced to the g effect; or even some parts, concerning which we not ascertain whether they conduced to that effect i manner whatever. For, as to the first branch of the if by the loss, or disorder, or decay of the parts in

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spond with them. These two grooves cross each othe play upon the pivots in such a manner that the cen motion varies, and the rim of the wheel moves in an el It is exactly on the same principle that we draw an figure, by driving two nails into a board, and throw band round them, and then running the pencil round w the band. These two nails are in the points called b thematicians the *foci* of the oval or ellipse; and accord a fundamental property of the curve is, that the sum o two lines whatever, drawn from the two *foci* to any po the curve, is always the same. These points are called *fires*, because light reflected from the surface of an *mirror* is concentrated there and produces heat.

tion, the movement of the watch were found in fact to be stopped, or disturbed, or retarded, no doubt would remain in our minds as to the utility or intention of these parts, although we should be unable to investigate the manner according to which, or the connexion by which, the ultimate effect depended upon their action or assistance; and the more complex is the machine, the more likely is this obscurity to arise. Then, as to the second thing supposed, namely, that there were parts which might be spared without prejudice to the movement of the watch, and that we had proved this by experiment, these superfluous parts, even if we were completely assured that they were such, would not vacate the reasoning which we had instituted concerning other parts. The indication of contrivance remained, with respect to them, nearly as it was before.

IV. Nor, fourthly, would any man in his senses think the existence of the watch, with its various machinery, accounted for, by being told that it was one out of possible combinations of material forms; that whatever he had found in the place where he found the watch, must have contained some internal configuration or other; and that this configuration might be the structure now exhibited, viz., of the works of a watch, as well as a different structure.

V. Nor, fifthly, would it yield his inquiry more satisfaction, to be answered, that there existed in things a principle of order, which had disposed the parts of the watch into their present form and situation. He never knew a watch made by the principle of order; nor can he even form to himself an idea of what is meant by a principle of order, distinct from the intelligence of the watchmaker.

VI. Sixthly, he would be surprised to hear that the mechanism of the watch was no proof of contrivance, only a motive to induce the mind to think so:

VII. And not less surprised to be informed, that the watch in his hand was nothing more than the result of the laws of *metallic* nature. It is a perversion of language to assign any law as the efficient, operative cause of any-

Such are the opinions of those who say that they cannot comprehend how the mind can exist distinct from the body, who yet comprehended it when it was in the body. To me, when I contemplate the nature of the soul, the subject is more obscure, and it is much more difficult to conceive what the soul is in the body, as in a house not belonging to it, than what it may be when it has left the body, and has come into the open heaven as into its own house.

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it. There cannot be design without a designer; contrivance, without a contriver; order, without choice; arrangement, without anything capable of arranging; subserviency and relation to a purpose, without that which could intend a purpose; means suitable to an end, and executing their office in accomplishing that end, without the end ever having been contemplated, or the means accommodated to it. Arrangement, disposition of parts, subserviency of means to an end, relation of instruments to a use, imply the presence of intelligence and mind. No one, therefore, can rationally believe, that the insensible, inanimate watch, from which the watch before us issued, was the proper cause of the mechanism we so much admire in it:—could be truly said to have constructed the instrument, disposed its parts, assigned their office, determined their order, action, and mutual dependency, combined their several motions into one result, and that also a result connected with the utilities of other beings. All these properties, therefore, are as much unaccounted for as they were before.

IV. Nor is anything gained by running the difficulty farther back, *i. e.*, by supposing the watch before us to have been produced from another watch, that from a former, and so on indefinitely. Our going back ever so far, brings us no nearer to the least degree of satisfaction upon the subject. Contrivance is still unaccounted for. We still want a contriver. A designing mind is neither supplied by this supposition, nor dispensed with. If the difficulty were diminished the farther we went back, by going back indefinitely we might exhaust it. And this is the only case to which this sort of reasoning applies. Where there is a tendency, or, as we increase the number of terms, a continual approach towards a limit, *there*, by supposing the number of terms to be what is called infinite, we may conceive the limit to be attained; but where there is no such tendency or approach, nothing is effected by lengthening the series. There is no difference as to the point in question (whatever there may be as to many points), between one series and another; *between a series which* is finite, and a series which is infinite. A chain, composed of an infinite ber of links, can no more support itself than a composed of a finite number of links. And of th are assured (though we never *can* have tried the e ment), because, by increasing the number of links, ten for instance to a hundred, from a hundred to a sand, &c., we make not the smallest approach, w serve not the smallest tendency, towards self-su There is no difference in this respect (yet there m a great difference in several respects) between a ch a greater or less length, between one chain and an between one that is finite and one that is infinite. very much resembles the case before us. The ma which we are inspecting demonstrates, by its con tion, contrivance and design. Contrivance must had a contriver; design, a designer; whether the ma immediately proceeded from another machine or That circumstance alters not the case. That other ma may, in like manner, have proceeded from a forme chine: nor does that alter the case; the contri must have had a contriver. That former one fro preceding it: no alteration still; a contriver is sti cessary. No tendency is perceived, no approach to a diminution of this necessity. It is the same with and every succession of these machines; a successi ten, of a hundred, of a thousand; with one serie with another; a series which is finite, as with a which is infinite. In whatever other respects they differ, in this they do not. In all, equally, contri and design are unaccounted for.

The question is not simply, How came the first w into existence? which question, it may be pretend done away by supposing the series of watches thus duced from one another to have been infinite, and sequently to have had no such *first*, for which i necessary to provide a cause. This, perhaps, w have been nearly the state of the question if nothing been before us but an unorganised, unmechanised stance, without mark or indication of contrivance. *might be* difficult to show that such substance coul have existed from eternity, either in succession (if it were possible, which I think it is not, for unorganised bodies to spring from one another), or by individual perpetuity. But that is not the question now. To suppose it to be so, is to suppose that it made no difference whether he had found a watch or a stone. As it is, the metaphysics of that question have no place: for, in the watch which we are examining are seen contrivance, design; an end, a purpose; means for the end, adaptation to the purpose. And the question which irresistibly presses upon our thoughts, is, Whence this contrivance and design? The thing required is the intending mind, the adapted hand, the intelligence by which that hand was directed. This question, this demand, is not shaken off, by increasing a number or succession of substances, destitute of these properties; nor the more, by increasing that number to infinity. If it be said, that, upon the supposition of one watch being produced from another in the course of that other's movements, and by means of the mechanism within it, we have a cause for the watch in my hand, viz., the watch from which it proceeded,—I deny, that for the design, the contrivance, the suitableness of means to an end, the adaptation of instruments to a use (all which we discover in the watch), we have any cause whatever. It is in vain, therefore, to assign a series of such causes, or to allege that a series may be carried back to infinity; for I do not admit that we have yet any cause at all for the phenomena, still less any series of causes either finite or infinite. Here is contrivance, but no contriver; proofs of design, but no designer.

V. Our observer would further also reflect, that the maker of the watch before him was, in truth and reality, the maker of every watch produced from it: there being no difference (except that the latter manifests a more exquisite skill) between the making of another watch with his own hands, by the mediation of files, lathes, chisels, &c., and the disposing, fixing, and inserting of these instruments, or of others equivalent to them, in the body of the watch already made in such a manner, as to form a new *watch in the* course of the movements which he had given to the old one. It is only working by one set of tools instead of another.

The conclusion which the *first* examination of the watch, of its works, construction, and movement, suggested, was, that it must have had, for the cause and author of that construction, an artificer who understood its mechanism and designed its use. This conclusion is invincible. A *second* examination presents us with a new discovery. The watch is found, in the course of its movement, to produce another watch, similar to itself; and not only so, but we perceive in it a system or organisation, separately calculated for that purpose. What effect would this discovery have, or ought it to have, upon our former inference? What, as hath already been said, but to increase, beyond measure, our admiration of the skill which had been employed in the formation of such a machine? Or shall it, instead of this, all at once turn us round to an opposite conclusion, viz., that no art or skill whatever has been concerned in the business, although all other evidences of art and skill remain as they were, and this last and supreme piece of art be now added to the rest? Can this be maintained without absurdity? Yet this is atheism.[5]

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[5] We must leave this logical and satisfactory argument untouched. In this chapter our author is laying the foundation for a course of reasoning on the mechanism displayed in the animal body. The argument in favour of a creating and presiding Intelligence may be drawn from the study of the laws of physical agency:—such as the properties of heat, light, and sound; of gravitation, and chemical combination; the structure of the globe, the divisions of land and sea, the distribution of temperature; nay, the mind may rise to the contemplation of the sun and planets, their mutual dependence, and their revolutions; but, as affording proof obvious not only to cultivated reason but to plain sense almost to ignorance, there is nothing to be compared with that for which our author is preparing the reader in this chapter, the mechanism of the animal body, and the adaptations which affect the well-being of living creatures.

CHAPTER III.

APPLICATION OF THE ARGUMENT.[6]

IS is atheism: for every indication of contrivance,
ry manifestation of design, which existed in the
:ch, exists in the works of nature; with the dif-
ence, on the side of nature, of being greater and
re, and that in a degree which exceeds all com-
ation. I mean that the contrivances of nature surpass
contrivances of art, in the complexity, subtilty, and
iosity of the mechanism; and still more, if possible,
they go beyond them in number and variety; yet, in
nultitude of cases, are not less evidently mechanical,
less evidently contrivances, not less evidently accom-
dated to their end, or suited to their office, than are
most perfect productions of human ingenuity.



[know no better method of introducing so large a
ject, than that of comparing a single thing with a
gle thing: an eye, for example, with a telescope. As

The arguments adduced in this chapter being drawn
n the laws according to which light is refracted by the
nours of the eye, the reader may be inclined to peruse
few observations on the elements of this part of physics
:he *Appendix, No. 16.*

far as the examination of the instrument goe
precisely the same proof that the eye was
vision, as there is that the telescope was made
ing it. They are made upon the same princi
being adjusted to the laws by which the tr
and refraction of rays of light are regulated
not of the origin of the laws themselves; but
being fixed, the construction in both cases is
them. For instance; these laws require, ir
produce the same effect, that the rays of light,
from water into the eye, should be refracted
convex surface than when it passes out of ai
eye. Accordingly we find that the eye of
that part of it called the crystalline lens, is mu
than the eye of terrestrial animals. What pla
festation of design can there be than this d
What could a mathematical instrument maker
more to show his knowledge of his principle,
cation of that knowledge, his suiting of his me
end; I will not say to display the compass or
of his skill and art, for in these all compariso
corous, but to testify counsel, choice, con
purpose?[7]

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[7] The reader will find a comparison, more in
tween the eye and optical instruments, in the
No. 17.

In illustration of the instance adduced here, of
tion of the fish's eye to the medium in which i
may observe that the powers in the human eye, fo
of drawing the pencil of rays to a focus, and pr
accurate image upon the expanded optic nerve
retina, from its net-work structure) in the bottom
[illegible] principally upon two circumstances,—t
[illegible] and the convexity of the lens. That
[illegible] this effect, it is not only necessa
[illegible] in the left-hand figure on
[illegible] enter it from a rarer me
[illegible] the water, the lens or
[illegible] denser than water, is br
[illegible] of an animal living in the

To some it may appear a difference sufficient to destroy all similitude between the eye and the telescope, that the one is a perceiving organ, the other an unperceiving instrument. The fact is that they are both instruments. And, as to the mechanism, at least as to mechanism being employed, and even as to the kind of it, this circumstance varies not the analogy at all. For observe what the constitution of the eye is. It is necessary, in order to produce distinct vision, that an image or picture of the object be formed at the bottom of the eye. Whence this necessity arises, or how the picture is connected with the sensation, or contributes to it, it may be difficult, nay, we will confess, if you please, impossible for us to search out. But the present question is not concerned in the inquiry. It may be true, that, in this, and in other instances, we trace mechanical contrivance a certain way; and that then we come to something which is not mechanical, or which is inscrutable. But this affects not the certainty of our investigation, as far as we have gone. The difference between an animal and an automatic statue consists in this,—that, in the animal, we trace the mechanism to a certain point, and then we are stopped; either the mechanism being too subtile for our discernment, or something else beside the known laws of mechanism taking place; whereas, in the automaton, for the comparatively few motions of

the lens is removed backwards, and resembles the optician's double convex lens; but in the fish it is a sphere, and being brought in contact with the transparent cornea, it not only has the power to concentrate the rays of light coming through the water, but by its altered position it increases greatly the sphere of vision. (See the right-hand figure, page 17.) To be critically correct, we may add that it is not exactly the cornea which is deficient in the fish, but the aqueous humour behind it. An aqueous fluid being thus both behind and before the cornea, and that membrane being in a very slight degree thicker in the centre than in the margin, this part of the organ which is so efficient in the atmosphere is rendered useless in water. A man diving, for example, sees imperfectly, being in *something* worse than the condition of an *old man who requires spectacles.*

is capable, we trace the mechanism throughout
o the limit, the reasoning is as clear and certain
e case as in the other. In the example before
a matter of certainty, because it is a matter
perience and observation demonstrate, that the
of an image at the bottom of the eye is neces-
erfect vision. The image itself can be shown.
r affects the distinctness of the image, affects
nctness of the vision. The formation then of
image being necessary (no matter how) to the
sight, and to the exercise of that sense, the
by which it is formed is constructed and put
not only with infinitely more art, but upon the
principles of art, as in the telescope or the
bscura. The perception arising from the image
aid out of the question; for the production of
e, these are instruments of the same kind. The
e same; the means are the same. The purpose
s alike; the contrivance for accomplishing that
is in both alike. The lenses of the telescope,
umours of the eye, bear a complete resemblance
nother, in their figure, their position, and in
er over the rays of light, viz. in bringing each
a point at the right distance from the lens:
n the eye, at the exact place where the mem-
spread to receive it. How is it possible, under
nces of such close affinity, and under the ope-
equal evidence, to exclude contrivance from the
to acknowledge the proof of contrivance having
loyed, as the plainest and clearest of all propo-
the other?

esemblance between the two cases is still more
and obtains in more points than we have yet
ed, or than we are, on the first view of the sub-
re of. In dioptric telescopes there is an im-
n of this nature. Pencils of light, in passing
glass lenses, are separated into different colours,
inging the object, especially the edges of it, as
e viewed through a prism. To correct this
ence had been long a desideratum in the art.
came into the mind of a sagacious optician to

ire how this matter was managed in the eye: in h there was exactly the same difficulty to contend as in the telescope. His observation taught him, in the eye, the evil was cured by combining lenses osed of different substances, *i. e.*, of substances possessed different refracting powers. Our artist wed thence his hint; and produced a correction of efect by imitating, in glasses made from different als, the effects of the different humours through the rays of light pass before they reach the bottom eye. Could this be in the eye without purpose, suggested to the optician the only effectual means ining that purpose?[8]

farther; there are other points, not so much s of strict resemblance between the two, as of rity of the eye over the telescope; yet of a rity which, being founded in the laws that regu- th, may furnish topics of fair and just comparison. hings were wanted to the eye, which were not (at least in the same degree) to the telescope; ese were the adaptation of the organ, first, to it degrees of light; and secondly, to the vast ty of distance at which objects are viewed by the eye, viz., from a few inches to as many miles. difficulties present not themselves to the maker of escope. He wants all the light he can get; and er directs his instrument to objects near at hand. eye, both these cases were to be provided for; the purpose of providing for them, a subtile and riate mechanism is introduced.

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is is an interesting part of the inquiry, which will be nore fully explained in the Appendix.

not, accurately speaking, "glasses of different re- powers" which are required. Refraction is the ection which the ray takes in passing from one trans- body into another of different density. Dispersion is aration of the beam of light into differently coloured A piece of glass may differ from another in its power acting, and also in its property of dispersing. It is arranging *these* different properties that the achro- *lescope is formed.*



[This figure represents a section of the anterior part of the hu eye :—A, A, the iris ; B, the object, from which the rays strike off in a directions : a pencil of these enters at the pupil ; a portion is intercep by the iris A, A. The pencil which enters the eye, passing through t lens, converges to form the image. But the spaces C, C, are deprived o rays by the intervention of the iris A, A. Yet this in no measure aff the size of the image, but only diminishes the intensity of its illuminati By the contraction of the iris, and consequent enlargement of the pupi a larger pencil of rays is admitted. It is remarkable that the imag formed on the retina must always be inverted, and yet such is the pow of habit and experience, derived from touching objects, that we s things as they are in reality, and not as they are painted in our eye- experience thus correcting the errors of sense. It is in the same wa that we see single, though we have an image made in each eye. But i we change the ordinary position of our eye, the habit is broken, and w see double.]

I. In order to exclude excess of light, when it is excessive, and to render objects visible under obscurer degrees of it, when no more can be had, the hole or apertu in the eye, through which the light enters, is so forme as to contract or dilate itself for the purpose of admittin a greater or lesser number of rays at the same time. Th chamber of the eye is a camera-obscura, which, when th light is too small, can enlarge its opening; when to strong, can again contract it; and that without any othe assistance than that of its own exquisite machinery. I is farther also, in the human subject, to be observed, tha this hole in the eye, which we call the pupil, under al its different dimensions, retains its exact circular shape This is a structure extremely artificial. Let an arti only try to execute the same; he will find that his thread *and strings* must be disposed with great consideration an *contrivance*, to make a circle which shall continuall ange its diameter, yet preserve its form. This is done t the eye by an application of fibres, *i. e.*, of strings milar, in their position and action, to what an artist uld and must employ, if he had the same piece of rkmanship to perform.



[This figure represents the iris separated from the eye and laid out flat. We perceive the straight fibres passing towards the inner margin, and the circular fibres running round the margin.]

II. The second difficulty which has been stated was the suiting of the same organ to the perception of objects that lie near at hand, within a few inches, we will suppose, of the eye, and of objects which are placed at a considerable distance from it, that, for example, of as many furlongs (I speak in both cases of the distance at which distinct vision can be exercised). Now this, according to the principles of optics, that is, according to the laws by which the transmission of light is regulated (and these laws are fixed), could not be done without the organ itself undergoing an alteration, and receiving an adjustment, that might correspond with the exigency of the case, that is to say, with the different inclination to one another under which the rays of light reached it. Rays issuing from points placed at a small distance from the eye, and which consequently must enter the eye in a spreading or diverging order, cannot, by the same optical instrument in the same state, be brought to a point, *i. e., be made to form* an image, in the same place with rays proceeding from objects situated at a much greater distance, and which rays arrive at the eye in directions nearly (and physically speaking) parallel. It requires a rounder lens to do it. The point of concourse behind the lens must fall critically upon the retina, or the vision is confused; yet, other things remaining the same, this point, by the immutable properties of light, is carried farther back when the rays proceed from a near object than when they are sent from one that is remote. A person who was using an optical instrument would manage this matter by changing, as the occasion required, his lens or his telescope, or by adjusting the distance of his glasses with his hand or his screw: but how is this to be managed in the eye? What the alteration was, or in what part of the eye it took place, or by what means it was effected (for if the known laws which govern the refraction of light be maintained, some alteration in the state of the organ there must be), had long formed a subject of inquiry and conjecture. The change, though sufficient for the purpose, is so minute as to elude ordinary observation. Some very late discoveries, deduced from a laborious and most accurate inspection of the structure and operation of the organ, seem at length to have ascertained the mechanical alteration which the parts of the eye undergo. It is found, that by the action of certain muscles, called the straight muscles, and which action is the most advantageous that could be imagined for the purpose, it is found, I say, that whenever the eye is directed to a near object, three changes are produced in it at the same time, all severally contributing to the adjustment required. The cornea, or outermost coat of the eye, is rendered more round and prominent; the crystalline lens underneath is pushed forward; and the axis of vision, as the depth of the eye is called, is elongated. These changes in the eye vary its power over the rays of light in such a manner and degree as to produce exactly the effect which is wanted, viz. the formation of an image *upon the retina*, whether the rays come to the eye in a state of divergency, which is the case when the *object is* near to the eye, or come parallel to one another,

is the case when the object is placed at a distance.
ıything be more decisive of contrivance than this
'he most secret laws of optics must have been
to the author of a structure endowed with such a
y of change. It is as though an optician, when
a nearer object to view, should rectify his instru-
y putting in another glass, at the same time drawing
› his tube to a different length.*
ɜrve a new-born child first lifting up its eyelids.
does the opening of the curtain discover? The
r part of two pellucid globes, which, when they
:o be examined, are found to be constructed upon
›ptical principles; the self-same principles upon
we ourselves construct optical instruments. We
em perfect for the purpose of forming an image by

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is is a subject over which there is still great ob-
and on which adverse experiments and opinions are
d. However difficult it may be to account for the
›f adjustment, yet the property is not denied, and
re the argument in the text remains. That there is
ng in the sensibility of the nerve, and in the power
ıtion, there seems no doubt. Birds of prey, it has
ɔticed, possess a power of vision of which we can
form a conception. Where it is the object to snare
on, a pigeon is tied, in an exposed situation, with a
attached that a person concealed can flutter the bird,
ɜ it extend its wings; and although no bird of prey
›le in the whole sky, presently the hawk will be seen
ing to pounce upon the pigeon. The endowment of
d's eye must be different from ours, else the bird of
uld not see the most minute object when hovering at
height; nor, in sweeping down upon his quarry,
e strike it with precision. Nothing of the nature of
echanical provision can account for the possession of
›erior power. One instance of the power of adjust-
'hich the eye has under the influence of the will,
› be this. Let a person who cannot read distinctly,
l, without spectacles, at a given distance, look at a
ırough a very small aperture, and he will see what he
could not without spectacles. This can hardly be
ed by the removal of the lateral light, or by inflection.

refraction; composed of parts executing different o one part having fulfilled its office upon the pencil of delivering it over to the action of another part; th third, and so onward: the progressive action depe for its success upon the nicest and minutest adjustm the parts concerned: yet these parts so in fact ad as to produce, not by a simple action or effect, bu combination of actions and effects, the result wh ultimately wanted. And forasmuch as this organ have to operate under different circumstances, with degrees of light and with weak degrees, upon near c and upon remote ones, and these differences dem according to the laws by which the transmission of is regulated, a corresponding diversity of structure,- the aperture, for example, through which the light should be larger or less—the lenses rounder or fla or that their distance from the tablet upon whic picture is delineated should be shortened or lengt —this, I say, being the case and the difficulty to the eye was to be adapted, we find its several capable of being occasionally changed, and a most ficial apparatus provided to produce that change. is far beyond the common regulator of a watch, requires the touch of a foreign hand to set it; but not altogether unlike Harrison's contrivance for m a watch regulate itself, by inserting within it a mach which, by the artful use of the different expans metals, preserves the equability of the motion unc the various temperatures of heat and cold in whi instrument may happen to be placed. The ingent this last contrivance has been justly praised. Shall, fore, a structure which differs from it chiefly by su ing it, be accounted no contrivance at all? or, if i contrivance, that it is without a contriver?

But this, though much, is not the whole: by dif species of animals the faculty we are describing i sessed in degrees suited to the different range of which their mode of life and of procuring thei requires. *Birds*, for instance, in general, procure *food by* means of their beak; and, the distance be the eye and the point of the beak being small, it becomes necessary that they should have the power of seeing very near objects distinctly. On the other hand, from being often elevated much above the ground, living in the air, and moving through it with great velocity, they require for their safety, as well as for assisting them in descrying their prey, a power of seeing at a great distance; a power of which, in birds of rapine, surprising examples are given. The fact accordingly is, that two peculiarities are found in the eyes of birds, both tending to *facilitate* the change upon which the adjustment of the eye to different distances depends. The one is a bony, yet, in most species, a flexible rim or hoop, surrounding the broadest part of the eye, which, confining the action of the muscles to that part, increases the effect of their lateral pressure upon the orb, by which pressure its axis is elongated for the purpose of looking at very near objects. The other is an additional muscle, called the marsupium, to draw, on occasion, the crystalline lens *back*, and to fit the same eye for the viewing of very distant objects. By these means, the eyes of birds can pass from one extreme to another of their scale of adjustment, with more ease and readiness than the eyes of other animals.

The eyes of *fishes* also, compared with those of terrestrial animals, exhibit certain distinctions of structure, adapted to their state and element. We have already observed upon the figure of the crystalline compensating by its roundness the density of the medium through which their light passes. To which we have to add, that the eyes of fish, in their natural and indolent state, appear to be adjusted to near objects, in this respect differing from the human eye, as well as those of quadrupeds and birds. The ordinary shape of the fish's eye being in a much higher degree convex than that of land animals, a corresponding difference attends its muscular conformation, viz., that it is throughout calculated for *flattening* the eye.

The *iris* also in the eyes of fish does not admit of contraction. This is a great difference, of which the probable reason is, that the diminished light in water is never too strong for the retina.

In the *eel*, which has to work its head through sand and gravel, the roughest and harshest substances, there is placed before the eye, and at some distance from it, a transparent, horny, convex case or covering, which, without obstructing the sight, defends the organ. To such an animal could anything be more wanted or more useful?

Thus, in comparing the eyes of different kinds of animals, we see in their resemblances and distinctions one general plan laid down, and that plan varied with the varying exigencies to which it is to be applied.[10]

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[10] In viewing the structure of the eye as adjusted to the condition of fishes, we may remark the peculiar thickness of the sclerotic coat in the whale. Although he breathes the atmosphere, and lies out on the surface of the water, to escape his enemies he will plunge some hundred fathoms deep. The pressure therefore must be very great upon his surface, and on the surface of the eye. If a cork be knocked into the mouth of a bottle, so that it resists all further pressure that we can make upon it, and if this bottle be carried, by being attached to the sounding-lead, to a great depth in the sea, the pressure of the water will force in the cork, and fill the bottle; for the cork is pressed with a force equal to the weight of the column of water above it, of which it is the base. It is pressed in all directions equally, so that a common-sized cork is reduced to the size of that of a phial bottle.

"A creature living at the depth of 100 feet would sustain *a pressure,* including that of the atmosphere, of about 60

re is one property, however, common, I believe,
yes, at least to all which have been examined,*
, that the optic nerve enters the bottom of the eye,
the centre or middle, but a little on one side : not
point where the axis of the eye meets the retina,

on the square inch; while one at 4000 feet, a depth
eans considerable, would be exposed to a pressure
t 1830 pounds upon the square inch."—*De la Beche,*
Geol., p. 243.
an therefore comprehend how it shall happen, that
foundering of a ship at sea, though its timbers part,
ar floats to the surface; everything is swallowed up;
the hull has sunk to a great depth, all that is porous
trated with water, or compressed, and consequently
where it sunk. So it happened, and the fact goes
to our purpose, that when, by the entangling of the
the harpoon, the boat was carried down with the
and, being recovered, it required two boats to keep
surface.—*Scoresby.*
ay easily conceive, therefore, the pressure which the
he whale sustains when it dives, and why it is formed
provisions which we are about to describe. When
e a section of the whole eye, cutting through the
the sclerotic coat, which is dense as tanned leather,
s in thickness towards the back part, and is full five
he thickness behind, that it is at the anterior part.
terior part of the eye sustains the pressure from with-
requires no additional support; but were the back
yield, the globe would be then distended in that
n, and the whole interior of the eye consequently
lerangement. We perceive, therefore, the necessity
oats being thus so remarkably strengthened behind.
tural enemies of the whale are the sword-fish and
k; and it is stated with some show of reason, that
e creature, being without means of defence of any
rries his enemies that have fixed upon him to a
f water, and consequently to a pressure, which sub-
em, as their bodies are not constituted for such
It is under this instinct, that when the whale re-
he harpoon, he dives to the bottom.
e eye of the seal or sea-calf, I understand, is an ex-

* Mem. Acad. Paris, 1710, p. 123.—*Paley.*

but between that point and the nose. The differ which this makes is, that no part of an object is un ceived by both eyes at the same time.

In considering vision as achieved by the means o image formed at the bottom of the eye, we can n reflect without wonder upon the smallness yet corr ness of the picture, the subtilty of the touch, the fine of the lines. A landscape of five or six square leagu brought into a space of half an inch diameter; yet multitude of objects which it contains are all preser are all discriminated in their magnitudes, positi figures, colours. The prospect from Hampstead-hi compressed into the compass of a sixpence, yet circ stantially represented. A stage-coach, travelling a ordinary speed for half an hour, passes, in the eye, over one-twelfth of an inch, yet is this change of plac the image distinctly perceived throughout its whole gress; for it is only by means of that perception that motion of the coach itself is made sensible to the If anything can abate our admiration of the smallne the visual tablet compared with the extent of vision, a reflection which the view of nature leads us every to make, viz., that, in the hands of the Creator, great little are nothing.

Sturmius held, that the examination of the eye w cure for atheism. Besides that conformity to op principles which its internal constitution displays, which alone amounts to a manifestation of intellig having been exerted in the structure; besides this, w forms, no doubt, the leading character of the organ, t is to be seen, in everything belonging to it and abou an extraordinary degree of care, an anxiety for its servation, due, if we may so speak, to its value and tenderness. It is lodged in a strong, deep, bony soc composed by the junction of seven different bones,* lowed out at their edges. In some few species, as of the coatimondi,† the orbit is not bony through but whenever this is the case, the upper, which is the deficient part, is supplied by a cartilaginous ligament; a substitution which shows the same care. Within this socket it is embedded in fat, of all animal substances the best adapted both to its repose and motion. It is sheltered by the eyebrows—an arch of hair, which, like a thatched penthouse, prevents the sweat and moisture of the forehead from running down into it.

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* Heister, sect. 89.

† Mem. R. Acad. Paris, p. 117.—*Paley.*

But it is still better protected by its *lid*. Of the superficial parts of the animal frame, I know none which, in its office and structure, is more deserving of attention than the eyelid. It defends the eye; it wipes it; it closes it in sleep. Are there, in any work of art whatever, purposes more evident than those which this organ fulfils? or an apparatus for executing those purposes more intelligible, more appropriate, or more mechanical? If it be overlooked by the observer of nature, it can only be because it is obvious and familiar. This is a tendency to be guarded against. We pass by the plainest instances, whilst we are exploring those which are rare and curious; by which conduct of the understanding, we sometimes neglect the strongest observations, being taken up with others which, though more recondite and scientific, are, as solid arguments, entitled to much less consideration.

In order to keep the eye moist and clean (which qualities are necessary to its brightness and its use), a wash is constantly supplied by a secretion for the purpose; and the superfluous brine is conveyed to the nose through a perforation in the bone as large as a goose-quill. When once the fluid has entered the nose, it spreads itself upon the inside of the nostril, and is evaporated by the current of warm air which, in the course of respiration, is continually passing over it. Can any pipe or outlet, for carrying off the waste liquor from a dye-house or a distillery, be more mechanical than this is? It is easily perceived that the eye must want moisture: b
the want of the eye generate the gland whic
the tear, or bore the hole by which it is dis
hole through a bone?

It is observable that this provision is not found in fish—the element in which they live supplying a constant lotion to the eye.[11]

It were, however, injustice to dismiss the eye as a piece of mechanism, without noticing that most exquisite of all contrivances, the *nictitating membrane*, which is found in the eyes of birds, and of many quadrupeds. Its use is to sweep the eye, which it does in an instant; to spread over it the lachrymal humour; to defend it also from sudden injuries; yet not totally, when drawn upon the pupil, to shut out the light. The commodiousness with which it lies folded up in the upper corner of the eye, ready for use and action, and the quickness with which it executes its purpose, are properties known and obvious to every observer; but what is equally admirable, though not quite so obvious, is the combination of two kinds of substance, muscular and elastic, and of two different kinds of action, by which the motion of this membrane is performed. It is not, as in ordinary cases, by the action of two antagonist muscles, one pulling forwar and the other backward, that a reciprocal change is effected; but it is thus: the membrane itself is an elastic substance, capable of being drawn out by force like piece of elastic gum, and by its own elasticity returnin when the force is removed, to its former position. Su being its nature, in order to fit it up for its office, it i connected by a tendon or thread with a muscle in th back part of the eye: this tendon or thread, thoug strong, is so fine as not to obstruct the sight, even wh it passes across it; and the muscle itself, being placed the *back* part of the eye, derives from its situation th advantage, not only of being secure, but of being out of the way; which it would hardly have been in any position that could be assigned to it in the anterior part of the orb, where its function lies. When the muscle behind the eye contracts, the membrane, by means of the communicating thread, is instantly drawn over the fore-part of it. When the muscular contraction (which is a positive and, most probably, a voluntary effort) ceases to be exerted, the elasticity alone of the membrane brings it back again to its position.* Does not this, if anything can do it, bespeak an artist, master of his work, acquainted with his materials? "Of a thousand other things," say the French Academicians, "we perceive not the contrivance, because we understand them only by their effects, of which we know not the causes: but we here treat of a machine, all the parts whereof are visible, and which need only be looked upon to discover the reasons of its motion and action." †

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[11] We have entered into a much fuller explanation of apparatus for the preservation of the eye, in the App there being a great deal that is curious in it hitherto un ticed. It will be there found that, although the eye of fish has no eyelid, yet it has the rapid motion of the ball, which, under water, must serve to free it from impurity. Some curious instances are, at the same *afforded*, of a still more artificial mode, in the lobste *crab*, of removing whatever obstructs the sight.

In the configuration of the muscle which, though placed behind the eye, draws the nictitating membrane over the eye, there is, what the authors just now quoted deservedly call a marvellous mechanism. I suppose this structure to be found in other animals; but, in the memoirs from which this account is taken, it is anatomically demonstrated only in the cassowary. The muscle [illegible] *passed through a loop formed by another muscle*; and [illegible] there inflected as if it were round a pulley. This is a peculiarity, and observe the advantage of it. A single muscle with a straight tendon, which is the common muscular form, would have been sufficient, if it had had power [illegible] draw far enough. But the contraction necessary to draw the membrane over the whole eye, required a longer muscle than could lie straight at the bottom of the eye. Therefore, in order to have a greater length in a less space, the cord of the main muscle makes an angle.

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* Phil. Trans. 1796.

† Memoirs for a Natural History of Animals, by the Royal Academy of Sciences at Paris, done into English by [illegible] member of the *Royal Society, 1701*, p. 249.—*Paley*.

This so far answers the end; but, still farther, it makes an angle, not round a fixed pivot, but round a loop formed by another muscle, which second muscle, whenever it contracts, of course twitches the first muscle at the point of inflection, and thereby assists the action designed by both.[12]

One question may possibly have dwelt in the reader's mind during the perusal of these observations, namely, Why should not the Deity have given to the animal the faculty of vision *at once?* Why this circuitous perception; the ministry of so many means; an element provided for the purpose; reflected from opaque substances, refracted through transparent ones; and both according to precise laws; then, a complex organ, an intricate and artificial apparatus, in order, by the operation of this element, and in conformity with the restrictions of these laws, to produce an image upon a membrane communicating with the brain? Wherefore all this? Why make the difficulty in order to surmount it? If to perceive objects by some other mode than that of touch, or objects which lay out of the reach of that sense, were the thing proposed, could not a simple volition of the

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[12] There is one effect, however, of this apparatus, which our author has omitted to notice—that is, the rapidity of motion in the *membrana nictitans,* produced by the oblique direction and junction of the tendons of these muscles. This will be illustrated hereafter.

The *membrana nictitans* is peculiar to birds: the term is not applicable to the corresponding structure in quadrupeds, the object being there obtained by a very different mechanism. The *haw* is a thin cartilage, which, lying between the eye-ball and the inner part of the orbit, flies rapidly out, and sweeps the surface of the eye in a manner much more perfect than can be performed by the outer eyelids. Every one who has ridden a horse in a dusty road must have been struck with the superior provision in the horse's eye: he never suffers from the dust, because, this cartilage, being bedewed by the secretion of a peculiar gland, not tears, but a matter more glutinous, sweeps across the eye, and collects and removes every particle of dust.

Creator have communicated the capacity? Why resort to contrivance, where power is omnipotent? Contrivance, by its very definition and nature, is the refuge of imperfection. To have recourse to expedients implies difficulty, impediment, restraint, defect of power. This question belongs to the other senses, as well as to sight; to the general functions of animal life, as nutrition, secretion, respiration; to the economy of vegetables; and, indeed, to almost all the operations of nature. The question, therefore, is of very wide extent; and amongst other answers which may be given to it, besides reasons of which probably we are ignorant, one answer is this: It is only by the display of contrivance that the existence, the agency, the wisdom of the Deity, *could* be testified to his rational creatures. This is the scale by which we ascend to all the knowledge of our Creator which we possess, so far as it depends upon the phenomena, or the works of nature. Take away this, and you take away from us every subject of observation, and ground of reasoning; I mean, as our rational faculties are formed at present. Whatever is done, God could have done without the intervention of instruments or means; but it is in the construction of instruments, in the choice and adaptation of means, that a creative intelligence is seen. It is this which constitutes the order and beauty of the universe. God, therefore, has been pleased to prescribe limits to his own power, and to work his ends within those limits.* The general laws of matter have perhaps prescribed the nature of these limits; its inertia, its reaction; the laws which govern the communication of motion, the refraction and reflection of light, the constitution of fluids non-elastic and elastic, the transmission of sound through the latter; the laws of magnetism, of electricity; and probably others, yet undiscovered. These are general laws; and when a particular purpose is to be effected, it is not by making a new law, nor by the suspension of the old ones, nor by making them wind, and bend, and yield to the occasion

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* This subject is touched upon in the introductory observations *to the Appendix*.

(for nature with great steadiness adheres to and support them); but it is, as we have seen in the eye, by th interposition of an apparatus, corresponding with thes laws, and suited to the exigency which results fro them, that the purpose is at length attained. As w have said, therefore, God prescribes limits to his powe that he may let in the exercise and thereby exhib demonstrations of his wisdom. For then, i. e., [illegible] laws and limitations being laid down, it is as though [illegible] Being should have fixed certain rules, and, if we [illegible] speak, provided certain materials, and afterwards [illegible] committed to another Being, out of these materials [illegible] in subordination to these rules, the task of drawing [illegible] a creation: a supposition which evidently leaves [illegible] and induces, indeed, a necessity for contrivance. [illegible] there may be many such agents, and many ranks of [illegible] We do not advance this as a doctrine either of philosoph or of religion; but we say that the subject may safely b represented under this view; because the Deity, actin himself by general laws, will have the same consequence upon our reasoning, as if he had prescribed these laws t another. It has been said, that the problem of creatio was, "attraction and matter being given, to make world out of them;" and, as above explained, this statement perhaps does not convey a false idea.

We have made choice of the eye as an instance upo which to rest the argument of this chapter. Some singl example was to be proposed; and the eye offered itsel under the advantage of admitting of a strict comparis with optical instruments. The ear, it is probable, is n less artificially and mechanically adapted to its office tha the eye. But we know less about it: we do not so wel understand the action, the use, or the mutual dependenc of its internal parts.[13] Its general form, however, bot al and **internal**, is sufficient to show that it is an nent adapted to the reception of *sound;* that is to

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[13] The reader will find a dissertation on the ear in th Appendix. Other authors, as well as Dr. Paley, have sai that we do not understand the uses or mutual dependency o *the internal* parts of the ear: an observation either not ver

gible, or which shows them to have studied it super-



planation of the Plan of the Ear.—A, the tube of the aving little glands to secrete the wax, and hairs stand-ross it to exclude insects, without impeding the vibra-of the atmosphere; B, the membrane of the *tympanum* into the form of a funnel by the attachment of the *us;* C, the chain of four bones lying in the irregular of the *tympanum*, and communicating the vibrations of embrane B to the fluid in the labyrinth; D, Eustachian which forms a communication between the throat and *mpanum*, so as to preserve an equilibrium of the air in vity of the *tympanum* and the atmosphere; E, F, the inth, consisting of a central cavity, the vestibule; the semicircular canals, E, and the *cochlea*, F.

inning from the left hand we have the *malleus*, or say, already knowing that sound consists in pulses of the air, we perceive, in the structure of the ear, a suitableness to receive impressions from this species of action, and to propagate these impressions to the brain. For of what does this structure consist? An external ear (the concha), calculated, like an ear trumpet, to catch and collect the pulses of which we have spoken; in large quadrupeds, turning to the sound, and possessing a configuration, as well as motion, evidently fitted for the office: of a tube which leads into the head, lying at the root of this outward ear, the folds and sinuses thereof tending and conducting the air towards it: of a thin membrane, like the pelt of a drum, stretched across this passage upon a bony rim: of a chain of movable and infinitely curious bones, forming a communication, and the only communication that can be observed, between the membrane last mentioned and the interior channels and recesses of the skull: of cavities, similar in shape and form to wind instruments of music, being spiral or portions of circles: of the Eustachian tube, like the hole in a drum, to let the air pass freely into and out of the barrel of the ear, as the covering membrane vibrates, or as the temperature may be altered: the whole labyrinth hewn out of a rock; that is, wrought into the substance

hammer, the first of the chain of bones; we see the long handle or process which is attached to the membrane of the *tympanum*, and which moves with the vibrations of that membrane; the other end is enlarged, and has a groove upon it which is articulated with the next bone. The second bone is the *incus*, or anvil, to the grooved surface of which the *malleus* is attached. A long process extends from this bone, which has upon it the *os orbiculare;* and to this third bone there is attached a fourth, the *stapes*, which is in shape like a stirrup iron. The base of this bone is of an oval shape, and rests upon a membrane which closes the hole leading into the labyrinth. This hole is called *foramen ovale*. The plan of the *cochlea* shows that one of its spiral passages, beginning in the vestibule, winds round the pillar till it meets in a point with another tube. If the eye follow this *second spiral* tube, it will be found to lead, not into the *vestibule,* but into the irregular cavity of the tympanum.

the hardest bone of the body. This assemblage of nnected parts constitutes together an apparatus plainly ough relative to the transmission of sound, or of the pulses received from sound, and only to be lamented not being better understood.



The communication within, formed by the small bones the ear, is, to look upon, more like what we are ustomed to call machinery, than any thing I am uainted with in animal bodies. It seems evidently igned to continue towards the sensorium the tremus motions which are excited in the membrane of the npanum, or what is better known by the name of the rum of the ear." The compages of bones consists of



[This figure represents the bones which form the chain.]

r, which are so disposed, and so hinge upon one ther, as that if the membrane, the drum of the ear, rate, all the four are put in motion together; and, by result of their action, work the base of that which is last in the series, upon an aperture which it closes, l upon which it plays, and which aperture opens into tortuous canals that lead to the brain. This last e of the four is called the *stapes*. The office of the m of the ear is to spread out an extended surface, able of *receiving the* impressions of sound, and of being put by them into a state of vibration. The office of the stapes is to repeat these vibrations. It is a repeating frigate, stationed more within the line. From which account of its action may be understood how the sensation of sound will be excited by any thing which communicates a vibratory motion to the stapes, though not, as in all ordinary cases, through the intervention of the membrana tympani. This is done by solid bodies applied to the bones of the skull, as by a metal bar holden at one end between the teeth, and touching at the other end a tremulous body. It likewise appears to be done, in a considerable degree, by the air itself, even when this membrane, the drum of the ear, is greatly damaged. Either in the natural or preternatural state of the organ, the use of the chain of bones is to propagate the impulse in a direction towards the brain, and to propagate it with the advantage of a lever; which advantage consists in increasing the force and strength of the vibration, and at the same time diminishing the space through which it oscillates; both of which changes may augment or facilitate the still deeper action of the auditory nerves.[14]

The benefit of the Eustachian tube to the organ may be made out upon pneumatic principles. Behind the drum of the ear is a second cavity, or barrel, called the tympanum. The Eustachian tube is a slender pipe, but sufficient for the passage of air, leading from this cavity into the back part of the mouth. Now, it would not have done to have had a vacuum in this cavity; for, in that case, the pressure of the atmosphere from without would have burst the membrane which covered it. Nor would it have done to have filled the cavity with lymph, or any other secretion; which would necessarily have obstructed both the vibration of the membrane, and the play of the small bones. Nor, lastly, would it have done to have occupied the space with confined air, because the expansion of that air by heat, or its contraction by cold, would have distended or relaxed the covering membrane, in a degree inconsistent with the purpose which it was assigned to execute. The only remaining expedient, and that for which the Eustachian tube serves, is to open to this cavity a communication with the external air. In one word, it exactly answers the purpose of the hole in a drum.

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[14] It will be shown in the Appendix, that the fine apparatus consisting of these bones, with their four minute muscles attached to them, is not necessary to the sensation coming through the bones of the head, as here described by our author: it is provided for the more delicate vibrations of the elastic atmosphere, and is not found except in animals that breathe the air. It will be also found, that whilst these bones move with the slightest impulse of sound, they regulate the *impression*, and protect the nerve.



[This figure represents the membrane of the tympanum of a larger size than natural. It is represented as tucked in by the handle of the *malleus*. The description of Sir Everard Home, referred to in the text, is altogether fanciful. There is no proof that these fibres are muscular: they are drawn tight by the small muscle attached to the *malleus* called *tensor tympani*; and it would appear that these cords are necessary to produce that variety of motion in the membrane suited to all the variety of sounds which are conveyed through it to the seat of the sense. Sir Everard played to the elephant on the pianoforte. That the animal took some notice of the extraordinary sound cannot surprise us; but the inferences drawn by Sir Everard were equally ingenious and groundless. He supposed that the musical ear was owing to the membrane of the tympanum.]

The membrana tympani itself, likew
the examination which can be made
found in the ears of fish: which furni

proof of what indeed is indicated by every thing about it, that it is appropriated to the action of air, or of an elastic medium. It bears an obvious resemblance to the pelt or head of a drum, from which it takes its name. It resembles also a drum-head in this principal property, that its use depends upon its tension. *Tension* is the state essential to it. Now we know that, in a drum, the pelt is carried over a hoop, and braced as occasion requires, by the means of strings attached to its circumference. In the membrane of the ear, the same purpose is provided for, more simply, but not less mechanically nor less successfully, by a different expedient, viz., by the end of a bone (the handle of the malleus) pressing upon its centre. It is only in very large animals that the texture of this membrane can be discerned. In the Philosophical Transactions for the year 1800 (vol. i.), Mr. Everard Home has given some curious observations upon the ear, and the drum of the ear of an *elephant*. He discovered in it what he calls a radiated muscle—that is, straight muscular fibres passing along the membrane from the circumference to the centre—from the bony rim which surrounds it towards the handle of the malleus, to which the central part is attached. This muscle he supposes to be designed to bring the membrane into unison with different sounds; but then he also discovered, that this muscle itself cannot act, unless the membrane be drawn to a stretch, and kept in a due state of tightness, by what may be called a foreign force—viz., the action of the muscles of the malleus. Supposing his explanation of the use of the parts to be just, our author is well founded in the reflection which he makes upon it—"that this mode of adapting the ear to different sounds, is one of the most beautiful applications of muscles in the body; *the mechanism is so simple, and the variety of effects so great.*"

In another volume of the Transactions above referred to, and of the same year, two most curious cases are related, of persons who retained the sense of hearing, not in a perfect but in a very considerable degree, notwithstanding the almost total loss of the membrane we have *been describing*. In one of these cases, the use here assigned to that membrane, of modifying the impressions of sound by change of tension, was attempted to be supplied by straining the muscles of the outward ear. "The external ear," we are told, "had acquired a distinct motion upward and backward, which was observable whenever the patient listened to any thing which he did not distinctly hear; when he was addressed in a whisper, the ear was seen immediately to move; when the tone of voice was louder, it then remained altogether motionless."

It appears probable, from both these cases, that a collateral if not principal use of the membrane is to cover and protect the barrel of the ear which lies behind it. Both the patients suffered from cold: one, "a great increase of deafness from catching cold;" the other, "very considerable pain from exposure to a stream of cold air." Bad effects therefore followed from this cavity being left open to the external air; yet, had the Author of Nature shut it up by any other cover than what was capable, by its texture, of receiving vibrations from sound, and, by its connexion with the interior parts, of transmitting those vibrations to the brain, the use of the organ, so far as we can judge, must have been entirely obstructed.

CHAPTER IV.

ON THE SUCCESSION OF PLANTS AND ANIMALS.

The *generation* of the animal no more accounts for the contrivance of the eye or ear, than, upon the supposition stated in a preceding chapter, the production of a watch by the motion and mechanism of a former watch, would account for the skill and attention evidenced in the watch so produced—than it would account for the disposition of the wheels, the catching of their teeth, the relation of the several parts of the works to one another, and to their common end; for the suitableness of their forms and places to their offices, for their connexion, their operation, and the useful result of that operation. I do insist most strenuously upon the correctness of this comparison; that it holds as to every mode of specific propagation; and that whatever was true of the watch, under the hypothesis above mentioned, is true of plants and animals.

I. To begin with the fructification of plants. Can it be doubted but that the seed contains a particular organization? Whether a latent plantule with the means of temporary nutrition, or whatever else it be, it encloses an organization suited to the germination of a new plant. Has the plant which produced the seed any thing more to do with that organization, than the watch would have had to do with the structure of the watch which was produced in the course of its mechanical movement? I mean—Has it any thing at all to do with the *contrivance*? The maker and contriver of one watch, when he inserted within it a mechanism suited to the production of another
was, in truth, the maker and contriver of that
perties of the new watch were
; the design manifested in it,
him as the artist; the collo-

ion of each part, to his placing: the action, effect, and
, to his counsel, intelligence, and workmanship. In
ducing it by the intervention of a former watch, he
s only working by one set of tools instead of another.
it is with the plant, and the seed produced by it.
n any distinction be assigned between the two cases;
tween the producing watch, and the producing plant;
th passive, unconscious substances; both, by the orga-
ation which was given to them, producing their like,
thout understanding or design; both, that is, instru-
nts?

II. From plants we may proceed to oviparous animals:
m seeds to eggs. Now I say, that the bird has the
ne concern in the formation of the egg which she lays,
the plant has in that of the seed which it drops; and
other nor greater. The internal constitution of the
g is as much a secret to the hen as if the hen were
nimate. Her will cannot alter it, or change a single
ather of the chick. She can neither foresee nor deter-
ne of which sex her brood shall be, or how many of
her; yet the thing produced shall be, from the first,
ry different in its make according to the sex which it
ars. So far, therefore, from adapting the means, she
not beforehand apprised of the effect. If there be
ncealed within that smooth shell a provision and a
eparation for the production and nourishment of a new
imal, they are not of her providing or preparing; if
ere be contrivance, it is none of hers. Although,
erefore, there be the difference of life and perceptivity
tween the animal and plant, it is a difference which
ters not into the account;—it is a foreign circumstance;
is a difference of properties not employed. The animal
nction and the vegetable function are alike destitute of
y design which can operate upon the form of the thing
oduced. The plant has no design in producing the
ed—no comprehension of the nature or use of what it
oduces: the bird, with respect to its egg, is not above
e plant with respect to its seed. Neither the one nor
e other bears that sort of relation to what proceeds from
em which a joiner does to the chair which he makes.

Now a cause which bears *this* relation to the effect, is what we want, in order to account for the suitableness of means to an end—the fitness and fitting of one thing to another; and this cause the parent plant or animal does not supply.

It is further observable concerning the propagation of plants and animals, that the apparatus employed exhibits no resemblance to the thing produced; in this respect, holding an analogy with instruments and tools of art. The filaments, antheræ, and stigmata of flowers, bear no more resemblance to the young plant, or even to the seed which is formed by their intervention, than a chisel or a plane does to a table or chair. What then are the filaments, antheræ, and stigmata of plants but instruments strictly so called?

III. We may advance from animals which bring forth eggs to animals which bring forth their young alive; and of this latter class, from the lowest to the highest; from irrational to rational life, from brutes to the human species; without perceiving, as we proceed, any alteration whatever in the terms of the comparison. The rational animal does not produce its offspring with more certainty or success than the irrational animal: a man than a quadruped, a quadruped than a bird; nor (for we may follow the gradation through its whole scale) a bird than a plant; nor a plant than a watch, a piece of dead mechanism, would do, upon the supposition which has already so often been repeated. Rationality, therefore, has nothing to do in the business. If an account must be given of the contrivance which we observe; if it be demanded, whence arose either the contrivance by which the young animal is produced, or the contrivance manifested in the young animal itself, it is not from the reason of the parent that any such account can be drawn. He is the cause of his offspring, in the same sense as that in which a gardener is the cause of the tulip which grows upon his parterre, and in no other. We admire the flower; we examine the plant; we perceive the conduciveness of many of its parts to their end and office: we observe a provision for its *nourishment*, growth, protection, and fecundity; but we ık of the gardener in all this. We attribute f this to his agency; yet it may still be true out the gardener we should not have had the ust so it is with the succession of animals, even ghest order. For the contrivance discovered in ure of the thing produced, we want a contriver. nt is not that contriver: his consciousness decides tion. He is in total ignorance why that which ed took its present form rather than any other. him only to be astonished by the effect. We nore look therefore to the intelligence of the ıimal for what we are in search of—a cause of and of subserviency of parts to their use, which ınd subserviency we see in the procreated body e can refer the internal conformation of an acorn elligence of the oak from which it dropped, or ture of the watch to the intelligence of the ıich produced it: there being no difference, as gument is concerned, between an intelligence not exerted, and an intelligence which does not

n we have, in some measure, comprehended the an animal body, how the different organs are re- ach other, and how the whole exists through a ıfluence of its parts, the wonder is renewed how reature should grow out of that, which, as far as een, has no tendency to multiply itself. Authors of reproduction, even to the very last, affirm, that germ of life in all organized structures are con- seeds of decay and of death: they tell us that the life are finite, and that the time must come when be expended. Now there are no seeds of decay; ıgh, according to the law of animal existence, the l perishes, it is incorrect to say that it is the result ıaustion of the powers of vitality, or the deteriora- e material which enters into its composition. We ing by adapting the language of one science to ex- her: it is of no advantage, in treating of life and ıdopt a chemical nomenclature. The term of life reature, from the elephant to the ephemeral fly, ıit; but it is wrong to say that it is by the defect

of the material, or of the energy of life: it is a better
sophy to admit that it is in accordance with the system
the Deity has ordained.

Life, in the sense in which it is used here, is contin
the germ that rises from the parent; since out of t
body, that is described as a deteriorated and useless ma
a new creation is produced, it suffices to show that th
no necessary decay from the material itself. A leaf o
of an old tree will strike root into the ground, and ve
and exhibit youthful vigour. So will the fresh-water p
furnish a portion which, being cut off, will grow with
fect resemblance to the original stock. In the reprod
of the higher and the more complex organized bodies
is much that is obscure; but in the simpler, and, as
termed, the lower examples—vegetables, zoophytes, a
fusory animals—we have abundant proofs that the resul
not proceed from the exhausted or deteriorated nature
material.

Amongst the infusoria, the animals called *Monads*, of
there is a great variety, exhibit very curious pheno
They are of a globular form, and this globe is seen fi
contract and then divide, each becoming a distinct a
And something like this may be done artificially by th
sion of the fresh-water polypus, or hydra; and what i
cient in the divided portion is supplied by a new grow
it head or tail. The thing, however, is not so remar
if we consider that those lower animals have abunda
semblance to vegetables; and that in cutting off portio
experimenter is cutting off buds. These buds or tub
if left to undergo their natural changes, acquire indepe
motion, produce tentacula, or feelers, to procure food
thus prepared to be independent, fall off from the
stock.

The microscope exhibits another instance in the *V*
It is a transparent globule, within which smaller gl
may be seen; and when matured the parent bursts, dis
the offspring, and dies.

In all these examples, we see that there is no rea
speak of exhausted or deteriorated matter, or debility
powers of life.

So in the higher and the more complex animals w
one set of organs decaying and another rising into exis
Contemplating the one, we would say that the powers
decaying; contemplating the other, that they were fre

ous. We must come to the conclusion, then, that the th of parts, or the period of their development, the decay e animal, or of the parts of the animal, is by an ordi- which is very inaccurately expressed by the terms ıstion of life, or imperfection of the material. Imper- n, in truth, is a relative term, and means failure or in- ency towards the accomplishment of certain purposes. object in view were the duration of animal bodies for t length of time, we might be justified in saying that the ials they are made of are imperfect; but this is clearly e design with which they are formed.

CHAPTER V.

APPLICATION OF THE ARGUMENT CONTINUED.

Every observation which was made in our first chapter concerning the watch, may be repeated with strict propriety concerning the eye; concerning animals; concerning plants; concerning, indeed, all the organized parts of the works of nature. As,

I. When we are inquiring simply after the *existence* of an intelligent Creator, imperfection, inaccuracy, liability to disorder, occasional irregularities, may subsist in a considerable degree, without inducing any doubt into the question: just as a watch may frequently go wrong, seldom, perhaps, exactly right, may be faulty in some parts, defective in some, without the smallest ground of suspicion from thence arising that it was not a watch, not made, or not made for the purpose ascribed to it. When faults are pointed out, and when a question is started concerning the skill of the artist, or dexterity with which the work is executed, then, indeed, in order to defend these qualities from accusation, we must be able, either to expose some intractableness and imperfection in the materials, or point out some invincible difficulty in the execution, into which imperfection and difficulty the matter of complaint may be resolved; or, if we cannot do this, we must adduce such specimens of consummate art and contrivance proceeding from the same hand as may convince the inquirer of the existence, in the case before him, of impediments like those which we have mentioned, although, what from the nature of the case is very likely to happen, they be unknown and unperceived by him. This we must do in order to vindicate the *artist's skill*, or at least the perfection of it: as we must *also judge* of his intention, and of the provisions emoyed in fulfilling that intention, not from an instance n which they fail, but from the great plurality of instances in which they succeed. But, after all, these are different questions from the question of the artist's existence; or, which is the same, whether the thing before us be a work of art or not; and the questions ought always to be kept separate in the mind. So likewise it is in the works of nature. Irregularities and imperfections are of little or no weight in the consideration, when that consideration relates simply to the existence of a Creator. When the argument respects his attributes, they are of weight; but are then to be taken in conjunction (the attention is not to rest upon them, but they are to be taken in conjunction) with the unexceptionable evidences which we possess of skill, power, and benevolence, displayed in other instances; which evidences may, in strength, number, and variety, be such, and may so overpower apparent blemishes, as to induce us, upon the most reasonable ground, to believe that these last ought to be referred to some cause, though we be ignorant of it, other than defect of knowledge or of benevolence in the author.

II. There may be also parts of plants and animals, as there were supposed to be of the watch, of which, in some instances the operation, in others, the use, is unknown. These form different cases; for the operation may be unknown, yet the use be certain. Thus it is with the lungs of animals. It does not, I think, appear, that we are acquainted with the action of the air upon the blood, or in what manner that action is communicated by the lungs; yet we find that a very short suspension of their office destroys the life of the animal.[16] In this case, therefore, we may be said to know the use, nay, we experience the necessity, of the organ, though we be norant of its operation. Nearly the same thing may observed of what is called the lymphatic system. suffer grievous inconveniences from its disorder, with being informed of the office which it sustains in economy of our bodies. There may possibly also be so few examples of the second class, in which not only operation is unknown, but in which experiments m seem to prove that the part is not necessary; or m leave a doubt how far it is even useful to the plant animal in which it is found. This is said to be the c with the spleen, which has been extracted from d without any sensible injury to their vital functions. stances of the former kind, namely, in which we can explain the operation, may be numerous; for they w be so in proportion to our ignorance. They will be m or fewer to different persons, and in different stages science. Every improvement of knowledge diminish their number. There is hardly, perhaps, a year pas that does not, in the works of nature, bring some ope tion, or some mode of operation, to light, which w before undiscovered—probably unsuspected. Instanc of the second kind, namely, where the part appears to totally useless, I believe to be extremely rare; compar with the number of those of which the use is evide they are beneath any assignable proportion, and perha have been never submitted to a trial and examinati sufficiently accurate, long enough continued, or oft enough repeated. No accounts which I have seen a satisfactory. The mutilated animal may live and gr fat (as was the case of the dog deprived of its spleen yet may be defective in some other of its functions, whic whether they can all, or in what degree of vigour a perfection, be performed, or how long preserved witho the extirpated organ, does not seem to be ascertained experiment. But to this case, even were it fully ma out, may be applied the consideration which we su gested concerning the watch, viz., that these superfluo parts do not negative the reasoning which we institut *concerning* those parts which are useful, and of whi ıow the use; the indication of contrivance, with t to them, remains as it was before.[17]

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[16] Undoubtedly the exposure of the blood to the atmosphere, in the circulation through the lungs, and the throwing off of carbon, are essential to life. But the pain and alarm excited when there is danger of suffocation are not so much a direct consequence of the interruption of the function, as an instance of the manner in which the sensibility is bestowed to guard the *important actions of life.*

One atheistic way of replying to our observations he works of nature, and to the proofs of a Deity we think that we perceive in them, is to tell us, ll which we see must necessarily have had some ınd that it might as well be its present form as any

Let us now apply this answer to the eye, as we fore to the watch. Something or other must have ed that place in the animal's head; must have up, we will say, that socket; we will say, also, must have been of that sort of substance which we ıimal substance, as flesh, bone, membrane, or car- &c. But that it should have been an *eye*, know- we do what an eye comprehends,—viz., that it have consisted, first, of a series of transparent (very different, by-the-by, even in their substance, he opaque materials of which the rest of the body general at least, composed; and with which the of its surface, this single portion of it excepted, ɜred): secondly, of a black cloth or canvass (the

ı the higher animals there is a great complication of Yet, in the lower animals, the functions of digestion, tion, assimilation, secretion, and growth proceed by of an apparatus comparatively simple. We must not ırised, then, that certain parts may be removed from her animals without destroying life. But this does ply that those parts are useless, since they are struc- uperadded for the finer adjustment of the different ns one to the other, belonging to a higher condition of nomy.

ı regard to parts which are thus called useless, we ɜmember that the varieties of created animals belong type. As we have just said, the essential functions same in all; and there is much of the structure com- ı all: when an animal of a particular class has its ɜation adjusted to a certain condition of existence, we e the rudiments of parts which, not being in action, ıperfect, and we must look to the individuals of r species or variety to discover them in their full ɔnment.

only membrane of the body which is black) spread
behind these lenses, so as to receive the image for
by pencils of light transmitted through them; and pl
at the precise geometrical distance, at which,
which alone, a distinct image could be formed,
at the concourse of the refracted rays: thirdly, of a
nerve communicating between this membrane an
brain: without which, the action of light upon the
brane, however modified by the organ, would be
the purposes of sensation:—that this fortunate con
tion of parts should have been the lot, not of one
vidual out of many thousand individuals, like the
prize in a lottery, or like some singularity in natur
the happy chance of a whole species: nor of one s
out of many thousand species, with which we a
quainted, but of by far the greatest number of a
exist; and that under varieties, not casual or capr
but bearing marks of being suited to their respecti
igences:—that all this should have taken place,
because something must have occupied these po
every animal's forehead;—or, that all this sho
thought to be accounted for by the short answer,
whatever was there must have had some form or oth
is too absurd to be made more so by any augme ntat
We are not contented with this answer; we fin no
tisfaction in it, by way of accounting for appeara nces
organization far short of those of the eye, suc h as w
observe in fossil shells, petrified bones, or oth er sub
stances which bear the vestiges of animal or ve getable
recrements, but which, either in respect to utilit y, or of
the situation in which they are discovered, may s eem ac
cidental enough. It is no way of accounting e ven for
these things, to say, that the stone, for instanc whi
is shown to us (supposing the question to be con cern
a petrification), must have contained some inter al
mation or other. Nor does it mend the an
with respect to the singularity of the confor
after th it is no longer to be compute
chanc at it. This is always to
is, whether a useful or i

conformation be the produce of chance or not: I desire no greater certainty in reasoning than that by which chance is excluded from the present disposition of the natural world. Universal experience is against it. What does chance ever do for us? In the human body, for instance, chance, *i. e.*, the operation of causes without design, may produce a wen, a wart, a mole, a pimple, but never an eye. Amongst inanimate substances, a clod, a pebble, a liquid drop might be; but never was a watch, a telescope, an organised body of any kind, answering a valuable purpose by a complicated mechanism, the effect of chance.[18] In no assignable instance hath such a thing existed without intention somewhere.

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[18] There is great inaccuracy, and indeed a very unphilosophical and superficial view of the subject, in these observations upon "*chance.*" Chance is merely an abridged form of expressing our ignorance of the cause or preceding event to which any given event may be traced; and nothing can be more inaccurate, or indeed more productive of serious errors in this very branch of science, than to speak of chance as a substantive thing or power. To take the most obvious instance: we say, in common parlance, that the dice being shaken together, it is a matter of chance what faces they will turn up; but, if we could accurately observe their position in the box before the shaking, the direction of the force applied, its quantity, the number of turns of the box, and the curve in which the motion was made, the manner of stopping the motion and the line in which the dice were thrown out, the faces turned up would be a matter of certain prediction, after a sufficient number of experiments had been made to correct the theory. It is only because we take no heed of all these things that we are ignorant what will be the event; and the darkness in which we are respecting the circumstances which regulate it, is called by the name of chance. Nor is it correct to say, that this or anything else is done without design. All we can mean by the expression is, that our design stops short at a certain point, and leaves the laws of nature to guide the rest of the operation. But such a position is manifestly quite inapplicable to the operations of nature.

Equally inaccurate is it, if not more so, to speak of a wen or a pimple, &c., as the result of any cause in the least degree different from *that which* produced the eye. These are pos-

IV. There is another answer which has the sa
effect as the resolving of things into chance; whi
answer would persuade us to believe that the eye, t
animal to which it belongs, every other animal, eve
plant, indeed every organized body which we see, a
only so many out of the possible varieties and combin
tions of being which the lapse of infinite ages has broug
into existence; that the present world is the relic of th
variety; millions of other bodily forms and other speci
having perished, being, by the defect of their constit
tion, incapable of preservation, or of continuance by g
neration. Now there is no foundation whatever for th
conjecture in any thing which we observe in the worl
of nature; no such experiments are going on at presen
no such energy operates as that which is here suppose
and which should be constantly pushing into existen
new varieties of beings. Nor are there any appearanc
to support an opinion, that every possible combinatio
of vegetable or animal structure has formerly been trie
Multitudes of conformations, both of vegetables an
animals, may be conceived capable of existence and su
cession, which yet do not exist. Perhaps almost as man
forms of plants might have been found in the fields
figures of plants can be delineated upon paper.
countless variety of animals might have existed which d
not exist. Upon the supposition here stated, we shoul
see unicorns and mermaids, sylphs and centaurs, th

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sibly always, certainly sometimes, diseases; but they are th
result of contrivance as clearly as the eye itself. The fun
tions of the animal system, though acting in an unusu
manner, yet acting according to rule, produce those phen
mena. Indeed one of them, a pimple, is, in part at least, th
result of the provision made for restoring the interrupte
continuity of the skin, by a slight suppuration from whic
the granulation, or production of new animal fibre, tak
place. The like remark applies to the cases of a clod, pebbl
or liquid drop, also put in this passage. We have alread
adverted to the two first in a former note; the formation
a drop is in truth one of the phenomena of gravitation, an
a very remarkable one.

es of painters, and the fables of poets, realised by iples. Or, if it be alleged that these may transgress ounds of possible life and propagation, we might at have nations of human beings without nails upon fingers, with more or fewer fingers and toes than some with one eye, others with one ear, with one il, or without the sense of smelling at all. All , and a thousand other imaginable varieties, might and propagate. We may modify any one species different ways, all consistent with life, and with the ns necessary to preservation, although affording dif- t degrees of conveniency and enjoyment to the al. And if we carry these modifications through lifferent species which are known to subsist, their ber would be incalculable. No reason can be given , if these deperdits ever existed, they have now dis- ared. Yet, if all possible existences have been tried, must have formed part of the catalogue.[19]

No doubt men in different ages have asserted the possi- of all we see being made by chance; but we are not aritable when we say that no man ever believed it. It sily shown, that, of all the varieties of fabulous animals h have been bred in the fertile imagination of the poet, ne could have lived. They want that relation and ba- of the different organs, that provision running through hole texture of the frame of the animal, which we see e natural productions. The sphinx has wings, but no itution of body to give these strength. The griffin, with oked bill, has no feathers to preen, and no substitute for . The centaur has the body of the horse, but no mouth ther appropriate food.

e may conclude, then, that these products of the imagi- n are altogether abortive, and only tend to prove how the relation must be of all the parts, and especially of ital organs of an animal, in order that it may live.

to the second position, that the animals which exist are appy results of chance when thousands have perished by rfection, the supposition is contradicted by the perfect armonious chain of beings forming the animal kingdom, ich there is no link interrupted, no interval implying ss of any species.

But, moreover, the division of organised substances into animals and vegetables, and the distribution and sub-distribution of each into genera and species, which distribution is not an arbitrary act of the mind, but founded in the order which prevails in external nature, appear to me to contradict the supposition of the present world being the remains of an indefinite variety of existences; of a variety which rejects all plan. The hypothesis teaches, that every possible variety of being hath, at one time or other, found its way into existence (by what cause or in what manner is not said), and that those which were badly formed perished; but how or why those which survived should be cast, as we see that plants and animals are cast, into regular classes, the hypothesis does not explain; or rather the hypothesis is inconsistent with this phenomenon.

The hypothesis, indeed, is hardly deserving of the consideration which we have given to it. What should we think of a man who, because we had never ourselves seen watches, telescopes, stocking-mills, steam-engines, &c., made, knew not how they were made, nor could prove by testimony when they were made, or by whom, would have us believe that these machines, instead of deriving their curious structures from the thought and design of their inventors and contrivers, in truth derive them from no other origin than this: viz., that a mass of metals and other materials having run, when melted, into all possible figures, and combined themselves in all possible forms, and shapes, and proportions, these things which we see are what were left from the accident, as best worth preserving, and, as such, are become the remaining stock of a magazine, which, at one time or other, has by this means contained every mechanism, useful and useless, convenient and inconvenient, into which such like materials could be thrown? I cannot distinguish the hypothesis, as applied to the works o

ature, fr tion, which no one would accept a

of machines.

contrivance discoverable in ani

ment deduced from them in

of design and of a designing Creator, this turn is sometimes attempted to be given, namely, that the parts were not intended for the use, but that the use arose out of the parts. This distinction is intelligible. A cabinet-maker rubs his mahogany with fish-skin; yet it would be too much to assert that the skin of the dog-fish was made rough and granulated on purpose for the polishing of wood, and the use of cabinet-makers. Therefore the distinction is intelligible. But I think that there is very little place for it in the works of nature. When roundly and generally affirmed of them, as it hath sometimes been, it amounts to such another stretch of assertion as it would be to say, that all the implements of the cabinet-maker's workshop, as well as his fish-skin, were substances accidentally configurated, which he had picked up and converted to his use; that his adzes, saws, planes, and gimlets, were not made, as we suppose, to hew, cut, smooth, shape out, or bore wood with; but that, these things being made, no matter with what design, or whether with any, the cabinet-maker perceived that they were applicable to his purpose, and turned them to account.

But, again. So far as this solution is attempted to be applied to those parts of animals the action of which does not depend upon the will of the animal, it is fraught with still more evident absurdity. Is it possible to believe that the eye was formed without any regard to vision; that it was the animal itself which found out that, though formed with no such intention, it would serve to see with; and that the use of the eye as an organ of sight resulted from this discovery, and the animal's application of it? The same question may be asked of the ear; the same of all the senses. None of the senses fundamentally depend upon the election of the animal; consequently neither upon his sagacity nor his experience. It is the impression which objects make upon them that constitutes their use. Under that impression he is passive. He may bring objects to the sense, or within its reach; he may select these objects; but over the impression itself he has no power, or very little; *and that properly* is the sense.

Secondly; there are many parts of animal l
which seem to depend upon the will of the anim
greater degree than the senses do, and yet with r
to which this solution is equally unsatisfactory.
apply the solution to the human body, for insta
forms itself into questions upon which no reas
mind can doubt; such as, whether the teeth wer
expressly for the mastication of food, the feet for w
the hands for holding? or whether, these things
as they are, being in fact in the animal's possessi
own ingenuity taught him that they were conver
these purposes, though no such purposes were c
plated in their formation?

All that there is of the appearance of reason
way of considering the subject is, that, in some
the organization seems to determine the habits
animal, and its choice to a particular mode c
which, in a certain sense, may be called "the use
out of the part."[20] Now, to all the instances in
there is any place for this suggestion, it may be r
that the organization determines the animal to
beneficial and salutary to itself; and that this

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[20] We deceive ourselves in this matter: the dexterit
use gives, makes us apt to believe that the faculty is
through the accidental possession of the instrument.
difficulty is removed, if we make due comparison l
man and other animals. In the former, it is intenc
the faculty should be gradually developed; and the s
with which perfection is attained leaves us in some c
the relation between the effort and the instrument use
in the latter, all obscurity is removed: their propensi
instincts, and the use of their instruments are so perfe
the beginning, as to admit of no improvement. T
catcher requires no experience to adjust his eye, no
effort of his bill to correct the first. Whether it be th
or the tooth, or the sting, the disposition is given with
the mode of its action is prescribed. The spider wea
web without improvement, or room for improvement.
subject is treated at some length in the "Bridgewater T
on the Hand," where the question is discussed, whe
not the possession of the hand is the source of man
riority.

ld not be seen so regularly to follow, if the several nisations did not bear a concerted and contrived ation to the substance by which the animal was surnded. They would, otherwise, be capacities without jects; powers without employment. The web-foot termines, you say, the duck to swim; but what would t avail if there were no water to swim in? The ng hooked bill and sharp talons of one species of d determine it to prey upon animals; the soft straight l and weak claws of another species determine it to ck up seeds: but neither determination could take ffect in providing for the sustenance of the birds, if nimal bodies and vegetable seeds did not lie within heir reach. The peculiar conformation of the bill and ngue and claws of the woodpecker determines that bird to search for his food amongst the insects lodged behind the bark or in the wood of decayed trees; but what would this profit him if there were no trees, no decayed trees, no insects lodged under their bark, or in their trunk? The proboscis with which the bee is furnished determines him to seek for honey: but what would that signify if flowers supplied none? Faculties thrown down upon animals at random, and without reference to the objects amidst which they are placed, would not produce to them the services and benefits which we see: and if there be that reference, then there is intention.

Lastly; the solution fails entirely when applied to plants. The parts of plants answer their uses without any concurrence from the will or choice of the plant.

VI. Others have chosen to refer everything to a *principle of order* in nature. A principle of order is the word: but what is meant by a principle of order, as different from an intelligent Creator, has not been explained either by definition or example; and, without such explanation, it should seem to be a mere substitution of words for reasons, names for causes. Order itself is only the adaptation of means to an end: a principle of order, therefore, can only signify the mind and intention which so adapts them. Or, were it capable of being *explained in any other* sense, is there any experience, any analogy, to sustain it? Was a watch ever produced by a principle of order? and why might not a watch be so produced as well as an eye?

Furthermore, a principle of order, acting blindly and without choice, is negatived by the observation that order is not universal; which it would be if it issued from a constant and necessary principle: nor indiscriminate, which it would be if it issued from an unintelligent principle. Where order is wanted, there we find it: where order is not wanted, *i. e.*, where, if it prevailed, it would be useless, there we do not find it. In the structure of the eye (for we adhere to our example), in the figure and position of its several parts, the most exact order is maintained. In the forms of rocks and mountains, in the lines which bound the coasts of continents and islands, in the shape of bays and promontories, no order whatever is perceived, because it would have been superfluous. No useful purpose would have arisen from moulding rocks and mountains into regular solids, bounding the channel of the ocean by geometrical curves; or from the map of the world resembling a table of diagrams in Euclid's Elements or Simson's Conic Sections.

VII. Lastly; the confidence which we place in our observations upon the works of nature, in the marks which we discover of contrivance, choice, and design, and in our reasoning upon the proofs afforded us, ought not to be shaken, as it is sometimes attempted to be done, by bringing forward to our view our own ignorance, or rather the general imperfection of our knowledge of nature. Nor, in many cases, ought this consideration to affect us, even when it respects some parts of the subject immediately under our notice. True fortitude of under-
ding consists in not suffering what we know to be
rbed by what we do not know. If we perceive a
l end, and means adapted to that end, we perceive
gh for our conclusion. If these things be clear, no
er what is obscure. The argument is finished. For
ance v of vision to the animal which
oye ation of the eye to this office,
de I can mention nothing which
or prejudice the inference which

draw from these premises, that we cannot explain the use of the spleen? Nay, more: if there be parts of the eye, viz., the cornea, the crystalline, the retina, in their substance, figure, and position, manifestly suited to the formation of an image by the refraction of rays of light, at least as manifestly as the glasses and tubes of a dioptric telescope are suited to that purpose, it concerns not the proof which these afford of design, and of a designer, that there may perhaps be other parts, certain muscles, for instance, or nerves in the same eye, of the agency or effect of which we can give no account, any more than we should be inclined to doubt, or ought to doubt, about the construction of a telescope, viz. for what purpose it was constructed, or whether it were constructed at all, because there belonged to it certain screws and pins, the use or action of which we did not comprehend. I take it to be a general way of infusing doubts and scruples into the mind, to recur to its own ignorance, its own imbecility: to tell us that upon these subjects we know little; that little imperfectly; or rather, that we know nothing properly about the matter. These suggestions so fall in with our consciousness as sometimes to produce a general distrust of our faculties and our conclusions. But this is an unfounded jealousy. The uncertainty of one thing does not necessarily affect the certainty of another thing. Our ignorance of many points need not suspend our assurance of a few. Before we yield, in any particular instance, to the scepticism which this sort of insinuation would induce, we ought accurately to ascertain whether our ignorance or doubt concern those precise points upon which our conclusion rests. Other points are nothing. Our ignorance of other points may be of no consequence to these, though they be points, in various respects, of great importance. A just reasoner removes from his consideration, not only what he knows, but what he does not know, touching matters not strictly connected with his argument, *i. e.*, not forming the very steps of his deduction: beyond these, his knowledge and his ignorance are alike relative.

CHAPTER VI.

THE ARGUMENT CUMULATIVE.

Were there no example in the world of except that of the *eye*, it would be alone s support the conclusion which we draw from necessity of an intelligent Creator. It coul got rid of; because it could not be accounted other supposition, which did not contradict a ciples we possess of knowledge; the principle to which things do, as often as they can be the test of experience, turn out to be true o coats and humours, constructed as the lenses of are constructed, for the refraction of rays of *point, which* forms the proper action of the



[The figure is introduced to remind the reader of the of the eye; a subject explained in the Appendix:—A, I and the lines represent the light reflected from it into th surface of the cornea, which is the transparent part of th are in a certain degree refracted. Passing through the coat they enter the aqueous humour. In their transmission t pass into the pupil. They enter the lens or crystalline h the greater power of refraction in this humour, the rays point and impinge on the bottom of the eye at A, B. It seen that the rays coming from B are refracted to *a*, tho and that the image is therefore represented inverted.]

provision in its muscular tendons for turning its pupil to the object, similar to that which is given to the telescope by screws, and upon which power of direction in the eye the exercise of its office as an optical instrument depends; the further provision for its defence, for its constant lubricity and moisture, which we see in its socket and its lids, in its glands for the secretion of the matter of tears, its outlet or communication with the nose for carrying off the liquid after the eye is washed with it; these provisions compose altogether an apparatus, a system of parts, a preparation of means, so manifest in their design, so exquisite in their contrivance, so successful in their issue, so precious and so infinitely beneficial in their use, as, in my opinion, to bear down all doubt that can be raised upon the subject.* And what I wish, under the title of the present chapter, to observe, is, that if other parts of nature were inaccessible to our inquiries, or even if other parts of nature presented nothing to our examination but disorder and confusion, the validity of this example would remain the same. If there were but one watch in the world, it would not be less certain that it had a maker. If we had never in our lives seen any but one single kind of hydraulic machine, yet, if of that one kind we understood the mechanism and use, we should be as perfectly assured that it proceeded from the hand and thought and skill of a workman, as if we visited a museum of the arts, and saw collected there twenty different kinds of machines for drawing water, or a thousand different kinds for other purposes. Of this point each machine is a proof independently of all the rest. So it is with the evidences of a Divine agency. The proof is not a conclusion which lies at the end of a chain of reasoning, of which chain each instance of contrivance is only a link, and of which, if one link fail, the whole falls; but it is an argument separately supplied by every separate example. An error in stating an example affects only that example. The argument is cumulative, in the fullest sense of that term. The eye proves it without the ear; the ear without the eye. The proof in each example is complete; for when the design of the part, and the conduciveness of its structure to that design is shown, the mind may set itself at rest; no future consideration can detract any thing from the force of the example.

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* Again we have reference to the structure of the eye, which shows the necessity of throwing our observations on this organ into the Appendix.

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE MECHANICAL AND IMMECHANICAL PARTS AND FUNCTIONS OF ANIMALS AND VEGETABLES.

It is not that *every* part of an animal or vegetable has not proceeded from a contriving mind; or that every part is not constructed with a view to its proper end and purpose, according to the laws belonging to and governing the substance or the action made use of in that part; or that each part is not so constructed as to effectuate its purpose whilst it operates according to these laws; but it is because these laws themselves are not in all cases equally understood—or, what amounts to nearly the same thing, are not equally exemplified in more simple processes, and more simple machines, that we lay down the distinction, here proposed, between the mechanical parts of animals and vegetables.[21]

[21] The observation here is most sensible. When we speak of an organ as peculiarly suited to exhibit design, we mean merely that we comprehend something of the object of the particular structure. But there is no part of an animal, if we fully comprehended what was necessary to the performance of its functions, that would not raise our admiration. Were we to take a portion of the skin, and contemplate its exquisite sensibility, so finely appropriated—could we penetrate, as it were, into the pores, and duly estimate the power which regulates the secretions and absorption—could we fully understand the relations of this organ, either with the economy of the body within, or the constitution of the atmosphere without—we should have no occasion to draw our argument, for the twentieth time, from the structure of the eye or the ear. Were we to take one cell of the millions of that substance which, intervening between the more solid textures of the frame, gives elasticity to the whole, and permits circulation and muscular action, and all the various movements of the body, we should have in that one cell as much reason for wonder at the perfection of the contrivance, as in any joint of the limb.

[The reader will not be easily convinced that the mass of f
which he is familiar, is easily and almost spontaneously divided
tinct muscles. This figure represents a muscle. C is the be
muscle; A and B the tendons: A being the tendinous *orig*
termed, attached to a fixed point of bone; B the tendinous
being attached to a part movable by the contraction of the mus
belly, C, consists of fibres, which are possessed of the powe
traction or irritability, and through the operation of which t
motions of the body are performed. We shall presently have
on the direction of these fibres.]

For instance: the principle of muscular motio
upon what cause the swelling of the belly of the
and consequent contraction of its tendons, eithe
act of the will, or by involuntary irritation, dep
wholly unknown to us. The substance employed,
it be fluid, gaseous, elastic, electrical, or none of
or nothing resembling these, is also unknown to
course, the laws belonging to that substance, and
regulate its action, are unknown to us. We see
similar to this contraction in any machine which
make, or any process which we can execute. Sc
is confessed) we are in ignorance, but no farther.
power and principle, from whatever cause it pr
being assumed, the collocation of the fibres to rece
principle, the disposition of the muscles for the
application of the power, is mechanical; and is a
ligible as the adjustment of the wires and strings b
a puppet is moved. We see, therefore, as far as
the subject before us, what is not mechanical in t
mal frame, and what is. The nervous influence
are often obliged to give names to things which w
little about)—I say the nervous influence, by wh
belly or middle of the muscle is swelled, is not
nical. The utility of the effect we perceive—the
or the preparation of means, by which it is produc
do not. But obscurity as to the origin of muscular
brings no doubtfulness into our observations, up
sequel of the process: which observations relate—

the constitution of the muscle, in consequence of which constitution, the swelling of the belly or middle part is necessarily and mechanically followed by a contraction of the tendons; 2ndly, to the number and variety of the muscles, and the corresponding number and variety of useful powers which they supply to the animal, which is astonishingly great; 3rdly, to the judicious (if we may be permitted to use that term in speaking of the Author, or of the works, of Nature), to the wise and well-contrived disposition of each muscle for its specific purpose; for moving the joint this way, and that way, and the other way; for pulling and drawing the part to which it is attached in a determinate and particular direction: which is a mechanical operation exemplified in a multitude of instances. To mention only one: The tendon of the trochlear muscle of the eye, to the end that it may draw in the line required, is passed through a cartilaginous ring, at which it is reverted, exactly in the same manner as a rope in a ship is carried over a block, or round a stay, in order to make it pull in the direction which is wanted. All this, as we have said, is mechanical, and is as accessible to inspection, as capable of being ascertained, as the mechanism of the automaton in the Strand. Supposing the automaton to be put in motion by a magnet (which is probable), it will supply us with a comparison very apt for our present purpose. Of the magnetic effluvium we know perhaps as little as we do of the nervous fluid. But, magnetic attraction being assumed (it signifies nothing from what cause it proceeds), we can trace, or there can be pointed out to us, with perfect clearness and certainty, the mechanism, viz., the steel bars, the wheels, the joints, the wires, by which the motion so much admired is communicated to the fingers of the image; and to make any obscurity, or difficulty, or controversy in the doctrine of magnetism, an objection to our knowledge or our certainty, concerning the contrivance, or the marks of contrivance, displayed in the automaton, would be exactly the same thing as it is to make our ignorance (which we acknowledge) of the cause of nervous agency, or even of the substance and structure of the nerves themselves, a ground of question or suspicion as to t reasoning which we institute concerning the mechani part of our frame. That an animal is a machine is a p position neither correctly true nor wholly false. T distinction which we have been discussing will serve show how far the comparison, which this expression i plies, holds; and wherein it fails. And whether t distinction be thought of importance or not, it is certai of importance to remember, that there is neither tr nor justice in endeavouring to bring a cloud over c understandings, or a distrust into our reasonings up this subject, by suggesting that we know nothing voluntary motion, of irritability, of the principle of li of sensation, of animal heat, upon all which the anim functions depend; for, our ignorance of these parts the animal frame concerns not at all our knowledge the mechanical parts of the same frame. I conten therefore, that there is mechanism in animals; that th mechanism is as properly such, as it is in machines ma by art; that this mechanism is intelligible and certai that it is not the less so, because it often begins or te minates with something which is not mechanical; th whenever it is intelligible and certain it demonstra intention and contrivance, as well in the works of natu as in those of art; and that it is the best demonstrati which either can afford.

But whilst I contend for these propositions, I do n exclude myself from asserting, that there may be, a that there are, other cases in which, although we can exhibit mechanism, or prove indeed that mechanism employed, we want not sufficient evidence to conduct to the same conclusion.

There is what may be called the *chemical* part of o frame; of which, by reason of the imperfection of o chemistry, we can attain to no distinct knowledge; mean, not to a knowledge, either in degree or kin similar to that which we possess of the mechanical p of our frame. It does not, therefore, afford the sa species of argument as that which mechanism affor *and yet it* may afford an argument in a high degree sat factory. The *gastric juice*, or the liquor which digests the food in the stomachs of animals, is of this class. Of all the menstrua it is the most active, the most universal. In the human stomach, for instance, consider what a variety of strange substances, and how widely different from one another, it in a few hours reduces to a uniform pulp, milk, or mucilage. It seizes upon everything; it dissolves the texture of almost everything that comes in its way. The flesh of perhaps all animals; the seeds and fruits of the greatest number of plants; the roots, and stalks, and leaves of many, hard and tough as they are, yield to its powerful pervasion. The change wrought by it is different from any chemical solution which we can produce, or with which we are acquainted, in this respect as well as many others, that, in our chemistry, particular menstrua act only upon particular substances. Consider, moreover, that this fluid, stronger in its operation than a caustic alkali or mineral acid, than red precipitate, or aqua-fortis itself, is nevertheless as mild, and bland, and inoffensive to the touch or taste as saliva or gum-water, which it much resembles. Consider, I say, these several properties of the digestive organ, and of the juice with which it is supplied, or rather with which it is made to supply itself, and you will confess it to be entitled to a name which it has sometimes received, that of "the chemical wonder of animal nature."

Still we are ignorant of the composition of this fluid, and of the mode of its action; by which is meant, that we are not capable, as we are in the mechanical part of our frame, of collating it with the operations of art. And this I call the imperfection of our chemistry; for, should the time ever arrive, which is not, perhaps, to be despaired of, when we can compound ingredients so as to form a solvent which will act in the manner in which the gastric juice acts, we may be able to ascertain the chemical principles upon which its efficacy depends, as well as from what part, and by what concoction, in the human body these principles are generated and derived.

In the mean time, ought that, which is in truth the defect of our *chemistry*, to hinder us from acquiescing in the inference which a production of nature, by its place, its properties, its action, its surprising efficacy, its invaluable use, authorises us to draw in respect of a creative design?[22]

Another most subtle and curious function of animal bodies is *secretion*. This function is semi-chemical and semi-mechanical; exceedingly important and diversified in its effects, but obscure in its process and in its apparatus. The importance of the secretory organs is but too well attested by the diseases which an excessive, a deficient, or a vitiated secretion is almost sure of producing. A single secretion being wrong is enough to make life miserable, or sometimes to destroy it. Nor is the variety less than the importance. From one and the same blood (I speak of the human body) about twenty different fluids are separated; in their sensible properties, in taste, smell, colour, and consistency, the most unlike one another that is possible; thick, thin, salt, bitter, sweet: and if from our own we pass to other species of animals, we find amongst their secretions not only the most various but the most opposite properties; the most nutritious aliment, the deadliest poison; the sweetest perfumes, the most fœtid odours. Of these the greater part, as the gastric juice, the saliva, the bile, the slipnucilage which lubricates the joints, the tears which n the eye, the wax which defends the ear, are, hey are secreted, made use of in the animal eco- are evidently subservient, and are actually contri- to the utilities of the animal itself. Other fluids to be separated only to be rejected. That this also essary (though why it was originally necessary we t tell) is shown by the consequence of the separa- eing long suspended, which consequence is disease eath. Akin to secretion, if not the same thing, is lation, by which one and the same blood is con- into bone, muscular flesh, nerves, membranes, is; things as different as the wood and iron, can- nd cordage, of which a ship with its furniture is sed. We have no operation of art wherewith ex- o compare all this, for no other reason, perhaps, hat all operations of art are exceeded by it. No cal election, no chemical analysis or resolution of a nce into its constituent parts, no mechanical sifting ision that we are acquainted with, in perfection or y come up to animal secretion. Nevertheless, the tus and process are obscure, not to say absolutely aled from our inquiries. In a few, and only a stances, we can discern a little of the constitution gland. In the kidneys of large animals, we can the emulgent artery dividing itself into an infinite er of branches; their extremities every where com- ating with little round bodies, in the substance of bodies the secret of the machinery seems to reside, ere the change is made. We can discern pipes om these round bodies towards the pelvis, which is n within the solid of the kidney. We can discern pipes joining and collecting together into larger ; and, when so collected, ending in innumerable e, through which the secreted fluid is continually into its receptacle. This is all we know of the nism of a gland, even in the case in which it seems capable of being investigated. Yet to pronounce ve know nothing of animal secretion, or nothing ctorily, *and with that* concise remark to dismiss the article from our argument, would be to dispose of the subject very hastily and very irrationally. For the purpose which we want, that of evincing intention, we know a great deal. And what we know is this: We see the blood carried by a pipe, conduit, or duct, *to* the gland. We see an organised apparatus, be its construction or action what it will, which we call that gland. We see the blood, or part of the blood, after it has passed through and undergone the action of the gland, coming *from* it by an emulgent vein or artery, *i. e.*, by another pipe or conduit. And we see also at the same time a new and specific fluid issuing from the same gland by its excretory duct, *i. e.*, by a third pipe or conduit; which new fluid is in some cases discharged out of the body, in more cases retained within it, and there executing some important and intelligent office. Now supposing, or admitting, that we know nothing of the proper internal constitution of a gland, or of the mode of its acting upon the blood, then our situation is precisely like that of an unmechanical looker-on, who stands by a stocking-loom, a corn-mill, a carding-machine, or a thrashing-machine, at work, the fabric and mechanism of which, as well as all that passes within, is hidden from his sight by the outside case; or, if seen, would be too complicated for his uninformed, uninstructed understanding to comprehend. And what is that situation? This spectator, ignorant as he is, sees at one end a material enter the machine, as unground grain the mill, raw cotton the carding-machine, sheaves of unthrashed corn the thrashing-machine; and, when he casts his eye to the other end of the apparatus, he sees the material issuing from it in a new state; and, what is more, in a state manifestly adapted to future uses; the grain in meal fit for the making of bread, the wool in rovings ready for spinning into threads, the sheaf in corn dressed for the mill. Is it necessary that this man, in order to be convinced that design, that intention, that contrivance has been employed about the machine, should be allowed to pull it to pieces; should be enabled to examine the parts separately; explore their action upon one another, or their operation, whether simultaneous or successive, upon the material which is presented to them? He may long to do this to gratify his curiosity; he may desire to do it to improve his theoretic knowledge; or he may have a more substantial reason for requesting it, if he happen, instead of a common visitor, to be a millwright by profession, or a person sometimes called in to repair such-like machines when out of order; but for the purpose of ascertaining the existence of counsel and design in the formation of the machine, he wants no such intromission or privity. What he sees is sufficient. The effect upon the material, the change produced in it, the utility of that change for future applications, abundantly testify, be the concealed part of the machine or of its construction what it will, the hand and agency of a contriver.

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[22] After this enumeration of the things dissolved by the gastric juice, the most extraordinary fact remains to be stated, that the delicate surface of the stomach itself, softer and finer than the surface of the eye, remains untouched by this humour, which our author, somewhat quaintly, describes as more powerful to dissolve than aqua-fortis. John Hunter showed us that it was the property of life that protected the coats of the stomach. This fact is a most singular proof of the power bestowed through life on the membranes and vessels; and it is as important as it is curious: for as the stomach in the dead body no longer resists this menstruum, it may become dissolved, if the person has died with the fluid already secreted into the stomach. And so it has happened that persons have been supposed to be poisoned, and relations have been falsely accused, from the stomach *being found* eroded as if some acrid poison had been taken *before* death.

If any confirmation were wanting to the evidence which the animal secretions afford of design, it may be derived, as has been already hinted, from their variety, and from their appropriation to their place and use. They all come from the same blood; they are all drawn off by glands; yet the produce is very different, and the difference exactly adapted to the work which is to be done, or the end to be answered. No account can be given of this, without resorting to appointment. Why, for instance, is the saliva, which is diffused over the seat of taste, insipid, whilst so many others of the secretions, the urine, the tears, and the sweat, are salt? Why does the gland within the ear separate a viscid substance, which defends that passage; the gland in the upper angle of the eye a thin brine, which washes the ball? Why is the synovia of the joints mucilaginous; the bile bitter, stimulating, and soapy? Why does the juice which flows into the stomach contain powers which make that bowel the great laboratory, as it is by its situation the recipient, of the materials of future nutrition? These are all fair questions; and no answer can be given to them but what calls in intelligence and intention.

My object in the present chapter has been to teach three things: first, that it is a mistake to suppose that, in reasoning from the appearances of nature, the imperfection of our knowledge proportionably affects the certainty of our conclusion; for in many cases it does not affect it at all: secondly, that the different parts of the animal frame may be classed and distributed according to the degree of exactness with which we compare them with works of art: thirdly, that the *mechanical* parts of our frame, or those in which this comparison is most complete, although constituting, probably, the coarsest portions of nature's workmanship, are the most proper to be alleged as proofs and specimens of design.

CHAPTER VIII.

MECHANICAL ARRANGEMENT IN THE HUMAN FRAME.



This figure represents the lower surface or base of the skull. The hole
he *foramen magnum*, through which the spinal marrow descends into
spine; and on each side of the hole are the articulating processes,
led the *condyles*.]

E proceed, therefore, to propose certain examp
ken out of this class; making choice of such
ongst those which have come to our knowledge
ur to be the most striking and the best under
obliged, perhaps, to postpone both these

mendations to a third: that of the example being capable of explanation without plates, or figures, or technical language.

OF THE BONES.

I.—I challenge any man to produce in the joints and pivots of the most complicated or the most flexible machine that was ever contrived, a construction more artificial, or more evidently artificial, than that which is seen in the vertebræ of the *human neck*. Two things were to be done: the head was to have the power of bending forward and backward, as in the act of nodding, stooping, looking upward or downward; and, at the same time, of turning itself round upon the body to a certain extent—the quadrant, we will say, or rather, perhaps a hundred and twenty degrees of a circle. For these two purposes, two distinct contrivances are employed: first, the head rests immediately upon the uppermost part of the vertebræ, and is united to it by a *hinge*-joint; upon which joint the head plays freely forward and backward, as far either way as is necessary, or as the ligaments allow; which was the first thing required. But then the rotatory motion is unprovided for: therefore, secondly, to make the head capable of this, a further mechanism is introduced: not between the head and the uppermost bone of the neck, where the hinge is, but between that bone and the bone next underneath it. It



figure represents the uppermost vertebra, or atlas; and the
mentioned in the former figure, sink into the articulating
[illegible] odding motions. a and b are the
hich receives the tooth of the
the spinal marrow passes.]

is a mechanism resembling a *tenon and mortise*. The second, or uppermost bone but one, has what anatomists call a process, viz., a projection, somewhat similar, in size and shape, to a tooth; which tooth, entering a corresponding hole or socket in the bone above it, forms a pivot or axle, upon which that upper bone, together with the head which it supports, turns freely in a circle; and as far in the circle as the attached muscles permit the head to turn. Thus are both motions perfect without interfering with each other. When we nod the head, we use the hinge-joint, which lies between the head and the first bone of the neck. When we turn the head round, we use the tenon and mortise, which runs between the first bone of the neck and the second.[23]



[Here the tooth-like process of the second vertebra, which is called *dentata*, is passed through the ring of the first, and is held there by a transverse ligament, like a spindle in the bush. No doubt the object of this complexity is to permit the free motion of the head, without too great a laxity at any one joining, and thereby to protect the most vital organ of the body, the *medulla oblongata*, or spinal marrow, which passes from the head into the tube of the spine.]

We see the same contrivance and the same principle employed in the frame or mounting of a telescope. It is occasionally requisite that the object-end of the instrument be moved up and down, as well as horizontally, or equatorially. For the vertical motion, there is a hinge, upon which the telescope plays; for the horizontal or equatorial motion, an axis upon which the telescope and the hinge turn round together. And this is exactly the mechanism which is applied to the motion of the head; nor will any one here doubt of the existence of counsel and design, except it be by that debility of mind which can trust to its own reasonings in nothing.

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[23] The meaning of our author is obvious here; but the tenon and mortise are terms used for the firm joining of beams, as in the carpentry of a roof; not for rotatory motion.

We may add, that it was, on another account, also expedient that the motion of the head backward and forward should be performed upon the upper surface of the first vertebra; for, if the first vertebra itself had bent forward, it would have brought the spinal marrow, at the very beginning of its course, upon the point of the tooth.

II. Another mechanical contrivance, not unlike the last in its object, but different and original in its means, is seen in what anatomists call the *fore-arm*—that is, in the arm between the elbow and the wrist. Here, for the perfect use of the limb, two motions are wanted: a motion at the elbow, backward and forward, which is called a reciprocal motion; and a rotatory motion, by which the palm of the hand, as occasion requires, may be turned upward. How is this managed? The fore-arm, it is well known, consists of two bones, lying alongside each other, by touching only towards the ends. One, and only one, of these bones is joined to the cubit, or upper part of the arm, at the elbow; the other alone to the hand at the wrist. The first, by means, at the elbow, of a hinge-joint (which allows only of motion in the same plane), swings backward and forward, carrying along with it the other bone, and the whole fore-arm. In the mean time, as often as there is occasion to turn the palm upward, that other bone to which the hand is attached rolls upon the first, by the help of a groove or hollow near each end of one bone, to which is fitted a corresponding prominence in the other. If both bones had been joined to the cubit, or upper arm, at the elbow, *or both to the* hand at the wrist, the thing could not have



[Since it has been our author's pleasure to take this instance, the figure will illustrate his description. A is the lower part of the arm-bone, or *humerus*; B is the *ulna* and C the *radius*, the two bones of the fore-arm. It will be understood how these bones, being tied together by ligaments, hinge and move upon the humerus A; *c* being the process of the ulna, on which we rest when leaning on the elbow. By applying our hand to the arm, we at once feel the freedom with which the bone moves in bending and extending the arm.—When we turn the key in a lock, or make the guards in fencing by the motion of the wrist, the ulna B is stationary, and the radius C turns round upon the head of the bone at *d* and *e*, carrying the hand with it. The rest is abundantly well explained in the text.]

been done. The first was to be at liberty at one en and the second at the other; by which means the t actions may be performed together. The great bo which carries the fore-arm may be swinging upon hinge at the elbow, at the very time that the lesser bon which carries the hand, may be turning round it in t grooves. The management, also, of these grooves, rather of the tubercles and grooves, is very observabl The two bones are called the *radius* and the *uln* Above, *i. e.*, towards the elbow, a tubercle of the radi plays into a socket of the ulna; whilst below, *i. e.*, t wards the wrist, the radius finds the socket, and the ul the tubercle. A single bone in the fore-arm, with ball-and-socket joint at the elbow, which admits of m tion in all directions, might, in some degree, have a swered the purpose of both moving the arm and turni the hand. But how much better it is accomplished the present mechanism any person may convince hims who puts the ease and quickness with which he c shake his hand at the wrist circularly (moving likewi if he pleases, his arm at the elbow at the same time) competition with the comparatively slow and labori motion with which his arm can be made to turn ro at the shoulder by the aid of a ball-and-socket joint.

III. The *spine*, or back-bone, is a chain of join very wonderful construction. Various, difficult, almost inconsistent offices were to be executed b same instrument. It was to be firm, yet flexible (I know no chain made by art which is both these by firmness I mean, not only strength but stabi *firm*, to support the erect position of the body; *f* to allow of the bending of the trunk in all deg curvature. It was further also (which is anoth quite a distinct purpose from the rest) to becom or conduit for the safe conveyance from the brai most important fluid of the animal frame, that, upon which all voluntary motion depends, th marrow; a substance not only of the first nec *action*, if not to life, but of a nature so del *tender*, so susceptible and so impatient of injur



his represents a section of three of the lower vertebræ. The subject ; by no means exhausted in the text, the reader will find it taken up e Appendix.]

unusual pressure upon it, or any considerable ob- ction of its course, is followed by paralysis or death. v the spine was not only to furnish the main trunk the passage of the medullary substance from the brain, to give out, in the course of its progress, small pipes efrom, which, being afterwards indefinitely subdi- d, might, under the name of nerves, distribute this uisite supply to every part of the body. The same e was also to serve another use not less wanted than preceding, viz., to afford a fulcrum, stay, or basis (or, e properly speaking, a series of these) for the inser- of the muscles which are spread over the trunk of body; in which trunk there are not, as in the limbs, ndrical bones to which they can be fastened: and wise, which is a similar use, to furnish a support for ends of the ribs to rest upon.

espeak of a workman a piece of mechanism which l comprise all these purposes, and let him set about to contrive it; let him try his skill upon it; let him feel the difficulty of accomplishing the task, before he be told how the same thing is effected in the animal frame. Nothing will enable him to judge so well of the wisdom which has been employed; nothing will dispose him to think of it so truly. First, for the firmness, yet flexibility, of the spine; it is composed of a great number of bones (in the human subject, of twenty-four) joined to one another, and compacted by broad bases. The breadth of the bases upon which the parts severally rest, and the closeness of the junction, give to the chain its firmness and stability; the number of parts, and consequent frequency of joints, its flexibility. Which flexibility, we may also observe, varies in different parts of the chain; is least in the back, where strength more than flexure is wanted; greater in the loins, which it was necessary should be more supple than the back; and greatest of all in the neck, for the free motion of the head. Then, secondly, in order to afford a passage for the descent of the medullary substance, each of these bones is bored through in the middle, in such a manner as that, when put together, the hole in one bone falls into a line and corresponds with the holes in the two bones contiguous to it. By which means the perforated pieces, when joined, form an entire, close, uninterrupted channel, at least while the spine is upright and at rest. But as a settled posture is inconsistent with its use, a great difficulty still remained, which was to prevent the vertebræ shifting upon one another, so as to break the line of the canal as often as the body moves or twists, or the joints gaping externally whenever the body is bent forward and the spine thereupon made to take the form of a bow. These dangers, which are mechanical, are mechanically provided against. The vertebræ, by means of their processes and projections, and of the articulations which some of these form with one another at their extremities, are so locked in and confined as to maintain, in what are called the bodies or broad surfaces of the bones, the relative position nearly unaltered, and to throw the *change* and the pressure produced by flexion almost entirely upon the intervening cartilages, the springiness and yielding nature of whose substance admits of all the motion which is necessary to be performed upon them, without any chasm being produced by a separation of the parts. I say, of all the motion which is necessary; for, although we bend our backs to every degree almost of inclination, the motion of each vertebra is very small; such is the advantage we receive from the chain being composed of so many links, the spine of so many bones. Had it consisted of three or four bones only, in bending the body the spinal marrow must have been bruised at every angle. The reader need not be told that these intervening cartilages are gristles, and he may see them in perfection in a loin of veal. Their form also favours the same intention. They are thicker before than behind; so that, when we stoop forward, the compressible substance of the cartilage, yielding in its thicker and anterior part to the force which squeezes it, brings the surface of the adjoining vertebræ nearer to the being parallel with one another than they were before, instead of increasing the inclination of their planes, which must have occasioned a fissure or opening between them. Thirdly, for the medullary canal giving out in its course, and in a convenient order, a supply of nerves to different parts of the body, notches are made in the upper and lower edge of every vertebra, two on each edge, equidistant on each side from the middle line of the back. When the vertebræ are put together, these notches, exactly fitting, form small holes, through which the nerves at each articulation issue out in pairs, in order to send their branches to every part of the body, and with an equal bounty to both sides of the body. The fourth purpose assigned to the same instrument is the insertion of the bases of the muscles, and the support of the ends of the ribs; and for this fourth purpose, especially the former part of it, a figure, specifically suited to the design, and unnecessary for the other purposes, is given to the constituent bones. Whilst they are plain, and round, and smooth towards the front, where any roughness or projection might have wounded the adjacent viscera, they run out, behind, and on each side, into long processes, to which processes the muscles necessary to the motions of the trunk are fixed, and fixed with such art, that, whilst the vertebræ supply a basis for the muscles, the muscles help to keep these bones in their position, or by their tendons to tie them together.

That most important, however, and general property, viz., the strength of the compages, and the security against luxation, was to be still more specially consulted; for, where so many joints were concerned, and where, in every one, derangement would have been fatal, it became a subject of studious precaution. For this purpose the vertebræ are articulated, that is, the moveable joints between them are formed by means of those projections of their substance which we have mentioned under the name of processes, and these so lock in with and overwrap one another as to secure the body of the vertebra not only from accidentally slipping, but even from being pushed out of its place by any violence short of that which would break the bone. I have often remarked and admired this structure in the chine of a hare. In this, as in many instances, a plain observer of the animal economy may spare himself the disgust of being present at human dissections, and yet learn enough for his information and satisfaction, by even examining the bones of the animals which come upon his table. Let him take, for example, into his hands a piece of the clean-picked bone of a hare's back, consisting, we will suppose, of three vertebræ. He will find the middle bone of the three so implicated, by means of its projections or processes, with the bone on each side of it, that no pressure which he can use will force it out of its place between them. It will give way neither forward nor backward, nor on either side. In whichever direction he pushes, he perceives, in the form, or junction, or overlapping of the bones, an impediment opposed to his attempt, a check and guard against dislocation. In one part of the spine he will find a still further fortifying expedient, in the mode according to which the vertebræ are annexed *to the spine*. Each rib rests upon two vertebræ. That is the thing to be remarked, and any one may remark it in carving a neck of mutton. The manner of it is this: the end of the rib is divided by a middle ridge into two surfaces, which surfaces are joined to the bodies of two contiguous vertebræ, the ridge applying itself to the intervening cartilage. Now this is the very contrivance which is employed in the famous iron bridge at my door at Bishop-Wearmouth, and for the same purpose of stability, viz., the cheeks of the bars which pass between the arches ride across the joints by which the pieces composing each arch are united. Each cross-bar rests upon two of these pieces at their place of junction, and by that position resists, at least in one direction, any tendency in either piece to slip out of its place. Thus perfectly, by one means or the other, is the danger of slipping laterally, or of being drawn aside out of the *line* of the back, provided against; and, to withstand the bones being pulled asunder longitudinally, or in the direction of that line, a strong membrane runs from one end of the chain to the other, sufficient to resist any force which is ever likely to act in the direction of the back or parallel to it, and consequently to secure the whole combination in their places. The general result is, that not only the motions of the human body necessary for the ordinary offices of life are performed with safety, but that it is an accident hardly ever heard of that even the gesticulations of a harlequin distort his spine.

Upon the whole, and as a guide to those who may be inclined to carry the consideration of this subject farther, there are three views under which the spine ought to be regarded, and in all which it cannot fail to excite our admiration. These views relate to its articulations, its ligaments, and its perforation; and to the corresponding advantages which the body derives from it, for action, for strength, and for that which is essential to every part, a secure communication with the brain.

The *structure of* the spine is not in general different *in different animals.*[24] In the serpent tribe, however, it is considerably varied; but with a strict reference to the conveniency of the animal. For, whereas in quadrupeds the number of vertebræ is from thirty to forty, in the serpent it is nearly one hundred and fifty: whereas in men and quadrupeds the surfaces of the bones are flat, and these flat surfaces laid one against the other, and bound tight by sinews; in the serpent, the bones play one within another, like a ball and socket,* so that they

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[24] *There is a* notion entertained by the ingenio *mewhat fanciful* physiologists of France, that the

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mities of the body, the parts farthest removed from the centre, are most subject to change in their conformation, whilst the central parts of the system are the most unvarying. Entertaining such a view, we lose much of the interest that is attached to the subject; and the inference which it is important to draw is forgotten, the accommodation not of parts only, but of the whole framework of the animal body, to the peculiar condition or necessities of the creature. The teeth vary because the food is different; the feet vary because the mode of progression is different; the claws vary in connexion with the teeth, and the mode of procuring food, by digging, or scraping, or by holding and tearing. So does the eye, and so does the ear. But with these adaptations of parts, we must not lose sight of the fact which is the most important to our conclusions—that the whole is accommodated, as well as the individual organs.

The spine in all vertebrated animals holds its office in perpetuity; it contains and protects the spinal marrow; and so far as its office is permanent, there will be an uniformity in its appearance in all creatures. But even in man it varies in its structure, in the different portions or divisions of it, as these portions are required to admit of more or less freedom of motion. In the hare, as mentioned in the text, the spine is beautifully accommodated to the motion in running. In the cat-kind, as the leopard or tiger, it has a lateral mobility, quite different from its structure in the horse or the stag. In the boar, the vertebræ are unusually firm, and the processes enormously extended, to give strength to the union with the head, and to direct the action of the muscles upon the head, so that he may tear up strong roots and possess his defence in his powerful tusks. In short, as far as the spine is required to accommodate itself to the motions of the trunk, it is varied with as fine an adjustment as the farthest bone of the toe or finger.

* *Der. Phys. Theol.* p. 396.

have a free motion upon one another in every direction: that is to say, in men and quadrupeds, firmness is more consulted; in serpents, pliancy. Yet even pliancy is not obtained at the expense of safety. The back-bone of a serpent, for coherence and flexibility, is one of the most curious pieces of animal mechanism with which we are acquainted. The chain of a watch (I mean the chain which passes between the spring-barrel and the fusee), which aims at the same properties, is but a bungling piece of workmanship in comparison with that of which we speak.

IV. The reciprocal enlargement and contraction of the *chest*, to allow for the play of the lungs, depends upon a simple yet beautiful mechanical contrivance, referable to the structure of the bones which enclose it. The ribs are articulated to the back-bone, or rather to its side projections, *obliquely:* that is, in their natural position they bend or slope from the place of articulation downwards. But the basis upon which they rest at this end being fixed, the consequence of the obliquity, or the inclination downwards, is, that when they come to move, whatever pulls the ribs upwards, necessarily, at the same time, draws them out; and that, whilst the ribs are brought to a right angle with the spine behind, the sternum, or part of the chest to which they are attached in front, is thrust forward. The simple action, therefore, of the elevating muscles does the business; whereas, if the ribs had been articulated with the bodies of the vertebræ at right angles, the cavity of the thorax could never have been further enlarged by a change of their position. If each rib had been a rigid bone, articulated at both ends to fixed bases, the whole chest had been immoveable. Keill has observed that the breast-bone, in an easy inspiration, is thrust out one-tenth of an inch; and he calculates that this, added to what is gained to the space within the chest by the flattening or descent of the diaphragm, leaves room for forty-two cubic inches of air to enter at every drawing-in of the breath. When there is a necessity for a deeper and more laborious inspiration, the enlargement of the *capacity* of the chest may be so increased by effort, as that the lungs may be distended with seventy or a hundred such cubic inches.* The thorax, says Schelhammer, forms a kind of bellows, such as never have been, nor probably will be, made by any artificer.*

V. The *patella*, or knee-pan, is a curious little bone: in its form and office unlike any other bone in the body. It is circular; the size of a crown-piece; pretty thick; a little convex on both sides, and covered with a smooth cartilage. It lies upon the front of the knee: and the powerful tendons, by which the leg is brought forward, pass through it (or rather it makes a part of their continuation), from their origin in the thigh to their insertion in the tibia. It protects both the tendon and the joint from any injury which either might suffer, by the rubbing of one against the other, or by the pressure of unequal surfaces. It also gives to the tendons a very consider-



[Three views of the knee-joints.]

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* Anat. p. 229.

'5 In the dissertation in the Appendix on the Thorax,
be observed that we have additional proofs of the
modation of the bones of the trunk, as well as of
s of the extremities, to the varying habits and condi
e animal

ble mechanical advantage, by altering the line of their direction, and by advancing it farther out from the centre f motion ; and this upon the principles of the resolution f force, upon which principles all machinery is founded. These are its uses. But what is most observable in it is, hat it appears to be supplemental, as it were, to the frame : added, as it should almost seem, afterward ; not quite necessary, but very convenient. It is separate from he other bones ; that is, it is not connected with any other bones by the common mode of union. It is soft, r hardly formed, in infancy ; and produced by an ossification, of the inception or progress of which no account an be given from the structure or exercise of the part.

VI. The *shoulder-blade* is, in some material respects, a very singular bone : appearing to be made so expressly for its own purpose, and so independently of every other reason. In such quadrupeds as have no collar-bones, which are by far the greater number, the shoulder-blade has no bony communication with the trunk, either by a joint, or process, or in any other way. It does not grow to, or out of, any other bone of the trunk. It does not apply to any other bone of the trunk—(I know not whether this be true of any second bone in the body, except perhaps the os hyoïdes) ; in strictness, it forms no part f the skeleton. It is bedded in the flesh, attached only o the muscles. It is no other than a foundation-bone for he arm, laid in, separate as it were, and distinct, from he general ossification. The lower limbs connect themelves at the hip with bones which form part of the skeleton ; but this connexion, in the upper limbs, being anting, a basis, whereupon the arm might be articulated, as to be supplied by a detached ossification for the urpose.[26]

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[26] The shoulder-blade undergoes many changes, as we iew it in comparative anatomy. That bone which we feel unning across the upper part of the chest and lower part of he neck, the collar-bone, is properly a process of the shouler-blade. (See the figure in the Appendix, No. 7, c, c.) ts purpose is to hold the shoulders apart, and to give trength to the arms, by throwing upon the arm the action

OF THE JOINTS.

I. The above are a few examples of bones made remarkable by their configuration; but to almost all the bones belong *joints;* and in these, still more clearly than in the form or shape of the bones themselves, are seen both contrivance and contriving wisdom. Every joint is a curiosity, and is also strictly mechanical. There is the hinge-joint and the mortise-and-tenon joint; each as manifestly such, and as accurately defined, as any which can be produced out of a cabinet-maker's shop; and one or the other prevails, as either is adapted to the motion which is wanted—*e. g.*, a mortise and tenon, or ball and socket joint, is not required at the knee, the leg standing in need only of a motion backward and forward in the same plane, for which a hinge-joint is sufficient; a mortise and tenon, or ball and socket joint, is wanted at the hip, that not only the progressive step may be provided for, but the interval between the limbs may be enlarged or contracted at pleasure. Now observe what would

of the muscles of the chest. Accordingly, we find it in climbing animals, in those which require to swing themselves by the upper extremities, as the monkeys; but in animals that have a solid hoof, which implies that the anterior extremity is for the particular purpose of running or bounding upon the ground, not only is there no occasion for that variety in the motions of the extremity, which is produced by the introduction of this bone into the skeleton of the arm, but it would be injurious—it would deprive the animal of that elasticity with which it alights upon the ground. Where there is no clavicle—in the horse and deer, for example—the shoulder-blade, or scapula, is attached to the trunk by muscles alone. Hence when the animal makes a leap, it comes down upon the fore-legs with an elastic rebound, the trunk hanging upon the muscles, the muscles supported by the scapula, and the scapula sustained upon the bones of the extremity. There is no solid substance to receive the shock. Were the collar-bone introduced here, it *would* be snapped across by the percussion, as happens to a man when he is thrown upon his shoulder.

have been the inconveniency—*i. e.*, both the superfluity and the defect of articulation, if the case had been inverted: if the ball and socket joint had been at the knee, and the hinge-joint at the hip. The thighs must have been kept constantly together, and the legs had been loose and straddling. There would have been no use, that we know of, in being able to turn the calves of the legs before; and there would have been great confinement by restraining the motion of the thighs to one plane. The disadvantage would not have been less, if the joints at the hip and the knee had been both of the same sort; both balls and sockets, or both hinges: yet why, independently of utility, and of a Creator who consulted that utility, should the same bone (the thigh-bone) be rounded at one end, and channelled at the other?

The *hinge-joint* is not formed by a bolt passing through the two parts of the hinge, and thus keeping them in their places, but by a different expedient. A strong, tough, parchment-like membrane, rising from the receiving bones, and inserted all round the received bones a little below their heads, encloses the joint on every side. This membrane ties, confines, and holds the ends of the bones together, keeping the corresponding parts of the joints—*i. e.*, the relative convexities and concavities—in close application to each other.

For the *ball and socket joint*, beside the membrane already described, there is in some important joints, as an additional security, a short, strong, yet flexible ligament, inserted by one end into the head of the ball, by the other into the bottom of the cup, which ligament keeps the two parts of the joint so firmly in their place, that none of the motions which the limb naturally performs, none of the jerks and twists to which it is ordinarily liable, nothing less indeed than the utmost and the most unnatural violence, can pull them asunder. It is hardly imaginable, how great a force is necessary, even to stretch, still more to break, this ligament: yet so flexible is it as to oppose no impediment to the suppleness of the joint. By *its situation* also it is inaccessible to injury from sharp edges. As it cannot be ruptured (such is its strength), so it cannot be cut, except by an accident which would sever the limb. If I had been permitted to frame a proof of contrivance, such as might, satisfy the most distrustful inquirer, I know not whether I could have chosen an example of mechanism more unequivocal, or more free from objection, than this ligament. Nothing can be more mechanical; nothing, however subservient to the safety, less capable of being generated by the action of the joint. I would particularly solicit the reader's attention to this provision, as it is found in the head of the *thigh-bone:* to its strength, its structure, and its use. It is an instance upon which I lay my hand. One single fact, weighed by a mind in earnest, leaves oftentimes the deepest impression. For the purpose of addressing different understandings and different apprehensions—for the purpose of sentiment—for the purpose of exciting admiration of the Creator's works, we diversify our views, we multiply our examples: but for the purpose of strict argument, one clear instance is sufficient; and not only sufficient, but capable perhaps of generating a firmer assurance than what can arise from a divided attention.[27]

The *ginglymus*, or hinge-joint, does not, it is manifest, admit of a ligament of the same kind with that of the ball and socket joint; but it is always fortified by the species of ligament of which it does admit. The strong, firm, investing membrane, above described, accompanies it in every part; and in particular joints, this membrane, which is properly a ligament, is considerably stronger on the sides than either before or behind, in order that the convexities may play true in their concavities, and not be subject to slip sideways, which is the chief danger; for the muscular tendons generally restrain the parts from going farther than they ought to go in the plane of their motion. In the *knee*, which is a joint of this form, and of great importance, there are superadded to the common provisions for the stability of the joint, two strong ligaments, which cross each other—and cross each other in such a manner as to secure the joint from being displaced in any assignable direction. "I think," says Cheselden, "that the knee cannot be completely dislocated without breaking the *cross* ligaments."* We can hardly help comparing this with the binding up of a fracture, where the fillet is almost wholly strapped across, for the sake of giving firmness and strength to the bandage.

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[27] This ligament is absent in the orang-outang; and in the lower extremity of this animal there are other points of resemblance to the structure of the arm; and certainly the use of the hinder extremity corresponds with this structure, *since he* grasps and swings equally well with either extremity.

Another no less important joint, and that also of the ginglymus sort, is the *ankle;* yet though important (in order, perhaps, to preserve the symmetry and lightness of the limb), *small*, and, on that account, more liable to injury. Now this joint is strengthened, *i. e.*, is defended from dislocation, by two remarkable processes or prolongations of the bones of the leg, which processes form the protuberances that we call the inner and outer ankle. It is part of each bone going down lower than the other part, and thereby overlapping the joint: so that if the joint be in danger of slipping outward, it is curbed by the inner projection, *i. e.*, that of the tibia; if inward, by the outer projection, *i. e.*, that of the fibula. Between both, it is locked in its position. I know no account that can be given of this structure, except its utility.[28] Why should the tibia terminate, at its lower extremity, with a double end, and the fibula the same—but to barricade the joint on both sides by a continuation of part of the thickest of the bone over it? The joint at the *shoulder*, compared with the joint at the *hip*, though both ball and socket joints, discovers a difference in their form and proportions, well suited to the different offices which the limbs have to execute. The cup or socket at the shoulder is much shallower and flatter than it is at the hip, and is also in part formed of cartilage set round the rim of the cup. The socket, into which the head of the thigh-bone is inserted, is deeper, and made of more solid materials. This agrees with the duties assigned to each part. The arm is an instrument of motion, principally, if not solely. Accordingly, the shallowness of the socket at the shoulder, and the yieldingness of the cartilaginous substance with which its edge is set round, and which in fact composes a considerable part of its concavity, are excellently adapted for the allowance of a free motion and a wide range, both which the arm wants. Whereas, the lower limb, forming a part of the column of the body—having to support the body, as well as to be the means of its locomotion—firmness was to be consulted as well as action. With a capacity for motion, in all directions indeed, as at the shoulder, but not in any direction to the same extent as in the arm, was to be united stability, or resistance to dislocation. Hence the deeper excavation of the socket, and the presence of a less proportion of cartilage upon the edge.

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* Ches. Anat. ed. 7th, p. 45.

[28] It is surprising, that among so many instances our author should omit to notice the perfection in the ankle-joint. When we stand resting upon the foot, the joint is firm, and yields neither to the inside nor the outside; but when we move the foot forward and point the toe in making the step, such is the happy form of the bones that the foot is in this position thrown quite loose. The object here certainly is, that in walking on the irregular ground, we may have a freedom in directing the foot so as to plant it securely. But before the weight of the body is brought perpendicularly over the *foot, there is* no danger to the joint, because there

The suppleness and pliability of the joints we every moment experience; and the *firmness* of animal articulation, the property we have hitherto been considering, may be judged of from this single observation, that, at any given moment of time, there are millions of animal joints in complete repair and use, for one that is dislo-

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is no strain upon it. Just in proportion as the advancing body begins to bear upon it do the bones take that position, *in which* they are as firm as in the knee-joint itself, *admitting* only the motion of a hinge.

and this, notwithstanding the contortions and nes to which the limbs of animals are continually .

The *joints*, or rather the ends of the bones which hem, display also, in their configuration, another The nerves, blood-vessels, and tendons, which are ary to the life, or for the motion, of the limbs, it is evident, in their way from the trunk of the o the place of their destination, travel over the ble joints; and it is no less evident that, in this f their course, they will have, from sudden motions, om abrupt changes of curvature, to encounter the of compression, attrition, or laceration. To fibres so tender against consequences so injurious, ath is in those parts protected with peculiar care; at by a provision in the figure of the bones them-

The nerves which supply the *fore-arm*, especi- e inferior cubital nerves, are at the elbow con- , by a kind of covered way, between the condyles, er under the inner extuberances of the bone which ses the upper part of the arm.* At the *knee*, the ity of the thigh-bone is divided by a sinus, or cliff, ro heads or protuberances; and these heads on the art stand out beyond the cylinder of the bone. gh the hollow which lies between the hind-parts e two heads—that is to say, under the ham, between m-strings, and within the concave recess of the ormed by the extuberances on each side—in a along a defile, between rocks, pass the great vessels rves which go to the leg.† Who led these vessels ad so defended and secured? In the joint at the er, in the edge of the cup which receives the head bone, is a *notch*, which is joined or covered at the th a ligament. Through this hole, thus guarded, od-vessels steal to their destination in the arm, l of mounting over the edge of the concavity.‡

In all joints, the ends of the bones, which work t each other, are tipped with *gristle*. In the ball and socket joint, the cup is lined and the ball capped with it. The smooth surface, the elastic and unfriable nature of cartilage, render it of all substances the most proper for the place and purpose. I should, therefore, have pointed this out amongst the foremost of the provisions which have been made in the joints for the facilitating of their action, had it not been alleged, that cartilage in truth is only nascent or imperfect bone; and that the bone in these places is kept soft and imperfect, in consequence of a more complete and rigid ossification being prevented from taking place by the continual motion and rubbing of the surfaces: which being so, what we represent as a designed advantage is an unavoidable effect. I am far from being convinced that this is a true account of the fact; or that, if it were so, it answers the argument.[29] To me the surmounting of the bones with gristle looks more like a plating with a different metal, than like the same metal kept in a different state by the action to which it is exposed. At all events, we have a great particular benefit, though arising from a general constitution; but this last, not being quite what my argument requires, lest I should seem by applying the instance to overrate its value, I have thought it fair to state the question which attends it.

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* Ches. Anat. p. 255, ed. 7.

† Ibid. *p.* 35. ‡ Ibid. p. 30.

IV. In some joints, very particularly in the knees, there are loose cartilages or gristles between the bones, ithin the joint, so that the ends of the bones, 1 of working upon one another, work upon the iediate cartilages. Cheselden has observed,* that ntrivance of a loose ring is practised by mechanics the friction of the joints of any of their machines it, as between the parts of crook-hinges of large or under the head of the male screw of large vices. artilages of which we speak have very much of the if these rings. The comparison, moreover, shows ason why we find them in the knees rather than in joints. It is an expedient, we have seen, which a nic resorts to only when some strong and heavy is to be done. So here the thigh-bone has to e its motion at the knee, with the whole weight of dy pressing upon it, and often, as in rising from it, with the whole weight of the body to lift. It seem also, from Cheselden's account, that the ig and sliding of the loose cartilages, though it be ly a small and obscure change, humoured the mot the end of the thigh-bone, under the particular iration which was necessary to be given to it for mmodious action of the tendons (and which confion requires what he calls a variable socket; that is, avity, the lines of which assume a different curvature erent inclinations of the bones).[80]

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[29] As the Archdeacon had been a pupil of Dr. William Hunter's, which we gather from the tenor of many of his observations, it is surprising that he has not spoken with more decision upon this point. The cartilage, which is the substitute for the bone in infancy, is very different from that which tips the ends of the articulating extremities of the bones. In a valuable paper of Dr. Hunter's, it is shown that this articulating cartilage consists of fibres, placed together like the hairs of a brush, but more compactly, and perpendicularly to the ends of the bones; and that on this arrangement chiefly depends the elasticity of the material. Its use is best proved by what takes place when it is deficient: for then the articulation creaks like an old hinge, and the patient suffers aches.

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ies. Anat. p. 13, ed. 7.

'his is not explained with our author's usual clearness. ower head of the thigh-bone, which rests upon the one or *tibia,* is not the segment of a regular circle. we stand with the knees straight, the thigh-bone rests broad surface, and the convexity is principally on the art. Such an irregularity would make a very imperd jarring hinge-joint on any configuration that could n to the corresponding surface of the tibia. Thereese cartilages intervene; and, being possessed of conle elasticity, and so connected with the bone as to heir place a little, they accommodate themselves, r the flatter end or the more convex part of the artig surface of the bone be presented to them; and there advantage, that, in standing, when the weight on the greatest, the thigh-bone has a more extensive, and

V. We have now done with the configuration: but there is also in the joints, and that common to them all, another exquisite provision manifestly adapted to their use, and concerning which there can, I think, be no dispute, namely, the regular supply of a mucilage, more emollient and slippery than oil itself, which is constantly softening and lubricating the parts that rub upon each other, and thereby diminishing the effect of attrition in the highest possible degree. For the continual secretion of this important liniment, and for the feeding of the cavities of the joint with it, glands are fixed near each joint, the excretory ducts of which glands, dripping with their balsamic contents, hang loose like fringes within the cavity of the joints. A late improvement in what are called friction wheels, which consist of a mechanism so ordered as to be regularly dropping oil into a box which encloses the axis, the nave, and certain balls upon which the nave revolves, may be said, in some sort, to represent the contrivance in the animal joint, with this superiority, however, on the part of the joint, viz., that here the oil is not only dropped, but *made*.

In considering the joints, there is nothing, perhaps, which ought to move our gratitude more than the reflection *how well they wear*. A limb shall swing upon its hinge, or play in its socket, many hundred times in an hour, for sixty years together, without diminution of its agility, which is a long time for anything to last—for anything so much worked and exercised as the joints are. This durability I should attribute in part to the provision which is made for the preventing of wear and tear, first, by the polish of the cartilaginous surfaces; secondly, by the healing lubrication of the mucilage, and, in part, to that astonishing property of animal constitutions, assimilation, by which, in every portion of the body, let it consist of what it will, substance is restored, and waste repaired.[81]

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consequently a more secure basis, at the same time that the motion of the joint as a hinge is perfect.

[81] *This subject is touched upon in the Appendix, in treating of the spine.* We may here take a practical illustration.

Movable joints, I think, compose the curiosity of
nes; but their union, even where no motion is intended
wanted, carries marks of mechanism and of mechanical
isdom. The teeth, especially the front teeth, are one
ne fixed in another, like a peg driven into a board.
he sutures of the skull are like the edges of two saws
pped together in such a manner as that the teeth of
e enter the intervals of the other. We have sometimes
e bone lapping over another, and planed down at the
ges; sometimes also the thin lamella of one bone re-
ived into a narrow furrow of another. In all which
rieties we seem to discover the same design, viz., firm-
ss of juncture without clumsiness in the seam.

e have said that exercise is necessary to the perfection of
joint. Suppose the knee-joint to be inflamed: it is of
urse kept in perfect rest, because motion produces pain.
is absolute rest, joined with inflammation, alters all the
tures; the bone becomes light and spongy; the cartilage
absorbed; the ligaments which ought to hold the bones
gether become loose and relaxed; and what the surgeon
ls consecutive dislocation may take place—that is, the
nes will actually shift their place, from the defect of those
achments which ought to keep them together. Now, let
suppose the inflammation to have subsided: by due atten-
n all may be restored; and by no other mode than moving
e joint—the only precaution necessary being, that it shall
moved with a care and gentleness corresponding to its
akened condition. By this simple means the ligaments
ll acquire firmness, the cartilages smoothness, and the
novia, or lubricating mucilage, will be again poured out:
om all which we see, that in the living animal textures,
ear and tear do not take place upon continued motion;
t, on the contrary, that exercise is made the stimulus to
provement. All other proofs of design, as adjustment,
lation, compensation, prospective contrivance, are weak in
mparison with this.

CHAPTER IX.

OF THE MUSCLES.

Muscles, with their tendons, are the instruments which animal motion is performed. It will be our ness to point out instances in which, and properties respect to which, the disposition of these muscles strictly mechanical as that of the wires and strings puppet.

I. We may observe, what I believe is univer exact relation between the joint and the muscles move it. Whatever motion the joint, by its me construction, is capable of performing, that mo annexed muscles, by their position, are capable ducing. For example, if there be, as at the k elbow, a hinge-joint, capable of motion only in plane, the leaders, as they are called, *i. e.*, the tendons, are placed in directions parallel to the as, by the contraction or relaxation of the m which they belong, to produce that motion and If these joints were capable of a freer motion, no muscles to produce it. Whereas, at the shou the hip, where the ball and socket joint allows by struction of a rotatory or sweeping motion, ten placed in such a position, and pull in such a dire to produce the motion of which the joint admi instance, the sartorius or tailor's muscle, rising spine, running diagonally across the thigh, an of the inside of the main bone of the leg a e knee. enables us, by its contraction, to th ther, giving effect, at cket joint at the hip, There is, as we have bones for the rotatory

the head and hands: there is, also, in the oblique di-
tion of the muscles belonging to them, a specific pro-
ion for the putting of this mechanism of the bones
o action. And mark the consent of uses: the oblique
scles would have been inefficient without that particular
iculation; that particular articulation would have been
t without the oblique muscles. It may be proper,
wever, to observe, with respect to the *head*, al-
ugh I think it does not vary the case, that its oblique
tions and inclinations are often motions in a *diagonal*
duced by the joint action of muscles lying in straight
ections. But whether the pull be single or combined,
articulation is always such as to be capable of obeying
action of the muscles. The oblique muscles attached
the head are likewise so disposed as to be capable of
adying the globe as well as of moving it. The head
a new-born infant is often obliged to be filleted up.
ter death the head drops and rolls in every direction.
that it is by the equilibre of the muscles, by the aid
a considerable and equipollent muscular force in con-
nt exertion, that the head maintains its erect posture.
e muscles here supply what would otherwise be a great
fect in the articulation: for the joint in the neck, al-
ough admirably adapted to the motion of the head, is
ufficient for its support. It is not only by the means
a most curious structure of the bones that a man turns
head, but by virtue of an adjusted muscular power
at he even holds it up.

As another example of what we are illustrating, viz.,
nformity of use between the bones and the muscles, it
s been observed of the different vertebræ, that their
ocesses are exactly proportioned to the quantity of
otion which the other bones allow of, and which the
spective muscles are capable of producing.

II. A muscle acts only by contraction. Its force is
erted in no other way. When the exertion ceases, it
laxes itself, that is, it returns by relaxation to its former
ate, but without energy.[32] This is the nature of the

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[32] *Excellently well as this* is put, there is something more

muscular fibre; and being so, it is evident that the procal *energetic* motion of the limbs, by which we motion *with force* in opposite directions, can onl produced by the instrumentality of opposite or antag muscles—of flexors and extensors answering to other. For instance, the biceps and brachialis *int* muscles placed in the front part of the upper arn their contraction, bend the elbow, and with such de of force as the case requires or the strength admit The relaxation of these muscles after the effort w merely let the fore-arm drop down. For the *back st* therefore, and that the arm may not only bend at the el but also extend and straighten itself with force, muscles, the longus and brevis brachialis *externus* the anconæus, placed on the hinder part of the arm their contractile twitch, fetch back the fore-arm i straight line with the cubit, with no less force than with which it was bent out of it. The same thin

admirable still in the condition of the muscular sy With respect to the support of the head, as mentioned i preceding page, and the instance embraces, of course erect position of the body as well as the equable poisi the head, the most extraordinary part of the phenome this, that we are sensible of the slightest inclination body or of any member, although it would be difficult to what order of acknowledged sensations this belongs. only do we feel every degree of inclination from the pendicular in the poising of the body, but we act u with the most minute correspondence of the muscles. muscles are antagonists certainly, but there is a fine co ation and adjustment in their action, which is not illus by the two sawyers dividing a log of wood. The n having finished what we call its action or contraction, in the condition of a loose rope, but on the contrary th always a perfect balance of action preserved betwee extent of relaxation of the one class of muscles, and th traction of the other; and there is a tone in both by the limb may be sustained in any posture that is w This subject is treated in the Philosophical Transa *and also* in the Treatise on the Hand, under the head "*Muscular* Sense."

ins in all the limbs, and in every movable part of the ody. · A finger is not bent and straightened without the *ntraction* of two muscles taking place. It is evident, ierefore, that the animal functions require that particular sposition of the muscles which we describe by the name 'antagonist muscles. And they are accordingly so dis- ised. Every muscle is provided with an adversary. hey act like two sawyers in a pit, by an opposite pull; d nothing, surely, can more strongly indicate design d attention to an end than their being thus stationed, an this collocation. The nature of the muscular fibre ing what it is, the purposes of the animal could be swered by no other. And not only the capacity for otion, but the aspect and symmetry of the body is pre- rved by the muscles being marshalled according to this der—*e. g.*, the mouth is holden in the middle of the ce, and its angles kept in a state of exact correspon- ncy, by two muscles drawing against and balancing ch other. In a hemiplegia, when the muscle on one de is weakened, the muscle on the other side draws the outh awry.

III. Another property of the muscles, which could ly be the result of care, is, their being almost univer- lly so disposed as not to obstruct or interfere with one other's action. I know but one instance in which this pediment is perceived. We cannot easily swallow hilst we gape. This, I understand, is owing to the uscles employed in the act of deglutition being so im- licated with the muscles of the lower jaw, that whilst ese last are contracted, the former cannot act with eedom. The obstruction is, in this instance, attended ith little inconvenience; but it shows what the effect where it does exist; and what loss of faculty there ould be if it were more frequent. Now, when we eflect upon the number of muscles, not fewer than four undred and forty-six, in the human body, known and amed,* how contiguous they lie to each other, in layers, it were, over one another, crossing one another, some- imes embedded in one another, sometimes perforating one another—an arrangement which leaves to each its liberty and its full play, must necessarily require meditation and counsel.

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* Keill's Anatomy, p. 295, ed. 3.

IV. The following is oftentimes the case with the muscles. Their action is wanted where their situation would be inconvenient. In which case the body of the muscle is placed in some commodious position at a distance, and made to communicate with the point of action by slender strings or wires. If the muscles which move the fingers had been placed in the palm or back of the hand, they would have swelled that part to an awkward and clumsy thickness. The beauty, the proportions of the part, would have been destroyed. They are therefore disposed in the arm, and even up to the elbow, and act by long tendons strapped down at the wrist, and passing under the ligaments to the fingers, and to the joints of the fingers which they are severally to move. In like manner, the muscles which move the toes and many of the joints of the foot, how gracefully are they disposed in the calf of the leg, instead of forming an unwieldy tumefaction in the foot itself! The observation may be repeated of the muscle which draws the nictitating membrane over the eye. Its office is in the front of the eye; but its body is lodged in the back part of the globe, where it lies safe, and where it encumbers nothing.

V. The great mechanical variety in the figure of the muscles may be thus stated. It appears to be a fixed law that the contraction of a muscle shall be towards its centre. Therefore the subject for mechanism on each occasion is, so to modify the figure and adjust the position of the muscle as to produce the motion required agreeably with this law. This can only be done by giving to different muscles a diversity of configuration suited to their several offices, and to their situation with respect to the work which they have to perform. On which account we find them under a multiplicity of forms and attitudes; sometimes with double, sometimes with treble tendons, sometimes with none: sometimes one tendon to several muscles, at other times one muscle to several tendons. *The shape* of the organ is susceptible of an incalculable r, whilst the original property of the muscle, the ıd line of its contraction, remains the same, and is . Herein the muscular system may be said to bear 'ect resemblance to our works of art. An artist ot alter the native quality of his materials, or their f action. He takes these as he finds them. His nd ingenuity are employed in turning them, such y are, to his account, by giving to the parts of his ıe a form and relation in which these unalterable ·ties may operate to the production of the effects ed.[38]

The ejaculations can never too often be repeated—.

n the figure of a muscle, given in page 68, it may be ed that the tendons are on different sides of the muscle.



re were to plan their arrangement it would be thus: ıe tendinous origin, and B the tendinous insertion; e muscular fibres run obliquely between them. This ity of the fibres is almost universal in the muscles of



How many things must go right for us to be an h ease! how many more for us to be vigorous and a Yet vigour and activity are, in a vast plurality stances, preserved in human bodies, notwithstandin they depend upon so great a number of instru of motion, and notwithstanding that the def disorder sometimes of a very small instrument, single pair, for instance, out of the four hundre forty-six muscles which are employed, may l tended with grievous inconveniency. There is and good sense in the following observation tak of the 'Religious Philosopher:' "With much passion," says this writer, "as well as astonishn the goodness of our loving Creator, have I cons the sad state of a certain gentleman, who, as to th was in pretty good health, but only wanted the these *two little muscles* that serve to lift up the e and so had almost lost the use of his sight, being as long as this defect lasted, to shove up his every moment with his own hands!" In general v

the limb, and the effect is very important. It needs ference to mechanics to understand, that if we pull ob upon a weight we sacrifice a great deal of power. F advantage, then, is power resigned in the muscle? " wish to draw a thing towards any place with the leas you must pull directly in the line between the thing place; but if you wish to draw it as quickly as possil do not regard the loss of force, you must pull it ob by drawing it in two directions at once. Tie a stri stone A, and draw it straight towards you at C w hand; then make a loop on another string, and runn first through it, draw one string in each hand at B towards you, in the line A C, but sideways, till both are stretched in a straight line; you will see how remark in how small a degree those who enjoy the perfect use of their organs know the comprehensiveness of the blessing, the variety of their obligation. They perceive a result, but they think little of the multitude of concurrences and rectitudes which go to form it.

Besides these observations, which belong to the muscular organ as such, we may notice some advantages of structure which are more conspicuous in muscles of a certain class or description than in others. Thus:

I. The variety, quickness, and precision of which muscular motion is capable are seen, I think, in no part so remarkably as in the *tongue*. It is worth any man's while to watch the agility of his tongue, the wonderful promptitude with which it executes changes of position, and the perfect exactness. Each syllable of articulated sound requires for its utterance a specific action of the tongue, and of the parts adjacent to it. The disposition and configuration of the mouth appertaining to every letter and word, is not only peculiar, but, if nicely and accurately attended to, perceptible to the sight; insomuch, that curious persons have availed themselves of this circumstance to teach the deaf to speak, and to understand what is said by others. In the same person, and after his habit of speaking is formed, one, and only one, position of the parts will produce a given articulate sound correctly. How instantaneously are these positions assumed and dismissed! how numerous are the permutations, how various, yet how infallible! Arbitrary and antic variety is not the thing we admire; but variety obeying a rule, conducing to an effect, and commensurate with exigencies infinitely diversified. I believe also that the anatomy of the tongue corresponds with these observations upon its activity. The muscles of the tongue are so numerous, and so implicated with one another, that they cannot be traced by the nicest dissection; nevertheless (which is a great perfection of the organ) neither the

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By the liberal employment of muscular power, quickness and variety of motion are obtained, and with the advantages which are so well described in the succeeding chapter.

number, nor the complexity, nor what might seem to be the entanglement of its fibres, in anywise impede its motion, or render the determination or success of its efforts uncertain.

I here entreat the reader's permission to step a little out of my way, to consider *the parts of the mouth* in some of their other properties. It has been said, and that by an eminent physiologist, that whenever nature attempts to work two or more purposes by one instrument, she does both or all imperfectly. Is this true of the tongue regarded as an instrument of speech and of taste, or regarded as an instrument of speech, of taste, and of deglutition? So much otherwise, that many persons, that is to say, nine hundred and ninety-nine persons out of a thousand, by the instrumentality of this one organ, talk, and taste, and swallow very well. In fact, the constant warmth and moisture of the tongue, the thinness of the skin, the papillæ upon its surface, qualify this organ for its office of tasting, as much as its inextricable multiplicity of fibres do for the rapid movements which are necessary to speech. Animals which feed upon grass have their tongues covered with a perforated skin, so as to admit the dissolved food to the papillæ underneath, which, in the meantime, remain defended from the rough action of the unbruised spiculæ.

There are brought together within the cavity of the mouth more distinct uses, and parts executing more distinct offices, than I think can be found lying so near to one another, or within the same compass, in any other portion of the body: viz., teeth of different shape, first for cutting, secondly for grinding; muscles, most artificially disposed for carrying on the compound motion of the lower jaw, half lateral and half vertical, by which the mill is worked: fountains of saliva, springing up in different parts of the cavity for the moistening of the food, whilst the mastication is going on: glands, to feed the fountains; a muscular constriction of a very peculiar kind in the back part of the cavity, for the guiding of the prepared aliment into its passage towards the stomach, and in many cases for carrying it along that passage; for, h we may imagine this to be done simply by the of the food itself, it in truth is not so, even in the posture of the human neck; and most evidently the case with quadrupeds—with a horse, for in- in which, when pasturing, the food is thrust by muscular strength instead of descending of its cord.

e mean time, and within the same cavity, is going ther business, altogether different from what is scribed—that of respiration and speech. In ad- therefore, to all that has been mentioned, we passage opened from this cavity to the lungs, for ission of air exclusively of every other substance: e muscles, some in the larynx, and without number ongue, for the purpose of modulating that air in age, with a variety, a compass, and precision, of o other musical instrument is capable. And lastly, in my opinion, crowns the whole as a piece of ery, we have a specific contrivance for dividing eumatic part from the mechanical, and for pre- one set of actions interfering with the other. various functions are united, the difficulty is to against the inconveniences of a too great com- . In no apparatus put together by art and for the s of art, do I know such multifarious uses so aptly ed, as in the natural organization of the human ; or where the structure, compared with the uses, imple. The mouth, with all these intentions to s a single cavity; is one machine; with its parts crowded nor confused, and each unembarrassed rest: each at least at liberty in a degree sufficient end to be attained. If we cannot eat and sing at e moment, we can eat one moment and sing the he respiration proceeding freely all the while.

e is one case, however, of this double office, and the *earliest* necessity, which the mouth alone ot perform; and that is, carrying on together the tions of sucking and breathing. Another route re is opened for the air—namely, through the which lets the breath pass backward and forward, whilst the lips, in the act of sucking, are necessarily shut close upon the body from which the nutriment is drawn. This is a circumstance which always appeared to me worthy of notice. The nose would have been necessary, although it had not been the organ of smelling. The making it the seat of a sense was superadding a new use to a part already wanted; was taking a wise advantage of an antecedent and a constitutional necessity.[34]

But to return to that which is the proper subject of the present section—the celerity and precision of muscular motion. These qualities may be particularly observed in the execution of many species of instrumental music, ıe changes produced by the hand of the ı exceedingly rapid; are exactly measured, nost minute; and display, on the part of the obedience of action alike wonderful for its d its correctness.

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[34] When our author describes the variety of functions performed by the mouth and tongue, he is in admiration at the simplicity of the instrument. But this is only an apparent simplicity: the complexity of structure is concealed. Indeed, it has been this very consideration which led to the new investigations into the nervous system. Without entering far into this subject, we take the tongue in illustration. It is a fine organ of touch: it is the seat of the sense of taste: it is necessary to deglutition: its modulations are infinite in speech; but the reason of a body so simple in its outward form being capable of performing offices apparently so discordant, is visible only to the anatomist, who traces the nerves into this organ. Then he discovers, besides the nerve proceeding from the papillæ of the tongue to the sensorium, that there are nerves of volition governing the muscles of the tongue. In addition to these, there is a nerve which regulates the action of swallowing, and which combines the motions of the gullet with those of the tongue; and in the same manner another nerve, tending to the organ of voice in the larynx, branches off to the tongue, and associates it with the organ of the voice, so as to produce articulate language: these nervous cords are the true organization by which one member, simple in its exterior form, has a complexity in its internal relations. And thus it is, that in many instances organs which are apparently simple, and *through* which we perform many offices so easily that we *think* not at all of what is necessary to their execution, have yet *internally*, and to the eye of the anatomist, a thousand ute circumstances or relations on which the perfection ir action depends.

erson only observe his own hand whilst he he number of muscles which are brought to e pen; how the joint and adjusted operation ndons is concerned in every stroke, yet that such strokes are drawn in a minute. Not be turned without more than one, or two, or ıous contractions, definite, both as to the e tendon, and as to the space through which on moves; yet how currently does the work d when we look at it, how faithful have the ı to their duty—how true to the order which r habit hath inculcated! For let it be re- hat, whilst a man's hand-writing is the same, e of order is preserved, whether he write These two instances of music and writing ıly the quickness and precision of muscular ıe docility.

ding the particular configuration of muscles, circular muscles appear to be admirable echanism. It is the muscular power most ied; the same quality of the muscular sub- under a new modification. The circular of the fibres is strictly mechanical; but, most mechanical, is not the only thing in hich deserves our notice. The regulated ntractile force with which they are endowed, retention, yet vincible when requisite, n their ordinary state of actual contraction, which their dependence upon the will is but occasional, gives to them a constitution e conveniency is inestimable. This their y character is exactly such as suits with the nctions of the animal.

may also, upon the subject of muscles, t many of our most important actions are achieved by the combined help of different muscles. Frequently, a diagonal motion is produced by the contraction of tendons pulling in the direction of the sides of the parallelogram. This is the case, as hath been already noticed, with some of the oblique nutations of the head. Sometimes the number of co-operating muscles is very great. Dr. Nieuentyt, in the Leipsic Transactions, reckons up a hundred muscles that are employed every time we breathe; yet we take in, or let out, our breath, without reflecting what a work is thereby performed; what an apparatus is laid in of instruments for the service, and how many such contribute their assistance to the effect. Breathing with ease is a blessing of every moment; yet of all others it is that which we possess with the least consciousness. A man in an asthma is the only man who knows how to estimate it.

IV. Mr. Home has observed,* that the most important and the most delicate actions are performed in the body by the smallest muscles; and he mentions, as his examples, the muscles which have been discovered in the iris of the eye, and the drum of the ear. The tenuity of these muscles is astonishing: they are microscopic hairs; must be magnified to be visible; yet are they real effective muscles: and not only such, but the



[*The figure here represents the* action of the biceps muscle which lies *the arm, and* is *inserted* upon the radius of the fore-arm in sustaining *ght in the* hand.]

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rans. part i. 1830, p. 8.

grandest and most precious of our faculties, sight and hearing, depend upon their health and action.

V. The muscles act in the limbs with what is called a mechanical disadvantage. The muscle at the shoulder, by which the arm is raised, is fixed nearly in the same manner as the load is fixed upon a steelyard, within a few decimals, we will say, of an inch from the centre upon which the steelyard turns. In this situation we find that a very heavy draught is no more than sufficient to countervail the force of a small lead plummet, placed upon the long arm of the steelyard, at the distance of perhaps fifteen or twenty inches from the centre and on the other side of it. And this is the disadvantage which is meant; and an absolute disadvantage, no doubt, it would be, if the object were to spare the force of muscular contraction. But observe how conducive is this constitution to animal conveniency. Mechanism has always in view one or other of these two purposes—either to move a great weight slowly, and through a small space, or to move a light weight rapidly, through a considerable sweep. For the former of these purposes, a different species of lever, and a different collocation of the muscles, might be better than the present; but for the second, the present structure is the true one. Now so it happens, that the second, and not the first, is that which the occasions of animal life principally call for. In what concerns the human body, it is of much more consequence to any man to be able to carry his hand to his head with due expedition, than it would be to have the power of raising from the ground a heavier load (of two or three more hundred weight, we will suppose) than he can lift at present.

This last is a faculty which on some extraordinary occasions he may desire to possess; but the other is what he wants and uses every hour or minute. In like manner, a husbandman or a gardener will do more execution, by being able to carry his scythe, his rake, or his flail, with a sufficient dispatch through a sufficient space, than if, with greater strength, his motions were proportionably more confined and slow. It is the same with a mechanic in the use of his tools. It is the same also with other animals in the use of their limbs. In general, the vivacity of their motions would be ill exchanged for greater force under a clumsier structure.

We have offered our observations upon the structure of muscles in general; we have also noticed certain species of muscles; but there are also *single* muscles which bear marks of mechanical contrivance appropriate as well as particular. Out of many instances of this kind we select the following:—

I. Of muscular actions, even of those which are well understood, some of the most curious are incapable of popular explanation; at least, without the aid of plates and figures. This is in a great measure the case with a very familiar but, at the same time, a very complicated motion, that of the *lower jaw;* and with the muscular structure by which it is produced. One of the muscles concerned may, however, be described in such a manner as to be, I think, sufficiently comprehended for our present purpose. The problem is to pull the lower jaw *down.* The obvious method should seem to be, to place a straight muscle—viz., to fix a string from the chin to the breast, the contraction of which would open the mouth, and produce the motion required at once. But it is evident that the form and liberty of the neck forbid a muscle being laid in such a position; and that, consistently with the preservation of this form, the motion which we want must be effectuated by some muscular mechanism disposed farther back in the jaw. The mechanism adopted is as follows:—A certain muscle, called the *digastric*, rises on the side of the face, considerably *above* the insertion of the lower jaw, and comes down, being converted in its progress into a round tendon. Now it is manifest that the tendon, whilst it pursues a direction *descending* towards the jaw, must, by its contraction, pull the jaw up instead of down. What en was to be done? This, we find, is done: The ending tendon, when it is got low enough, is passed a loop, or ring, or pulley, in the os hyoïdes, ascend; and having thus changed its line of direction, is inserted into the inner part of the chin: by which device, viz., the turn at the loop, the action of the muscle (which in all muscles is contraction) that before would have pulled the jaw up, now as necessarily draws it down. "The mouth," says Heister, "is opened by means of this trochlea in a most wonderful and elegant manner."

II. What contrivance can be more mechanical than the following, viz., a slit in one tendon to let another tendon pass through it? This structure is found in the tendons which move the toes and fingers. The long tendon, as it is called, in the foot, which bends the first joint of the toe, passes *through* the short tendon which bends the second joint, which course allows to the sinew more liberty, and a more commodious action than it would otherwise have been capable of exerting.* There is nothing, I believe, in a silk or cotton mill, in the belts, or straps, or ropes, by which motion is communicated from one part of the machine to another, that is more artificial, or more evidently so, than this *perforation*.

III. The next circumstance which I shall mention under this head of muscular arrangement is so decisive a mark of intention, that it always appeared to me to supersede, in some measure, the necessity of seeking for any other observation upon the subject; and that circumstance is, the tendons which pass from the leg to the foot, being bound down by a ligament to the ankle. The foot is placed at a considerable angle with the leg. It is manifest, therefore, that flexible strings, passing along the interior of the angle, if left to themselves, would, when stretched, start from it. The obvious preventive is to tie them down. And this is done in fact. Across the instep, or rather just above it, the anatomist finds a strong ligament, *under* which the tendons pass to the foot. The effect of the ligament as a bandage can be made evident to the senses; for if it be cut, the tendons start up. The simplicity, yet the clearness of this contrivance, its exact resemblance to established resources of art, place it amongst the most indubitable manifestations of design with which we are acquainted.

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* Ches. Anat. p. 119.

There is also a further use to be made of the present example, and that is, as it precisely contradicts the opinion that the parts of animals may have been all formed by what is called *appetency*, *i. e.*, endeavour perpetuated and imperceptibly working its effect through an incalculable series of generations. We have here no endeavour, but the reverse of it—a constant renitency and reluctance. The endeavour is all the other way. The pressure of the ligament constrains the tendons; the tendons re-act upon the pressure of the ligament. It is impossible that the ligament should ever have been generated by the exercise of the tendon, or in the course of that exercise, forasmuch as the force of the tendon perpendicularly resists the fibre which confines it, and is constantly endeavouring, not to form, but to rupture and displace, the threads of which the ligament is composed.

Keill has reckoned up in the human body four hundred and forty-six muscles, dissectible and describable; and hath assigned a use to every one of the number. This cannot be all imagination.

Bishop Wilkins hath observed from Galen, that there are at least ten several qualifications to be attended to in each particular muscle—viz., its proper figure; its just magnitude; its fulcrum; its point of action, supposing the figure to be fixed; its collocation with respect to its two ends, the upper and the lower; the place; the position of the whole muscle; the introduction into it of nerves, arteries, veins. How are things including so many adjustments to be made; or when made, how are they to be put together, without intelligence?

I have sometimes wondered why we are not struck with mechanism in animal bodies as readily and so *strongly* as we are struck with it, at first sight, in a *watch* or a mill. One reason of the difference may be, animal bodies are, in a great measure, made up of by substances, such as muscles and membranes have been accustomed to trace mechanism sharp lines, in the configuration of hard materials, in the moulding, chiseling, and filing into shapes of such articles as metals or wood. There is something therefore of habit in the case; but it is sufficiently evident that there can be no proper reason for any distinction of the sort. Mechanism may be displayed in the one kind of substance as well as in the other.

Although the few instances we have selected, even as they stand in our description, are nothing short, perhaps, of logical proofs of design, yet it must not be forgotten, that, in every part of anatomy, description is a poor substitute for inspection. It is well said by an able anatomist,* and said in reference to the very part of the subject which we have been treating of:—"Imperfecta hæc musculorum descriptio non minùs arida est legentibus quàm inspectantibus fuerit jucunda eorundem præparatio. Elegantissima enim mechanicês artificia, creberrimè in illis obvia, verbis nonnisi obscurè exprimuntur: carnium autem ductu, tendinum colore, insertionum proportione, et trochlearium distributione, oculis exposita, omnem superant admirationem."

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* Steno, in Blas. Anat. Animal. p. 2. c. 4.

CHAPTER X.

OF THE VESSELS OF ANIMAL BODIES.



[illegible] the heart and great blood-vessels,
of the blood. We under
A from the body; B th

or auricle. From this cavity of the heart the blood is carried into C, the ventricle; and from this ventricle the pulmonary artery goes off. This great artery of the lungs is for the conveyance of the blood which is returned from the body into the lungs. Now the great vein A, the auricle B, the ventricle C, and the pulmonary artery D D, belong to the right side of the heart; or, to take a more important distinction, they convey dark-coloured blood, which is unfit for the uses of the system. But when this blood reaches the lungs, and is exposed to the atmosphere we breathe, it throws off the carbon, becomes bright in colour, and is called arterial blood. It returns to the heart, not to the cavities which we have enumerated, but by the veins of the lungs to the other side of the heart, the left—that is, to another auricle and another ventricle. From this left ventricle there ascends the aorta, the great artery of the body, E E. This great vessel conveys the blood to every part that has life. From all the parts of the body the blood is gathered again by the extremities of the veins, and so returns to the point of the auricle from which we began to trace it. This short preface may make the observations of the author easily intelligible.]

THE circulation of the *blood* through the bodies of men and quadrupeds, and the apparatus by which it is carried on, compose a system, and testify a contrivance, perhaps the best understood of any part of the animal frame. The lymphatic system, or the nervous system, may be more subtle and intricate—nay, it is possible that in their structure they may be even more artificial than the sanguiferous—but we do not know so much about them.

The utility of the circulation of the blood I assume as an acknowledged point. One grand purpose is plainly answered by it—the distributing to every part, every extremity, every nook and corner of the body, the nourishment which is received into it by one aperture. What enters at the mouth finds its way to the fingers' ends. A more difficult mechanical problem could hardly, I think, be proposed, than to discover a method of constantly repairing the waste, and of supplying an accession of substance to every part of a complicated machine at the same time.[85]

This system presents itself under two views:

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[85] *We must refer* our reader to the dissertat
Appendix, on the circulation of the blood and its

disposition of the blood-vessels, *i. e.*, the laying of the pipes; and, secondly, the construction of the engine at the centre, viz., the heart, for driving the blood through them.

I. The disposition of the blood-vessels, as far as regards the supply of the body, is like that of the water-pipes in a city, viz., large and main trunks branching off by smaller pipes (and these again by still narrower tubes) in every direction and towards every part in which the fluid which they convey can be wanted. So far the water-pipes which serve a town may represent the vessels which carry the blood from the heart. But there is another thing necessary to the blood, which is not wanted for the water; and that is, the carrying of it back again to its source. For this office, a reversed system of vessels is prepared, which, uniting at their extremities with the extremities of the first system, collects the divided and subdivided streamlets, first by capillary ramifications into larger branches, secondly, by these branches into trunks; and thus returns the blood (almost exactly inverting the order in which it went out) to the fountain whence its motion proceeded. All which is evident mechanism.

The body, therefore, contains two systems of blood-vessels, arteries and veins. Between the constitution of the systems there are also two differences, suited to the functions which the systems have to execute. The blood, in going out, passing always from wider into narrower tubes; and, in coming back, from narrower into wider, it is evident that the impulse and pressure upon the sides of the blood-vessel will be much greater in one case than the other. Accordingly, the arteries which carry out the blood are formed of much tougher and stronger coats than the veins which bring it back. That is one difference: the other is still more artificial, or, if I may so speak, indicates still more clearly the care and anxiety of the artificer. Forasmuch as, in the arteries, by reason of the greater force with which the blood is urged along them, a wound or rupture would be more dangerous than in the veins, *these* vessels are defended from injury, not only by their texture, but by their situation, and by every advantage of situation which can be given to them. They are buried in sinuses, or they creep along grooves made for them in the bones; for instance, the under edge of the ribs is sloped and furrowed solely for the passage of these vessels. Sometimes they proceed in channels, protected by stout parapets on each side, which last description is remarkable in the bones of the fingers, these being hollowed out, on the under-side, like a scoop, and with such a concavity, that the finger may be cut across to the bone, without hurting the artery which runs along it. At other times, the arteries pass in canals wrought in the substance, and in the very middle of the substance, of the bone. This takes place in the lower jaw; and is found where there would, otherwise, be danger of compression by sudden curvature. All this care is wonderful, yet not more than what the importance of the case required. To those who venture their lives in a ship, it has been often said, that there is only an inch-board between them and death; but in the body itself, especially in the arterial system, there is, in many parts, only a membrane, a skin, a thread. For which reason, this system lies deep under the integuments; whereas the veins, in which the mischief that ensues from injuring the coats is much less, lie in general above the arteries; come nearer to the surface; are more exposed.

It may be further observed concerning the two systems taken together, that though the arterial, with its trunk and branches and small twigs, may be imagined to issue or proceed—in other words, to *grow* from the heart, like a plant from its root, or the fibres of a leaf from its foot-stalk (which however, were it so, would be only to resolve one mechanism into another); yet the venal, the returning system, can never be formed in this manner. The arteries might go on shooting out from their extremities—*i. e.*, lengthening and subdividing indefinitely; but an inverted system, continually uniting its streams, instead of dividing, and thus carrying back what the other system carried out, could not be referred to the same process.

II. The next thing to be considered is the engine which works this machinery—viz., the *heart*. For our purpose it is unnecessary to ascertain the principle upon which the heart acts. Whether it be irritation excited by the contact of the blood, by the influx of the nervous fluid, or whatever else be the cause of its motion, it is something which is capable of producing, in a living muscular fibre, reciprocal contraction and relaxation. This is the power we have to work with; and the inquiry is, how this power is applied in the instance before us. There is provided, in the central part of the body, a hollow muscle, invested with spiral fibres, running in both directions, the layers intersecting one another; in some animals, however, appearing to be semicircular rather than spiral. By the contraction of these fibres, the sides of the muscular cavities are necessarily squeezed together, so as to force out from them any fluid which they may at that time contain: by the relaxation of the same fibres, the cavities are in their turn dilated, and, of course, prepared to admit every fluid which may be poured into them. Into these cavities are inserted the great trunks, both of the arteries which carry out the blood, and of the veins which bring it back. This is a general account of the apparatus; and the simplest idea of its action is, that by each contraction a portion of blood is forced by a syringe into the arteries; and, at each dilatation, an equal portion is received from the veins. This produces, at each pulse, a motion, and change in the mass of blood, to the amount of what the cavity contains, which in a full-grown human heart I understand is about an ounce, or two table-spoons full. How quickly these changes succeed one another, and by this succession how sufficient they are to support a stream or circulation throughout the system, may be understood by the following computation, abridged from Keill's Anatomy, p. 117, ed. 3: "Each ventricle will at least contain one ounce of blood. The heart contracts f thousand times in one hour: from which it follows, t there pass through the heart, every hour, four thous *ounces*, or three hundred and fifty pounds of blo ow the whole mass of blood is said to be about twenty- ve pounds: so that a quantity of blood, equal to the hole mass of blood, passes through the heart fourteen mes in one hour, which is about once in every four inutes."

Consider what an affair this is, when we come to very rge animals. The aörta of a whale is larger in the re than the main pipe of the water-works at London ridge; and the water roaring in its passage through at pipe is inferior, in impetus and velocity, to the ood gushing from the whale's heart. Hear Dr. unter's account of the dissection of a whale: "The rta measured a foot diameter. Ten or fifteen gallons ' blood are thrown out of the heart at a stroke with an mense velocity, through a tube of a foot diameter. he whole idea fills the mind with wonder."†

The account which we have here stated, of the injec- n of blood into the arteries by the contraction, and of e corresponding reception of it from the veins by the latation, of the cavities of the heart, and of the circula- n being thereby maintained through the blood-vessels the body, is true, but imperfect. The heart performs is office, but it is in conjunction with another of equal riosity and importance. It was necessary that the blood ould be successively brought into contact, or contiguity, proximity with the *air*. I do not know that the che- ical reason, upon which this necessity is founded, has en yet sufficiently explored. It seems to be made ap- ar, that the atmosphere which we breathe is a mixture two kinds of air: one pure and vital, the other, for e purposes of life, effete, foul, and noxious;[36] that when have drawn in our breath the blood in the lungs im- bes from the air thus brought into contiguity with it a rtion of its pure ingredient, and at the same time gives out the effete or corrupt air which it contain which is carried away, along with the halitus, ev we expire. At least, by comparing the air v breathed from the lungs with the air which en lungs, it is found to have lost some of its pure p to have brought away with it an addition of its part. Whether these experiments satisfy the qu to the need which the blood stands in of bein by continual accesses of air, is not for us to inqu nor material to our argument: it is sufficient t that, in the constitution of most animals, such sity exists, and that the air, by some means o *must* be introduced into a near communication blood.[37] The lungs of animals are constru this purpose. They consist of blood-vessels vessels, lying close to each other; and whenever a branch of the trachea or windpipe, there is accompanying it of the vein and artery, and the a is always in the middle between the blood-vessels internal surface of these vessels, upon which th cation of the air to the blood depends, would, if and expanded, be, in a man, equal to a superfici

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[36] The atmosphere contains, in every 100 parts, of oxygen parts; nitrogen or azote, 79 parts; carbonic acid gas, a otional part.

† Dr. Hunter's Account of the Dissection of a Whale.— hil. Trans.)

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[37] The most simple view, and the best supported, that the dark venous blood which is returning from culation through the body is loaded with carbon. is carried to the right side of the heart, and from the lungs, the branches of the pulmonary artery ar buted in great minuteness on cells infinite in number cells communicate with the extreme branches of t pipe; and as the atmosphere is received into these circulating blood comes to be exposed to its influe neither the coats of the minute vessels which con blood, nor the fine membrane of the cells which co air, prevents the influence of the atmosphere upon t The carbon of the blood meeting the oxygen in th phere, forms carbonic acid gas; and the air expell piration, thus loaded, carries away, of course, a p moisture by exhalation. (See the dissertation entit the Circulation. Appendix.)

* Keill's Anatomy, p. 121.



The figure represents the two sides of the heart separated: that to the
of the figure, but on the right side of the body, containing the venous
od which must pass through the lungs to serve the purposes of the
nomy; and that on the left side containing arterial blood, which is
t out into the body. Man, and all animals of warm blood, have the
le mass of blood passing through the lungs, and a double heart, as
e represented, each consisting of a vein, an auricle, a ventricle, and
rtery. The arrows point out the course of the circulation.]

teen feet square. Now, in order to give the blood in its course the benefit of this organization (and this is the part of the subject with which we are chiefly concerned), the following operation takes place. As soon as the blood is received by the heart from the veins of the body, and *before* that is sent out again into its arteries, it carried, by the force of the contraction of the heart, and by means of a separate and supplementary artery, to the lungs, and made to enter the vessels of the lungs; from which, after it has undergone the action, whatever it be, of that viscus, it is brought back by a large vein once more to the heart, in order, when thus concocted and prepared, to be thence distributed anew into the system. This assigns to the heart a double office. The pulmonary circulation is a system within a system; and one action of the heart is the origin of both.

For this complicated function four cavities become necessary, and four are accordingly provided: two called ventricles, which *send out* the blood, viz., one into the lungs, in the first instance; the other into the mass, after it has returned from the lungs; two others also, called auricles, which *receive* the blood from the veins, viz., one, as it comes immediately from the body; the other, as the same blood comes a second time after its circulation through the lungs. So that there are two receiving cavities, and two forcing cavities. The structure of the heart has reference to the lungs; for without the lungs, one of each would have been sufficient. The translation of the blood in the heart itself is after this manner. The receiving cavities respectively communicate with the forcing cavities, and, by their contraction, unload the received blood into them. The forcing cavities, when it is their turn to contract, compel the same blood into the mouths of the arteries.

The account here given will not convey to a reader ignorant of anatomy any thing like an accurate notion of the form, action, or use of the parts (nor can any short and popular account do this); but it is abundantly sufficient to testify contrivance; and although imperfect, *being* true as far as it goes, may be relied upon for the only purpose for which we offer it—the purpose of this conclusion.

"The wisdom of the Creator," saith Hamburgher, "is in nothing seen more gloriously than in the heart." And how well doth it execute its office! An anatomist, who understood the structure of the heart, might say beforehand that it would play; but he would expect, I think, from the complexity of its mechanism, and the delicacy of many of its parts, that it should always be liable to derangement, or that it would soon work itself out. Yet shall this wonderful machine go, night and day, for eighty years together, at the rate of a hundred thousand strokes every twenty-four hours, having, at every stroke, a great resistance to overcome; and shall continue this action for this length of time, without disorder and without weariness!



This figure will assist the explanation of the following pages. It presents a section of the ventricle and the artery. Suppose that the blood entering in the direction of the arrow, it passes between two valves, of very particular construction. They are of a triangular shape, and held out by little cords, which are called the *cordæ tendineæ*. These cords are attached to muscles, which, from their appearance, are called *columnæ carneæ* and these fibres are continuous with the fibrous substance of the heart itself. Now when the ventricle is distended with blood, the valves are drawn by their tendons in such a manner as almost to close the orifice; and certainly so to dispose them, that the instant the blood takes a direction backward into the vein by the contraction of the ventricle, they fall together, and like a flood-gate stop the current in that direction. Were there no *cordæ tendineæ* or *columnæ carneæ*, these valves would be forced back into the auricle, and lose their office. But the most admirable part of the contrivance is, that the *columnæ carneæ* receiving the same impulse to contract as the walls of the heart itself, act at the same instant with and by contracting in proportion as the walls approach each other, they hold the margins of the valves like the leeches of a sail when bagged by the wind. The blood being prevented passing backward is urged into the great artery still in the direction of the arrow. And now it will be observed that the artery must be dilated when the heart contracts. And the artery itself being both elastic and muscular, reacting upon this impulse, it will contract while the ventricle is dilating. The blood would fall back from the great artery into the ventricle, were it not again prevented by the mechanical intervention of valves. *a* represents the semilunar valve of the aörta at the root of that great artery; and it is a surprising thing to see how offices so nearly alike are performed by a mechanism entirely different. This valve consists of three little bags, which are driven up by the force of the blood in the natural course of the circulation; but when, by the action of the aörta, the blood makes a motion backwards, it fills these three little bags, and they fall together, and prevent the blood flowing back into the heart.]

But further: from the account which has been given of the mechanism of the heart, it is evident that it must require the interposition of *valves;* that the success indeed of its action must depend upon these; for when any one of its cavities contracts, the necessary tendency of the force will be to drive the enclosed blood, not only into the mouth of the artery where it ought to go, but also back again into the mouth of the vein from which it flowed. In like manner, when by the relaxation of the fibres the same cavity is dilated, the blood would not only run into it from the vein, which was the course intended, but back from the artery, through which it ought to be moving forward. The way of preventing a reflux of the fluid, in both these cases, is to fix valves, which, flood-gates, may open a way to the stream in one direction, and shut up the passage against it in another;

heart, constituted as it is, can no more work without
es than a pump can. When the piston descends in
ump, if it were not for the stoppage by the valve be-
th, the motion would only thrust down the water
ch it had before drawn up. A similar consequence
ld frustrate the action of the heart. Valves, there-
, properly disposed, *i. e.*, properly with respect to the
rse of the blood which it is necessary to promote, are
ntial to the contrivance. *And valves so disposed are*
ordingly provided. A valve is placed in the commu-
ation between each auricle and its ventricle, lest, when
ventricle contracts, part of the blood should get back
in into the auricle, instead of the whole entering,
it ought to do, the mouth of the artery. A valve
lso fixed at the mouth of each of the great arteries
ich take the blood from the heart; leaving the pas-
e free, so long as the blood holds its proper course
ward; closing it, whenever the blood, in consequence
the relaxation of the ventricle, would attempt to
w back. There is some variety in the construction
these valves, though all the valves of the body act
rly upon the same principle, and are destined to
same use. In general they consist of a thin mem-
ne, lying close to the side of the vessel, and conse-
ently allowing an open passage while the stream runs
way, but thrust out from the side by the fluid getting
hind it, and opposing the passage of the blood when
vould flow the other way. Where more than one mem-
ne is employed, the different membranes only com-
se one valve. Their joint action fulfils the office of a
ve: for instance; over the entrance of the right au-
le of the heart into the right ventricle, three of these
ns or membranes are fixed, of a triangular figure, the
es of the triangles fastened to the flesh; the sides and
nmits loose; but, though loose, connected by threads
a determinate length, with certain small fleshy pro-
nences adjoining. The effect of this construction is
it, when the ventricle contracts, the blood endeavour-
g to escape in all directions, and amongst other direc-
ns pressing *upwards*, gets *between* these membranes

and the sides of the passage; and thereby forces them up into such a position, as that together they constitute when raised, a hollow cone (the strings before spoken of hindering them from proceeding or separating farther): which cone, entirely occupying the passage, prevents the return of the blood into the auricle. A shorter account of the matter may be this: so long as the blood proceeds in its proper course, the membranes which compose the valve are pressed close to the side of the vessel, and occasion no impediment to the circulation: when the blood would regurgitate, they are raised from the side of the vessel, and, meeting in the middle of its cavity, shut up the channel. Can any one doubt of contrivance here; or is it possible to shut our eyes against the proof of it? [38]

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[38] We cannot resist following up these observations with some minute notices of the appropriate structure. A sail distended with the wind would be torn up, were not the margins secured: accordingly, the canvass is folded over a strong cord, which is called the bolt-rope. So the margins of these semi-lunar valves are as finely finished as any sheet from the dock-yard. There is a ligament which runs along the margin, and strengthens it to sustain the impulse of the back-stroke of the artery. And were those *cordæ tendineæ*, which we have described as like the leeches of a sail, attached to the corner of the mitral valve without further security, they would be torn off on the first pulsation. But as the leeches are secured to the bolt-ropes of the sail, so are the *cordæ tendineæ* continued into firm ligamentous cords which strengthen the valves.

Our author says well, that the valve is thrown down on the side of the artery when the blood is in its course. But were this really the case, the refluent blood would not easily catch the edge of the valve to throw it up. Now this difficulty is met very curiously, and in two different modes. The *cordæ tendineæ* prevent the margins of the mitral valve within the ventricle from flapping close against the side of the cavity; and as to the semi-lunar valves at the root of the great artery, they are prevented falling against the walls in anothermode: the section of the artery at its root is not a regular circle; but it is formed into three little bags or

This valve, also, is not more curious in its structure than it is important in its office. Upon the play of the valve, even upon the proportional length of the strings or fibres which check the ascent of the membranes, depends, as it should seem, nothing less than the life itself of the animal. We may here likewise repeat, what we before observed concerning some of the ligaments of the body, that they could not be formed by any action of

sinuses, and as each of the three valves has a little sinus behind it, its margin never reaches the wall of the artery. The consequence of which is, that in the instant that the column of blood takes a retrograde direction, the margins of the valve are caught, and they are thrown up to close the passage. Nothing can be more admirably mechanical.



Since our author has so properly insisted upon the mechanism of the heart as the very strength of his argument, we shall mention one circumstance more as showing what may be called the perfection of the workmanship. It has been explained that the valves of the great artery consist of three semicircular membranes. Now if we consider the effect of these three semicircles meeting, there must be a triangular space in their centre, an imperfection in the point of their union as it were. To remedy this defect, on the centre of the margin of each valve, there is a little body like a small excrescence or tongue: and when these three bodies meet, they exactly fill up the triangular space which is left in the centre of the three semicircles. It is as if an ingenious workman had contrived a thing the most apposite to remedy a defect.

3 3

the parts themselves. There are cases in which, a
good uses appear to arise from the shape or config
of a part, yet that shape or configuration itself m
to be produced by the action of the part, or by th
or pressure of adjoining parts. Thus the bend
internal smooth concavity of the ribs may be at
to the equal pressure of the soft bowels; the p
shape of some bones and joints, to the traction of
nexed muscles, or to the position of contiguous
But valves could not be so formed. Action and
are all against them. The blood, in its proper
has no tendency to produce such things; and in
proper or reflected current has a tendency to
their production. Whilst we see, therefore, the
necessity of this machinery, we can look to n
account of its origin or formation than the intendin
of a Creator. Nor can we without admiration
that such thin membranes, such weak and tender
ments, as these valves are, should be able to hold
seventy or eighty years.

Here also we cannot consider but with gratitud
happy it is that our vital motions are *involuntary*
should have enough to do, if we had to keep ou
beating and our stomachs at work. Did these
depend, we will not say upon our effort, but up
bidding, our care, or our attention, they would l
leisure for nothing else. We must have been cont
upon the watch, and continually in fear; nor wou
constitution have allowed of sleep.

It might perhaps be expected, that an organ
cious, of such central and primary importance
heart is, should be defended by *a case*. The fact
a membranous purse or bag, made of strong, tou
terials, is provided for it; holding the heart within
vity, sitting loosely and easily about it; guarding i
stance, without confining its motion; and containin
wise a spoonful or two of water, just sufficient to k
surface of the heart in a state of suppleness and m
How should such a loose covering be generated
action of the heart? Does not the enclosing of it in

nswering no other purpose but that enclosure, show the are that has been taken of its preservation?

One use of the circulation of the blood probably amongst other uses) is, to distribute nourishment to the ifferent parts of the body. How minute and multiplied he ramifications of the blood-vessels for that purpose re, and how thickly spread over at least the superficies f the body, is proved by the single observation, that we annot prick the point of a pin into the flesh without rawing blood, *i. e.*, without finding a blood-vessel. Nor nternally is their diffusion less universal. Blood-vessels un along the surface of membranes, pervade the subtance of muscles, penetrate the bones. Even into every ooth we trace, through a small hole in the root, an rtery to feed the bone, as well as a vein to bring back he spare blood from it; both which, with the addition f an accompanying nerve, form a thread only a little hicker than a horsehair.

Wherefore, when the nourishment taken in at the outh has once reached and mixed itself with the blood, very part of the body is in the way of being supplied ith it. And this introduces another grand topic, amely, the manner in which the aliment gets into the *lood;* which is a subject distinct from the preceding, nd brings us to the consideration of another entire sysem of vessels.

III. For this necessary part of the animal economy an pparatus is provided in a great measure capable of being hat anatomists call demonstrated, that is, shown in the ead body; and a line or course of conveyance, which we an pursue by our examinations.

First, the food descends by a wide passage into the instines, undergoing two great preparations on its way: ne in the mouth by mastication and moisture—(can it e doubted with what design the teeth were placed in e road to the stomach, or that there was choice in xing them in this situation?)—the other by digestion the stomach itself. Of this last surprising dissolution say nothing; because it is chemistry, and I am endeauring to display mechanism. The figure and position of the stomach (I speak all along with a reference to the human organ) are calculated for detaining the food long enough for the action of its digestive juice. It has the shape of the pouch of a bagpipe; lies across the body; and the pylorus, or passage by which the food leaves it, is somewhat higher in the body than the cardia or orifice by which it enters; so that it is by the contraction of the muscular coat of the stomach that the contents, after having undergone the application of the gastric menstruum, are gradually pressed out. In dogs and cats, this action of the coats of the stomach has been displayed to the eye. It is a slow and gentle undulation, propagated from one orifice of the stomach to the other. For the same reason that I omitted, for the present, offering any observation upon the digestive fluid, I shall say nothing concerning the bile or the pancreatic juice, further than to observe upon the mechanism, viz., that from the glands in which these secretions are elaborated pipes are laid into the first of the intestines, through which pipes the product of each gland flows into that bowel, and is there mixed with the aliment as soon almost as it passes the stomach; adding also as a remark, how grievously this same bile offends the stomach itself, yet cherishes the vessel that lies next to it.

Secondly. We have now the aliment in the intestines converted into pulp; and though lately consisting of ten different viands, reduced to nearly a uniform substance, and to a state fitted for yielding its essence, which is called chyle, but which is milk, or more nearly resembling milk than any other liquor with which it can be compared. For the straining off this fluid from the digested aliment in the course of its long progress through the body, myriads of capillary tubes, *i. e.*, pipes as small as hairs, open their orifices into the cavity of every part of the intestines. These tubes, which are so fine and slender as not to be visible unless when distended with chyle, soon unite into larger branches. The pipes formed by this union terminate in glands, from which other pipes, of a still larger diameter, arising, carry the *chyle from* all parts into a common reservoir or *recep-*

teals. This receptacle is a bag of size enough to hold about two table-spoons full; and from this vessel a duct or main pipe proceeds, climbing up the back part of the chest, and afterwards creeping along the gullet till it reach the neck. Here it meets the river; here it discharges itself into a large vein, which soon conveys the chyle, now flowing along with the old blood, to the heart. This whole route can be exhibited to the eye; nothing is left to be supplied by imagination or conjecture. Now, besides the subserviency of this structure, collectively considered, to a manifest and necessary purpose, we may remark two or three separate particulars in it, which show, not only the contrivance, but the perfection of it. We may remark, first, the length of the intestines, which, in the human subject, is six times that of the body. Simply for a passage, these voluminous bowels, this prolixity of gut, seems in nowise necessary; but in order to allow time and space for the successive extraction of the chyle from the digestive aliment, namely, that the chyle which escapes the lacteals of one part of the guts may be taken up by those of some other part, the length of the canal is of evident use and conduciveness. Secondly, we must also remark their peristaltic motion, which is made up of contractions following one another like waves upon the surface of a fluid, and not unlike what we observe in the body of an earthworm crawling along the ground, and which is effected by the joint action of longitudinal and of spiral, or rather perhaps of a great number of separate semicircular fibres. This curious action pushes forward the grosser part of the aliment, at the same time that the more subtile parts, which we call chyle, are, by a series of gentle compressions, squeezed into the narrow orifices of the lacteal veins. Thirdly, it was necessary that these tubes, which we denominate lacteals, or their mouths at least, should be made as narrow as possible, in order to deny admission into the blood to any particle which is of size enough to make a lodgment afterwards in the small arteries, and thereby to obstruct the circulation; and it was also necessary that this extreme tenuity should be compensated by multitude; for a large quantity of chyle (in ordinary constitutions not less, it has been computed, than two or three quarts in a day) is, by some means or other, to be passed through them. Accordingly, we find the number of the lacteals exceeding all powers of computation, and their pipes so fine and slender as not to be visible, unless filled, to the naked eye, and their orifices, which open into the intestines, so small as not to be discernible even by the best microscope. Fourthly, the main pipe, which carries the chyle from the reservoir to the blood, viz., the thoracic duct, being fixed in an almost upright position, and wanting that advantage of propulsion which the arteries possess, is furnished with a succession of valves to check the ascending fluid, when once it has passed them, from falling back. These valves look upwards, so as to leave the ascent free, but to prevent the return of the chyle, if, for want of sufficient force to push it on, its weight should at any time cause it to descend. Fifthly, the chyle enters the blood in an odd place, but perhaps the most commodious place possible, viz., at a large vein in the neck, so situated with respect to the circulation as speedily to bring the mixture to the heart. And this seems to be a circumstance of great moment; for had the chyle entered the blood at an artery, or at a distant vein, the fluid composed of the old and the new materials must have performed a considerable part of the circulation before it received that churning in the lungs which is probably necessary for the intimate and perfect union of the old blood with the recent chyle. Who could have dreamt of a communication between the cavity of the intestines and the left great vein of the *neck?* Who could have suspected that this communication should be the medium through which all nourishment is derived to the body, or this the place where, by a side inlet, the important junction is formed between the blood and the material which feeds it?

We postponed the consideration of *digestion*, lest it should interrupt us in tracing the course of the food to the blood; but in treating of the alimentary system, so *principal* a part of the process cannot be omitted.

Of the gastric juice, the immediate agent by which that change which food undergoes in our stomachs is effected, we shall take our account from the numerous, careful, and varied experiments of the Abbé Spallanzani.

1. It is not a simple diluent, but a real solvent. A quarter of an ounce of beef had scarcely touched the stomach of a crow, when the solution began.

2. It has not the nature of saliva; it has not the nature of bile; but is distinct from both. By experiments out of the body, it appears that neither of these secretions acts upon alimentary substances in the same manner as the gastric juice acts.

3. Digestion is not *putrefaction;* for the digesting fluid resists putrefaction most pertinaciously; nay, not only checks its farther progress, but restores putrid substances.

4. It is not a *fermentative* process; for the solution begins at the surface, and proceeds towards the centre, contrary to the order in which fermentation acts and spreads.

5. It is not the *digestion of heat;* for the cold maw of a cod or sturgeon will dissolve the shells of crabs or lobsters, harder than the sides of the stomach which contains them.

In a word, animal digestion carries about it the marks of being a power and a process completely *sui generis*, distinct from every other, at least from every chemical process with which we are acquainted. And the most wonderful thing about it is its appropriation—its subserviency to the particular economy of each animal. The gastric juice of an owl, falcon, or kite will not touch grain; no, not even to finish the macerated and half-digested pulse which is left in the crops of the sparrows that the bird devours. In poultry, the trituration of the gizzard, and the gastric juice, conspire in the work of digestion. The gastric juice will not dissolve the grain whilst it is whole. Entire grains of barley, enclosed in tubes or spherules, are not affected by it. But if the same grain be by any means broken or ground, the gastric juice immediately lays hold of it. Here then is wanted, and here we find, a combination of mechanism and chemistry.[39] For the preparatory grinding the gizzard lends its mill; and as all mill-work should be strong, its structure is so beyond that of any other muscle belonging to the animal. The internal coat also, or lining of the gizzard, is, for the same purpose, hard and cartilaginous. But, forasmuch as this is not the sort of animal substance suited for the reception of glands, or for secretion, the gastric juice, in this family, is not supplied, as in membranous stomachs, by the stomach itself, but by the gullet, in which the feeding-glands are placed; and from which it trickles down into the stomach.

In sheep, the gastric fluid has no effect in digesting plants, *unless they have been previously masticated.* It only produces a slight maceration, nearly such as common water would produce, in a degree of heat somewhat exceeding the medium temperature of the atmosphere. But, provided that the plant has been reduced to pieces by chewing, the gastric juice then proceeds with it, first, by softening its substance; next, by destroying its natural consistency; and, lastly, by dissolving it so completely as not even to spare the toughest and most stringy parts, such as the nerves of the leaves.

So far our accurate and indefatigable Abbé. Dr. Stevens, of Edinburgh, in 1777, found, by experiments tried with perforated balls, that the gastric juice of the sheep and the ox speedily dissolved vegetables, but made no impression upon beef, mutton, and other animal bodies. Mr. Hunter discovered a property of this fluid, of a most curious kind—viz., that in the stomachs of animals which feed upon flesh, irresistibly as this fluid acts upon animal substances, it is only upon the *dead* substance that it operates at all. The *living* fibre suffers no injury from lying in contact with it. Worms and insects are found alive in the stomachs of such animals. The coats of the human stomach, in a healthy state, are insensible to its presence; yet in cases of sudden death (wherein the gastric juice, not having been weakened by disease, retains its activity), it has been known to eat a hole through the bowel which contains it.* How nice is this discrimination of action, yet how necessary!

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[39] One of the many modes by which seeds are carried to a distance, and Sir Joseph Banks gave us reason to believe that it served as a preparation for sowing, as seeds so carried *germinated* sooner.

But to return to our hydraulics.

IV. The gall-bladder is a very remarkable contrivance. It is the reservoir of a canal. It does not form the channel itself—*i. e.*, the direct communication between the liver and the intestine, which is by another passage—viz., the ductus hepaticus, continued under the name of the ductus communis; but it lies adjacent to this channel, joining it by a duct of its own, the ductus cysticus: by which structure it is enabled, as occasion may require, to add its contents to and increase the flow of bile into the duodenum. And the position of the gall-bladder is such as to apply this structure to the best advantage. In its natural situation, it touches the exterior surface of the stomach, and consequently is compressed by the distension of that vessel: the effect of which compression is to force out from the bag, and send into the duodenum, an extraordinary quantity of bile, to meet the extraordinary demand which the repletion of the stomach by food is about to occasion.† Cheselden describes ‡ the gall-bladder as seated against the duodenum, and thereby liable to have its fluid pressed out by the passage of the aliment through that cavity, which likewise will have the effect of causing it to be received into the intestine at a right time and in due proportion.

There may be other purposes answered by this contrivance, and it is probable that there are. The contents of the gall-bladder are not exactly of the same kind as what passes from the liver through the direct passage.§ It is possible that the gall may be changed, and for some purposes meliorated, by keeping.[40]

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[40] On this passage some remarks on the absence of the gall-bladder in certain animals might be required; but the

* Phil. Trans. vol. lxii. p. 447. † Keill's Anat. p. 64.

‡ Anat. p. 164. § Keill (from Malpighius), p. 6

The entrance of the gall-duct into the duodenum furnishes another observation. Whenever either smaller tubes are inserted into larger tubes, or tubes into vessels and cavities, such receiving tubes, vessels, or cavities, being subject to muscular constriction, we always find a contrivance to prevent *regurgitation*. In some cases valves are used; in other cases, amongst which is that now before us, a different expedient is resorted to, which may be thus described: the gall-duct enters the duodenum obliquely; after it has pierced the first coat it runs near two fingers' breadth *between* the coats before it opens into the cavity of the intestine.* The same contrivance is used in another part, where there is exactly the same occasion for it, viz., in the insertion of the ureters in the bladder. These enter the bladder near its neck, running obliquely for the space of an inch between its coats.† It is, in both cases, sufficiently evident that this structure has a necessary mechanical tendency to resist regurgitation; for whatever force acts in such a direction as to urge the fluid back into the orifices of the tubes, must, at the same time, stretch the coats of the vessels, and thereby compress that part of the tube which is included between them.

V. Amongst the *vessels* of the human body, the pipe which conveys the saliva from the place where it is made to the place where it is wanted deserves to be reckoned amongst the most intelligible pieces of mechanism with which we are acquainted. The saliva, we all know, is used in the mouth; but much of it is produced on the outside of the cheek by the parotid gland, which lies between the ear and the angle of the lower jaw. In order to carry the secreted juice to its destination, there is laid from the gland on the outside a pipe about the thickness of a wheat straw, and about three fingers' breadth in length, which, after riding over the masseter muscle, bores for itself a hole through the very middle of

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reader may turn to the note in the Appendix on the stomach of the horse.

* *Keill's* Anat. p. 62.   † Ches. Anat. p. 260.

eek, enters by that hole, which is a complete per-
on of the buccinator muscle, into the mouth, and
discharges its fluid very copiously.

. Another exquisite structure, differing, indeed,
the four preceding instances in that it does not re-
to the conveyance of fluids, but still belonging, like
e, to the class of pipes or conduits of the body, is
in the *larynx*. We all know that there go down
throat two pipes, one leading to the stomach, the
er to the lungs—the one being the passage for the
d, the other for the breath and voice; we know also,
t both these passages open into the bottom of the
outh—the gullet, necessarily, for the conveyance of
od, and the wind-pipe, for speech and the modulation
sound, not much less so: therefore the difficulty was
he passages being so contiguous, to prevent the food
specially the liquids which we swallow into the stomach,
rom entering the wind-pipe, *i. e.*, the road to the lungs
—the consequence of which error, when it does happen,
is perceived by the convulsive throes that are instantly
produced. This business, which is very nice, is managed in this manner. The gullet (the passage for food) opens into the mouth like the cone or upper part of a funnel, the capacity of which forms indeed the bottom of the mouth. Into the side of this funnel, at the part which lies the lowest, enters the wind-pipe by a chink or slit, with a lid or flap, like a little tongue, accurately fitted to the orifice. The solids or liquids which we swallow pass over this lid or flap as they descend by the funnel into the gullet. Both the weight of the food and the action of the muscles concerned in swallowing contribute to keep the lid close down upon the aperture whilst anything is passing; whereas, by means of its natural cartilaginous spring, it raises itself a little as soon as the food is passed, thereby allowing a free inlet and outlet for the respiration of air by the lungs. Such is its structure, and we may here remark the almost complete success of the expedient, viz., how seldom it fails of its purpose compared with the number of instances in which it fulfils it. Reflect how frequently we

swallow, how constantly we breathe. In a city-feast, for example, what deglutition, what anhelation! yet does this little cartilage, the epiglottis, so effectually interpose its office, so securely guard the entrance of the wind-pipe, that whilst morsel after morsel, draught after draught are coursing one another over it, an accident of a crumb or a drop slipping into this passage (which, nevertheless, must be opened for the breath every second of time) excites in the whole company, not only alarm by its danger, but surprise by its novelty. Not two guests are choked in a century.

There is no room for pretending that the action of the parts may have gradually formed the epiglottis: I do not mean in the same individuals, but in a succession of generations. Not only the action of the parts has no such tendency, but the animal could not live, nor consequently the parts act, either without it or with it in a half-formed state. The species was not to wait for the gradual formation or expansion of a part which was from the first necessary to the life of the individual.

Not only is the larynx curious, but the whole wind-pipe possesses a structure adapted to its peculiar office. It is made up (as any one may perceive by putting his fingers to his throat) of stout cartilaginous ringlets, placed at small and equal distances from one another. Now this is not the case with any other of the numerous conduits of the body. The use of these cartilages is to keep the passage for the air *constantly* open, which they do mechanically. A pipe with soft membranous coats, liable to collapse and close when empty, would not have answered here; although this be the general vascular structure, and a structure which serves very well for those tubes which are kept in a state of perpetual distension by the fluid they enclose, or which afford a passage to solid and protruding substances.

Nevertheless (which is another particularity well worthy of notice), these rings are not complete—that is, are not cartilaginous and stiff all round; but their hinder part, which is contiguous to the gullet, is membranous *and soft, easily* yielding to the distensions of that organ occasioned by the descent of solid food. The same rings are also bevelled off at the upper and lower edges, the better to close upon one another when the trachea is compressed or shortened.

The constitution of the trachea may suggest likewise another reflection. The membrane which lines its inside is perhaps the most sensible, irritable membrane of the body. It rejects the touch of a crumb of bread, or a drop of water, with a spasm which convulses the whole frame; yet, left to itself and its proper office, the intromission of air alone, nothing can be so quiet. It does not even make itself felt; a man does not know that he has a trachea. This capacity of perceiving with such acuteness, this impatience of offence, yet perfect rest and ease when let alone, are properties, one would have thought, not likely to reside in the same subject. It is to the junction, however, of these almost inconsistent qualities, in this, as well as in some other delicate parts of the body, that we owe our safety and our comfort —our safety to their sensibility, our comfort to their repose.[41]

[41] Our author touches here upon the sensibilities which govern the motions of the chest—a subject which might be enlarged upon to fill a volume. But considering the object of this work, we ought not to omit the occasion of observing the union of a property of life with the most complex mechanical structure imaginable. We have seen, in former notes, that for the grand and vital purpose of decarbonizing the blood, the atmospheric air must be drawn deep into the lungs; and the problem is, to permit the vital air to pass, and yet prevent foreign matter from finding access. On this subject there is a note in the Appendix. But the more remarkable circumstance in connexion with the statement in the text is, that the whole of this apparatus for respiration is taken from the governance of the will, and placed under a power more constantly vigilant and more absolutely peremptory. The sensibility about the glottis holds in control a hundred muscles; and whilst it excites the action, directs the force of the stream of expired air with extraordinary exactness to the very point where the irritating matter

The larynx, or rather the whole wind-pipe taken together (for the larynx is only the upper part of the wind-pipe), besides its other uses, is also a musical instrument —that is to say, it is *mechanism* expressly adapted to the modulation of sound; for it has been found upon trial, that, by relaxing or tightening the tendinous bands at the extremity of the wind-pipe, and blowing in at the other end, all the cries and notes might be produced of which the living animal was capable. It can be sounded just as a pipe or flute is sounded.

Birds, says Bonnet, have, at the lower end of the wind-pipe, a conformation like the reed of a hautboy, for the modulation of their notes. A tuneful bird is a ventriloquist. The seat of the song is in the breast.

The use of the lungs *in* the system has been said to be obscure; one use, however, is plain, though, in some sense, external to the system, and that is, the formation, in conjunction with the larynx, of voice and speech. They are, to animal utterance, what the bellows are to the organ.[42]

For the sake of method, we have considered animal bodies under three divisions: their bones, their muscles, and their vessels; and we have stated our observations upon these parts separately. But this is to diminish the strength of the argument. The wisdom of the Creator is seen, not in their separate but their collective action;

be it in the passages of the throat, or in the cavities of the nose. There are many instances of the same kind in the economy of the frame, where actions are excited by sensibilities seated in certain spots, some of them attended with suffering, by which our voluntary efforts are brought in aid and others where there is neither sensation nor volition, and yet the muscles are controlled and regulated, and the offices performed, with undeviating precision.

[42] The subject admits of a much more extensive application of physical science; and one division of it will be found treated in the Appendix.

r mutual subserviency and dependence; in their
uting *together* to one effect and one use. It has
said, that a man cannot lift his hand to his head
t finding enough to convince him of the existence
God. And it is well said; for he has only to
, familiar as this action is, and simple as it seems
how many things are requisite for the performing
how many things which we understand, to say no-
of many more, probably, which we do not: viz.,
long, hard, strong cylinder, in order to give to the
s firmness and tension; but which being rigid, and
substance inflexible, can only turn upon joints; se-
, therefore, joints for this purpose; one at the
er to raise the arm, another at the elbow to bend
se joints continually fed with a soft mucilage to
the parts slip easily upon one another, and holden
er by strong braces, to keep them in their position:
thirdly, strings and wires—*i. e.*, muscles and ten-
-artificially inserted, for the purpose of drawing
nes in the directions in which the joints allow them
ve. Hitherto we seem to understand the mechan-
retty well; and, understanding this, we possess
h for our conclusion: Nevertheless, we have hi-
only a machine standing still—a dead organization
apparatus. To put the system in a state of activity,
it at work, a further provision is necessary—viz., a
unication with the brain by means of nerves. We
the existence of this communication, because we
e the communicating threads, and can trace them to
rain: its necessity we also know, because if the
l be cut, if the communication be intercepted, the
e becomes paralytic; but beyond this we know
the organization being too minute and subtile for
spection.

what has been enumerated, as officiating in the sin-
t of a man's raising his hand to his head, must be
likewise all that is necessary and all that contri-
to the growth, nourishment, and sustentation of
nb, the repair of its waste, the preservation of its

health: such as the circulation of the blood every part of it; its lymphatics, exhalents, ab its excretions and integuments. All these sha result—join in the effect; and how all these, o them, come together without a designing, disposi ligence, it is impossible to conceive.

CHAPTER XI.

OF THE ANIMAL STRUCTURE REGARDED AS A MASS.

CONTEMPLATING *an animal body* in its collective capacity, we cannot forget to notice what a number of instruments are brought together, and often within how small a compass. It is a cluster of contrivances. In a canary-bird, for instance, and in the single ounce of matter which composes his body (but which seems to be all employed), we have instruments for eating, for digesting, for nourishment, for breathing, for generation, for running, for flying, for seeing, for hearing, for smelling: each appropriate—each entirely different from all the rest.

The human or indeed the animal frame, considered as a mass or assemblage, exhibits in its composition three properties, which have long struck my mind as indubitable evidences not only of design, but of a great deal of attention and accuracy in prosecuting the design.

I. The first is, the exact correspondency of the two sides of the same animal: the right hand answering to the left, leg to leg, eye to eye, one side of the countenance to the other; and with a precision, to imitate which in any tolerable degree forms one of the difficulties of statuary, and requires, on the part of the artist, a constant attention to this property of his work, distinct from every other.

It is the most difficult thing that can be to get a wig made even; yet how seldom is the *face* awry! And what care is taken that it should not be so, the anatomy of its bones demonstrates. The upper part of the face is composed of thirteen bones, six on each side, answering each to each, and the thirteenth, without a fellow, in the

middle. The lower part of the face is in lik
composed of six bones, three on each side, res
corresponding, and the lower jaw in the cen
building an arch, could more be done in orde
the curve *true*—*i. e.*, the parts equi-distant
middle, alike in figure and position?

The exact resemblance of the *eyes*, conside
compounded this organ is in its structure, ho
and how delicate are the shades of colour with
iris is tinged; how differently, as to effect upo
ance, the eye may be mounted in its socket,
differently in different heads eyes actually are
property of animal bodies much to be admired.
thousand eyes, I do not know that it would be p
match one, except with its own fellow; or to
them into suitable pairs by any other selection t
which obtains.

This regularity of the animal structure is
more remarkable by the three following
tions:—

1. The limbs, *separately* taken, have not this
tion of parts, but the contrary of it. A knif
down the chine cuts the human body into two p
ternally equal and alike; you cannot draw a stra
which will divide a hand, a foot, the leg, the th
cheek, the eye, the ear, into two parts equal an
Those parts which are placed upon the middle
tion line of the body, or which traverse that line
nose, the tongue, and the lips—may be so div
more properly speaking, are double organs; b
parts cannot. This shows that the corresponden
we have been describing does not arise by any
in the nature of the subject; for, if necessary, it
universal; whereas it is observed only in the
assemblage. It is not true of the separate parts
to say, it is found where it conduces to beauty or
it is not found where it would subsist at the ex
both. The two wings of a bird always correspo
two sides of a feather frequently do not. In cen
millepedes, and the whole tribe of insects, no

on the same side are alike; yet there is the most exact parity between the legs opposite to one another.

2. The next circumstance to be remarked is, that, whilst the cavities of the body are so configurated, as *externally* to exhibit the most exact correspondency of the opposite sides, the contents of these cavities have no such correspondency. A line drawn down the middle of the breast divides the thorax into two sides exactly similar; yet these two sides enclose very different contents. The heart lies on the left side; a lobe of the lungs on the right; balancing each other neither in size nor shape. The same thing holds of the abdomen. The liver lies on the right side, without any similar viscus opposed to it on the left. The spleen indeed is situated over-against the liver; but agreeing with the liver neither in bulk nor form. There is no equipollency between these. The stomach is a vessel, both irregular in its shape, and oblique in its position. The foldings and doublings of the intestines do not present a parity of sides. Yet that symmetry which depends upon the correlation of the sides is externally preserved throughout the whole trunk; and is the more remarkable in the lower parts of it, as the integuments are soft; and the shape, consequently, is not, as the thorax is by its ribs, reduced by natural stays. It is evident, therefore, that the external proportion does not arise from any equality in the shape or pressure of the internal contents. What is it, indeed, but a correction of inequalities?—an adjustment, by mutual compensation, of anomalous forms into a regular congeries?—the effect, in a word, of artful, and, if we might be permitted so to speak, of studied collocation?

3. Similar also to this is the third observation: that an internal inequality in the feeding vessels is so managed as to produce no inequality of parts which were intended to correspond. The right arm answers accurately to the left, both in size and shape; but the arterial branches which supply the two arms do not go off from their trunk, in a pair, in the same manner, at the same place, or at the same angle. Under which want of similitude, it is very difficult to conceive how the same quantity of blood

should be pushed through each artery; yet the result is right; the two limbs which are nourished by them perceive no difference of supply—no effects of excess or deficiency.

Concerning the difference of manner in which the subclavian and carotid arteries, upon the different sides of the body, separate themselves from the aörta, Cheselden seems to have thought, that the advantage which the left gain by going off at an angle much more acute than the right, is made up to the right by their going off together in one branch.* It is very possible that this may be the compensating contrivance; and if it be so, how curious—how hydrostatical!

II. Another perfection of the animal mass is the *package*. I know nothing which is so surprising. Examine the contents of the trunk of any large animal. Take notice how soft, how tender, how intricate they are; how constantly in action, how necessary to life. Reflect upon the danger of any injury to their substance, any derangement of their position, any obstruction to their office. Observe the heart pumping at the centre at the rate of eighty strokes in a minute; one set of pipes carrying the stream away from it, another set bringing in its course, the fluid back to it again; the lungs performing their elaborate office, viz., distending and contracting their many thousand vesicles by a reciprocation which cannot cease for a minute; the stomach exercising its powerful chemistry; the bowels silently propelling the changed aliment; collecting from it, as it proceeds, and transmitting to the blood, an incessant supply of prepared and assimilated nourishment; that blood pursuing its course; the liver, the kidneys, the pancreas, the parotid, with many other known and distinguishable glands, drawing off from it, all the while, their proper secretions. These several operations, together with others more subtile but less capable of being investigated, are going on within us at one and the same time. Think of this; and then observe how the body itself, the case which holds this machinery, is rolled, and jolted, and tossed about, the mechanism remaining unhurt, and with very little molestation even of its nicest motions. Observe a rope-dancer, a tumbler, or a monkey; the sudden inversions and contortions which the internal parts sustain by the postures into which their bodies are thrown; or rather observe the shocks which these parts, even in ordinary subjects, sometimes receive from falls and bruises, or by abrupt jerks and twists, without sensible or with soon-recovered damage. Observe this, and then reflect how firmly every part must be secured, how carefully surrounded, how well tied down and packed together.

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* Ches. Anat. p. 184, ed. 7.

This property of animal bodies has never, I think, been considered under a distinct head, or so fully as it deserves. I may be allowed therefore, in order to verify my observation concerning it, to set forth a short anatomical detail, though it oblige me to use more technical language than I should wish to introduce into a work of this kind.

1. The *heart* (such care is taken of the centre of life) is placed between two soft lobes of the lungs; is *tied* to the mediastinum and to the pericardium; which pericardium is not only itself an exceedingly strong membrane, but *adheres* firmly to the duplicature of the mediastinum, and, by its point, to the middle tendon of the diaphragm. The heart is also *sustained* in its place by the great blood-vessels which issue from it.*

2. The *lungs* are *tied* to the sternum by the mediastinum before; to the vertebræ by the pleura behind. It seems indeed to be the very use of the mediastinum (which is a membrane that goes straight through the middle of the thorax, from the breast to the back) to keep the contents of the thorax in their places; in particular to hinder one lobe of the lungs from incommoding another, or the parts of the lungs from pressing upon each other when we lie on one side.†

3. The *liver* is fastened in the body by two ligaments: the first, which is large and strong, comes from the

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* Keill's Anat. p. 107, ed. 3.

† Ib. p. 119, ed. 3.

covering of the diaphragm, and penetrates the substance of the liver; the second is the umbilical vein, which, after birth, degenerates into a ligament. The first, which is the principal, fixes the liver in its situation whilst the body holds an erect posture; the second prevents it from pressing upon the diaphragm when we lie down; and both together *sling* or suspend the liver when we lie upon our backs, so that it may not compress or obstruct the ascending vena cava,* to which belongs the important office of returning the blood from the body to the heart.

4. The *bladder* is tied to the navel by the urachus, transformed into a ligament: thus what was a passage for urine to the fœtus, becomes, after birth, a support or stay to the bladder. The peritonæum also keeps the viscera from confounding themselves with, or pressing irregularly upon, the bladder; for the kidneys and bladder are contained in a distinct duplicature of that membrane, being thereby partitioned off from the other contents of the abdomen.

5. The *kidneys* are lodged in a bed of fat.

6. The *pancreas*, or sweetbread, is strongly tied to the peritonæum, which is the great wrapping sheet, that encloses all the bowels contained in the lower belly.†

7. The *spleen* also is confined to its place by an adhesion to the peritonæum and diaphragm, and by a connexion with the omentum.‡ It is possible, in my opinion, that the spleen may be merely a *stuffing*, a soft cushion to fill up a vacancy or hollow, which, unless occupied, would leave the package loose and unsteady: for, supposing that it answers no other purpose than this, it must be vascular, and admit of a circulation through it, in order to be kept alive, or be a part of a living body.[43]

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* Ches. Anat. p. 162.

† Keill's Anat. p. 57.

‡ Ches. Anat. p. 167.

[43] Our author has not failed to fall into the snare which lies in the path of the adventurous theorist. We have here a new theory of the spleen. The spleen in truth has a double office: it is ever found attached to the digesting part of the *intestinal* canal; and is reasonably considered to afford occa-

8. The *omentum*, epiplöon, or cawl, is an apron tucked up, or doubling upon itself, at its lowest part. The upper edge is tied to the bottom of the stomach, to the spleen, as hath already been observed, and to part of the duodenum. The reflected edge also, after forming the doubling, comes up behind the front flap, and is tied to the colon and adjoining viscera.*

9. The septa of the brain probably prevent one part of the organ from pressing with too great a weight upon another part. The processes of the dura mater divide the cavity of the skull, like so many inner partition walls, and thereby confine each hemisphere and lobe of the brain to the chamber which is assigned to it, without its being liable to rest upon or intermix with the neighbouring parts. The great art and caution of packing is to prevent one thing hurting another. This, in the head, the chest, and the abdomen, of an animal body, is, amongst other methods, provided for by membranous partitions and wrappings, which keep the parts separate.

The above may serve as a short account of the manner in which the principal viscera are sustained in their places. But of the provisions for this purpose, by far, in my opinion, the most curious, and where also such a provision was most wanted, is in the *guts*. It is pretty evident, that a long narrow tube (in man, about five times the length of the body) laid from side to side in folds upon one another, winding in oblique and circuitous directions, composed also of a soft and yielding substance, must, without some extraordinary precaution for its safety, be continually displaced by the various, sudden, and abrupt motions of the body which contains it. I should expect that, if not bruised or wounded by every fall, or leap, or twist, it would be entangled, or be involved with itself; or, at the least, slipped and shaken out of the order in which it is disposed, and which order

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sional increase of circulation to the stomach, and to supply blood to the liver of that quality which appears necessary to a copious secretion of bile.

* Ches. Anat. p. 167.

is necessary to be preserved for the carrying
important functions which it has to execute in t
economy. Let us see, therefore, how a danger s
and yet so natural to the length, narrowness, an
form of the part, is provided against. The ex
admirable; and it is this. The intestinal canal,
out its whole process, is knit to the edge of a
membrane called the mesentery. It forms the
this mesentery, being stitched and fastened to i
edging of a ruffle: being four times as long a
sentery itself, it is what a sempstress would call
ered or gathered on" to it. This is the natu
connexion of the gut with the mesentery; and b
joined to, or rather made a part of, the mes
is folded and wrapped up together with it.
mesentery, having a considerable dimension in
being in its substance withal both thick and
capable of a close and safe holding, in compariso
the intestinal tube would admit of, if it had
loose. The mesentery likewise not only kee
testinal canal in its proper place and position
the turns and windings of its course, but sustains
berless small vessels, the arteries, the veins, the
ducts, and, above all, the lacteals, which lead f
almost every point of its coats and cavity. T
brane, which appears to be the great support an
of the alimentary apparatus, is itself strongly t
first three vertebræ of the loins.*

III. A third general property of animal forms
I do not mean relative beauty, or that of one i
above another of the same species, or of one spe
pared with another species; but I mean, generally
vision which is made in the body of almost eve
to adapt its appearance to the perception of th
with which it converses. In our own specie
ample, only consider what the parts and materi
which the fairest body is composed; and no fu
servation will be necessary to show how well the

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* Keill's Anat. p. 45.

are wrapped up, so as to form a mass which shall be capable of symmetry in its proportion, and of beauty in its aspect; how the bones are covered, the bowels concealed, the roughnesses of the muscle smoothed and softened; and how over the whole is drawn an integument, which converts the disgusting materials of a dissecting-room into an object of attraction to the sight, or one upon which it rests at least with ease and satisfaction. Much of this effect is to be attributed to the intervention of the cellular or adipose membrane, which lies immediately under the skin; is a kind of lining to it; is moist, soft, slippery, and compressible; everywhere filling up the interstices of the muscles, and forming thereby their roundness and flowing line, as well as the evenness and polish of the whole surface.

All which seems to be a strong indication of design, and of a design studiously directed to this purpose. And it being once allowed that such a purpose existed with respect to *any* of the productions of nature, we may refer, with a considerable degree of probability, other particulars to the same intention; such as the tints of flowers, the plumage of birds, the furs of beasts, the bright scales of fishes, the painted wings of butterflies and beetles, the rich colours and spotted lustre of many tribes of insects.

There are parts also of animals ornamental, and the properties by which they are so not subservient, that we know of, to any other purpose. The *irides* of most animals are very beautiful, without conducing at all, by their beauty, to the perfection of vision; and nature could in no part have employed her pencil to so much advantage, because no part presents itself so conspicuously to the observer, or communicates so great an effect to the whole aspect.

In plants, especially in the flowers of plants, the principle of beauty holds a still more considerable place in their composition; is still more confessed than in animals. Why, for one instance out of a thousand, does the corolla of the tulip, when advanced to its size and maturity, change its colour? The purposes, so far as we

that this property, which is independent, as i
seem, of the wants and utilities of the plant, w
lated for beauty, intended for display?

A ground, I know, of objection has been taker
the whole topic of argument, namely, that the
such thing as beauty at all; in other words, th
ever is useful and familiar comes of course to be
beautiful; and that things appear to be so, only
alliance with these qualities. Our idea of beau
pable of being in so great a degree modified b
by fashion, by the experience of advantage or
and by associations arising out of that experienc
question has been made, whether it be not al
generated by these causes, or would have any pr
istence without them. It seems, however, a car
the conclusion too far, to deny the existence of t
ciple, viz., a native capacity of perceiving beaut
count of an influence, or of varieties proceeding f
influence, to which it is subject, seeing that princ
most acknowledged are liable to be affected in t
manner. I should rather argue thus:—The
respects objects of sight. Now every other se
its distinction of agreeable and disagreeable. Son

stes. In like manner, smells affect the nose with sen-
tions pleasurable or disgusting. Some sounds, or com-
sitions of sound, delight the ear: others torture it.
abit can do much in all these cases (and it is well for
that it can; for it is this power which reconciles us to
any necessities): but has the distinction, in the mean
me, of agreeable and disagreeable, no foundation in the
nse itself? What is true of the other senses is most pro-
bly true of the eye (the analogy is irresistible), viz.,
at there belongs to it an original constitution, fitted to
ceive pleasure from some impressions, and pain from
hers.

I do not however know, that the argument which al-
ges beauty as a final cause rests upon this concession.
e possess a sense of beauty, however we come by it.
in fact exists. Things are not indifferent to this sense;
l objects do not suit it; many, which we see, are agree-
le to it: many others disagreeable. It is certainly
t the effect of habit upon the particular object, be-
use the most agreeable objects are often the most rare;
any which are very common, continue to be offensive.
they be made supportable by habit, it is all which
bit can do; they never become agreeable. If this
nse, therefore, be acquired, it is a result; the produce
numerous and complicated actions of external objects
on the senses, and of the mind upon its sensations.
ith this *result*, there must be a certain congruity to
able any particular object to please; and that con-
uity, we contend, is consulted in the *aspect* which is
ven to animal and vegetable bodies.

IV. The skin and covering of animals is that upon
hich their appearance chiefly depends; and it is that
rt which, perhaps, in all animals, is most decorated,
d most free from impurities. But were beauty, or
reeableness of aspect, entirely out of the question,
ere is another purpose answered by this integument,
d by the collocation of the parts of the body beneath
which is of still greater importance; and that purpose
concealment. Were it possible to view through the
in the mechanism of our bodies, the sight would

frighten us out of our wits. "Durst we mak
movement," asks a lively French writer, "or
from the place we were in, if we *saw* our bloo
ing, the tendons pulling, the lungs blowing, the
filtrating, and all the incomprehensible asse
fibres, tubes, pumps, valves, currents, pivots, w
tain an existence at once so frail and so presum

V. Of animal bodies, considered as masses,
another property, more curious than it is
thought to be; which is the faculty of *standin*
is more remarkable in two-legged animals than
rupeds, and, most of all, as being the tallest, ar
upon the smallest base, in man. There is more
in the matter than we are aware of. The st
man, placed loosely upon a pedestal, would not
of standing half an hour. You are obliged to fi
to the block by bolts and solder; or the first s
first gust of wind, is sure to throw it down.
statue shall express all the mechanical proport
living model. It is not therefore the mere figure,
placing the centre of gravity within the base, tha
cient. Either the law of gravitation is susp
favour of living substances, or something more
for them, in order to enable them to uphold t
ture. There is no reason whatever to doubt,
their parts descend by gravitation in the same
those of dead matter. The gift therefore app
to consist in a faculty of perpetually shifting th
of gravity, by a set of obscure, indeed, but o
balancing actions, so as to keep the line of d
which is a line drawn from that centre to the
within its prescribed limits. Of these actions i
st, that they in part constitute wha
he dead body drops down. The
efore of weight and pressure, whic
moment after death as the momen
ort the column. In cases also of
patient cannot stand upright. S
tions are only in a small degree v
seldom conscious of his voluntary

keeping himself upon his legs. A child learning to walk is the greatest posture-master in the world: but art, if it may be so called, sinks into habit; and he is soon able to poise himself in a great variety of attitudes, without being sensible either of caution or effort. But still there must be an aptitude of parts, upon which habit can thus attach; a previous capacity of motions which the animal is thus taught to exercise: and the facility with which this exercise is acquired forms one object of our admiration. What parts are principally employed, or in what manner each contributes to its office, is, as hath already been confessed, difficult to explain. Perhaps the obscure motion of the bones of the feet may have their share in this effect. They are put in action by every slip or vacillation of the body, and seem to assist in restoring its balance. Certain it is, that this circumstance in the structure of the foot, viz., its being composed of many small bones, applied to and articulating with one another by diversely-shaped surfaces, instead of being made of one piece, like the last of a shoe, is very remarkable.



I suppose also that it would be difficult to stand firmly upon stilts or wooden legs, though their base exactly imitated the figure and dimensions of the sole of the foot. The alternation of the joints, the knee-joint bending backward, the hip-joint forward; the flexibility, in every direction, of the spine, especially in the loins neck, appear to be of great moment in preservi equilibrium of the body. With respect to this cumstance, it is observable, that the vertebræ are fined by ligaments as to allow no more slipping, their bases, than what is just sufficient to break the shock which any violent motion may occasion to the body. A certain degree also of tension of the sinews appears to be essential to an erect posture; for it is by the loss of this that the dead or paralytic body drops down. The whole is a wonderful result of combined powers, and of very complicated operations. Indeed, that *standing* is not so simple a business as we imagine it to be, is evident from the strange gesticulations of a drunken man, who has lost the government of the centre of gravity.[44]

We have said that this property is the most worthy of observation in the *human* body; but a *bird*, resting upon its perch, or hopping upon a spray, affords no mean specimen of the same faculty. A chicken runs off as soon as it is hatched from the egg; yet a chicken, considered geometrically, and with relation to its centre of gravity, its line of direction, and its equilibrium, is a very irregular solid. Is this gift, therefore, or instruction? May it not be said to be with great attention that nature hath balanced the body upon its pivots?

I observe also in the same *bird* a piece of useful mechanism of this kind. In the trussing of a fowl, upon bending the legs and thighs up towards the body, the cook finds that the claws close of their own accord. Now let it be remembered, that this is the position of the limbs in which the bird rests upon its perch. And in this position it sleeps in safety; for the claws do their office in keeping hold of the support—not by any exertion of voluntary power, which sleep might suspend, but by the traction of the tendons in consequence of the attitude which the legs and thighs take by the bird sitting down, and to which the mere weight of the body gives the force that is necessary.

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[44] All this is admirably well put by our author. Yet when he says "the gift consists in the faculty of perpetually shifting the centre of gravity, by a set of obscure, indeed, but of quick balancing actions," he states a fact, but omits the most surprising circumstance of all. No doubt such efforts are made; but what directs them? If a man should balance a staff, resting it on the point of the finger, he shifts the finger continually, in doing which he is directed by the eye—he sees the staff inclining. How does a man judge of the inclination of his body in the very first degree of deviation from the perpendicular? He does not see himself, nor is he directed by the objects around him, since a blind man will stand as securely as one who sees. The fact is, that he has a knowledge of muscular action—a sensibility to the finest adjustment of the muscles, by which he directs their efforts. This sense is of all the most marvellous: a sensibility to an internal motion, more minute and curious than are the sensibilities to external impression; and which, as may be easily proved, ministers to a variety of properties in the living body, *and especially* to the organs of sense themselves.

VI. Regarding the human body as a mass; regarding the general conformations which obtain in it; regarding also particular parts in respect to those conformations; we shall be led to observe what I call "interrupted analogies." The following are examples of what I mean by these terms; and I do not know how such critical deviations can, by any possible hypothesis, be accounted for without design.

1. All the bones of the body are covered with a *periosteum*, except the teeth, where it ceases; and an enamel of ivory, which saws and files will hardly touch, comes into its place. No one can doubt of the use and propriety of this difference; of the "analogy" being thus "interrupted;" of the rule, which belongs to the conformation of the bones, stopping where it does stop; for, had so exquisitely sensible a membrane as the periosteum invested the teeth, as it invests every other bone of the body, their action, necessary exposure, and irritation, would have subjected the animal to continual pain. General as it is, it was not the sort of integument which suited the teeth; what they stood in need of was a strong, hard, insensible, defensive coat; and exactly such a covering is given to them, in the ivory enamel which adheres to their surface.[45]

2. The scarf-skin, which clothes all the rest
body, gives way, at the extremities of the toe

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[45] See *the* dissertation on the teeth, in the Appen

fingers, to *nails*. A man has only to look at his hand, to observe with what nicety and precision that covering, which extends over every other part, is here superseded by a different substance and a different texture. Now, if either the rule had been necessary, or the deviation from it accidental, this effect would not be seen. When I speak of the rule being necessary, I mean the formation of the skin upon the surface being produced by a set of causes constituted without design, and acting, as all ignorant causes must act, by a general operation. Were this the case, no account could be given of the operation being suspended at the fingers' ends, or on the back part of the fingers, and not on the fore part. On the other hand: if the deviation were accidental, an error, an anomalism—were it any thing else than settled by intention—we should meet with nails upon other parts of the body: they would be scattered over the surface, like warts or pimples.[46]

3. All the great cavities of the body are enclosed by membranes, except the *skull*. Why should not the brain be content with the same covering as that which serves for the other principal organs of the body? The heart, the lungs, the liver, the stomach, the bowels, have all soft integuments, and nothing else. The muscular coats are all soft and membranous. I can see a reason for this distinction in the final cause, but in no other. The in-

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[46] The human nail is calculated to support the cushion of the extremity of the finger, and is important to us in grasping or holding any thing; but more so still in sustaining that cushion as the chief organ of touch. There are other parts of the body which have exquisite sensibility, yet they are not provided so as to give us that information of the condition of matter which we have through the finger, and in a lesser degree through the whole inner surface of the hand. We easily feel, for example, the pulsation of the artery at the wrist, through the combination of the sensibility of the nerve of touch with the elastic cushion of the finger. The best proof of the use of the elastic cushion is this:—Although the tip of the tongue feels so exquisitely that the presence of a *hair of wool* troubles us, yet if we apply it to the pulse we *shall not be* sensible of the beat

portance of the brain to life (which experience proves to be immediate), and the extreme tenderness of its substance, make a solid case more necessary for it, than for any other part; and such a case the hardness of the skull supplies.[47] When the smallest portion of this natural casket is lost, how carefully, yet how imperfectly, is it replaced by a plate of metal! If an anatomist should say, that this bony protection is not confined to the brain, but is extended along the course of the spine, I answer, that he adds strength to the argument. If he remark, that the chest also is fortified by bones, I reply that I should have alleged this instance myself, if the ribs had not appeared subservient to the purpose of motion as well as of defence. What distinguishes the skull from every other cavity is, that the bony covering completely surrounds its contents, and is calculated, not for motion, but solely for defence. Those hollows, likewise, and inequalities which we observe in the inside of the skull, and which exactly fit the folds of the brain, answer the important design of keeping the substance of the brain steady, and of guarding it against concussions.

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[47] There is a note upon the form of the skull in the Appendix, which may interest the reader.

CHAPTER XII.

COMPARATIVE ANATOMY.

WHENEVER we find a general plan pursued, yet with such variations in it as are, in each case, required by the particular exigency of the subject to which it is applied, we possess, in such a plan and such adaptation, the strongest evidence that can be afforded of intelligence and design: an evidence which the most completely excludes every other hypothesis. If the general plan proceeded from any fixed necessity in the nature of things, how could it accommodate itself to the various wants and uses which it had to serve under different circumstances, and on different occasions? *Arkwright's* mill was invented for the spinning of cotton. We see it employed for the spinning of wool, flax, and hemp, with such modifications of the original principle, such variety in the same plan, as the texture of those different materials rendered necessary. Of the machine's being put together with design, if it were possible to doubt whilst we saw it only under one mode, and in one form; when we came to observe it in its different applications, with such changes of structure, such additions and supplements, as the special and particular use in each case demanded, we could not refuse any longer our assent to the proposition—"that intelligence, properly and strictly so called (including, under that name, foresight, consideration, reference to utility), had been employed, as well in the primitive plan, as in the several changes and accommodations which it is made to undergo."

Very much of this reasoning is applicable to what has been called *Comparative Anatomy*. In their general economy, in the outlines of the plan, in the construction *as well as* offices of their principal parts, there exists

n all large terrestrial animals a close resemblance.
life is sustained, and the body nourished, by nearly
ıe apparatus. The heart, the lungs, the stomach,
ɜr, the kidneys, are much alike in all. The same
'or no distinction of blood has been observed) cir-
through their vessels, and nearly in the same
The same cause, therefore, whatever that cause
ıs been concerned in the origin, has governed the
tion, of these different animal forms.

ɜn we pass on to smaller animals, or to the in-
ts of a different element, the resemblance becomes
istant and more obscure; but still the plan accom-
us.

, what we can never enough commend, and which
r business at present to exemplify, the plan is at-
through all its varieties and deflections, by sub-
ces to special occasions and utilities.

'he *covering* of different animals (though whether
ɔrrect in classing this under their anatomy, I do
ow) is the first thing which presents itself to our
tion; and is, in truth, both for its variety and its
ɜness to their several natures, as much to be ad-
ıs any part of their structure. We have bristles,
ool, furs, feathers, quills, prickles, scales; yet in
'ersity both of material and form, we cannot change
mal's coat for another, without evidently changing
ıe worse;—taking care, however, to remark, that
coverings are, in many cases, armour as well as
; intended for protection as well as warmth.

human animal is the only one which is naked, and
y one which can clothe itself. This is one of the
ies which renders him an animal of all climates,
all seasons. He can adapt the warmth or light-
his covering to the temperature of his habitation.
been born with a fleece upon his back, although
ht have been comforted by its warmth in high la-
it would have oppressed him by its weight and
the species spread towards the equator.

t art, however, does for men, nature has, in many
ɜs, done for those animals which are incapable of

art. Their clothing, of its own accord, changes with their necessities. This is particularly the case with that large tribe of quadrupeds which are covered with *furs*. Every dealer in hare-skins and rabbit-skins knows how much the fur is thickened by the approach of winter. It seems to be a part of the same constitution and the same design, that wool, in hot countries, degenerates, as it is called, but in truth (most happily for the animal's ease) passes into hair; whilst, on the contrary, that hair, in the dogs of the polar regions, is turned into wool, or something very like it. To which may be referred, what naturalists have remarked, that bears, wolves, foxes, hares, which do not take the water, have the fur much thicker on the back than the belly; whereas in the beaver it is the thickest upon the belly; as are the feathers in water-fowl. We know the final cause of all this, and we know no other.

The *covering of birds* cannot escape the most vulgar observation: its lightness, its smoothness, its warmth—the disposition of the feathers all inclined backward, the down about their stem, the overlapping of their tips, their different configuration in different parts, not to mention the variety of their colours, constitute a vestment for the body, so beautiful, and so appropriate to the life which the animal is to lead, as that, I think, we should have had no conception of anything equally perfect, if we had never seen it, or can now imagine anything more so. Let us suppose (what is possible only in supposition) a person who had never seen a bird to be presented with a plucked pheasant, and bid to set his wits to work how to contrive for it a covering which shall unite the qualities of warmth, levity, and least resistance to the air, and the highest degree of each; giving it also as much of beauty and ornament as he could afford. He is the person to behold the work of the Deity, in this part of his creation, with the sentiments which are due to it.

The commendation which the general aspect of the feathered world seldom fails of exciting will be increased by further examination. It is one of those cases in which the philosopher has more to admire than the common observer. Every *feather* is a mechanical wonder. If we look at the quill, we find properties not easily brought together, strength and lightness. I know few things more remarkable than the strength and lightness of the very pen with which I am writing. If we cast our eye to the upper part of the stem, we see a material, made for the purpose, used in no other class of animals, and in no other part of birds, tough, light, pliant, elastic. The pith also which feeds the feathers is, amongst animal substances, *sui generis*—neither bone, flesh, membrane, nor tendon.*

But the artificial part of a feather is the *beard*, or, as it is sometimes, I believe, called, the vane. By the beards are meant what are fastened on each side of the stem, and what constitute the breadth of the feather, what we usually strip off from one side or both when we make a pen. The separate pieces, or laminæ, of which the beard is composed, are called threads, sometimes filaments or rays. Now, the first thing which an attentive observer will remark is, how much stronger the beard of the feather shows itself to be when pressed in a direction perpendicular to its plane, than when rubbed, either up or down, in the line of the stem; and he will soon discover the structure which occasions this difference, viz., that the laminæ whereof these beards are composed are flat, and placed with their flat sides towards each other, by which means, whilst they *easily* bend for the approaching of each other, as any one may perceive by drawing his finger ever so lightly upwards, they are much harder to bend out of their plane, which is the direction in which they have to encounter the impulse and pressure of the air, and in which their strength is wanted and put to the trial.

This is one particularity in the structure of a feather: a second is still more extraordinary. Whoever examines a feather cannot help taking notice, that the threads or laminæ of which we have been speaking, in their natural state, *unite*—that their union is something more than the mere apposition of loose surfaces—that they are not parted asunder without some degree of force—that, nevertheless, there is no glutinous cohesion between them—that, therefore, by some mechanical means or other, they catch or clasp among themselves, thereby giving to the beard or vane its closeness and compactness of texture. Nor is this all: when two laminæ which have been separated by accident or force are brought together again, they immediately *reclasp;* the connexion, whatever it was, is perfectly recovered, and the beard of the feather becomes as smooth and firm as if nothing had happened to it. Draw your finger down the feather, which is against the grain, and you break, probably, the junction of some of the contiguous threads; draw your finger up the feather, and you restore all things to their former state. This is no common contrivance; and now for the mechanism by which it is effected. The threads or laminæ above mentioned are *interlaced* with one another; and the interlacing is performed by means of a vast number of fibres or teeth, which the laminæ shoot forth *on each side*, and which hook and grapple together. A friend of mine counted fifty of these fibres in one-twentieth of an inch. These fibres are crooked, but curved after a different manner; for those which proceed from the thread on the side towards the extremity of the feather are longer, more flexible, and bent downward; whereas those which proceed from the side towards the beginning or quill end of the feather are shorter, firmer, and turn upwards. The process, then, which takes place is as follows: when two laminæ are pressed together, so that these long fibres are forced far enough over the short ones, their crooked parts fall into the cavity made by the crooked parts of the others, just as the latch that is fastened to a door enters into the cavity of the catch fixed to the door-post, and there hooking itself, fastens the door; for it is properly in this manner that one thread of a feather is fastened to the other.

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* The quill part of a feather is composed of circular and *longitudinal fibres. In making a pen, you must scrape off the coat of circular* fibres, or the quill will split in a ragged *jagged manner,* making what boys call cat's teeth.

This admirable structure of the feather, which it is easy to see with the microscope, succeeds perfectly for the use to which nature has designed it, which use was, not only that the laminæ might be united, but that, when one thread or lamina has been separated from another by some external violence, it might be reclasped with sufficient facility and expedition.*

In the *ostrich*, this apparatus of crotchets and fibres, of hooks and teeth, is wanting; and we see the consequence of the want. The filaments hang loose and separate from one another, forming only a kind of down, which constitution of the feathers, however it may fit them for the flowing honours of a lady's head-dress, may be reckoned an imperfection in the bird, inasmuch as wings composed of these feathers, although they may greatly assist it in running, do not serve for flight.

But, under the present division of our subject, our business with feathers is as they are the *covering* of the bird. And herein a singular circumstance occurs. In the small order of birds which winter with us, from a snipe downwards, let the external colour of the feathers be what it will, their Creator has universally given them a bed of *black* down next their bodies. Black, we know, is the warmest colour; and the purpose here is, to *keep in* the heat arising from the heart and circulation of the blood.[48] It is further likewise remarkable, that this is not found in larger birds; for which there is also a reason. Small birds are much more exposed to the cold than large ones, forasmuch as they present, in proportion to their bulk, a much larger surface to the air. If a turkey were divided into a number of wrens (supposing the shape of the turkey and the wren to be similar), the surface of all the wrens would exceed the surface of the turkey in the proportion of the length, breadth (or of any homologous line) of a turkey to that of a wren, which would be, perhaps, a proportion of ten to one. It was necessary, therefore, that small birds should be more warmly clad than large ones; and this seems to be the expedient by which that exigency is provided for.

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* The above account is taken from Memoirs for a Natural History of Animals, by the Royal Academy of Paris, published in 1701, p. 219.

[48] When we attempt to apply the lights of experimental philosophy to this subject, the inquiry is not a little embarrassing. A loose woolly texture, or down, as it implies the presence of air in its interstices, air being a bad conductor of heat, is therefore a warm covering: it prevents the expenditure of animal heat. When we consider the colour of the coverings of birds, we must take new elements into our process of reasoning—we must reflect on the effects of the *conduction and radiation* of heat. The conduction is the *conveyance of heat*; and the radiation is the parting with *t into the atmosphere* or into space. We have already e

II. In comparing different animals, I know no part of their structure which exhibits greater variety, or, in that variety, a nicer accommodation to their respective conveniency, than that which is seen in the different formations of their *mouths*. Whether the purpose be the reception of aliment merely, or the catching of prey, the picking up of seeds, the cropping of herbage, the extraction of juices, the suction of liquids, the breaking and grinding of food, the taste of that food, together with the respiration of air, and, in conjunction with it, the utterance of sound; these various offices are assigned to this one part, and, in different species, provided for as they are wanted by its different constitution. In the human species, forasmuch as there are hands to convey the food to the mouth, the mouth is flat, and by reason of its flat-

plained why the interior covering of the arctic bird should be loose: as to the colour, its effect must result from radiation. It appears (to use the vulgar language) that the influence of cold both on quadrupeds and birds is to increase their woolly or downy covering, and, in many instances, to [illegible] the exterior colour to white: in other and more cor[illegible]ds, a provision is made for changing their clothing suit their altered circumstances. This change of rresponds with philosophical experiments—a white sorbing the least, and radiating the least, it should tend to confine the vital heat within the animal, y it off slowly to the atmosphere.

ness, fitted only for *reception;* whereas the projecting jaws, the wide rictus, the pointed teeth of the dog and his affinities, enable them to apply their mouths to *snatch and seize* the objects of their pursuit. The full lips, the rough tongue, the corrugated cartilaginous palate, the broad cutting teeth of the ox, the deer, the horse, and the sheep qualify this tribe for *browsing* upon their pasture; either gathering large mouthfuls at once, where the grass is long, which is the case with the ox in particular, or biting close where it is short, which the horse and the sheep are able to do in a degree that one could hardly expect. The retired under-jaw of a swine *works in the ground*, after the protruding snout, like a prong or plough-share, has made its way to the roots upon which it feeds. A conformation so happy was not the gift of chance.



In *birds*, this organ assumes a new character; new both in substance and in form, but in both wonderfully adapted to the wants and uses of a distinct mode of existence. We have no longer the fleshy lips, the teeth of
bone; but we have, in the place of these tw
to perform the office of both, a hard subst

same nature with that which composes the nails, claws, and hoofs of quadrupeds), cut out into proper shapes, and mechanically suited to the actions which are wanted. The sharp edge and tempered point of the *sparrow's* bill picks almost every kind of seed from its concealment in the plant, and not only so, but hulls the grain, breaks and shatters the coats of the seed, in order to get at the kernel. The hooked beak of the hawk tribe separates the flesh from the bones of the animals which it feeds upon, almost with the cleanness and precision of a dissector's knife. The butcher-bird transfixes its prey upon the spike of a thorn whilst it picks its bones. In some birds of this class we have the *cross* bill, *i. e.*, both the upper and lower bill hooked, and their tips crossing. The *spoon* bill enables the goose to graze, to collect its food from the bottom of pools, or to seek it amidst the soft or liquid substances with which it is mixed. The *long* tapering bill of the snipe and woodcock penetrates still deeper into moist earth, which is the bed in which the food of that species is lodged. This is exactly the instrument which the animal wanted. It did not want strength in its bill, which was inconsistent with the slender form of the animal's neck, as well as unnecessary for the kind of aliment upon which it subsists; but it wanted length to reach its object.[49]

[49] With the instrument, as we have before hinted, we



But the species of bill which belongs to the birds that live by *suction* deserves to be described in its relation to that office. They are what naturalists call serrated or dentated bills; the inside of them, towards the edge,

should expect a particular instinctive action, and a corresponding muscular power. As an animal with horns has a powerful neck, so has the neck of the heron, which is introduced here, an extraordinary muscular power, without which, indeed, the long and sharp bill would be of little use. When the dog approaches the wounded heron, the bird throws itself upon its back, and, retracting its long neck, suddenly darts it out with a force which strikes the bill deep into the dog. If you hold your hat towards the bird, the bill will be struck quite through it. In contending with the hawk, when the latter is spitted, it is not by the rapid descent of the hawk, but by the force with which the heron drives its bill.

The strength of the bill of the parrot, and that of all birds which break the stones of fruit, or nuts, or hard seeds, is in another direction: the bill is hooked, yet is differently formed from that of the carnivorous bird. The intention is, in the first place, that the point shall play vertically, which, with the strengthening of successive layers near the point, enables it to break hard materials; and secondly, that by this form the nut or seed may be brought nearer the joining or articulation of the jaw, which gives the same advantage that we have when we put a nut nearer the joint of the nutcracker, that is, nearer the fulcrum.

One disadvantage of this form and shortness of the bill would be, that the mandibles could not open wide enough to take in a large seed; but it is provided that the upper mandible shall move upon the skull as well as the lower one, a subject which has not escaped our author's attention.

The form of the bill of the cross-bill, which he mentions, looks like an imperfection, but is attended with real advantages. It is not for crushing, but rather for splitting up a seed into halves, and tearing the cones of the fir-tree.

One of the most curious provisions is in the bill of the sea-crow. The mandibles are compressed into the form of simple laminæ, and the lower mandible projects
upper one; so that, as he skims along the water
bill *and lifts his food* by the most appropriate

being thickly set with parallel or concentric rows of short, strong, sharp-pointed prickles. These, though they should be called teeth, are not for the purpose of mastication, like the teeth of quadrupeds; nor yet, as in fish, for the seizing and retaining of their prey; but for a quite different use. They form a filter. The *duck*, by means of them, discusses the mud; examining with great accuracy the puddle, the brake, every mixture which is likely to contain her food. The operation is thus carried on:—The liquid or semi-liquid substances in which the animal has plunged her bill, she draws, by the action of her lungs, through the narrow interstices which lie between these teeth, catching, as the stream passes across her beak, whatever it may happen to bring along with it that proves agreeable to her choice, and easily dismissing all the rest. Now, suppose the purpose to have been, out of a mass of confused and heterogeneous substances, [illegible] for the use of the animal, or rather to enable l to separate for its own, those few particles ted its taste and digestion, what more artificial ommodious instrument of selection could have en to it than this natural filter? It has been ob- also (what must enable the bird to choose and dis-

tinguish with greater acuteness, as well, probably, as what greatly increases its luxury) that the bills of this species are furnished with large nerves, that they are covered with a skin, and that the nerves run down to the very extremity. In the curlew, woodcock, and snipe, there are *three pairs* of nerves, equal almost to the optic nerve in thickness, which pass first along the roof of the mouth, and then along the upper chap down to the point of the bill, long as the bill is.[50]

But to return to the train of our observations. The similitude between the bills of birds and the mouths of quadrupeds is exactly such as, for the sake of the argument, might be wished for. It is near enough to show the continuation of the same plan: it is remote enough to exclude the supposition of the difference being produced by action or use. A more prominent contour, or a wider gap, might be resolved into the effect of continued efforts, on the part of the species, to thrust out the mouth or open it to the stretch. But by what course of action, or exercise, or endeavour, shall we get rid of the lips, the gums, the teeth, and acquire in the place of them pincers of horn? By what habit shall we so completely change, not only the shape of the part, but the substance of which it is composed? The truth is, if we had seen no other than the mouths of quadrupeds, we should have thought no other could have been formed: little could we have supposed that all the purposes of a mouth furnished with lips and armed with teeth could be answered by an instrument which had none of these—could be supplied, and that with many additional advantages, by the hardness, and sharpness, and figure of the bills of birds. Everything about the animal *mouth* is mechanical. The teeth of fish have their points turned backward, like the teeth of a wool or cotton card. The teeth of lobsters work one against another, like the sides of a pair of shears. In many insects, the mouth is converted into a pump or sucker, fitted at the end sometimes with a wimble, sometimes with a forceps; by which double provision, viz., of the tube and the penetrating form of the point, the insect first bores through the integuments of its prey, and then extracts the juices. And, what is most extraordinary of all, one sort of mouth, as the occasion requires, shall be changed into another sort. The caterpillar could not live without teeth; in several species the butterfly formed from it could not use them. The old teeth, therefore, are cast off with the exuviæ of the grub; a new and totally different apparatus assumes their place in the fly. Amid these novelties of form, we sometimes forget that it is all the while the animal's *mouth*; that, whether it be lips, or teeth, or bill, or beak, or shears, or pump, it is the same part diversified; and it is also remarkable, that, under all the varieties of configuration with which we are acquainted, and which are very great, the organs of taste and smelling are situated near each other.

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[50] *These are branches of the fifth nerve of the head, which alone, of all the nine nerves of the brain, bestows sensibility on the organ of touch.*

III. To the mouth adjoins the gullet: in this part also, comparative anatomy discovers a difference of structure adapted to the different necessities of the animal. In brutes, because the posture of their neck conduces little to the passage of the aliment, the fibres of the gullet which act in this business run in two close spiral lines, crossing each other: in men these fibres run only a little obliquely from the upper end of the œsophagus to the stomach, into which, by a gentle contraction, they easily transmit the descending morsels—that is to say, for the more laborious deglutition of animals which thrust their food *up* instead of *down*, and also through a longer passage, a proportionably more powerful apparatus of muscles is provided—more powerful, not merely by the strength of the fibres, which might be attributed to the greater exercise of their force, but in their collocation, which is a determinate circumstance, and must have been original.

IV. The gullet leads to the *intestines*: here, likewise, *as before*, comparing quadrupeds with man, under a general similitude we meet with appropriate differences. *The valvulæ conniventes*, or, as they are by some called he semi-lunar valves, found in the human intestine, are ranting in that of brutes. These are wrinkles or plates f the innermost coat of the guts, the effect of which is o retard the progress of the food through the alimentary anal. It is easy to understand how much more necesary such a provision may be to the body of an animal of n erect posture, and in which, consequently, the weight f the food is added to the action of the intestine, than n that of a quadruped, in which the course of the food, rom its entrance to its exit, is nearly horizontal; but it s impossible to assign any cause, except the final cause, or this distinction actually taking place. So far as deends upon the action of the part, this structure was nore to be expected in a quadruped than in a man. In ruth, it must in both have been formed, not by action, ut in direct opposition to action and to pressure; but the opposition which would arise from pressure is greater in the upright trunk than in any other. That theory, therefore, is pointedly contradicted by the example before us. The structure is found where its generation, according to the method by which the theorist would have it generated, is the most difficult; but, observe, it is found where its effect is most useful.

The different length of the intestines in carnivorous and herbivorous animals has been noticed on a former occasion. The shortest, I believe, is that of some birds of prey, in which the intestinal canal is little more than a straight passage from the mouth to the vent. The longest is in the deer-kind. The intestines of a Canadian stag, four feet high, measured ninety-six feet.* The intestine of a sheep, unravelled, measured thirty times the length of the body. The intestine of a wild cat is only three times the length of the body. Universally, where the substance upon which the animal feeds is of slow concoction, or yields its chyle with more difficulty, there the passage is circuitous and dilatory, that time and space may be allowed for the change and the absorption which are necessary. Where the food is soon dissolved, or already half assimilated, an unnecessary or perhaps hurtful detention is avoided, by giving to it a shorter and a readier route.

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* *Mem. Acad.* Paris, 1701, p. 170.

V. In comparing the *bones* of different animals, we are struck, in the bones of birds, with a *propriety* which could only proceed from the wisdom of an intelligent and designing Creator. In the bones of an animal which is to fly, the two qualities required are strength and lightness. Wherein, therefore, do the bones of birds (I speak of the cylindrical bones) differ in these respects from the bones of quadrupeds? In three properties: first, their cavities are much larger in proportion to the weight of the bone than in those of quadrupeds; secondly, these cavities are empty; thirdly, the shell is of a firmer texture than is the substance of other bones. It is easy to observe these particulars even in picking the wing or leg of a chicken. Now the weight being the same, the diameter, it is evident, will be greater in a hollow bone than in a solid one, and with the diameter, as every mathematician can prove, is increased, *cæteris paribus*, the strength of the cylinder or its resistance to breaking. In a word, a bone of the *same weight* would not have been so strong in any other form; and to have made it heavier would have incommoded the animal's flight. Yet this form could not be acquired by use, or the bone become hollow or tubular by exercise. What appetency could excavate a bone?

VI. The *lungs* also of birds, as compared with the lungs of quadrupeds, contain in them a provision distinguishingly calculated for this same purpose of levitation, namely, a communication (not found in other kinds of animals) between the air-vessels of the lungs and the cavities of the body; so that, by the intromission of air from one to the other (at the will, as it should seem, of the animal), its body can be occasionally puffed out, and its tendency to descend in the air, or its specific gravity, *made less*. The bodies of birds are blown up from their *lungs* (which no other animal bodies are), and thus *rendered* buoyant.[51]

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[51] We have thrown some observations upon this subject

VII. All birds are *oviparous.* This likewise carries on the work of gestation with as little increase as possible of the weight of the body. A gravid uterus would have been a troublesome burden to a bird in its flight. The advantage in this respect of an oviparous procreation is, that whilst the whole brood are hatched together, the eggs are excluded singly, and at considerable intervals. Ten, fifteen, or twenty young birds may be produced in one cletch or covey, yet the parent bird have never been encumbered by the load of more than one full-grown egg at one time.[52]

VIII. A principal topic of comparison between animals is in their *instruments of motion.* These come before us under three divisions—feet, wings, and fins. I desire any man to say which of the three is best fitted for its use; or whether the same consummate art be not conspicuous in them all. The constitution of the elements in which the motion is to be performed is very different. The animal action must necessarily follow that constitution. The Creator, therefore, if we might so speak, had to prepare for different situations, for different difficulties; yet the purpose is accomplished not less successfully in one case than in the other. And as between *wings* and the corresponding limbs of quadrupeds, it is accomplished without deserting the general idea. The idea is modified, not deserted. Strip a wing of its feathers, and it bears no obscure resemblance to the foreleg of a quadruped. The articulations at the shoulder and the cubitus are much alike; and, what is a closer circumstance, in both cases the upper part of the limb consists of a single bone, the lower part of two.

But, fitted up with its furniture of feathers and quills, it becomes a wonderful instrument, more artificial than its

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into the Appendix, under the title of "The Relation of the Bodies of Birds to the Atmosphere."

[52] It has been elsewhere observed, that when predatory *birds gorge themselves,* they are sometimes unable to rise on *the wing—a sufficient* demonstration that the burden of a*ffspring would* have unsuited them for flight.

first appearance indicates, though that be very striking; at least, the use which the bird makes of its wings in flying is more complicated and more curious than is generally known. One thing is certain, that if the flapping of the wings in flight were no more than the reciprocal motion of the same surface in opposite directions, either upwards and downwards, or estimated in any oblique line, the bird would lose as much by one motion as she gained by another. The skylark could never ascend by such an action as this; for, though the stroke upon the air by the under-side of her wing would carry her up, the stroke from the upper-side, when she raised her wing again, would bring her down. In order, therefore, to account for the advantage which the bird derives from her wing, it is necessary to suppose that the surface of the wing, measured upon the same plane, is contracted, whilst the wing is drawn up; and let out to its full expansion, when it descends upon the air for the purpose of moving the body by the re-action of that element. Now, the form and structure of the wing, its external convexity, the disposition, and particularly the overlapping, of its larger feathers, the action of the muscles and joints of the pinions, are all adapted to this alternate adjustment of its shape and dimensions. Such a twist, for instance, or semirotatory motion, is given to the great feathers of the wing, that they strike the air with their flat side, but rise from the stroke slantwise. The turning of the oar in rowing, whilst the rower advances his hand for a new stroke, is a similar operation to that of the feather, and takes its name from the resemblance. I believe that this faculty is not found in the great feathers of the tail. This is the place also for observing that the pinions are so set upon the body as to bring down the wings not vertically, but in a direction obliquely tending towards the tail;—which motion, by virtue of the common resolution of forces, does two things at the same time—supports the body in the air, and carries it forward. The *steerage* of a bird in its flight is effected partly by the wings, but in a principal degree by the tail. And herein we meet with a circumstance not a little remark-

le. Birds with long legs have short tails; and in their
ght place their legs close to their bodies, at the same
ne stretching them out backwards, as far as they can.
this position the legs extend beyond the rump, and
come the rudder; supplying that steerage which the
il could not.

From the *wings* of birds, the transition is easy to the
s of fish.[38] They are both, to their respective tribes,
e instruments of their motion; but, in the work which
ey have to do, there is a considerable difference,
unded in this circumstance. Fish, unlike birds, have
ry nearly the same specific gravity with the element in
hich they move. In the case of fish, therefore, there is
tle or no weight to bear up; what is wanted is only
impulse sufficient to carry the body through a resisting
edium, or to maintain the posture, or to support or re-
ore the balance of the body, which is always the most
steady where there is no weight to sink it. For these
fices, the fins are as large as necessary, though much
aller than wings, their action mechanical, their posi-
on, and the muscles by which they are moved, in the
ighest degree convenient. The following short account
some experiments upon fish, made for the purpose of
certaining the use of their fins, will be the best con-
mation of what we assert. In most fish, besides the
reat fin, the tail, we find two pairs of fins upon the
les, two single fins upon the back, and one upon the

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[38] This subject is necessarily treated at length in the
ridgewater Treatise of the Hand. We have had occasion
state, that in the higher division of animated nature, the
rtebrata, one plan or system of bones can be traced through
ery variety from man to fishes; and this is more especially
own by the comparison of the arm with the anterior ex-
emity of quadrupeds and the wing of birds, and even with
e pectoral fin of the fish. The number of the bones and
e form and the application of the muscles to them vary,
t yet they are accommodated in a manner so perfect, that,
examining any individual among the varieties of the
ecies, we should say that nothing could be better suited to
purpose.

belly, or rather between the belly and the tail. The *balancing* use of these organs is proved in this manner Of the large-headed fish, if you cut off the pectoral fins—*i. e.*, the pair which lies close behind the gills—the head falls prone to the bottom: if the right pectoral fin only be cut off, the fish leans to that side; if the ventral fin on the same side be cut away, then it loses its equilibrium entirely; if the dorsal and ventral fins be cut off, the fish reels to the right and left. When the fish dies, that is, when the fins cease to play, the belly turns upwards. The use of the same parts for *motion* is seen in the following observation upon them when put in action. The pectoral, and more particularly the ventral fins, serve to *raise and depress* the fish; when the fish desires to have a *retrograde* motion, a stroke forward with the pectoral fin effectually produces it; if the fish desire to *turn* either way, a single blow with the tail the opposite way sends it round at once; if the tail strike both ways, the motion produced by the double lash is *progressive*, and enables the fish to dart forward with an astonishing velocity.* The result is, not only in some cases the most rapid, but in all cases the most gentle, pliant, easy, animal motion with which we are acquainted. However, when the tail is cut off, the fish loses all motion, and gives itself up to where the water impels it. The rest of the fins, therefore, so far as respects motion, seem to be merely subsidiary to this. In their mechanical use, the anal fin may be reckoned the keel; the ventral fins, out-riggers; the pectoral muscles, the oars; and if there be any similitude between these parts of a boat and a fish, observe, that it is not the resemblance of imitation, but the likeness which arises from applying similar mechanical means to the same purpose.

We have seen that the *tail* in the fish is the great instrument of motion. Now, in cetaceous or warm-blooded fish, which are obliged to rise every two or three minutes to the surface to take breath, the tail, unlike what it is in other fish, is horizontal; its stroke, consequently, perpendicular to the horizon, which is the right direction for sending the fish to the top, or carrying it down to the bottom.[54]

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* Goldsmith, Hist. of An. Nat., vol. vi. p. 154.

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[54] The poising and motion of fishes in the water has interested some of our greatest philosophers, as Galileo and Borelli. It is estimated that fishes make their way through a medium which resists nine hundred times more than the atmosphere. But then, as it offers a certain resistance to their progress, it resists also the motion of their tail and fins by which they have their power of progression. The breadth of the tail of fishes, compared with that of their fins, and its muscularity and power, declare what is affirmed to us upon authority—that the tail is the great instrument of their progression; and we can see that when the trout darts away, the force of his motion lays down the fins close upon his body. But the fins direct him, as out-riggers, and the pectoral fins especially, by raising or depressing the head, give direction to the whole body under the force of the tail. The lateral fins, and particularly the pectoral fins, also sustain him in the right position in the water: without the co-operation of these with the tail, the fish would move like a boat sculled by one oar at the stern. As the digestion of fishes, as well as that of other animals, is attended with the extrication of air, and as the intestines are below the centre, the belly would be turned up but for the action of these lateral fins; as we see takes place in a dead fish. The tail and fins are the instruments of motion; but the incessant action of the muscles which move these is a just matter of admiration. If a fish move with his head down the stream, he must move more rapidly than the water, or the water gets under the operculum of the gills, and chokes him. He lies, therefore, continually with his head to the stream. We may see a trout lying for hours stationary, whilst the stream is running past him; and they seem to remain so for days and nights. In salmon-fishing, the fly is played upon the broken water, in the midst of the torrent, and there the fish shows himself rising from a part of the river where men could not preserve their footing, though assisted by poles, or by locking their arms together. When the salmon leaps, he makes extraordinary exertions. Just under the cataract, and against the stream, he will rush for some yards, and rise out of the spray six or eight feet; and amidst the

Regarding animals in their instruments of n have only followed the comparison through the division of animals into beasts, birds, and fish. our intention to pursue the consideration farthe take in that generic distinction amongst birds *foot* of water-fowl. It is an instance whic pointed out to a child. The utility of the web fowl, the inutility to land-fowl, are so obvio seems impossible to notice the difference witho ledging the design. I am at a loss to know who deny the agency of an intelligent Creator this example. There is nothing in the action



noise of the water, they may be heard striking rock with a sound like the clapping of the hand find a temporary lodgment on the shelving ro quivering and preparing for another somerset, reach the top of the cataract. This exhibits n power of their muscles, assisted by the elastici bones, but the force of instinct by which they are the shallow streams for depositing their eggs.

The porpoise will swim round and round a sh sailing at fourteen miles an hour: a thing alm prising as the fly circling round the horse's ear stage.

To all this may be added, that the solid which ticians have discovered, by refined application culus, and have termed "the solid of least because it is the conformation which is less than affected by the resistance of any medium, resembl its form ing, as carried on by a bird upon the surface of the water, at should generate a membrane between the toes. As to at membrane, it is an exercise of constant resistance. he only supposition I can think of is, that all birds have :en originally water-fowl, and web-footed; that spar- ws, hawks, linnets, &c., which frequent the land, have, process of time, and in the course of many generations, d this part worn away by treading upon hard ground. ɔ such evasive assumptions must atheism always have course! And after all, it confesses that the structure the feet of birds, in their original form, was critically apted to their original destination! The web-feet of ıphibious quadrupeds, seals, otters, &c., fall under the me observation.

IX. The *five senses* are common to most large ani- als; nor have we much difference to remark in their nstitution, or much, however, which is referable to echanism.

The superior sagacity of animals which hunt their ey, and which, consequently, depend for their liveli- od upon their *nose*, is well known in its use; but not all known in the organization which produces it.

The external *ears* of beasts of prey, of lions, tigers, ɔlves, have their trumpet-part, or concavity, standing rwards, to seize the sounds which are before them— ., the sounds of the animals which they pursue or ıtch. The ears of animals of flight are turned back- rd, to give notice of the approach of their enemy from hind, whence he may steal upon them unseen. This a critical distinction, and is mechanical; but it may be ggested, and, I think, not without probability, that it is e effect of continual habit.

The *eyes* of animals which follow their prey by night, cats, owls, &c., possess a faculty not given to those other species, namely, of closing the pupil *entirely*. ıe final cause of which seems to be this:—It was ne- ssary for such animals to be able to descry objects with ry small degrees of light. This capacity depended on the superior sensibility of the retina; that is, upon



its being effected by the most feeble impulses. But that tenderness of structure, which rendered the membrane thus exquisitely sensible, rendered it also liable to be offended by the access of stronger degrees of light. The contractile range therefore of the pupil is increased in these animals, so as to enable them to close the aperture entirely, which includes the power of diminishing it in every degree; whereby at all times such portions, and only such portions, of light are admitted, as may be received without injury to the sense.

There appears to be also in the figure, and in some properties of the pupil of the eye, an appropriate relation to the wants of different animals. In horses, oxen, goats, sheep, the pupil of the eye is elliptical; the transverse axis being horizontal; by which structure, although the eye be placed on the side of the head, the anterior elongation of the pupil catches the forward rays, or those which come from objects immediately in front of the animal's face.



[The figure represents the iris of a lion. B B, the straight or converging fibres; C, the fibres which encircle the inner margin of the iris.]

CHAPTER XIII.

PECULIAR ORGANIZATIONS.

I BELIEVE that all the instances which I shall collect under this title might, consistently enough with technical language, have been placed under the head of *Comparative Anatomy*. But there appears to me an impropriety in the use which that term hath obtained; it being, in some sort, absurd to call that a case of comparative anatomy in which there is nothing to "compare;" in which a conformation is found in one animal, which hath nothing properly answering to it in another. Of this kind are the examples which I have to propose in the present chapter; and the reader will see that, though some of them be the strongest, perhaps, he will meet with under any division of our subject, they must necessarily be of an unconnected and miscellaneous nature. To dispose them, however, into some sort of order, we will notice, first, particularities of structure which belong to quadrupeds, birds, and fish, as such, or to many of the kinds included in these classes of animals; and then, such particularities as are confined to one or two species.

I. Along each side of the neck of large *quadrupeds* runs a stiff robust cartilage, which butchers call the paxwax. No person can carve the upper end of a crop of beef without driving his knife against it. It is a tough, strong, tendinous substance, braced from the head to the middle of the back: its office is to assist in supporting the weight of the head. It is a mechanical provision, of which this is the undisputed use; and it is sufficient, and not more than sufficient, for the purpose which it has to execute. The head of an ox or a horse is a heavy *weight*, acting at the end of a long lever (consequently with a great purchase), and in a direction nearly perpendicular to the joints of the supporting neck. From such a force, so advantageously applied, the bones of the neck would be in constant danger of dislocation, if they were not fortified by this strong tape. No such organ is found in the human subject, because, from the erect position of the head (the pressure of it acting nearly in the direction of the spine), the junction of the vertebræ appears to be sufficiently secure without it. This cautionary expedient therefore is limited to quadrupeds: the care of the Creator is seen where it is wanted.[55]

II. The oil with which *birds* preen their feathers, and the organ which supplies it, is a specific provision for the winged creation. On each side of the rump of birds is observed a small nipple, yielding upon pressure a butter-like substance, which the bird extracts by pinching the pap with its bill. With this oil or ointment, thus procured, the bird dresses his coat; and repeats the action as often as its own sensations teach it that it is in any part wanted, or as the excretion may be sufficient for the expense. The gland, the pap, the nature and quality of the excreted substance, the manner of obtaining it from its lodgment in the body, the application of it when obtained, form, collectively, an evidence of intention which it is not easy to withstand. Nothing similar to it is found in unfeathered animals. What blind *conatus* of nature should produce it in birds; should not produce it in beasts?

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[55] The author is not quite correct here, inasmuch as elastic ligaments are liberally supplied in the human spine: a range of peculiar ligaments, the "*ligamenta subflava*," run along the course of the spine, and are highly elastic. The *ligamentum nuchæ* is that ligament which runs from the prominence of the spine between the shoulders to the back of the head; and the student who hangs his head over his book enjoys the advantage of this elastic support: so that it is strictly a matter comparative; we may trace it with increasing strength from the ligament that sustains a man's head, to that which, like the spring of a steelyard, weighs against the immense head of the elephant.

These elastic ligaments vary with the length and motion of the neck. It would be tedious to describe their varieties in the camel, camelopard, ostrich, &c. We may be satisfied with the fact, that the elastic ligament is a structure *extensively used* in the animal textures, generally coming *in aid of the muscles*, or as a substitute for them.

III. The air-bladder also of a *fish* affords a plain and direct instance, not only of contrivance, but strictly of that species of contrivance which we denominate mechanical. It is a philosophical apparatus in the body of an animal. The principle of the contrivance is clear: the application of the principle is also clear. The use of the organ to sustain, and, at will, also to elevate, the body of the fish in the water, is proved by observing, what has been tried, that, when the bladder is burst, the fish grovels at the bottom; and also, that flounders, soles, skates, which are without the air-bladder, seldom rise in the water, and that with effort. The manner in which the purpose is attained, and the suitableness of the means to the end, are not difficult to be apprehended. The rising and sinking of a fish in water, so far as it is independent of the stroke of the fins and tail, can only be regulated by the specific gravity of the body. When the bladder, contained in the body of the fish, is contracted, which the fish probably possesses a muscular power of doing, the bulk of the fish is contracted along with it; whereby, since the absolute weight remains the same, the specific gravity, which is the sinking force, is increased, and the fish descends: on the contrary, when, in consequence of the relaxation of the muscles, the elasticity of the enclosed and now compressed air restores the dimensions of the bladder, the tendency downwards becomes proportionably less than it was before, or is turned into a contrary tendency. These are known properties of bodies immersed in a fluid. The enamelled figures, or little glass bubbles, in a jar of water, are made to rise and fall by the same artifice. A diving-machine might be made to ascend and descend upon the like principle; namely, by introducing into the inside of it an air-vessel, which, by its contraction, would diminish, and by its distension enlarge the bulk of the machine itself,

render it specifically heavier or specifically
n the water which surrounds it. Suppose
done, and the artist to solicit a patent for his
the inspectors of the model, whatever they
k of the use or value of the contrivance, could
ibility entertain a question in their minds,
were a contrivance or not. No reason has
ssigned,—no reason can be assigned, why the
is not as certain in the fish as it is in the ma-
y the argument is not as firm in one case as

be very worthy of inquiry, if it were pos-
cover, by what method an animal which lives
in water is able to supply a repository of air.
ient, whatever it be, forms part, and perhaps
rious part of the provision. Nothing similar
ladder is found in land-animals; and a life in
has no natural tendency to produce a bag of
ing can be farther from an acquired organi-
this is.[56]

a varies in temperature and pressure at different
no doubt the texture of the fish, and especially
ment, must conform to this variety. The swim-
r is the means of adjustment by which the fish
native depths without waste of animal exertion:
power of expansion of the air-bladder when re-
the pressure, that, when a fish is brought up
eatest depth, it inverts and thrusts out the viscera
outh. We do not see, however, that naturalists
ed to the place of this swimming-bladder. It
the spine, and appears to counterbalance, in
re at least, the air in the intestines by being thus
e them. In the cetacea, as the whale, their
oceeds from the quantity of oil under the skin,
f their head, and which it has been observed is
order to ensure their readily coming to the sur-
the when their natural powers are weakened.
e reason, that they may raise their heads to the
r tails are horizontal. In the jelly-fish, those
which float in sheltered estuaries (the *physso-*
e is an air-vessel which they can fill and empty,

These examples mark the attention of the Creator to the three great kingdoms of his animal creation, and to their constitution as such. The example which stands next in point of generality, belonging to a large tribe of animals, or rather to various species of that tribe, is the poisonous tooth of serpents.

I. The *fang of a viper* is a clear and curious example of mechanical contrivance. It is a perforated tooth, loose at the root: in its quiet state, lying down flat upon the jaw, but furnished with a muscle which, with a jerk, and by the pluck, as it were, of a string, suddenly erects it. Under the tooth, close to its root, and communicating with the perforation, lies a small bag containing the venom. When the fang is raised, the closing of the jaw presses its root against the bag underneath; and the force of this compression sends out the fluid with a considerable impetus through the tube in the middle of the tooth. What more unequivocal or effectual apparatus could be devised for the double purpose of at once inflicting the wound and injecting the poison? Yet, though lodged in the mouth, it is so constituted, as, in its inoffensive and quiescent state, not to interfere with the animal's ordinary office of receiving its food. It has been observed also, that none of the harmless serpents, the black snake, the blind worm, &c., have these fangs, but teeth of an equal size; not moveable as this is, but fixed into the jaw.

II. In being the property of several different species, the preceding example is resembled by that which I shall next mention, which is the *bag of the opossum*. This is a mechanical contrivance, most properly so called. The simplicity of the expedient renders the contrivance more obvious than many others, and by no means less certain. A false skin under the belly of the animal forms a pouch, into which the young litter are received at their birth; where they have an easy and constant access to the teats; in which they are transported by the

by which means they rise or sink at pleasure. Others (the *villela*) raise a sail. Some of this class propel themselves by taking in water, and suddenly rejecting it.

m from place to place; where they are at liberty to n in and out; and where they find a refuge from sur-ise and danger. It is their cradle, their asylum, and e machine for their conveyance. Can the use of this ucture be doubted of? Nor is it a mere doubling of e skin; but is a new organ, furnished with bones and uscles of its own. Two bones are placed before the pubis, and joined to that bone as their base. These pport and give a fixture to the muscles which serve to en the bag. To these muscles there are antagonists, hich serve in the same manner to shut it; and this fice they perform so exactly, that, in the living animal, e opening can scarcely be discerned, except when the des are forcibly drawn asunder.* Is there any action this part of the animal, any process arising from that tion, by which these members could be formed? any count to be given of the formation, except design?

III. As a particularity, yet appertaining to more ecies than one, and also as strictly mechanical, we ay notice a circumstance in the structure of the *claws* certain birds. The middle claw of the heron and rmorant is toothed and notched like a saw. These rds are great fishers, and these notches assist them in olding their slippery prey. The use is evident; but e structure such as cannot at all be accounted for by e effort of the animal, or the exercise of the part. ome other fishing birds have these notches in their *lls*; and for the same purpose. The gannet, or Soland oose, has the side of its bill irregularly jagged, that it ay hold its prey the faster. Nor can the structure in is, more than in the former case, arise from the manner employing the part. The smooth surfaces, and soft esh of fish, were less likely to notch the bills of birds, an the hard bodies upon which many other species feed.

We now come to particularities strictly so called, as eing limited to a single species of animal. Of these I all take one from a quadruped, and one from a bird.

I. The *stomach of the camel* is well known to retain

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* Goldsmith, Nat. Hist., vol. iv. p. 244.

large quantities of water, and to retain it
a considerable length of time. This pro
it for living in the desert. Let us see, t
is the internal organisation, upon which a
and so beneficial depends. A number o
or bags (in a dromedary thirty of the
counted) are observed to lie between the
the second stomach, and to open into the
the top by small square apertures. T
orifices, after the stomach is full, the ann
filled from it: and the water so deposited
place, not liable to pass into the intestines
place, is kept separate from the solid alir
the third place, is out of the reach of the d
of the stomach, or of mixture with the gas
appears probable, or rather certain, that t
the conformation of its muscles, possesses
squeezing back this water from the adja
the stomach, whenever thirst excites it to
in action.

II. The *tongue of the woodpecker* is one
gularities which nature presents us with
gular purpose is to be answered. It is a
strument for a particular use; and what, e
ever produces such? The woodpecker
upon insects lodged in the bodies of decaye
trees. For the purpose of boring into th
furnished with a bill straight, hard, angul
When, by means of this piercer, it has rea
of the insects, then comes the office of its t
tongue is, first, of such a length that the
it out three or four inches from the bill,—i
differing greatly from every other specie
the second place, it is tipped with a stiff
thorn; and, in the third place (which appe
most remarkable property of all), this tip i
both sides like the beard of an arrow or t
hook. The description of the part decl
The bird, having exposed the retreats of
the assistance of its bill, with a motion

quick, launches out at them this long tongue; transfixes them upon the barbed needle at the end of it; and thus draws its prey within its mouth. If this be not mechanism, what is? Should it be said, that, by continual endeavours to shoot out the tongue to the stretch, the woodpecker species may by degrees have lengthened the organ itself, beyond that of other birds, what account can be given of its form, of its tip? how, in particular, did it get its barb, its dentation? These barbs, in my opinion, wherever they occur, are decisive proofs of mechanical contrivance.[57]

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[57] What could have tempted Buffon to express his pity for this bird as abject and degraded, it is not easy to conceive: nor why it should be described as leading an insipid life, because continually employed in boring and hammering the old stump of a tree. A late naturalist describes the woodpecker as enjoying the sweet hours of the morning, on the highest branch of the tallest tree, fluttering and playing with his mate and companions. No doubt his diligence, perseverance, and energy in plying his beak are very extraordinary. But, besides the wedge-like strength of the beak, and the power of the neck to strike with it, there is something remarkable in its sensibility. That nerve, the fifth pair, on which we have shown that all the sensibility of the head depends, transmits a large branch along the inside of the mandibles; and, as this nerve approaches the extremity, it perforates the bone by innumerable small canals, so as to be given to the horny covering of the beak, which is thus possessed of a sensibility to feel in the crevices of the wood, and under the bark; and the woodpecker is enabled by this means to direct the tongue, which our author correctly describes as moving with extraordinary celerity, and with a point like a barbed arrow.

We have represented the dissection of the head of this bird more accurately in its anatomy than is to be found in books. We offer it because it exhibits a very curious piece of mechanism, adjusted to the tongue, to enable the animal to thrust it out far, and with unusual rapidity. *a* is the barbed tongue; *b*, two slender elastic ligamentous cartilages, of very peculiar structure and use. On one extremity they are attached to the bone which supports the upper mandible; from this we trace them over the skull down upon the sides


b
c
c
b
b
b
a
a

III. I shall add one more example, for the sake of its novelty. It is always an agreeable discovery, when,

of the neck; and, with a large sweep, turning under the lower mandible, and so continued into the tongue, and not terminating until they reach the horny point. *c c c*, a long muscle which follows these ligamentous cartilages upon their concave side, arising from the bone of the lower mandible, and so sweeping round with the cartilages and over the skull, to have another fixed point at the upper mandible: these protrude the tongue. Two muscles are seen to arise from the sides of the larynx, which are the opponents of the last, and retract the tongue. Leaving the other parts of the anatomy, we beg the reader's attention to the action of the muscle *c c c*, which presents one of those curious instances observed in comparative anatomy, of a mechanism adapted to a particular purpose. The tongue is not only thrust out far by this apparatus, but is shot with great rapidity, in correspondence with its barbed point. This effect is produced by the two extremities of the muscle being fixed points, and the fibres of the muscle itself running on the concave side of the cartilaginous bow, so as to form a smaller circle. We require no mathematical demonstration to prove that the tongue must be thrust out to a greater distance than the measure of contraction of the muscle. Let us tie the line of the fishing-rod to its slender top, and pull upon it at the butt: the motion of the top will be very extensive, even when only an inch of the line is drawn through the rings. This is a pretty accurate representation of what takes place by the contraction of this protruding muscle. We have noticed that the upper end of this arch is fixed, the whole motion must therefore be given to the loose extremity in the tongue; and we cannot but observe that this peculiar arch and muscular ring are adapted for the rapid protrusion of the tongue; whilst its retraction is produced by a common muscle, that is, a muscle running in a straight course.

Another curious part of this apparatus is, that a very large gland, which pours out a glutinous matter, is embraced and compressed by the action of the circular muscle. This viscid secretion bedewing the tongue furnishes an additional means for the bird to pick up insects, such as ants, without the necessity of sticking each with its arrow. Nothing can be more mechanical, or more happily adapted to its purpose, than the whole of this structure, and consequently nothing having remarked in an animal an extraorc ture, we come at length to find out an un for it. The following narrative furnishes of this kind. The babyroussa, or Indian h of wild boar, found in the East Indies, t teeth, more than half a yard long, growi and (which is the singularity) from the These instruments are not wanted for c service being provided for by two tusks issu under jaw, and resembling those of the co nor does the animal use them for defence. seem, therefore, to be both a superfluity an brance. But observe the event: the a standing; and, in order to support its he upper tusks upon the branches of trees.[58]



better suited to strengthen the argument in the it is not inferior to the means employed for g of motion to the *membrana nictitans* of the eye

[58] This notion of the babyroussa sleeping c hanging by its teeth the while, is a mere i arisen from the difficulty of accounting for th *rise out* from the mouth, and turn up before t *better opinion* is, that they guard the eyes in r *the thick* underwood.

CHAPTER XIV.

PROSPECTIVE CONTRIVANCES.

hardly imagine to myself a more distinguishing , and, consequently, a more certain proof of design, *preparation—i. e.*, the providing of things before- , which are not to be used until a considerable time wards: for this implies a contemplation of the e, which belongs only to intelligence.

these *prospective* contrivances, the bodies of animals sh various examples.

The human teeth afford an instance, not only of ective contrivance, but of the completion of the ivance being designedly suspended. They are ed within the gums, and there they stop; the fact , that their farther advance to maturity would not be useless to the new-born animal, but extremely way; as it is evident that the act of *sucking*, by h it is for some time to be nourished, will be per- ed with more ease both to the nurse and to the in- whilst the inside of the mouth and edges of the are smooth and soft, than if set with hard-pointed s. By the time they are wanted the teeth are . They have been lodged within the gums for months past, but detained, as it were, in their ts, so long as their farther protrusion would interfere the office to which the mouth is destined. Nature, ly, that intelligence which was employed in crea- looked beyond the first year of the infant's life; whilst she was providing for functions which were that term to become necessary, was careful not to mode *those* which preceded them. What renders e *probable* that this is the effect of design, is, that *eth* are imperfect, whilst all other parts of th mouth are perfect. The lips are perfect, the tongue is perfect; the cheeks, the jaws, the palate, the pharynx, the larynx, are all perfect: the teeth alone are not so. This is the fact with respect to the human mouth: the fact also is, that the parts above enumerated are called into use from the beginning; whereas the teeth would be only so many obstacles and annoyances, if they were there. When a contrary order is necessary, a contrary order prevails. In the worm of the beetle, as hatched from the egg, the teeth are the first things which arrive at perfection. The insect begins to gnaw as soon as it escapes from the shell, though its other parts be only gradually advancing to their maturity.[59]

What has been observed of the teeth, is true of the *horns* of animals; and for the same reason. The horn of a calf or a lamb does not bud, or at least does not sprout to any considerable length, until the animal be capable of browsing upon its pasture; because such a substance upon the forehead of the young animal would very much incommode the teat of the dam in the office of giving suck.

But in the case of the *teeth*—of the human teeth at least, the prospective contrivance looks still farther. A succession of crops is provided, and provided from the beginning; a second tier being originally formed beneath the first, which do not come into use till several years afterwards. And this double or suppletory provision meets a difficulty in the mechanism of the mouth, which would have appeared almost insurmountable. The expansion of the jaw (the consequence of the proportionable growth of the animal, and of its skull) necessarily separates the teeth of the first set, however compactly disposed, to a distance from one another, which would be very inconvenient. In due time, therefore, *i. e.*, when the jaw has attained a great part of its dimensions, a new set of teeth springs up (loosening and pushing out the old ones before them), more exactly fitted to the space which they are to occupy, and rising also in such

[59] See the note upon the teeth in the Appendix. The subject is full of interest.

close ranks, as to allow for any extension of line which the subsequent enlargement of the head may occasion.[60]

II. It is not very easy to conceive a more evidently prospective contrivance than that which, in all viviparous animals, is found in the *milk* of the female parent. At the moment the young animal enters the world there is its maintenance ready for it. The particulars to be remarked in this economy are neither few nor slight. We have, first, the nutritious quality of the fluid, unlike, in this respect, every other excretion of the body; and in which nature hitherto remains unimitated, neither cookery nor chemistry having been able to make milk out of grass: we have, secondly, the organ for its reception and retention: we have, thirdly, the excretory duct annexed to that organ: and we have, lastly, the determination of the milk to the breast at the particular juncture when it is about to be wanted. We have all these properties in the subject before us; and they are all indications of design. The last circumstance is the strongest of any. If I had been to guess beforehand, I should have conjectured, that at the time when there was an extraordinary demand for nourishment in one part of the system there would be the least likelihood of a redundancy to supply another part. The advanced pregnancy of the female has no intelligible tendency to fill the breasts with milk. The lacteal system is a constant wonder; and it adds to other causes of our admiration, that the number of the teats or paps in each species is found to bear a proportion to the number of the young. In the sow, the bitch, the rabbit, the cat, the rat, which have numerous litters, the paps are numerous, and are disposed along the whole length of the belly: in the cow and mare, they are few. The most simple account of this, is to refer it to a designing Creator.[61]

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[60] The second or permanent set of teeth does not push out the deciduous or milk teeth. The process is not mechanical. Whilst yet a tender membrane is around the second tooth, those of the first set are suffering absorption at their fangs. Another circumstance, which shows the provision not to be mechanical, is the wasting of the old alveolar process, and the growth of the new: the new alveolar process or socket of the permanent tooth is forming at the time that the portion of the jaw which held the first tooth firm is yielding by absorption.

But in the argument before us, we are entitled to consider not only animal bodies when framed, but the circumstance under which they are framed: and in this view of the subject, the constitution of many of their parts is most strictly prospective.

III. The eye is of no use, at the time when it is formed. It is an optical instrument made in a dungeon; constructed for the refraction of light to a focus, and perfect for its purpose, before a ray of light has had access to it; geometrically adapted to the properties and action of an element with which it has no communication. It is about indeed to enter into that communication: and this is precisely the thing which evidences intention. It is *providing* for the *future* in the closest sense which can be given to these terms; for it is pro-

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[61] The only parallel to this is the care with which nature secures the nourishment of the embryon plant, or the chick in the egg. The lobes of a bean or a pea, and of most seeds, consist of a deposit of nutritious matter, and when heat and moisture favour the development of the living property, vessels which are scattered in these lobes or cotyledons commence absorption of the matter, and carry it to the centre of the plant. It is remarkable that these lobes, having thus, in the first instance, supplied the young plant with nutritious matter, change their office, and, rising above the surface, become the first leaves. Thus we see how the nourishment is supplied, until the radicle is pushed down into the earth, and the leaves receive the influence of the atmosphere. So in the chick, the white or albumen of the egg goes to its nourishment whilst it is in the shell: but the yolk of the egg is embraced in the body of the chick when excluded from the shell, and a duct leads from the membrane enclosing this mass of nutriment into the first intestine. And thus is the chick nourished, not only whilst included in the shell, but also during its first feeble existence, a period which *corresponds* with that of lactation in mammalia.

g for a future change; not for the then subsisting
ition of the animal; not for any gradual progress or
ıce in that same condition; but for a new state, the
quence of a great and sudden alteration, which the
al is to undergo at its birth. Is it to be believed
the eye was formed, or, which is the same thing,
the series of causes was fixed by which the eye is
ed, without a view to this change; without a pros-
of that condition, in which its fabric, of no use at
nt, is about to be of the greatest; without a con-
ation of the qualities of that element, hitherto en-
excluded, but with which it was hereafter to hold
timate a relation? A young man makes a pair of
acles for himself against he grows old; for which
acles he has no want or use whatever at the time he
s them. Could this be done without knowing and
dering the defect of vision to which advanced age
ject? Would not the precise suitableness of the
ument to its purpose, of the remedy to the defect,
e convex lens to the flattened eye, establish the
inty of the conclusion, that the case, afterwards to
, had been considered beforehand, speculated upon,
ided for? all which are exclusively the acts of a
ning mind. The eye formed in one state, for use
in another state, and in a different state, affords a
f no less clear of destination to a future purpose;
proof proportionably stronger, as the machinery is
complicated, and the adaptation more exact.

7. What has been said of the eye, holds equally
of the lungs. Composed of air-vessels, where there
air; elaborately constructed for the alternate ad-
ion and expulsion of an elastic fluid, where no such
exists; this great organ, with the whole apparatus
nging to it, lies collapsed in the fœtal thorax; yet
der, and in readiness for action, the first moment
the occasion requires its service. This is having a
ine locked up in store for future use; which incon-
bly proves, that the case was expected to occur in
h this use might be experienced; but expectation
e proper act of intelligence. Considering the state

hich an animal exists before its birth, I should look nothing less in its body than a system of lungs. It ke finding a pair of bellows in the bottom of the sea; no sort of use in the situation in which they are found; med for an action which was impossible to be exerted; lding no relation or fitness to the element which surunds them, but both to another element in another ace.

As part and parcel of the same plan ought to be menioned, in speaking of the lungs, the provisionary conrivances of the *foramen ovale* and *ductus arteriosus*. In the fœtus pipes are laid for the passage of the blood through the lungs; but, until the lungs be inflated by the inspiration of air, that passage is impervious, or in a great degree obstructed. What then is to be done? What would an artist, what would a master, do upon the occasion? He would endeavour, most probably, to provide a *temporary* passage, which might carry on the communication required, until the other was open. Now this is the thing which is actually done in the heart. Instead of the circuitous route through the lungs which the blood afterwards takes before it get from one auricle of the heart to the other, a portion of the blood passes immediately from the right auricle to the left, through a hole placed in the partition which separates these cavities. This hole anatomists call the *foramen ovale.* There is likewise another cross cut, answering the same purpose, by what is called the *ductus arteriosus*, lying between the pulmonary artery and the aörta. But both expedients are so strictly temporary, that after birth the one passage is closed, and the tube which forms the other shrivelled up into a ligament. If this be not contrivance, what is?

But, forasmuch as the action of the air upon the blood in the lungs appears to be necessary to the perfect concoction of that fluid, *i. e.*, to the life and health of the animal (otherwise the shortest route might still be the best), how comes it to pass that the *fœtus* lives, and grows, and thrives without it? The answer is, that the *blood of the fœtus* is the mother's; that it has under-action in her habit; that one pair of lungs both. When the animals are separated a new ırises; and to meet this necessity as soon as it organisation is prepared. It is ready for its it only waits for the atmosphere; it begins to ıoment the air is admitted to it.[62]

ıot the whole condition of the embryon go to this At first there is a mere jelly, or what appears little further advanced, and there are bones, and ıd nerves. But these lie quite inactive for a long nerve excites to no action; the muscles do not joints are not exercised, they are perfected slowly. of full development is not arrived; they have not timulus to activity. The whole then is in a state tion. Conduit pipes without their fluids, glands ıithout their secretions, sensibilities dormant, and m quite inoperative; a whole animal system beau-rived, but only in "prospective contrivance."

CHAPTER XV.

RELATIONS.

When several different parts contribute to one effect, or, which is the same thing, when an effect is produced by the joint action of different instruments; the fitness of such parts or instruments to one another for the purpose of producing, by their united action, the effect, is what I call *relation;* and wherever this is observed in the works of nature or of man it appears to me to carry along with it decisive evidence of understanding, intention, art. In examining, for instance, the several parts of a *watch*, the spring, the barrel, the chain, the fusee, the balance, the wheels of various sizes, forms, and positions, what is it which would take an observer's attention, as most plainly evincing a construction, directed by thought, deliberation, and contrivance? It is the suitableness of these parts to one another; first, in the succession and order in which they act; and, secondly, with a view to the effect finally produced. Thus, referring the spring to the wheels, our observer sees in it that which originates and upholds *their* motion; in the chain, that which transmits the motion to the fusee; in the fusee, that which communicates it to the wheels; in the conical figure of the fusee, if he refer to the spring, he sees that which corrects the inequality of its force. Referring the wheels to one another, he notices, first, their teeth, which would have been without use or meaning if there had been only one wheel, or if the wheels had had no connexion between themselves, or common bearing upon some joint effect; secondly, the correspondency of their position, so that the teeth of one wheel catch into the teeth of another; thirdly, the proportion observed in the number of teeth in each wheel, which determines the *rate of going*. Referring the balance to the rest of the works, he saw, when he came to understand its action, hat which rendered their motions equable. Lastly, in ooking upon the index and face of the watch, he saw he use and conclusion of the mechanism, viz., marking he succession of minutes and hours; but all depending pon the motions within, all upon the system of internediate actions between the spring and the pointer. What thus struck his attention in the several parts of the vatch he might probably designate by one general name f "relation;" and observing with respect to all cases vhatever, in which the origin and formation of a thing ould be ascertained by evidence, that these relations vere found in things produced by art and design, and in o other things, he would rightly deem of them as chaacteristic of such productions. To apply the reasoning ere described to the works of nature.

The animal economy is full, is made up, of these *elations.*

I. There are, first, what in one form or other belong o all animals, the parts and powers which successively ct upon their *food*. Compare this action with the proess of a manufactory. In men and quadrupeds the aliment s first broken and bruised by mechanical instruments of nastication, viz., sharp spikes or hard knobs, pressing gainst or rubbing upon one another; thus ground and omminuted, it is carried by a pipe into the stomach, vhere it waits to undergo a great chemical action, which ve call digestion: when digested it is delivered through n orifice, which opens and shuts, as there is occasion, nto the first intestine; there, after being mixed with ertain proper ingredients, poured through a hole in the ide of the vessel, it is farther dissolved: in this state he milk, chyle, or part which is wanted, and which is uited for animal nourishment, is strained off by the nouths of very small tubes opening into the cavity of he intestines; thus freed from its grosser parts, the ercolated fluid is carried by a long, winding, but traceble course, into the main stream of the old circulation; vhich conveys it in its progress to every part of the ody. Now I say again, compare this with the process f a manufactory, with the making of cider, for example; vith *the bruising of the* apples in the mill, the squeez-

of them when so bruised in the press, the fermen-
on in the vat, the bestowing of the liquor thus fer-
ted in the hogsheads, the drawing off into bottles,
pouring out for use into the glass. Let any one show
any difference between these two cases as to the
it of contrivance. That which is at present under
consideration, the "relation" of the parts succes-
ly employed, is not more clear in the last case than
he first. The aptness of the jaws and teeth to pre-
the food for the stomach is, at least, as manifest as
of the cider-mill to crush the apples for the press.
concoction of the food in the stomach is as neces-
for its future use as the fermentation of the stum in
vat is to the perfection of the liquor. The disposal
ie aliment afterwards, the action and change which
ndergoes, the route which it is made to take, in
er that, and until that, it arrive at its destination, is
e complex indeed and intricate, but, in the midst of
plication and intricacy, as evident and certain as is
apparatus of cocks, pipes, tunnels, for transferring
cider from one vessel to another; of barrels and
les for preserving it till fit for use, or of cups and
ses for bringing it when wanted to the lip of the
umer. The character of the machinery is in both
s this,—that one part answers to another part, and
y part to the final result.

his parallel between the alimentary operation and
e of the processes of art might be carried further
detail. Spallanzani has remarked* a circumstantial
mblance between the stomachs of gallinaceous fowls
the structure of *corn-mills*. Whilst the two sides
ie gizzard perform the office of the mill-stones, the
r or crop supplies the place of the *hopper*.

hen our fowls are abundantly supplied with meat,
soon fill their craw; but it does not immediately
thence into the gizzard; it always enters in very
l quantities, in proportion to the progress of tritu-
in like manner as, in a mill, a receiver is fixed
e two large stones which serve for grinding the

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* Disc. i. sec. liv.

ich receiver, although the corn be put into it
els, allows the grain to dribble only in small
s into the central hole in the upper mill-stone.
e have not done with the alimentary history.
ubsists a general *relation* between the external
f an animal by which it procures its food and
rnal powers by which it digests it. Birds of
their talons and beaks, are qualified to seize
our many species both of other birds and of
eds. The constitution of the stomach agrees
with the form of the members. The gastric
a bird of prey, of an owl, a falcon, or a kite,
n the animal fibre alone; it will not act upon
grasses at all. On the other hand, the confor-
f the mouth of the sheep or the ox is suited for
g upon herbage. Nothing about these animals
for the pursuit of living prey. Accordingly it
n found by experiments, tried not many years
h perforated balls, that the gastric juice of rumi-
nimals, such as the sheep and the ox, speedily
s vegetables, but makes no impression upon
odies. This accordancy is still more particular.
stric juice, even of granivorous birds, will not act
e grain whilst whole and entire. In performing
eriment of digesting with the gastric juice in
the grain must be crushed and bruised before it
itted to the menstruum, that is to say, must un-
y art, without the body, the preparatory action
he gizzard exerts upon it within the body, or no
n will take place. So strict, in this case, is the
between the offices assigned to the digestive
etween the mechanical operation and the chemi-
ess.

The relation of the kidneys to the bladder, and
reters to both, *i. e.*, of the secreting organ to the
eceiving the secreted liquor, and the pipe laid
e to the other for the purpose of conveying it
e to the other, is as manifest as it is amongst the
t vessels employed in a distillery, or in the com-
tions between them. The animal structure, in
e, *being simple*, and the parts easily separated,

it forms an instance of correlation which may be presented by dissection to every eye, or which, indeed, without dissection, is capable of being apprehended by every understanding. This correlation of instruments to one another fixes intention somewhere—especially when every other solution is negatived by the conformation. If the bladder had been merely an expansion of the ureter, produced by retention of the fluid, there ought to have been a bladder for each ureter. One receptacle fed by two pipes issuing from different sides of the body, yet from both conveying the same fluid, is not to be accounted for by any such supposition as this.

III. Relation of parts to one another accompanies us throughout the whole animal economy. Can any relation be more simple, yet more convincing than this, that the eyes are so placed as to look in the direction in which the legs move and the hands work? It might have happened very differently if it had been left to chance. There were at least three-quarters of the compass out of four to have erred in. Any considerable alteration in the position of the eye or the figure of the joints would have disturbed the line, and destroyed the alliance between the sense and the limbs.

IV. But relation, perhaps, is never so striking as when it subsists, not between different parts of the same thing, but between different things. The relation between a lock and a key is more obvious than it is between different parts of the lock. A bow was designed for an arrow, and an arrow for a bow; and the design is more evident for their being separate implements.

Nor do the works of the Deity want this clearest species of relation. The *sexes* are manifestly made for each other. They form the grand relation of animated nature, universal, organic, mechanical, subsisting, like the clearest relations of art, in different individuals, unequivocal, inexplicable without design.

So much so, that, were every other proof of contrivance in nature dubious or obscure, this alone would be sufficient. The example is complete. Nothing is wanting to the argument. I see no way whatever of getting over it.

V. The teats of animals which give suck bear a relation to the mouth of the suckling progeny, particularly to the lips and tongue. Here also, as before, is a correspondency of parts, which parts subsist in different individuals.

These are *general* relations, or the relations of parts which are found either in all animals or in large classes and descriptions of animals. *Particular* relations, or the relations which subsist between the particular configuration of one or more parts of certain species of animals, and the particular configuration of one or more other parts of the same animal (which is the sort of relation that is, perhaps, most striking), are such as the following:—

I. In the *swan*, the web-foot, the spoon-bill, the long neck, the thick down, the graminivorous stomach, bear all a relation to one another, inasmuch as they all concur in one design, that of supplying the occasions of an aquatic fowl floating upon the surface of shallow pools of water, and seeking its food at the bottom. Begin with any one of these particularities of structure, and observe how the rest follow it. The web-foot qualifies the bird for swimming; the spoon-bill enables it to graze. But how is an animal floating upon the surface of pools of water to graze at the bottom, except by the mediation of a long neck? A long neck accordingly is given to it. Again, a warm-blooded animal which was to pass its life upon water, required a defence against the coldness of that element. Such a defence is furnished to the swan in the muff in which its body is wrapped. But all this outward apparatus would have been in vain, if the intestinal system had not been suited to the digestion of vegetable substances. I say suited to the digestion of vegetable substances; for it is well known that there are two intestinal systems found in birds: one with a membranous stomach and a gastric juice, capable of dissolving animal substances alone—the other with a crop and gizzard calculated for the moistening, bruising, and afterwards digesting, of vegetable aliment.

Or set off with any other distinctive part in the body of the swan; for instance, with the long neck. The long neck, without the web-foot, would have been an encumbrance to the bird; yet there is no necessary connexion between a long neck and a web-foot. In fact they do not usually go together. How happens it, therefore, that they meet only when a particular design demands the aid of both?

II. This mutual relation, arising from a subserviency to a common purpose, is very observable also in the parts of a *mole*. The strong short legs of that animal, the palmated feet, armed with sharp nails, the pig-like nose, the teeth, the velvet coat, the small external ear, the sagacious smell, the sunk protected eye, all conduce to the utilities or to the safety of its under-ground life. It is a special purpose, specially consulted throughout. The form of the feet fixes the character of the animal. They are so many shovels; they determine its action to that of rooting in the ground; and everything about its body agrees with this destination. The cylindrical figure of the mole, as well as the compactness of its form, arising from the terseness of its limbs, proportionably lessens its labour; because, according to its bulk, it thereby requires the least possible quantity of earth to be removed for its progress. It has nearly the same structure of the face and jaws as a swine, and the same office for them. The nose is sharp, slender, tendinous, strong, with a pair of nerves going down to the end of it. The plush covering which, by the smoothness, closeness, and polish of the short piles that compose it, rejects the adhesion of almost every species of earth, defends the animal from cold and wet, and from the impediment which it would experience by the mould sticking to its body. From soils of all kinds the little pioneer comes forth bright and clean. Inhabiting dirt, it is of all animals the neatest.

But what I have always most admired in the mole is its *eyes*. This animal occasionally visiting the surface, and wanting, for its safety and direction, to be informed when it does so, or when it approaches it, a perception of light was necessary. I do not know that the clearness of sight depends at all upon the size of the organ What is gained by the largeness or prominence of the globe of the eye, is width in the field of vision. Such a capacity would be of no use to an animal which was to seek its food in the dark. The mole did not want to look about it; nor would a large advanced eye have been easily defended from the annoyance to which the life of the animal must constantly expose it. How indeed was the mole, working its way under ground, to guard its eyes at all? In order to meet this difficulty, the eyes are made scarcely larger than the head of a corking-pin; and these minute globules are sunk so deeply in the skull, and lie so sheltered within the velvet of its covering, as that any contraction of what may be called the eye-brows, not only closes up the apertures which lead to the eyes, but presents a cushion, as it were, to any sharp or protruding substance which might push against them. This aperture, even in its ordinary state, is like a pin-hole in a piece of velvet, scarcely pervious to loose particles of earth.

Observe, then, in this structure, that which we call relation. There is no natural connexion between a small sunk eye and a shovel palmated foot. Palmated feet might have been joined with goggle eyes; or small eyes might have been joined with feet of any other form. What was it therefore which brought them together in the mole? That which brought together the barrel, the chain, and the fusee in a watch—design; and design in both cases inferred, from the relation which the parts bear to one another in the prosecution of a common purpose. As hath already been observed, there are different ways of stating the relation, according as we set out from a different part. In the instance before us, we may either consider the shape of the feet, as qualifying the animal for that mode of life and inhabitation to which the structure of its eyes confines it; or we may consider the structure of the eye as the only one which would have suited with the action to which the feet are adapted. The relation is manifest, whichever of the parts related we place first in the order of our consideration. In a word, the feet of the mole are made for digging: the neck, nose, eyes, ears, and skin, are peculiarly adapted to *an underground life*; and this is what I call relation.

CHAPTER XVI.

COMPENSATION.

Compensation is a species of relation. It is relation when the *defects* of one part, or of one organ, are supplied by the structure of another part, or of another organ. Thus—

I. The short unbending neck of the *elephant* is compensated by the length and flexibility of his *proboscis*. He could not have reached the ground without it; or, if it be supposed that he might have fed upon the fruit, leaves, or branches of trees, how was he to drink? Should it be asked, why is the elephant's neck so short? it may be answered, that the weight of a head so heavy could not have been supported at the end of a longer lever. To a form, therefore, in some respects necessary, but in some respects also inadequate to the occasion of the animal, a supplement is added, which exactly makes up the deficiency under which he laboured.

If it be suggested that this proboscis may have been produced, in a long course of generations, by the constant endeavour of the elephant to thrust out its nose (which is the general hypothesis by which it has lately been attempted to account for the forms of animated nature), I would ask, How was the animal to subsist in the mean time—during the process—*until* this prolongation of snout were completed? What was to become of the individual whilst the species was perfecting?[63]

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[63] Whilst we have before us the daily proof of the capacities of animals for domestication, in considering their structure and their instincts, we must look back into that *long period* before man's creation, when they had not his *protection* and care. A thousand concurring testimonies

Our business at present is, simply to point out the relation which this organ bears to the peculiar figure of the animal to which it belongs. And herein all things correspond. The necessity of the elephant's proboscis arises from the shortness of his neck: the shortness of the neck is rendered necessary by the weight of the head. Were we to enter into an examination of the structure and anatomy of the proboscis itself, we should see in it one of the most curious of all examples of animal mechanism. The disposition of the ringlets and fibres, for the purpose, first, of forming a long cartilaginous pipe; secondly, of contracting and lengthening that pipe; thirdly, of turning it in every direction at the will of the animal; with the superaddition at the end,

prove that there were periods when the earth's surface was more suitable for brutes than it was for the abode of man; and when they were grouped together, each species with its enemy, and each with a power of preservation, at once to prevent too great an increase and total extermination. The young horse, which in his paddock has neither known bad treatment nor an enemy, will yet shiver and start away from a brindled swine, or any animal that is bristled or rough.

Geological researches, so happily combined with comparative anatomy, give us no room to conjecture that there has been anything like a progressive improvement in the species of animals. They have been created with all the characters in which they are now propagated; and had it been otherwise, the species would have become extinct, or they would have lost their place in that balance of offence and defence by which it has pleased the Creator to provide for their continuance.

One would imagine that an idea so wild, as that an animal should produce the variety of organs or external instruments which we see, by an effort—an energy proceeding from itself, could never have been maintained in an age like the present, when it is so fully proved that there is no change upon the extremity of an animal, no additional organ like this of the trunk of an elephant, no variety in its paw or its hoof, but what is attended with a corresponding alteration in the whole system of the creature—of its bones, its teeth, its stomach, as well as in its appetites and desires.

of a fleshy production, of about the length and thickness of a finger, and performing the office of a finger, so as to pick up a straw from the ground. These properties of the same organ, taken together, exhibit a specimen, not only of design (which is attested by the advantage), but of consummate art, and, as I may say, of elaborate preparation, in accomplishing that design.

II. The hook in the wing of a *bat* is strictly a mechanical, and, also, a *compensating* contrivance. At the angle of its wing there is a bent claw, exactly in the form of a hook, by which the bat attaches itself to the sides of rocks, caves, and buildings, laying hold of crevices, joinings, chinks, and roughnesses. It hooks itself by this claw; remains suspended by this hold; takes its flight from this position: which operations compensate for the decrepitude of its legs and feet. Without her hook, the bat would be the most helpless of all animals. She can neither run upon her feet, nor raise herself from the ground. These inabilities are made up to her by the contrivance in her wing; and in placing a claw on that part, the Creator has deviated from the analogy observed in winged animals. A singular defect required a singular substitute.

III. The *crane*-kind are to live and seek their food amongst the waters; yet, having no web-foot, are incapable of swimming. To make up for this deficiency, they are furnished with long legs for wading, or long bills for groping, or usually with both. This is *compensation*. But I think the true reflection upon the present instance is, how every part of nature is tenanted by appropriate inhabitants. Not only is the surface of deep waters peopled by numerous tribes of birds that swim, but marshes and shallow pools are furnished with hardly less numerous tribes of birds that wade.

IV. The common *parrot* has, in the structure of its beak, both an inconveniency and a *compensation* for it. When I speak of an inconveniency I have a view to a dilemma which frequently occurs in the works of nature, that the peculiarity of structure by which an made to answer one purpose necessarily unfits or some other purpose. This is the case before us. e upper bill of the parrot is so much hooked, and so ch overlaps the lower, that if, as in other birds, the 'er chap alone had motion, the bird could scarcely e wide enough to receive its food: yet this hook and rlapping of the bill could not be spared, for it forms very instrument by which the bird climbs,—to say hing of the use which it makes of it in breaking nuts . the hard substances upon which it feeds. How, refore, has nature provided for the opening of this luded mouth? By making the upper chap moveable, vell as the lower. In most birds, the upper chap is nected, and makes but one piece, with the skull; in the parrot the upper chap is joined to the bone he head by a strong membrane placed on each side t, which lifts and depresses it at pleasure *

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* Goldsmith's Nat. Hist., vol. v. p. 274.

V. The *spider's web* is a *compensating* contrivan
The spider lives upon flies, without wings to pur
them,—a case, one would have thought, of great d
culty, yet provided for, and provided for by a resou
which no stratagem, no effort of the animal, could h
produced, had not both its external and internal st
ture been specifically adapted to the operation.[64]

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[64] There are few things better suited to remove the
gust into which young people are betrayed on the vie
some natural objects, than this of the spider. They
find that the most despised creature may become a sub
of admiration, and be selected by the naturalist to exhibit
marvellous works of the creation. The terms given to t
insects lead us to expect interesting particulars concern
them, since they have been divided into vagrants, hunt
swimmers, and water-spiders, sedentary, and mason-spid
thus evincing a variety in their condition, activity, and m
of life; and we cannot be surprised to find them vary
in the performance of their vital functions (as, for exam
in their mode of breathing), as well as in their extrem
and instruments. Of these instruments the most striki
the apparatus for spinning and weaving, by which the
only fabricate webs to entangle their prey, but form cel
their residence and concealment; sometimes living i
ground, sometimes under water, yet breathing the
phere. Corresponding with their very singular organ
are their instincts. We are familiar with the watch
and voracity of some spiders, when their prey is in
by the vibration of the cords of their net-work.
have the eye and disposition of the lynx or tiger, a
couching in concealment, leap upon their victims.
conceal themselves under a silken hood or tube,
only projecting. Some bore a hole in the earth, a
as finely as if it were done with the trowel and m
then hang it with delicate curtains. A very extr
degree of contrivance is exhibited in the trap-d
This door, from which it derives its name, has a
hinge on the mouth of the cell, and is so provid
claw of the spider can lay hold of it, and whether
or goes out, says Mr. Kirby, the door shuts of
the water-spider has a domicile more curious
under water, with an opening at the lower part

In many species of insects the eye is fixed, and quently without the power of turning the pupil to object. This great defect is, however, perfectly *pensated*, and by a mechanism which we should not ect. The eye is a multiplying-glass with a lens ing in every direction and catching every object. which means, although the orb of the eye be stationary, the field of vision is as ample as that of other nals, and is commanded on every side. When this tice-work was first observed, the multiplicity and inuteness of the surfaces must have added to the surise of the discovery. Adams tells us that fourteen indred of these reticulations have been counted in the o eyes of a drone-bee.

In other cases the *compensation* is effected by the

d entrance; and although this cell be under water, it conins air like a diving-bell, so that the spider breathes the mosphere. The air is renewed in the cell in a manner t easily explained. The spider comes to the surface; a bble of air is attracted to its body; with this air she deends, and gets under her cell, when the air is disengaged d rises into the cell; and thus, though under water, she ves in the air. There must be some peculiar property of e surface of this creature by which she can move in the ater surrounded with an atmosphere, and live under the ater breathing the air.

The chief instrument by which the spider performs these onders is the spinning apparatus. The matter from which e threads are spun is a liquid contained in cells; the ducts om these cells open upon little projecting teats, and the mosphere has so immediate an effect upon this liquid, that on exposure to it. the secretion becomes a tough and strong read. Twenty-four of these fine strands form together a read of the thickness of that of the silk-worm. We are sured that there are three different sorts of material thus oduced, which are indeed required for the various purposes which they are applied—as, for example, to mix up with e earth to form the cells,—to line these cells as with fine tton,—to make light and floating threads by which they ay be conveyed through the air, as well as those meshes hich are so geometrically and correctly formed to entrap *eir prey.*

number and position of the eyes themselves. The spider has eight eyes, mounted upon different parts of the head; two in front, two in the top of the head, two on each side. These eyes are without motion, but, by their situation, suited to comprehend every view which the wants or safety of the animal rendered it necessary for it to take.

VII. The Memoirs for the Natural History of Animals, published by the French Academy, A.D. 1687, furnish us with some curious particulars in the eye of a cameleon. Instead of two eyelids, it is covered by an eyelid with a hole in it. This singular structure appears to be *compensatory*, and to answer to some other singularities in the shape of the animal. The neck of the cameleon is inflexible. To make up for this, the eye is so prominent as that more than half of the ball stands out of the head, by means of which extraordinary projection the pupil of the eye can be carried by the muscles in every direction, and is capable of being pointed towards every object. But then, so unusual an exposure of the globe of the eye requires for its lubricity and defence a more than ordinary protection of eyelid, as well as a more than ordinary supply of moisture; yet the motion of an eyelid, formed according to the common construction, would be impeded, as it should seem, by the convexity of the organ. The aperture in the lid meets this difficulty. It enables the animal to keep the principal part of the surface of the eye under cover, and to preserve it in a due state of humidity without shutting out the light, or without performing every moment a nictitation which it is probable would be more laborious to this animal than to others.

VIII. In another animal, and in another part of the animal economy, the same Memoirs describe a most remarkable *substitution*. The reader will remember what we have already observed concerning the *intestinal* canal—that its length, so many times exceeding that of the body, promotes the extraction of the chyle from the aliment by giving room for the lacteal vessels to act upon it through a greater space. This long intestine, wherever it occurs, is in other animals disposed in the abdomen from side to side in returning folds. But in the animal now under our notice the matter is managed otherwise. The same intention is mechanically effectuated, but by a mechanism of a different kind. The animal of which I speak is an amphibious quadruped, which our authors call the alopecias or sea-fox. The intestine is straight from one end to the other; but in this straight and consequently short intestine is a winding, corkscrew, spiral passage, through which the food, not without several circumvolutions, and in fact by a long route, is conducted to its exit. Here the shortness of the gut is *compensated* by the obliquity of the perforation.

IX. But the works of the Deity are known by expedients. Where we should look for absolute destitution —where we can reckon up nothing but wants—some contrivance always comes in to supply the privation. A *snail*, without wings, feet, or thread, climbs up the stalks of plants by the sole aid of a viscid humour discharged from her skin. She adheres to the stems, leaves, and fruits of plants by means of a sticking-plaster. A *mussel*, which might seem by its helplessness to lie at the mercy of every wave that went over it, has the singular power of spinning strong tendinous threads by which she moors her shell to rocks and timbers. A *cockle*, on the contrary, by means of its stiff tongue, works for itself a shelter in the sand. The provisions of nature extend to cases the most desperate. A *lobster* has in its constitution a difficulty so great that one could hardly conjecture beforehand how nature would dispose of it. In most animals the skin grows with their growth. If, instead of a soft skin, there be a shell, still it admits of a gradual enlargement. If the shell, as in the tortoise, consist of several pieces, the accession of substance is made at the sutures. Bivalve shells grow bigger by receiving an accretion at their edge; it is the same with spiral shells at their mouth. The simplicity of their form admits of this. But the lobster's shell being applied to the limbs of the body, as well as to the body itself, allows not of either of the modes of growth which are observed to take place in other shells. Its hardness resists expansion; and its complexity renders it incapable of increasing its size by addition of substance to its edge. How then was the growth of the lobster to be provided for? Was room to be made for it in the old shell, or was it to be successively fitted with new ones? If a change of shell became necessary, how was the lobster to extricate himself from his present confinement? how was he to uncase his buckler, or draw his legs out of his boots? The process which fishermen have observed to take place is as follows. At certain seasons the shell of the lobster grows soft; the animal swells its body; the seams open, and the claws burst at the joints. When the shell has thus become loose upon the body, the animal makes a second effort, and by a tremulous spasmodic motion casts it off. In this state the liberated but defenceless fish retires into holes in the rock. The released body now suddenly pushes its growth. In about eight-and-forty hours a fresh concretion of humour upon the surface, *i. e.* a new shell, is formed, adapted in every part to the increased dimensions of the animal. This wonderful mutation is repeated every year.[65]

If there be imputed defects without compensation, I should suspect that they were defects only in appearance. Thus, the body of the *sloth* has often been reproached for the slowness of its motions, which has been attributed to an imperfection in the formation of its limbs. But it ought to be observed that it is this slowness which alone suspends the voracity of the animal. He fasts during his migration from one tree to another: and this fast may be necessary for the relief of his overcharged vessels, as well as to allow time for the concoction of the mass of coarse and hard food which he has taken into his stomach. The tardiness of his pace seems to have reference to the capacity of his organs, and to his propensities with respect to food—*i. e.*, is calculated to counteract the effects of repletion.

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[65] See Appendix.

Or there may be cases in which a defect is artificial, d compensated by the very cause which produces it. hus the *sheep*, in the domesticated state in which we e it, is destitute of the ordinary means of defence or cape—is incapable either of resistance or flight. But is is not so with the wild animal. The natural sheep swift and active; and, if it lose these qualities when comes under the subjection of man, the loss is com-nsated by his protection. Perhaps there is no species quadruped whatever which suffers so little as this es from the depredation of animals of prey.

For the sake of making our meaning better under-ood, we have considered this business of compensation der certain *particularities* of constitution in which it pears to be most conspicuous. This view of the sub-ct necessarily limits the instances to single species of imals. But there are compensations, perhaps not less rtain, which extend over large classes and to large rtions of living nature.

I. In quadrupeds, the deficiency of teeth is usually *mpensated* by the faculty of rumination. The sheep, er, and ox tribe are without fore teeth in the upper w.[66] These ruminate. The horse and ass are fur-shed with teeth in the upper jaw, and do not ruminate. the former class, the grass and hay descend into the omach nearly in the state in which they are cropped om the pasture or gathered from the bundle. In the omach they are softened by the gastric juice, which in ese animals is unusually copious: thus softened and ndered tender, they are returned a second time to the tion of the mouth, where the grinding teeth complete their leisure the trituration which is necessary, but hich was before left imperfect: I say the trituration hich is necessary; for it appears from experiments that e gastric fluid of sheep, for example, has no effect in gesting plants unless they have been previously masti-ted; that it only produces a slight maceration, nearly common water would do in a like degree of heat; but that when once vegetables are reduced to pieces by mastication, the fluid then exerts upon them its specific operation. Its first effect is to soften them, and to destroy their natural consistency: it then goes on to dissolve them, not sparing even the toughest parts, such as the nerves of the leaves.*

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[66] See the account of the teeth, in the Appendix.

I think it very probable that the gratification also of the animal is renewed and prolonged by this faculty. Sheep, deer, and oxen appear to be in a state of enjoyment whilst they are chewing the cud: it is then, perhaps, that they best relish their food.[67]

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* Spall. Dis. iii. sect. cxl.

[67] Wherever a seed can lodge we find vegetables growing, and wherever we find digestible matter there are animals to live upon it; and the kind of food determines the organization of the creature, not resulting from it, but provided for it. The class of ruminants feed on the coarser herbage where the vegetable is in abundance, but the actual nutritious matter is small in quantity compared with the mass. There is therefore an obvious necessity for a more complex apparatus to extract the smaller proportion of matter capable of being animalized: hence the maceration in the first stomach, hence the regurgitation and rumination, and the reception into the second and third stomach, in preparation for the proper digestion in the last. When the mass is digested, the nutritious part is still small in proportion to the whole; and to permit that smaller portion of aliment to be absorbed and carried into the system, the intestinal canal must be long and complex, offering resistance to the rapid descent of the food, and giving it lodgment: and thus there is always a correspondence between the complication of the stomach and the length of the intestines, and between both and the nature of the food. It is further very remarkable, that when animals of the same species live in different climates, where there is more or less abundance of vegetable food, there is an adaptation of their digestive organs. Where it is abundant, the configuration of the intestines which is intended to delay its descent is less complex. Where the food is more scarce, the intestine is longer, and the valvular obstruction greater. This has been observed by Sir E. Home, in comparing the cassowary of Java with the cassowary of New South Wales, and the American ostrich with the same bird

II. In birds, the *compensation* is still more striking. They have no teeth at all. What have they then to make up for this severe want? I speak of granivorous and herbivorous birds; such as common fowls, turkeys, ducks, geese, pigeons, &c.; for it is concerning these alone that the question need be asked. All these are furnished with a peculiar and most powerful muscle, called the *gizzard;* the inner coat of which is fitted up with rough plaits, which, by a strong friction against one another, break and grind the hard aliment as effectually, and by the same mechanical action, as a coffee-mill would do. It has been proved by the most correct experiments, that the gastric juice of these birds will not operate upon the *entire* grain: not even when softened by water or macerated in the crop. Therefore, without a grinding machine within its body, without the trituration of the gizzard, a chicken would have starved upon a heap of corn. Yet, why should a bill and a gizzard go together? why should a gizzard never be found where there are teeth?

Nor does the gizzard belong to birds as such. A gizzard is not found in birds of prey: *their* food requires not to be ground down in a mill. The compensatory contrivance goes no farther than the necessity. In both classes of birds, however, the digestive organ within the body bears a strict and mechanical relation to the external instruments for procuring food. The soft membranous stomach accompanies a hooked notched beak; short muscular legs; strong, sharp, crooked talons:—the cartilaginous stomach attends that conformation of bill and toes which restrains the bird to the picking of seeds or the cropping of plants.[68]

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inhabiting the deserts of Africa. The same comparison has been made between the Leicestershire sheep and the mountain sheep of Scotland.

[68] We have said that it is the object to support animal life, and to give the enjoyment of existence; and that whe the means are afforded of converting a material und processes of digestion and assimilation, there animals *found with* an apparatus of digestion adapted to i

III. But to proceed with our *compensations*. A very numerous and comprehensive tribe of terrestrial animals are entirely without feet—yet locomotive, and in a very considerable degree swift in their motion. How is the *want of feet* compensated? It is done by the disposition of the muscles and fibres of the trunk. In consequence of the just collocation and by means of the joint action of longitudinal and annular fibres—that is to say, of strings and rings—the body and train of reptiles are capable of being reciprocally shortened and lengthened, drawn up and stretched out. The result of this action is a progressive and in some cases a rapid movement of the whole body, in any direction to which the will of the animal determines it. The meanest creature is a collection of wonders. The play of the rings in an

Nothing certainly can be more curious than the vicarious action of the stomach and mouth. We see, for example, that where the bill precludes mastication in the mouth, it is performed in the stomach; and then muscles are found in the stomach as powerful as those of the jaws and teeth; and as to the teeth, or what is equivalent to them, we may say that they are continually renewed. In fact, no mechanical structure of jaws and teeth could answer the purposes of nature here: no union of bone and enamel in the tooth could have withstood the attrition of the gizzard; and one of the most beautiful and interesting appliances of nature is the substitution, through the instinct of the animal, of small stones of hard texture, generally consisting of silex, introduced within the grasp and action of this organ. It is a further proof that the mastication, if we may use the term, is more perfect in the gizzard than where there is the most complex structure of teeth, and therefore that it is the means of extracting the greater quantity of nutritious matter. Accordingly, there are gizzards in most classes of animals. They are not only found in birds, but in reptiles. The sea-turtle has what is termed a muscular stomach. Among
s the mullet and the gillaroo trout have muscular sto-
. The cuttle-fish, the nautilus, and even the earth-
have a crop and gizzard; and insects, according as
ve on a leaf or suck the blood, have the same differ
the internal arrangement of the structure for assimi-
is that which distinguishes the ox from the lion.

earth-worm, as it crawls, the undulatory motion propagated along the body, the beards or prickles with which the annuli are armed, and which the animal can either shut up close to its body, or let out to lay hold of the roughness of the surface upon which it creeps, and the power arising from all these of changing its place and position, afford, when compared with the provisions for motion in other animals, proofs of new and appropriate mechanism. Suppose that we had never seen an animal move upon the ground without feet, and that the problem was: Muscular action, *i. e.* reciprocal contraction and relaxation, being given, to describe how such an animal might be constructed capable of voluntarily changing place. Something, perhaps, like the organization of reptiles might have been hit upon by the ingenuity of an artist; or might have been exhibited in an automaton, by the combination of springs, spiral wires, and ringlets; but to the solution of the problem would not be denied, surely, the praise of invention and of successful thought: least of all could it ever be questioned whether intelligence had been employed about it or not.[69]

[69] Not unconnected with the subject of the last note is the progression of animals: and we have none better suited for the object of this volume than the consideration of the infinite variety of the instruments of motion, from the blubber that floats like froth upon the water, to the eagle or the antelope. The genus *medusa* of Linnæus embraces those animals like jelly which float in the sea. Some of these, when taken out of the water, will weigh fifty ounces, and, on being dried, not more than five or six grains. From this it would appear that they must be of the specific gravity of water, and hence their peculiar organization and mode of existence; especially it accounts for their mode of progression, if it can be called so: since they are in a great measure passive, and float and are carried by the wind. For this purpose there is a vesicle or bladder filled with air, which in some rises above the water, and the animal is dragged as we might imagine a balloon would be after lighting on the water. The walls of this sac are muscular, and the animal, by retaining or forcing out the air, can either take advantage of the wind, and is sometimes moved with great velocity, or

sink under the surface, and move only with the current. There is every reason to believe that the air, which is the principal means of change of place, is secreted by the animal.

From some of these animals tentacula hang down into the water for seizing their food, and perhaps for directing their progress. They have a power of distending them, or erecting them by forcing water into their texture, by the contraction of vesicles near their base. Varieties of these animals hoist a plate or crest out of the water, which has a still greater resemblance to a sail.

We have already noticed the fins of fishes, the wing of the bird, and the web-foot of the duck. "The meanest creature is, indeed, a collection of wonders." In the earth-worm or the caterpillar, the head, or the anterior part of the body, is projected (and it is a difficult problem to produce extension by contraction) till it touches the ground, and slightly adheres to it, when the posterior part of the body is drawn forwards. In many worms or caterpillars there are holders discoverable upon minute inspection, and their anatomy exhibits a perfect set of muscles attached to those exterior rough points,—by which it is made evident that each of them is a foot. But nothing is more interesting than to see the change of the larva to the winged insect, where these muscles and their appropriate nerves disappear: and new muscles, and new nerves, and new energies direct the creature that crept an inch in an hour to outstrip, as we have said, the fleetest horse, or to rise upon the wind; for those who travel by the rail-roads observe bees to fly round them, and therefore to move above sixty miles an hour. The contrasts are the most curious between the flight of the bat and the motion of the mole; the same organization being calculated, with slight adaptation, for the atmosphere, and for moving under the earth. We might almost give the instance of the perforation of solid calcareous rock by the boring mollusca, which, by late observations, seems to be accomplished by means of the foot.

END OF VOLUME II.

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